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Abstract 
This thesis examines the regulation and development of the moneylending and 
pawnbroking markets in Britain since the 1870s. The six regulatory episodes 
examined illustrate how the role of state intervention in these markets has been 
debated, and how it has evolved. The thesis asks: what were the motivations 
for reform, which market features were regulators most concerned with, and 
what were their proposed solutions? It demonstrates how majority and minority 
viewpoints have informed regulation and documents the often-conflicting 
expectations of how regulation was meant to influence lending decisions, 
borrower outcomes and poverty. By identifying the primary motivating factors 
behind regulation, the study answers why and how some policymakers sought 
to restrict low-income borrowers from gaining access to credit. It finds that 
policymakers have shifted their focus from market competition and freedom of 
consumer choice towards financial inclusion and poverty reduction. The result 
is a better understanding of the regulation and development of two credit 
products that were, and remain, vital to the working class.  
This research shows that the motivations for reform have varied over time. 
In 1872, 1900, 1927, 2006 and after the Great Recession, policymakers sought 
to restrict ‘illegitimate, evil and predatory’ small loan lenders, who were accused 
of exacerbating the conditions of the poor. In 1974, policymakers sought 
enhanced regulation such as information disclosure to increase market 
competition and decrease the cost of borrowing. In 2014, the FCA believed that 
the payday loan market still lacked price competition and implemented price 
controls as a corrective measure. Less varied were the issues of concern and 
proposed solutions. This research identifies five main areas of regulatory 
concern: the high cost of loans, advertising, the use of an annual percentage 
rate (APR), the legitimacy of moneylenders and pawnbrokers in the financial 
system and regulatory enforcement. It identifies three main policy responses: 
price controls, information disclosure and licensing.  
By analysing the motivations, debated issues and proposed solutions, this 
research examines wider questions concerning freedom of contract, borrower 
rationality, bargaining inequity, market segmentation and credit rationing. It 
contributes to the scholarly and policy dialogue on price controls, information 
disclosure and the development of non-bank lending. This research also 
provides new perspectives on the Victorian poverty debate and the modern 
financial inclusion agenda as they relate to the interaction between regulation, 
high-cost credit and poverty.  
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Glossary 
Duffed/Duffing 
Mass-produced counterfeit goods, often of inferior quality. 
 
Note shaving 
A loan agreement that matures at par value above the purchase price, with the 
price appreciation representing the interest rate charged. 
 
Paid-in capital 
The amount of capital contributed by investors through purchase of stock from 
the issuing entity. 
 
Pawn 
A transaction in which moveable personal property is pledged as collateral for 
a loan.  
 
Payday loan 
A high-cost, short-term credit product repaid in a single sum or over multiple 
instalments. In 2015, the average payday loan was outstanding for 
approximately three weeks. These loans are issued on an unsecured basis. 
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Posted bond/capital requirements 
An amount of capital placed with a government entity to ensure payment of 
fines and as an incentive to moneylenders to follow regulatory procedures. 
Similarly, capital requirements indicate that a moneylender had sufficient 
funding to operate as an on-going concern. 
 
Promissory note issued by a moneylender 
A contract in which one party agrees in writing to pay a specific sum of money 
to another party. Typically, the note discloses the amount advanced, the 
interest rate, instalment dates and terms of default. These loans are issued on 
an unsecured basis. 
 
Reversion 
A contract that transfers assets on the death of the possessor to an heir. ‘High-
end’ moneylenders offered heirs the opportunity to borrow against their future 
inheritance. 
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1 Introduction 
 
A. Introduction 
In 2013 Ed Miliband MP (Labour, Leader of the Labour Party 2010-2015) 
declared that payday lenders were ‘one of the worst symbols of the cost of living 
crises’ and accused them of ‘predatory behaviour’.1 Since the onset of the 
Great Recession concerns over economic fairness, poverty and financial 
exclusion have resulted in policymakers showing considerable interest in high-
cost short-term credit (HCSTC). In 2015, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
implemented price controls on payday loans. In choosing an interest rate cap 
of 0.8 per cent per day, a £15 default fee ceiling and a maximum total cost of 
100 per cent, the FCA sought to ‘strike the right balance’ between consumer 
protection and a viable market.2 The implementation of price controls is the first 
instance of its kind since usury was repealed in 1854.3 Since 1900 politicians 
had rejected price controls on at least eight occasions. Lord Glasman, a Labour 
peer and academic, referred to the 2015 price controls as ‘an absolutely 
exceptional moment’.4 
Price controls were the culmination of public inquiries beginning in 
2012.5 In that year the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) found that some payday 
lenders were ‘taking advantage of people in financial difficulty’ and that, owing 
to the growth of the industry, vulnerable people were suffering at the hands of 
                                            
1 Elizabeth Rigby, ‘Miliband attacks Britain’s “Wonga economy”’, Financial Times, 5 
November 2013. 
2 ‘Detailed rules for the price cap on high-cost short-term credit’, Financial Conduct Authority 
PS14/16 (2014); ‘FCA confirms price cap for payday lenders’, Financial Conduct Authority 
press release, 11 November 2014. 
3 The Usury Act was repealed by section 1 of the Usury Laws Repeal Act 1854. 
4 House of Lords (HL) debate, 28 November 2012, vol. 741. 
5 In 2013, the FCA released payday loan guidelines in the Consumer Credit Sourcebook 
(CONC 4-7) and Parliament authorised the FCA to investigate price controls that same year. 
See also ‘The impact on business and customers of a cap on the total cost of credit’, A report 
for the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills prepared by The Personal Finance 
Research Centre, University of Bristol (2013) (hereafter Bristol Report (2013)). 
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‘irresponsible lenders’. 6  Stella Creasy MP (Labour) said that government 
intervention was necessary to combat the ‘devastating impact of 1,700 per cent 
interest rates’.7 The Citizens Advice Bureau believed that these ‘legal loan 
sharks’ needed to be regulated and had to stop issuing ‘irresponsible’ 
advertisements.8 Entering the fray, the Church of England believed that payday 
lenders ‘purposely’ put customers in debt to ‘farm their assets and milk them 
dry’.9 Economists and trade groups argued against increased regulation and 
declared that intervention would drive legal participants out of the market and 
encourage credit rationing and illegal lending.10 After new regulations were 
enacted in 2014, four of the eleven major UK payday lenders ceased 
operations.11 Data indicate that credit rationing has occurred. Shortly after the 
price cap was introduced Wonga ceased issuing loans of less than £50.12 
Similarly, during the regulatory investigation (2012-2015), the average high 
street loan increased from £107 to £180.13 For better or worse, the market has 
responded to potential and enacted regulation according to the industry’s 
predictions. 
Alongside payday lending and following the Great Recession, 
pawnbrokers experienced a boom in business. In October 2016, Steve Boggan, 
a reporter for the Guardian, wrote, ‘£75.06 interest on £180 over six months. 
That is 41.7 per cent. Extortionate, you might think, and surely one of the 
reasons why pawnbrokers, a ubiquitous feature of every working-class district 
                                            
6 ‘OFT launches review into payday lending’, Office of Fair Trading, 24 February 2012. 
7 Nicolas Watt, ‘Payday loan firms face cap after government U-turn’, Guardian, 28 November 
2012. 
8 ‘Payday loans’, Citizens Advice Bureau, campaign 2014. 
9 Jamie Merrill, ‘Church of England to open credit union in its “war” on Wonga’, Independent, 
20 June 2014. 
10 Sharlene Goff, ‘Tougher UK rules drive payday lenders away’, Financial Times, 20 May 2014; 
Hillary Osborne, ‘Payday lenders may vanish within year as result of price cap, says economist’, 
Guardian, 10 November 2014. 
11 ‘Payday lending market investigation’, Competitions and Markets Authority, 24 February 
2015 (hereafter CMA (2015)). 
12 Marion Dakers, ‘Payday loans past their peak as price cap comes into force’, Telegraph, 3 
January 2015. 
13 CMA (2015), 3, 418. 
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50-odd years go, died out. Except they didn’t.’14 The pawn industry grew from 
approximately 800 outlets in 2003 to over 2,000 in 2014, with a market value of 
£930 million.15 Average pawn loans range from £100 to £400 and carry an 
interest rate average of 80-130 pcpa.16 Phil Murphy, the founder of Albemarle 
& Bond, a major UK pawnbroker, argued that ‘in a funny way we don’t create 
indebtedness; we pick up the pieces when people have got into debt. In fact, 
we’re absolutely lovely.’17 Over a century earlier, John McKay, a pawnbroker in 
Glasgow, expressed a similar belief, asserting that during times of great need 
pawnbrokers ‘help people on in the world’. 18  While twenty-first-century 
pawnbroking has generated less regulatory interest than payday loans, this was 
not always the case. In the early twentieth century pawnbrokers operated under 
price controls and moneylenders were free to lend, but by 2014 that restriction 
had been reversed. This development has not been fully examined in the 
literature.19 
Recent areas of regulatory concern include: the high cost of loans, 
advertising, APR disclosure and the growth of the market. Records reveal that 
over a century ago policymakers had similar, if not identical, concerns. In 1870 
Alexander McCall, Chief Constable of Glasgow, sought regulation to rid Britain 
of small loan lenders.20 Supporters of regulation considered the small loan 
lending system to be ‘evil’ and believed that it took advantage of the vulnerable 
poor suffering at the hands of moneylending ‘bloodsuckers … [who were] 
                                            
14 Steve Boggan, ‘Pawn again’, Guardian, 20 October 2016. 
15 As of 12 December 2015, www.thenpa.com; ‘Pawnbroking customers in 2010’, A report for 
the National Pawnbrokers Association prepared by the Personal Finance Research Centre, 
University of Bristol (2010), 7.  
16 Ibid. 
17  Rachel Warren, ‘Uncle breaks loose: Pawnbrokers; Family money’, The Times, 24 
September 1988. 
18 PBSC 1870, 2165-2168, 2177. 
19 Until the 1990s, businesses issuing small value, unsecured HCSTC, were known as 
moneylenders. During and after the 1990s, ‘payday lenders’ issued the same credit product. 
Although the payment mechanism has evolved, that is the use of a current account rather 
than a pay packet, the borrower profile, loan structure and fund usage are similar. This 
argument is developed further in Chapter 5. 
20 PBSC 1870, 1417; MLSC 1898, 1903; HL deb. 20 February 1899, vol. 66. 
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canker-worms of ruin’.21 John Hollingshead, a social-religious commentator, 
derided the charging of special fees as ‘very common and [a] shameful fraud 
on the poor’.22 From 1897 to 1900, Parliament debated whether judges should 
rewrite moneylending contracts with high interest rates. 
Other policymakers strongly opposed regulation and the interference of 
the government in the market. In 1872, Lord Salisbury (Conservative, Prime 
Minister 1885-1886,1886-1892, 1895-1902) believed that ‘no other course but 
that of establishing perfectly free trade between the pawnbroker and his 
customers’ would protect the borrower.23 This view argued that competition 
encouraged fairness and lower interest rates. In 1899, Lord Elcho, a member 
of the Liberty and Property Defence League, a group that advocated an 
extreme form of laissez-faire trade, claimed that proponents of regulation did 
so in a ‘grandmotherly spirit’ and that regulation was not going ‘to save the fool 
from his folly’. 24  These ‘free traders’ argued that financial regulation went 
against the fundamental tenets of British liberty and would encourage harmful 
credit rationing. 
While historians have written volumes about consumer credit, few have 
analysed the regulatory response.25 Fewer still have paid attention to why and 
how the British government has controlled the working poor’s access to credit.26 
This is not surprising given that the everyday financial transactions of small loan 
lenders and the borrowing patterns of the working poor are neglected areas of 
financial history. To fill the lacuna in the literature, this thesis examines the 
regulation and development of the moneylending and pawnbroking markets in 
                                            
21 PBSC, 1547-1551; House of Commons (HC) debate 4 August 1898, vol. 64. 
22 John Hollingshead, ‘The poor man’s banker’, Good Words 5 (1864), 181. 
23 HL deb. 6 August 1872, vol. 213. 
24 HC deb. 1 May 1899, vol. 70. See Edward Bristow, ‘The Liberty and Property Defence 
League and individualism’, The Historical Journal 18:4 (1975), 761-789. 
25 Christopher Peterson made a similar observation in ‘Truth, understanding, and high-cost 
consumer credit: The historical context of the Truth in Lending Act’, Florida Law Review 55 
(2003), 816. 
26 Edward Glaeser and Jose Scheinkman made a similar point in ‘Neither a borrower nor a 
lender be: An economic analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws’, National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 4954 (1994), 2-3. 
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Britain since the 1870s. This thesis understands financial regulation as the 
establishment, monitoring and enforcement of rules.27 This research defines 
policymakers in a general way without recourse to political or regulatory theory 
to include politicians, the judiciary, government agencies, law enforcement, 
business interests, think-tanks, academics and charitable entities that have 
influenced the regulatory process.28 Table 1 shows the regulatory episodes 
analysed by this research. Each period under consideration is examined so that 
comparisons can be made across time. 
 
Table 1 Regulatory episodes29 
Regulation Key feature(s) 
The Pawnbrokers Act 1872 Raised the price ceiling on PB loans 
The Moneylenders Act 1900 No price controls; guidance rate rejected; ML registry 
The Moneylenders Act 1927 No price controls; guidance rate implemented; 
advertising restricted; ML licensing system 
The Consumer Credit Act 1974 No price controls; advertising restrictions lifted; guidance 
rate removed; ML & PB legitimised 
The Consumer Credit Act 2006 Licensing segmented by risk category, payday lenders 
targeted 
FCA price controls 2015 Three-part price control on payday lenders 
 
The objective is not to analyse regulatory theory or the legislative 
procedures by which the laws were enacted, but to use the episodes as 
                                            
27 See Rosa Maria Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
28 For current treatment of regulatory theory and financial markets see Edward Balleisen and 
David A. Moss, Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). For an accessible treatment of why and how trade groups 
influence regulation see Luca Lanzalaco, ‘Business interest associations’, in Oxford Handbook 
of Business History, 293-315, eds. Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009) and Peter Hall and David Soskice, ‘Introduction’, in Varieties of 
Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, 1-68, eds. Peter Hall and 
David Soskice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Specific to how ideas influenced social 
policy relating to the small loan market in the United States see Elisabeth Anderson, ‘Experts, 
ideas and policy change: The Russell Sage Foundation and small loan reform, 1909-1941’, 
Theory and Society 37:3 (2008), 271-310. 
29 ML (moneylenders) and PB (pawnbrokers). 
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inflection points to examine the evolution of two credit products that were, and 
remain, vital to the working class. Similarly, this research analyses the demand 
and supply features of the market and how those features influenced regulatory 
frameworks. In other words, what were the motivations for reform, which market 
features were regulators most concerned with, and what were their proposed 
solutions? 
This research shows that the motivations for reform have varied over 
time. In 1872, 1900, 1927, 2006 and after the Great Recession, policymakers 
sought to restrict ‘illegitimate, evil and predatory’ small loan lenders who were 
accused of exacerbating the conditions of the poor. In 1974, policymakers 
sought enhanced regulation such as information disclosure to increase market 
competition and the cost of borrowing. In 2014, the FCA believed that the 
payday loan market lacked price competition and implemented price controls 
as a corrective measure. Less varied were the issues of concern and proposed 
solutions. This research identifies five main areas of regulatory concern: the 
high cost of loans, advertising, the use of an annual percentage rate (APR), the 
legitimacy of moneylenders and pawnbrokers in the financial system and 
regulatory enforcement. It identifies three main policy responses: price controls, 
information disclosure and licensing. 
By analysing the motivations, debated issues and proposed solutions, 
this research examines wider questions concerning freedom of contract, 
borrower rationality, bargaining inequity, market segmentation and credit 
rationing. For example, did policymakers consider it rational and responsible to 
contract small sums at high interest rates? Were these cash loans considered 
helpful or harmful to the borrower? What constrained policymakers, until 2015, 
from implementing price controls? By answering these and related questions 
this research provides new insights into the regulation and business of 
moneylending and pawnbroking since 1870. It contributes to the scholarly and 
policy dialogue on price controls, information disclosure and the development 
and legitimacy of non-bank lending. This research also provides new 
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perspectives on the Victorian poverty debate and the modern financial inclusion 
agenda as they relate to the interaction between regulation, high-cost credit 
and poverty. While it leaves policy solutions to those empowered by the 
electorate to do so, it illustrates that the regulation and development of the 
moneylending and pawnbroking markets have long been debated.  
While the market value of government and industry debts far exceeds 
the moneylending and pawnbroking markets, the ability to access small loans 
enabled needy families to ‘fill their bellies and cover their nakedness’.30 The 
sheer volume of transactions speaks to its pivotal role within the working class. 
In 1911, British pawnbrokers issued approximately 253 million loans or 
approximately six pawns per capita of the entire United Kingdom. More 
appropriately, that is approximately 14 pawns per person gainfully employed 
and 140 pawns per person gainfully employed in the unskilled labour market.31 
Persons employed in those occupational classifications made up the majority 
of borrowers. The regulation and lending institutions that serviced the everyday 
needs of most people have been neglected by economic historians. 
This research avoids the term ‘alternative finance’. Instead, it argues that 
small loans were and are an everyday aspect of working-class life. In the 1870s, 
there was approximately one pawnbroker for every 2,000 urban residents.32 
During that decade 15 pawnbroking shops were visible on the same street in 
Liverpool. 33  In 1910-1914, many pawnshops took in 8,000-10,000 pawns 
monthly. As late as 1920, 47 pawnbrokers competed within a six-mile stretch 
                                            
30 Paul Johnson, ‘Credit and thrift and the British working class, 1870–1939’, in The Working 
Class in Modern British History, 147-170, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), 153. 
31 Author’s estimate based on licensing data from the Report of the Commissioners of HM 
Customs & Excise and Commissioners of HM Inland Revenue (1909-1914), Guy Routh (1980) 
occupational data, the application of a constant urban and provincial pawnbroking distribution 
and average pawn transactions per annum. 
32 Kenneth Hudson, Pawnbroking: An Aspect of British Social History (London: Bodley Head, 
1982), 53. 
33  The Pawnbrokers’ Gazette, 8 July 1867, The British Library, M78445-52 (1867-1894) 
(hereafter PBG). 
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of road between Manchester and Ashton.34 In 2010, the Centre for Responsible 
Credit estimated that payday lenders issued £900 million annually, with 
average loans of between £200 and £330.35 A 2013 survey conducted by the 
University of Birmingham suggested that approximately one in five of the poor 
working class said they would have to borrow if £200 was needed at short 
notice.36 In 2014, The Money Shop, one of Britain’s largest payday lending 
companies, operated 550 retail branches. 37  To refer to this segment as 
alternative fails to appreciate the importance of small loans to the working poor. 
This research examines archival data to gain insight into the regulation 
and development of the moneylending and pawnbroking markets. It takes a 
novel approach by analysing regulatory episodes from the perspective of 
various actors, including politicians, the judiciary, lenders, borrowers and 
charities. While enacted legislation reflected the ‘viewpoint of the victor’, this 
research also considers those that ‘lost the day’. Research conducted in this 
manner facilitates comparisons between periods, using sources that are often 
overlooked. This research contributes to important areas of economic history 
regarding the development of non-bank lending and offers new insights into the 
expansion and restriction of credit to the working poor. It will be of interest to 
regulators, academics and students of economics, politics and history, as it 
analyses the formation of regulation and the interaction of business, trade 
groups and government. 
Specialists concerned with price controls, information disclosure, 
economic inequality and financial exclusion will benefit from the long view 
provided by this research. Lenders of small sums, trade groups and charitable 
organisations active in consumer credit markets will draw insight from how their 
                                            
34 Melanie Tebbutt, Making Ends Meet: Pawnbroking and Working-Class Credit (Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1983), 142. 
35 Damon Gibbons and Nehra Malhotra, ‘Payday lending in the UK: A review of the debate and 
policy options’, Centre for Responsible Credit (2010). 
36 Karen Rowlingson, ‘Short of cash, rent and food - Britons in dire financial straits’, The 
Conversation, 25 July 2013.  
37 As of 1 January 2014. 
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historical counterparts contributed to the regulatory process. As Steven Finlay 
suggested in Consumer Credit Fundamentals, the UK consumer credit market 
is one of the largest and most developed in the world.38 Many other countries 
follow its regulatory procedures and so have similar market structures. 
Accordingly, conclusions drawn in this thesis are applicable to audiences 
beyond the United Kingdom. Historians have yet to examine these debates 
from the perspective offered by this research. Given that the credit market is 
constantly evolving, analysing the dominant products of their time can assist 
policymakers and lenders in executing their respective strategies. 
This chapter introduces the findings and analyses the historiography, 
credit supply channel and source material.39 Chapter 2 begins by examining 
the pawn market and events leading up to the Pawnbrokers Act 1872 (PBA 
1872). Unlike moneylenders, pawnbrokers had long been regulated. The most 
recent legislation was the Pawnbroker Act 1800 (PBA 1800) which required that 
pawnbrokers be licensed and capped interest rates. 40  Under price caps, 
pawnbrokers lost money on low-value pledges. Pawnbrokers were motivated 
to reform price controls and abolish burdensome bureaucratic requirements. 
Certain pawnbrokers and policymakers believed that price controls should be 
lifted. These ‘free trade’ advocates warned that interest rate capping resulted 
in market segmentation and credit rationing and encouraged illegal lending. It 
was argued that price controls limited the type of collateral a pawnbroker could 
take in profitably (e.g., bulky items), which, along with restricted trading hours, 
acted as an incentive to unlicensed lending. Other pawnbrokers found the PBA 
1800’s restrictions beneficial. They argued that licensing and price caps 
                                            
38 Steven Finlay, Consumer Credit Fundamentals (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1. 
39 Section C. clarifies why savings banks, friendly societies, buildings societies, co-operatives 
and other forms of working-class credit fall outside the scope of this research. For a detailed 
analysis of these credit providers see Paul Johnson, Saving and Spending: The Working-Class 
Economy in Britain 1870-1939 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); Sean O'Connell, Credit and 
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40 Having been regulated since 1603, pawnbrokers were excluded from the repeal of the Usury 
Act in 1854. 
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excluded new entrants from the industry and feared that increased competition 
would depress pricing of the high-end ‘London’ business. 
Archibald Orr-Ewing MP (Conservative) believed that the poor lacked 
the intellectual and moral capacity to protect themselves from lenders whom he 
viewed as predatory. Similar to Ross McKibbin’s findings concerning the 
gambling market, certain policymakers sought to regulate small loans because 
sections of the working class were ‘incompetent in the management of its own 
interests’. 41  Orr-Ewing believed pawnbrokers contributed to social ills and 
crime, and went so far as to call them ‘evil’. This line of thinking argued that 
poverty was a result of moral failings. Pawn loans were considered no better 
than ‘indiscriminate’ charity, which led the ‘irrational’ and ‘undeserving’ poor into 
destitution. In his opinion, there was little doubt that pawn credit should be 
constrained. 
An alternative position held that insufficient wages and labour market 
instability created situations where cash was desperately needed. Members of 
the Pawnbroker Select Committee 1870 (PBSC 1870) were surprised to learn 
that charity workers in London, people who were in close contact with the poor, 
were vehemently opposed to linking irrationality, immorality and poverty. They 
considered it rational and responsible to pawn an overcoat to pay the rent. 
Frederick Williamson, a police superintendent, believed that the hard life of the 
poor required a sharp wit and, while not of the bookish kind, a keen intellect, 
otherwise they ‘won’t have enough food to eat’.42 Many of the charity workers 
suggested that freedom of contract to negotiate pricing would best protect the 
working poor. This classic laissez-faire view asserted that unfettered markets 
fulfilled the needs of the people better than government policy.  
Historians interested in poverty in the nineteenth century have often 
overlooked the fact that the British contracted over 200 million pawn 
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transactions annually.43 Using underutilised source material, and by focusing 
on a loan product that served the working poor, this research contributes to the 
Victorian poverty debate literature. Chapter 2 documents the conflicts, 
compromises and effectiveness of the pawnbroking lobby. This approach is 
also new to the literature. It demonstrates how pawnbrokers, Parliament, the 
police and charity workers, to name just a few, understood this vital business 
and how those groups shaped the PBA 1872, especially in relation to price 
controls. Although price controls offended the sensibilities of free traders, there 
was little political will to remove them and many considered limiting the interest 
rate and ticket fee as a legitimate form of borrower protection. The evidence 
indicates that business and political realities influenced the regulatory outcome 
more than laissez-faire rhetoric or contested ideas about poverty. Led by the 
Pawnbroker Parliamentary Reform Association, the industry presented 
financial evidence and a coherent argument that helped to raise the price ceiling 
and produced a generally favourable bill.  
Chapter 3 analyses the formation of the Moneylenders Act 1900 (MLA 
1900) and Moneylenders Act 1927 (MLA 1927). Before 1900, moneylenders 
operated without regulation. Royston Goode, a legal scholar, remarked that for 
centuries transactions were influenced by Lord Nottingham’s 1676 statement 
that ‘the Chancery mends no man’s bargain’. 44  While the catalyst for 
pawnbroking reform was led by industry, the moneylending investigation was 
initiated by the government. Policymakers were motivated to reform 
moneylending owing to judicial conflicts concerning small debt claims, high 
rates of interest, prolific advertising and a growth in loan volume. Their intent 
was to restrict the ‘evil’ industry. Within the legal system liberal judges refused 
to interfere with contracts executed by competent adults and revisionist judges 
                                            
43 Author’s estimate based on licensing figures from the annual Reports of Customs & Excise 
(1911), Guy Routh’s (1980) occupational data, the application of a constant urban and 
provincial pawnbroking distribution and average pawn transactions per annum. 
44 Royston Goode, The Consumer Credit Act: A Student’s Guide (London: Butterworths, 1979), 
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pro-actively revised contracts in favour of poor borrowers. These judicial 
conflicts created uncertainty: how far should judges intervene in private 
contracts? At the same time, by the late 1890s a strong anti-moneylending 
sentiment prevailed. The government responded with the Moneylenders Select 
Committee 1897 (MLSC 1897) charged with investigating the ‘alleged evils’ 
within the moneylending industry.45  
Theories concerning freedom of contract and the role of judicial 
intervention were fiercely debated. Proponents of freedom of contract 
supported moneylenders in the belief that unregulated market outcomes 
facilitated competitive loan rates and borrower protection. Notwithstanding, 
moneylenders failed to convince the majority of policymakers that small loans 
were expensive to administer and that the interest rate charged should not be 
confused with profit. The MLSC 1897 and Parliament disagreed with 
moneylenders proposing that the APR was an ineffective measure of the cost 
of short-term loans. Instead, spiralling ‘debt traps’ and high interest rates 
generated debate concerning the reinstatement of price controls.  
Although it was recognised that the repeal of the Usury Act had 
contributed to the growth in moneylending and few condoned the high rates of 
interest, price controls found little support. There was a strong sense that 
regulating the cost of money went against a fundamental principle of British 
commerce. This research argues that a belief in freedom of contract 
outweighed concerns over borrower protection. There was also uncertainty 
about the implication of price controls on the wider financial system, that is, how 
to regulate ‘illegitimate’ moneylenders without restricting ‘legitimate’ banking. In 
2010, similar concerns were voiced in the financial inclusion agenda which 
divided the consumer credit market into ‘proper’ and helpful credit and 
‘improper’ and harmful payday loans. In 1900, MPs were so fearful of 
                                            
45 HC deb. 6 April 1897, vol. 48. 
  
21 
‘legitimising’ moneylending that they refused to implement a licensing system 
as this would indicate implicit government approval. 
Unlike licensing, the MLA 1900 enacted a moneylending registry and 
enshrined the ability of judges to rewrite contracts that were deemed to be 
‘harsh and unconscionable’. Soon after its passage the law was considered 
ineffective and, by 1925, was deemed to have failed. Few borrowers or law 
enforcement agents sought its protective measures. In the 1920s, high rates, a 
growth in loan volume and prolific advertising once again prompted a 
parliamentary response. In 1925, a Moneylending Select Committee was 
formed (MLSC 1925). This committee did not focus on theoretical concerns 
over freedom of contract and the role of the state in regulating financial markets. 
The MLSC 1925 was a practical response to legislation that had failed to control 
‘evil’ moneylenders. Instead of price controls, which were considered difficult to 
implement and easily evaded, the MLA 1927 enacted a 48 pcpa guidance rate 
of interest. Transactions appearing before a judge above that rate were 
considered ‘harsh and unconscionable’ unless the lender proved otherwise. 
With a solution in place, Parliament believed it had dealt with the issue of high 
rates on a transaction level without unduly interfering in the market’s pricing 
mechanism. The MLA 1925 also introduced strict advertising restrictions and a 
two-step licensing regime. The goal was to restrict the supply of credit. 
Chapter 4 analyses market developments from 1945 until the 1970s, the 
Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit (the Crowther Committee, 1968-
1972) and the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA 1974). The motivation for 
reform was to unify consumer credit regulation, enhance market efficiency and 
increase access to credit. By the 1960s, the legal status of finance houses, hire-
purchase companies and instalment credit under the restrictive and poorly 
designed MLA 1927 was being questioned. Ineffective regulation was blamed 
for high pricing, misleading advertising and ineffective APR disclosure. In 
September 1968, Crowther was appointed to investigate the regulatory 
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structure, explore possible alternatives and consider amending the MLA 1900-
1927.  
Like the PBA 1872, and in stark contrast to the MLA 1900-1927, 
Crowther worked collaboratively with trade groups and businesses. For the 
most part, policymakers understood that moneylender and pawn loans were 
not used to advance an individual’s standard of living, but to pay for necessities, 
such as rent, food and utilities. Notwithstanding, there was tension in 
Crowther’s findings. As before, the high cost of loans was debated. Statistical 
evidence suggested that borrowers valued non-price loan features such as 
speed and convenience over price. These results confirmed what Victorian 
pawnbrokers and moneylenders had argued. Crowther struggled to understand 
why borrowers valued non-price features so highly and had failed to encourage 
a market structure in which lenders competed on price. Crowther suggested 
that the lack of price competition was the result of borrowers’ failure to shop 
around for the best deal. Similarly, evidence supported previous arguments that 
borrowers paid little attention to APR disclosure and instead assessed 
affordability in terms of the amount owed in monetary terms. These results 
challenged the value of standardised APR disclosure, which Crowther 
advocated as essential to improving competition. 
However, Crowther understood that moneylending and pawnbroking 
carried with it high expenses and default rates. This, coupled with Crowther’s 
goal to unify consumer credit regulation without targeting the form or type of 
lending entity, would make it extremely difficult to implement price controls. 
Crowther also believed that price controls would limit competition as market 
rates would gravitate towards the maximum. Concerns that price controls would 
ration credit away from the lowest market segment were raised. Ultimately, 
Crowther did not support price controls. Accordingly, for the first time in 
centuries, pawnbrokers would operate without interest rate or fee restrictions. 
By including all consumer credit under a single Act of Parliament, 
moneylenders and pawnbrokers were legitimised and admitted into the 
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financial system. Advertising restrictions were lifted and licensing requirements 
were standardised. Although the value of APR was questioned it was 
considered as the key to greater competition. Guiding this unified framework 
was the belief that the state should minimise its restrictions to permit consumers 
the maximum amount of choice and encourage a diverse and dynamic 
consumer credit market. It was argued that a competitive market would price 
credit appropriately and mitigate risky lending behaviour.  
Chapter 5 examines market developments since the 1970s, the 
Consumer Credit Act 2006 (CCA 2006) and debates concerning price controls 
leading up to their implementation on payday loans in 2015. In response to the 
CCA 1974 single credit licence and a unified regulatory code, HCSTC providers 
expanded their offerings. The market structure shifted from a proprietor-issued 
single product line credit to corporations offering a range of secured and 
unsecured loans. What were once partnerships with limited capital became 
corporations such as AIM-traded pawnbroker Harvey & Thompson and DFC 
Global, formerly listed on the Nasdaq, but now backed by private equity. DFC 
Global operated approximately 1,300 retail locations worldwide, including 300 
in the United Kingdom.46  
In 1971, it was estimated that 402 pawnbrokers and 2,468 moneylenders 
had lent less than a combined £10 million, equivalent to £129.7 million in 
2015.47 By 2013-2015, pawnbrokers and payday lenders issued over £3.5 
billion annually.48 Certain policymakers, academics and charities linked the 
industry’s growth to an increase in economic inequality and financial exclusion. 
The Debt on our Doorstep campaign found that low-income households were 
three times more likely to be in arrears on ‘rent, council tax, utility bills and 
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the original report. 
48 Compiled from CMA (2015); ‘Key facts’, The National Pawnbrokers Association, 2 October 
2015; Bristol Report (2013). 
  
24 
mortgage payments’.49 In 2005, Sharon Collard and Elaine Kempson found that 
6.2 million adults with incomes in the lowest quantile would find it ‘difficult or 
impossible to raise £200-£300 in an emergency without borrowing’.50 As before, 
HCSTC providers responded to the unique demand features of the working 
poor in urgent need of cash. 
While Victorian- and Edwardian-era policymakers failed to interact with 
borrowers, and Crowther treated the process as akin to a research project, from 
2006 to 2015 policymakers engaged with the issues in their MP surgeries, 
meetings with lenders and through academic study. With the onset of the Great 
Recession, policymakers sought to restrict these ‘predatory lenders’. In 2006, 
attention again focused on the high cost of loans. Borrowers were considered 
vulnerable because of their HCSTC obligation. The CCA 2006 departed from 
the CCA 1974 and enhanced licensing screening and supervisory powers 
based on risk categories. The House of Commons Treasury Committee 
believed it ‘vital’ that the Office of Fair Trading be granted power to control 
‘excessive’ charges.51 High-risk lenders would be scrutinised for their ‘fitness’ 
to hold a licence and their activities monitored. This was a clear departure from 
lender equality under the CCA 1974. 
This research argues that the segmentation of lenders into risk 
categories and the FCA’s implementation of price controls were facilitated by 
the financial inclusion agenda. Beginning under the 1997 Labour government, 
a financial inclusion initiative sought access to basic banking facilities, 
affordable credit and financial literacy. 52  The financial inclusion agenda 
believed access to mainstream banking in an increasingly competitive 
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environment was an effective poverty reduction strategy.53 What was once a 
debate between free trade, judicial intervention and control of licensing had 
shifted to discussion of poverty reduction and financial exclusion.54 New Labour 
believed that ‘proper’ credit or the ‘right kind’ of market would reduce poverty 
and welfare spending while increasing self-sufficiency.55 It was believed that 
proper, self-driven market participation enhanced the ability to manage risk. 
This is similar to convictions held during the Victorian era concerning the Poor 
Laws, charity, morality and poverty. 
Financial inclusion advocates argued that payday loans contributed to 
poverty, increased risk and decreased living standards; they were therefore the 
‘wrong kind’ of credit. After studying the effects of price controls on the payday 
lending market the FCA determined that credit rationing and market 
segmentation would benefit marginal borrowers. Without conclusive supporting 
evidence, the FCA implemented price controls to force market contraction. The 
goal was to restrict access to the wrong kind of credit. While the lack of price 
competition was cited as justification for state intervention, this research 
suggests that the influence of the financial inclusion agenda and concern over 
economic ‘fairness’ were paramount. 56  This position was coupled with an 
expansive definition of poverty and vulnerability. These considerations provided 
an entry point for price controls, which were implemented to force a market 
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contraction that would correct the working poor’s failure to mitigate financial 
risk.57 
This research responds to Matthew Hilton’s observation that the 
literature fails to address how lower-class consumers have influenced the 
economy and politics.58 It illustrates how policymakers viewed moneylending 
and pawnbroking, and how those viewpoints influenced regulatory frameworks. 
It contributes to the contentious debates in response to high-cost credit, 
financial exclusion and poverty. It documents which groups and theories 
influenced the regulatory process and how the market responded to regulation. 
This research provides historical evidence on why regulation and the market 
developed in the way they did and not otherwise. The regulatory processes 
analysed by this research serve as inflection points to understand the 
development of the industry, and how businesses and trade groups have 
interacted with policymakers, neither of which have been covered sufficiently in 
the literature. It answers a question that has not yet been explored fully in the 
literature: Why has the British government controlled the working poor’s access 
to credit? It finds that policymakers have shifted their focus from market 
competition and freedom of consumer choice to economic inequality and 
financial exclusion. This development reframed the focus of regulation and 
facilitated the implementation of price controls in 2015. 
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B. Historiography 
As Luis Hyman put it, ‘there exist shockingly few histories of the modern credit 
system’.59 Similarly, Jan Logemann has suggested that there is a lack of early 
twentieth-century consumer credit research.60 While historians of consumerism 
focus on the cultural aspects of consumer life, scant attention has been paid to 
how these goods were paid for. The same historians too often neglect the 
business, economic and political dynamics inherent in the subject. Hyman 
argued that in search of ‘the human face of debt’, historians have too often 
focused on cultural perspectives.61 This approach has misinterpreted what 
drives the consumer debt economy. Economic historians have shown the 
importance of credit and industrial growth; this research focuses on the 
regulation and role of routine credit in the financial life of the working poor, a 
perspective that has not yet been fully examined. 
Recent national studies have examined France, Singapore, Mexico and 
the United States. Gunnar Trumbull finds that consumer credit markets in 
France were ‘simply’ another aspect of capitalism in need of regulation.62 The 
French government sought to protect its citizens from consumer credit at the 
expense of choice, innovation and access. 63  Ghee-Soon Lim found that 
pawnbrokers in Singapore, active there since 1875, occupied a niche within the 
financial sector.64 Marie Eileen Francois’s book A Culture of Everyday Credit: 
Housekeeping, Pawnbroking, and Governance in Mexico City, 1750-1920 
provided a detailed socio-cultural history of urban life for the working poor of 
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Mexico City. Like this research, her interest is in the often ignored labour market 
segment of those living on an insufficient income and without adequate savings. 
Francois’s insights confirm certain findings of this research (albeit on a different 
continent) regarding the importance of ‘everyday’ credit in the nineteenth 
century. 
Together, the United States and the United Kingdom comprise over half 
of the global consumer credit market.65 It is important then to sample the US 
literature in a more thorough way than that of other national markets. Lendol 
Calder, a historian, examined the moral legitimisation of American debt usage 
before the First World War. 66  While he introduced an innovative thesis 
regarding US-Victorian credit patterns, he neglected to account for the profit- 
and production-driven capitalism that gave rise to the modern debt system. In 
response, Hyman focused on the business side of debt in the United States. 
He acknowledged the complex interaction of politics, risk, reward and the high 
cost of lending small sums. In similar fashion and commenting on high-cost 
loans and usury rates, Charles Geisst wrote, ‘Few economic and social issues 
have the distinction of appearing, in one guise or other, in the Old Testament, 
canon law, English common law, and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.’67 While 
Geisst focused on the interaction between interest rates and social issues in 
the United States, this research focuses on the regulation and development of 
the British moneylending and pawnbroking markets since 1870. 
Wendy Woloson documented the ‘unglamorous economic lives of 
average, ordinary, and too often anonymous Americans’. 68 The focus of her 
book, In Hock, is to understand the pawn market, its misconceptions and why 
so many of those opinions remain. Like this research, Woloson finds that 
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economic historians have overlooked the ‘lives of ordinary individuals … The 
many thousands of people living in developing urban areas who daily struggled 
to get by relied on the services and products provided by pawnbrokers, junk 
dealers, and used good vendors’.69 In City of Debtors: Law, Loan Sharks, and 
the Shadow Economy of Urban Poverty, 1900-1970, Anne Fleming examined 
the formation of moneylending in the United States. As this research 
demonstrates for the British market, Fleming found that American policymakers 
struggled to regulate small loans, a product that ‘tested the limits’ of public law, 
private contracts, welfare systems and poverty.70 
Avram Taylor, Margot Finn and Kenneth Hudson suggested that too little 
is known about the British small loan market and working-class credit.71 Hudson 
noted the ‘almost total silence’ concerning pawnbroking in research that 
focuses on the working class.72 In 1982, Hudson wrote a social history of British 
pawnbroking in which he claimed that it was the first study of the subject since 
Alfred Hardaker’s 1892 book A Brief History of Pawnbroking. 73  Like this 
research, he finds that small credit was vital to the British working class and 
suggests that, ‘For generation after generation of poor families, life, before the 
coming of the welfare state, was difficult enough: without the local pawnbroker 
it would have been impossible.’ Like Hudson, this research finds that there was 
a lacuna between policymakers’ opinion of lenders and the working poor’s 
credit use.74 New to the literature, Chapter 2 documents how the Victorian 
poverty debate influenced the regulation of pawnbroking. This research 
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analyses quantitative data in a way that Hudson did not, supporting its claims 
qualitatively and quantitatively. 
One year after Hudson, Melanie Tebbutt published Making Ends Meet: 
Pawnbroking and Working-Class Credit. Tebbutt covered the development of 
the licensed pawnbroking industry in Britain from the 1850s until the mid-
twentieth century and analysed the role of women and household credit in the 
urban economy. However, Harold Smith critiqued her view as ‘too sympathetic’ 
and questioned her ‘heavy reliance’ on the industry’s trade magazine, 
Pawnbrokers’ Gazette (PBG).75 However, the industry’s opinion is as valid as 
government officials testifying during the PBSC 1870. Smith’s treatment of the 
industry as monolithic failed to appreciate differences within the industry. 
Chapter 2 demonstrates that divergent interests existed between wealthy 
London pawnbrokers and their provincial counterparts. 
This research supports Tebbutt’s argument that policymakers 
misunderstood the underlying rationale of the daily economic decisions of the 
working poor. In Chapter 2 this research demonstrates how policymakers 
projected Homo economicus onto working-class borrowers whose daily lives 
differed greatly from those of the middle and upper classes. As Tebbutt argued, 
‘Free choice is a myth to such borrowers’. 76  This research endorses her 
conclusion that the PBA 1872 reflected the divergent viewpoints of those 
concerned with the ‘demoralisation’ of the poor and free trade principles. 
However, the present research is comparative across time and focuses on the 
formation of regulation, the Select Committee and price controls in more detail 
than did Tebbutt. Similarly, in the final chapter, Tebbutt devoted a single 
paragraph to the CCA 1974. With the benefit of over 40 years since its passage, 
this research is in a better position to analyse the CCA 1974. 
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Like Tebbutt, Avram Taylor found that the poor borrowed to purchase 
necessities and not a consumer lifestyle.77 Taylor’s Working-Class Credit and 
Community since 1918 analysed the development and postwar shift in working-
class credit. Taylor’s work is comparative and based on local history. He 
analysed pre- and postwar Britain through 60 interviews with borrowers and 
lenders based in Tyneside. The unifying problem ‘is [that] the various forms of 
credit investigated can be explained in terms of the interpenetration of 
rationalities. It is argued that neighbourhood sharing was, as Abrams suggests, 
governed by the norm of reciprocity, and thus contained an instrumental 
element.’ 78  In addition to Philip Abrams, he cited Ferdinand Tonnies and 
Anthony Giddens. His work is as much applied social theory as it is social 
history.  
Taylor found that working-class credit was more exploitative than 
altruistic and cautioned against nostalgia for the days when the poor took care 
of their own.79 Taylor’s findings conflict with Carl Chinn’s, who suggested that 
a neighbourly, duty-bound balance existed between benefice and 
instrumentally-driven credit transactions.80 However, Paul Johnson and Sean 
O’Connell argued that Taylor’s views underestimated borrower agency in 
turning down the tallyman.81 Karen Rowlingson nuances this by suggesting that 
income level and alternative credit options affected the power imbalance 
between borrower and lender.82 This research finds little evidence to support 
the ‘nostalgia hypothesis’; nonetheless, Chinn’s argument was echoed by turn-
of-the-century lawmakers bent on eliminating moneylenders. These 
policymakers suggested that without access to moneylenders, the poor would 
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take care of one another.83 As Theodore Hoppen argued, by the middle of the 
Victorian period, owing to urbanisation and the Poor Laws, most forms of 
‘working-class mutuality’ had vanished.84 Keith Laybourn critiqued Taylor for 
restricting the form of credit under analysis.85 Laybourn argued that the working 
class had access to labour-sponsored entities, such as Miners’ Welfare and co-
operatives. This research avoids such criticism by focusing on a market 
segment falling below those served by labour and co-operative finance.86 This 
position is developed in section C. of this chapter. 
In The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740-1914, 
Margot Finn analysed economic decisions in the context of cultural norms, legal 
structures and the increased use of contracts by the working class. Finn argued 
that the development of ‘contractual individualism’ led to ‘tensions between 
equity and common law and conflicts created by differences of class and 
gender’, which demonstrated the ‘malleability of legal systems’. 87  She 
questioned whether small loan borrowers contracted as free, rational agents or 
if there was an inherent power imbalance between lenders and borrowers. Finn 
documented the growing tension between liberal and revisionist judges leading 
up to the MLSC 1897. She stated rightly that the law was shaped as much by 
interactions with moneylenders and creditors as it was effective in handling 
small debt disputes.88 Her analysis of ‘useful credit’, ‘false credit’ and the 
polarising exercise of judicial discretionary powers helps to frame the key 
debates of the MLA 1900. These are centred on two opposing judicial 
philosophies. Activist judges such as Matthew Parry favoured ‘equitable 
interpretations’ of the law to protect borrowers, whom he categorised as 
innocent victims. 89  Opposed to this were judges who supported classic 
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conceptions of laissez-faire economic exchange. While Finn traced the debate 
as part of Britain’s social and economic transition from ‘status based’ to 
‘contract based’, this research shows how the debate influenced the regulation 
and development of moneylending and pawnbrokers. 
In some respects, this research builds on Sean O’Connell’s work. Unlike 
previous scholarship, Credit and Community: Working-Class Debt in the UK 
since 1880 analysed the social, cultural and business history perspectives of 
working-class consumer credit. O’Connell’s use of business records and oral 
histories, especially those related to doorstep lending, contributed greatly to our 
understanding of working-class credit. His treatment included tallymen, cheque 
traders, mail order catalogues, co-operative unions and illegal moneylenders, 
none of which is covered by this research. O’Connell devoted very little analysis 
to the pawnbroking market. This thesis argues that pawnbroking readily 
compares to unsecured moneylending because the demand for both arises 
from the need to cover an immediate cash requirement. Moreover, the PBA 
1872 and the MLA 1900-1927 were reviewed by the Crowther Committee and 
rescinded by the CCA 1974. In a departure from the literature, this research 
considers how policymakers understood the small loan market, which specific 
issues regulators were trying to solve and how those views have shifted. 
At the time of writing, Chapters 4 and 5 of Credit and Community provide 
the most comprehensive scholarly treatment of twentieth-century British 
moneylending. Demonstrating the industry’s controversial social standing, 
O’Connell invoked the long-held image of moneylenders as ‘Shylocks, 
bloodsuckers, usurers and loan sharks’. These terms highlight the economic 
and social complexities inherent in working-class credit. Although O’Connell 
examined the construction of twentieth-century legislation, a subject matter 
shared by this work, his analysis of illegal lenders falls outside the scope of this 
research. This work shares O’Connell’s findings that policymakers held 
incomplete knowledge of small loan demand factors and that strong ‘animosity’ 
to restrictive usury influenced the legislative landscape. It nuances O’Connell’s 
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assertion that, ‘in principle’, street lenders fell subject to ‘state surveillance’.90 
While the MLA 1900-1927 empowered the judiciary and law enforcement with 
certain powers over the industry, it fell short of state supervision. The MLA 
1900-1927 registry scheme was not intended to provide supervision, as the 
FCA is charged with today, but acted as a non-discriminatory registry. The 
difference, though subtle, was crucial as policymakers denied legitimisation to 
moneylenders. Another point of distinction concerns the CCA 1974. Whereas 
this research focuses on its formation and impact on moneylending and 
pawnbroking, O’Connell analysed its impact from a broader perspective and in 
less detail than this work does.91  
Finally, this work challenges Peter Fearon’s findings. Fearon analysed 
the impact of the MLA 1927 on Liverpool moneylenders. He asserted that if the 
MLA 1927 ‘is to be judged on its ability to bring this “evil” business to near 
extinction, it was a remarkable successful piece of legislation’. 92  As this 
research demonstrates, the MLA 1927 lacked the regulatory powers of 
supervision and enforcement. The Act was ineffective and failed to reform the 
market. Legal scholarship suggests that ‘No consumer legislation, however 
sophisticated, is likely to have more than a marginal impact if not underpinned 
by effective enforcement machinery.’93 Fearon stated that ‘the Act sharply 
increased the cost of a moneylender’s licence, laid down clear rules regarding 
interest charges and, with the introduction of the certificate, attempted to 
cleanse the profession of undesirables … the process of certification was time 
consuming and costly and not to be undertaken lightly.’ His arguments are 
problematic. 
Certification and licensing were not an effective screening mechanism. 
Like much of the MLA 1927, the law failed. Royston Goode wrote, ‘So far as 
                                            
90 O’Connell, Credit and Community, 131. 
91 This is not a critique of his work, but an observable point of distinction. 
92 Peter Fearon, ‘A “social evil” Liverpool moneylenders 1920s-1940s’, Urban History 42:3 
(2015), 461. 
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moneylending was concerned, the law was theoretically stronger because of a 
licensing system and a battery of criminal sanctions for different types of 
offence. But as a method of control this also was largely ineffective.’94 The 
Crowther Committee found that the MLA 1927 certification was ‘a rather 
inconvenient formality’.95 Despite Fearon’s claims to the contrary, the Act did 
not provide ‘clear rules’ regarding the interest rate. The Act’s guidance rate of 
48 pcpa was of little value to judges, and the harsh and unconscionable 
framework failed to assist the judiciary.96 
While an increased licensing cost would, other things being equal, 
decrease financial returns to moneylenders, it is not clear that certification and 
higher licensing fees acted as a ‘disincentive to remain in what had previously 
been a rewarding trade’.97 Profit data presented during the MLSC 1900 and 
1925 show that, when compared to other businesses, moneylenders generated 
lower than expected returns. Fearon asked why consumers would borrow from 
illegal lenders if licensed lenders offered better terms. Evidence from the PBA 
1872, MLSC 1897 and contemporary research suggests that, alongside price, 
customers value convenience and ease of borrowing, on both of which illegal 
lenders could outcompete their legal counterparts. Fearon’s insight into the 
working poor’s dependence on emergency credit, the role of women in the 
credit system and his analysis of the Liverpool Personal Service Society 
contributed to our understanding of working-class credit. However, because 
moneylenders were not supervised and the MLA 1927 was not enforced, its 
impact on the industry is questionable. 98 
                                            
94 Ibid. 
95 Consumer Credit: Report of the Committee 1971 (4596), 4.1.12 (hereafter Crowther). 
96 Charles Collard, The Money-Lenders Acts, 1900-1911 (London: Butterworth, 1912), 172. 
With regard to moneylenders, the legal terms ‘harsh and unconscionable’ are found in the MLA 
1900 and remained in place until the CCA 1974. 
97 Fearon, ‘A “social evil”: Liverpool moneylenders’, 457. 
98 Literature related to the Victorian poverty debate is covered in Chapter 2. Research relating 
to financial inclusion and economic payday loan literature is covered in Chapter 5. 
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C. The supply channel 
This section examines selected working-class credit products. It clarifies why 
shop credit, cheque traders, tallymen, hire-purchase and friendly societies have 
been excluded. For the purposes of this research, shop credit, tallymen, cheque 
traders and hire-purchase are classified as purchase-money-credit, that is, 
credit issued as deferment of payment for the acquisition of goods. Shop credit 
was extended to regular customers and was limited to the goods of that shop. 
Similarly, credit advanced by cheque traders, although not confined to a single 
item, was limited to goods found in shops that accepted their cheques. Shop 
credit, tallymen, cheque traders and hire-purchase lenders limit and control the 
use of issued funds. Pawnbrokers and moneylenders issue non-purchase 
money credit, that is, a straight loan of money without restriction. 
Victorian shopkeepers had to overcome supply-chain issues and 
delayed customer payments, the latter indicating that credit played a significant 
role in retail operations.99 Though unquantifiable, shop credit, booking trade 
and on the tick book credit were the most important sources available to the 
working class.100 Demand for shop credit was driven by employment conditions 
and wage levels.101 The extension of shop credit and when to call it due were 
based on the relationship between the shopkeeper and the customer. Johnson 
found that traders and shopkeepers issued crisis credit to assist customers 
interrupted or insufficient income streams. This feature distinguished shop 
credit from cheque traders, tallymen and hire-purchase, which is pre-planned 
credit. In 1870, demonstrating how credit products interacted, a pawnbroker 
recounted how his loans were used to pay off the local baker, with the same 
coin returning to him later in the week covered in flour.102 Benjamin Blackwood, 
                                            
99 Crowther, 2.1.8. 
100 Johnson, Savings and Spending, 144-147. 
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Economic History Review 46:1 (1993), 69. 
102 PBSC 1870, 393-406. 
  
37 
a Bradford pawnbroker, recounted that, ‘I have a neighbour, a grocer, who tells 
me that the principal part of the money which he takes on a Monday comes 
from my shop … he has opened another shop about a mile away, and wishes 
I would open a branch shop there …’103 
O’Connell has written extensively on tallymen and cheque traders. 
Tallymen or drapers were travelling salesmen, who provided a range of 
inexpensive mass-market goods on credit, and cheque traders provided 
cheques that could be redeemed by participating local merchants. In stores the 
cheque was worth its face value. To obtain the cheque at face value the 
customer paid a fee to the cheque agent, and the retailer received payment 
from the cheque trader at a discount to face value. Often, customers preferred 
the opportunity to acquire goods in store, with marked prices and the ability to 
browse, as opposed to viewing a limited range of sample goods offered by the 
tallyman.104 In 1909, Woodhead’s Directory of the Credit Drapers of Great 
Britain estimated that 4,255 tallymen extended credit averaging £6-£7 per 
transaction.105 According to Gerry Rubin’s study of the East London Credit 
Drapers’ Association, between 1907 and 1908 65 drapers employed by 28 firms 
issued £61,000 of credit to 47,705 accounts for the purpose of obtaining 
clothing and household textile goods.106  
While the tally trade was decentralised, the cheque trading market was 
dominated by the Provident Clothing and Supply Company. Despite their high 
cost, their credit product was in much greater demand as customers found them 
convenient to use and enabled them to purchase a variety of goods. Borrowers 
found the predictability of weekly payments attractive and easy to understand. 
In 1910, 3,000 community-based agents operated out of 91 Provident branch 
offices in urban areas. By the 1930s Provident served over one million 
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customers annually. Cheque APRs with 20-week repayments offered 
approximate rates of 23.3 pcpa, with delayed payment rates ranging from 40 to 
47 pcpa. Weekly visits from the agents kept industry bad debt to the low level 
of 0.75 per cent.107 Like items obtained on hire-purchase, tally and cheque 
credit are distinguished from lenders of small sums by their relationship to the 
good for which the credit was issued. However, hire-purchase agreements 
feature a chain of ownership that differed from tally and cheque credit. The right 
of ownership for a hire-purchase good remained with the creditor until the debt 
was paid in full. Without going into the legal nuances, if a default occurred, the 
good was repossessed. Although popularised through Singer sewing 
machines, most lenders focused on wealthier customers seeking expensive 
durable goods.  
This section turns now to friendly and benefit societies. These mutual 
societies provided insurance, pension, savings and banking services to those 
with secure and regular labour employment. In his book A History of Savings 
Banks, Oliver Horne summarised the hierarchy and characteristics of working-
class savings institutions. He determined that ‘the savings bank was still mainly 
the bank of the skilled worker, the domestic servant, widows and children, and 
the small middle-class man and woman.’108 In terms of benefit societies, in 
Savings and Spending, Johnson clarified the cost of and rationale for working-
class burial assurance. His findings concerning class judgement are revealing. 
He found that while the upper class paid life assurance premiums quarterly or 
annually, the poor paid weekly for substandard industrial assurance. The rich 
questioned why the working poor would spend on an unnecessary and inferior 
product. Why would they purchase burial insurance and yet borrow cash for 
food and life’s necessities? Here again the rich and poor occupied different 
economic decision matrices. The purchasing habits of those with assets were 
assumed to be normative, while deviations were seen as irrational. With high 
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child mortality rates and social stigma surrounding a pauper’s funeral, and 
without sufficient savings to pay funeral expenses, the working poor paid 
weekly sums for burial insurance. In so far as burial insurance can be 
considered an asset, Johnson found that, of all savings vehicles used between 
1870 and 1939, burial and death insurance were by far the most common.109 
Along the lines of savings, companies falling under section 30 of the 
Friendly Societies Act 1875 played an important role in the working class’s 
financial system. However, like other savings and credit products, studies 
revealed that friendly societies catered to ‘respectable’ tradesmen and clerks. 
Bentley Gilbert’s study of national insurance found that ‘friendly societies made 
no appeal whatever to the grey, faceless, lower third of the working-class … 
membership was the badge of the skilled worker’.110 It was burial insurance 
companies and not friendly societies that provided comparatively expensive 
and less generous pay-outs to the lowest segment of the working class. While 
the upper classes were right to criticise the financial inefficiency of the burial 
insurance system, this product confirms the argument that the poor paid more 
for inferior products. 
This section has demonstrated why certain working-class credit products 
fall outside the scope of this research. Under consideration are HCSTC issued 
by moneylenders and pawnbrokers. This borrowing population balanced 
weekly expenses on an unpredictable and limited income. Needs were met with 
credit products, including small loans, draper and tally credit, to name but a few. 
Some argued that economic inequality and labour market instability created 
conditions of unavoidable need, and to fulfil those needs the working poor had 
little choice but to borrow. Others believed immorality and irrationality created 
the demand for cash that was both unnecessary and expensive. Martin 
Daunton, an economic historian, argued that ‘criminality, laziness, madness 
and pauperism were all seen as the result of loss of self-control and 
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abandonment of reason which could be rectified through surveillance, hard 
labour, and obedience to rules’.111 In response, some policymakers sought 
regulation to rein in undesirable behaviour. In the chapters that follow, this 
research demonstrates that these arguments influenced the regulation and 
development of moneylending and pawnbroking. 
 
D. Sources 
This research analyses primary and secondary sources across a range of 
disciplines. The sources ground the regulation and development of the 
moneylending and pawnbroking markets in qualitative and quantitative 
evidence. By analysing the market since the 1870s, this research contributes 
to wider movements in economic history that compare developments across 
time.112 This approach reveals the similarities and differences between the 
thought processes behind regulatory frameworks, poverty studies, the status of 
moneylenders and pawnbrokers in the financial system and demand features. 
Primary sources analyse the perspective of business, borrowers, 
government, the judiciary and charities. Government sources include ministry-
sponsored studies, parliamentary debates, parliamentary committees and 
testimony provided by outside parties, including trade groups and charities. 
Archives include the British Library, Guildhall and City Business Library, 
Hansard, the London Metropolitan Archives, the National Archives, and the 
Public Record Office of Northern Ireland. Archives and contemporary industry 
sources, including the National Pawnbrokers Association, the National 
Moneylenders Association and the Consumer Finance Association provided 
valuable insight. The Personal Finance Research Centre at Bristol University 
and the Policy Studies Institute offered academic and public policy 
perspectives. Publications issued by charities such as Which?, the Citizens 
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Advice Bureau and the Centre for Responsible Credit were consulted. The legal 
scholar and Crowther Committee member Sir Royston Goode CBE, QC, DCL, 
FBA was interviewed. Referenced periodicals and newspapers include the 
Birmingham Daily Post, Chamber’s Journal, Edinburgh Evening News, Evening 
Standard, the Fortnightly Review, Good Words, Guardian, Lancashire Evening 
Post, Leicester Chronicle and Mercury, Liverpool Daily Post, Liverpool Mercury, 
Lloyd’s Weekly, Manchester Examiner and Times, Marlborough Express, 
Newsweek, The Times, Northern Echo, the Observer, Once a Week, Pall Mall 
Gazette, Sheffield and Rotherham Independent, Sheffield Evening Telegraph, 
St. James Gazette, the Standard, Telegraph and Western Daily Press. Other 
than the single interview, the evidence is in documentary form. 
The greatest limitation to the evidence is the lack of Victorian- and 
Edwardian-era borrower voices. This is not surprising considering that poor 
borrowers were unlikely to discuss their financial position with outsiders. 
Moreover, as the PBG wrote, ‘Would the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street 
expect her clients to stand up at a Committee of the House of Commons … or 
would Coutt’s and Company ever dream that City merchants would give a full 
detail of … their overdrawn accounts?’113 Even so, the historical reality is that 
the opinion of the working poor was not a factor in the formation of financial 
regulation. With the exception of four borrowers who testified during the MLSC 
1897, this research has relied on evidence presented by charitable associations 
and reformers acting on behalf of the working poor. These actors did influence 
regulation.  
Beginning in the 1970s, borrower surveys are more readily available and 
have been analysed for this research. Notwithstanding, quantitative data are 
sparse. Few if any lenders were or are required to report their accounts. To 
overcome this, and unlike previous scholarship, this research systematically 
analyses quantitative data gathered from select committees and the public 
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record in order to confirm or challenge qualitative information presented in 
parliamentary sessions and popular accounts offered by newspapers and 
periodicals.  
By including evidence from business, legal authorities and charity 
organisations, in conjunction with government reports, newspapers and 
periodicals, this research is representative of the available historical data. 
Distinct from prior scholarship, this research seeks to understand 
moneylending and pawnbroking through the lens of regulatory developments. 
Unique to the literature is the use of primary source material related to trade 
groups. As Luca Lanzalaco, Peter Hall and David Soskice have shown, trade 
groups can have an impact on the evolution of capitalist economies and 
influence wider economic and social policy.114 While others have utilised certain 
trade materials, there are very few systematic analyses concerning the input of 
lenders in the formation of regulation. 
Similarly, parliamentary documents are used to understand how 
policymakers understood the marketplace and what theories and values they 
incorporated into regulation - a viewpoint that the existing literature does not 
yet address adequately. Periodicals and newspapers are used to corroborate 
evidence and situate the type of information that was made available to the 
reading public. Using a diverse set of primary and secondary sources, and by 
comparing regulation across time, this research adds to our understanding of 
the development of moneylending and pawnbroking, a neglected area of 
financial history. This research adds to our knowledge of credit utilised by the 
working poor, the role of financial regulation to protect the vulnerable and the 
development of non-bank consumer lending in Britain since 1870. Its longer-
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term analyses of the price control, advertising and the APR debate contribute 
directly to current political and economic concerns. 
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2 The Pawnbrokers Act 1872 
 
This chapter analyses the Victorian pawnbroking market and the reform 
movement leading up to the Pawnbrokers Act 1872 (PBA 1872). It addresses 
what motivated regulatory reform and identifies the factors that contributed to 
the outcome. It asks: How did laissez-faire beliefs interact with concerns over 
borrower protection and poverty? Was the debate structured as an economic 
policy question, that is, should the price of money be regulated? Or was 
regulation considered necessary to ameliorate the conditions of poverty? How 
did Victorian pawnbrokers understand ‘free trade’ and ‘freedom of contract’? 
Did conflicts exist within the trade, and if they did, how were they resolved? Did 
the Select Committee believe that pawnbrokers provided a financial service to 
hard-working, rational and competent adults, or were pawn loans evil and 
morally corrupting? 
This chapter provides insight into how Victorian pawnbrokers and 
policymakers understood the benefits and drawbacks of price controls, 
especially market segmentation and credit rationing. It demonstrates that the 
primary motivation for reform was that pawnbrokers were struggling to make a 
profit from low-value pledges. Pawnbrokers sought to reform the price ceiling 
and the burdensome bureaucratic terms of the Pawnbrokers Act 1800 (PBA 
1800). It argues that the PBA 1872 was influenced by debates on the role of 
the state in markets (laissez-faire theory), business concerns (practical matters) 
and the origins and effects of poverty and social policy. The evidence indicates 
that business, political and moral realities influenced the process more than 
laissez-faire rhetoric. It finds that those who held that the conditions of poverty 
were the result of moral failings were unlikely to be swayed by financial 
evidence, however convincing, presented by pawnbrokers. Notwithstanding, 
through their trade association, pawnbrokers argued for raising the price ceiling 
and fewer administrative burdens, which were granted under the PBA 1872. 
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What follows analyses the market under the PBA 1800, and the 
motivations, conflicts and compromises of the industry as it sought reform and 
the economic and political debate during the Select Committee. 
 
A. The market under the Pawnbrokers Act 1800 
This section explains how the pawn market operated under the PBA 1800. It 
demonstrates the vital importance of pawn to the everyday lives of the Victorian 
working class and the industry’s grievances with the PBA 1800, and introduces 
their motivation for reform. Pawnbrokers argued that, owing to price controls, 
certain low-value pawns were unprofitable and the price ceiling encouraged an 
illegal market and limited the type of collateral a licensed pawnbroker could 
accept. The PBA 1800 demanded strict penalties and, in some cases, 
invalidated contracts for even trivial clerical infractions. Although market 
conditions and expenses varied considerably over time, the interest rate and 
fee structure was fixed by law. Pawnbrokers found this situation unfair and 
unprofitable, and therefore sought to update the PBA 1800. 
Pawning is a simple transaction, whereby moveable personal property 
is given as security for a loan.1 Pawning does not require a credit application, 
nor does it question the borrower’s intended use of funds. After appraisal, the 
pawnbroker offers a loan to be repaid in a single sum on redemption of the 
collateral. The transaction is for money lent and is not payment for the transfer 
of property. The pledger retains ownership of the collateral. Upon agreement, 
a pawn ticket is issued and the good is stored on the premises. The contract is 
an agreement to pay a ticket fee and repay the principal and interest. The 
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interest is calculated from the day of the pledge until the day of redemption. If 
the loan went unpaid, the good was forfeited.2 In 1870, the PBG suggested that 
‘the object of the borrower is not to get what he wants in the cheapest market, 
but to get the largest loan with the least trouble. The lender’s interest is also to 
get as much capital out as he can … so long as he is assured of its 
redemption.’ 3  The Victorian business model contradicted claims that 
pawnbrokers sought possession of goods to resell them. First and foremost, 
pawnbrokers viewed themselves as lenders. Pawnbrokers considered ticket 
fees as compensation for appraisal, administrative and labour costs, while 
interest charges related to the loan itself. Not all policymakers shared this 
perspective and failed to consider a pawnbroker’s cost of capital, operations 
expense and loan risk when deliberating price controls during the PBSC 1870. 
Victorian pawnbrokers operated with impressive speed. In 1870, 
transaction times averaged two minutes to pledge and between 30 seconds 
and two minutes for redemption.4 Though fast, the pawn market was highly 
regulated, included price controls, ticket disclosure requirements, forfeiture 
limitations, administrative procedures and stringent penalties. Notwithstanding, 
the market grew considerably during the nineteenth century. Estimates from 
the Royal Statistical Society indicated that, in 1851, the ratio of pawnbroking 
licences to 100,000 of population was 8.9. By 1871, the ratio had increased to 
13.2, with approximately 3,450 pawnbroking establishments operating in 
England and Scotland. 5  Throughout the 1860s and 1870s, licensed 
pawnbrokers received more than 207 million pledges annually, or 
approximately eight pledges for every person in Britain. Pawnbrokers in 
provincial and metropolitan districts received, on average, 40,000 and 60,000 
                                            
2 Under the PBA 1800 the minimum holding time was 15 months.  
3 PBG, 13 June 1870. The importance of transaction speed to the borrower is a recurring theme 
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pledges annually, respectively. 6  Pawnbroking was primarily an urban 
phenomenon. Table 2 provides geographically segmented licensing data. 
 
Table 2 Geographic dispersion of licenced pawnbroking, 1870 
 Licence   
 
Cities 
and 
Towns 
and  %  % 
Country boroughs rural Total urban other 
      
England 2,476 478 2,954 84% 16% 
Wales 79 14 93 85% 15% 
Scotland 283 56 339 83% 17% 
Total 2,838 548 3,386 84% 16% 
 
Source: Data compiled from PBSC 1870, appendix 14. 
 
The trade was divided into three segments: the low trade of 5s and less, 
the medium trade of 5s to 10s and the auction trade or high end 10s and more. 
The majority of pledges were in the low and medium trade. In 1870, John May, 
a Salford pawnbroker, estimated that 80-90 per cent of his 76,603 loans issued 
in 1867-1868 were for less than 10s, with an average pledge of 4s 3d.7 In 1869, 
Liverpool pawnbrokers received an estimated 9,088,000 pledges, 49.5 per cent 
of which were less than or equal to 2s, and 99.4 per cent were for less than 
42s.8 The average pledge in Liverpool in 1869 was 4s 1.5d, placing that city’s 
average in the low range of the trade.9 William Hector, Procurator Fiscal for 
Renfrewshire, estimated that 50 per cent of the families in his district engaged 
in 100 pledge transactions annually. 10  George Gillman, a London City 
missionary, concurred with Hector, estimating that 50 per cent of his working-
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class constituency in Peckham frequented pawnbrokers with an average loan 
size of 5s.11 Table 3 provides estimated annual pledges by location. 
 
Table 3 Estimated annual pledges by location 
  
Est. 
annual   
Location  pledges  Type of business 
     
London  30,000,000  - 
Liverpool  9,088,000  50% less than 2s 
Glasgow  6,690,000  90% less than 10s; avg. 4s. 
Edinburgh  1,426,800  - 
Pollokshaws  96,000  85% less than 10s 
Salford  76,603  24% less than 2s 
Exeter  36,000  - 
 
Source: PBSC 1870, 129, 934, 1215, 1252, 1851, 4863. 
 
For loans of less than 42s, the PBA 1800 permitted rates of up to 20 
pcpa. For loans of or more than 42s, the law allowed for a charge of up to 15 
pcpa. A borrower had 15 months (12 months plus three months’ grace) to 
redeem pledged collateral. Upon default, items with loan values of 10s or less 
became the immediate property of the pawnbroker. By law, forfeited items 
valued at 10s and more were sold at public auction. If the sale value exceeded 
the amount due plus auction expenses, the surplus was owed to the borrower. 
A borrower had a right to collect these funds for a period of up to three years 
post-auction. During the PBSC 1870, Robert Carter MP (Liberal) asked why 
George Attenborough lost £356 on twelve articles at auction. Demonstrating 
the complexity of the business, Attenborough replied, ‘You must remember that 
a pawnbroker standing behind his counter has to advance money upon every 
description of article … between a flat iron and a diamond … and know its value 
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… and the consequence is that he only gets a smattering of judgement … so 
that he very frequently loses his money.’12 
As a collateralised loan, the risk to the pawnbroker is in the loan-to- 
market value and assessing the probability of redemption. If a pawn is forfeited 
and sold for less than the principal lent, the pawnbroker loses money. Without 
collecting the interest owed, the pawnbroker also failed to earn a return on 
capital. Owing to seasonality and during periods of economic depression, 
pawnbrokers found it difficult to resell goods at a profit. In 1869, the Manchester 
and Salford Pawnbroker Protection Society wrote, ‘The capital sunk during the 
winter is still lying in the warehouse; while there is great difficulty in realising 
sales at even the most ruinous prices.’13 If a pawnbroker offered too low an 
advance, the pawner might take the item, and any future business, to a 
competitor. Three assessments are therefore of importance in determining the 
profitability of a pawn contract: the value of the good, the advance rate and the 
forfeiture risk. Victorian pawnbrokers earned revenue from ticket fees, interest 
on loans and, when applicable, the sale profit from low-value forfeitures. These 
funds had to provide for all expenses incurred, including valuation, wages, 
employee board, rent, rates, duties, salary for services and a return on invested 
capital. 
The pawnbroker had no control over when an item would be redeemed. 
If the pawn was redeemed early, the compensation received failed to cover the 
fixed and variable transaction costs. This loan feature was known as 
prepayment risk. In the 1870s, owing to interest rate caps and limited ticket 
fees, pawnbrokers struggled to make a profit from low pledges held in pawn for 
less than one month. Because the loan had not yet accrued interest beyond a 
twelfth of 20 per cent (a simple interest monthly allocation of the PBA 1800 
maximum), and the ticket charge did not provide coverage for the expense of 
handling a pledge, pawnbrokers were losing money. George Attenborough 
                                            
12 PBSC 1870, 769-770. 
13 PBG, 29 March 1869. 
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said, ‘I lose by every pledge that goes out of my house, which is pledged for 5s 
and under, which does not remain with me more than a month.’14 John Telfer, 
a pawnbroker from Whitechapel, suggested that if all his business was from the 
low end and retained pledges for less than a month, he would ‘not realise three-
quarters above the 2.5d it takes’ in labour for a pledge.15 William Scoular, a 
pawnbroker in Glasgow and owner of one house at the Cross at the Salt Market 
for 23 years, and a second in Bridgeton for 17 years, stated that, ‘pledges cost 
the same if in for one week or one month’.16 Showing the importance of time in 
pledge to a pawnbroker’s profitability, Dicker found that if a pawn were to stay 
in ‘for two or three months’ it would be profitable. 
Table 4 represents a typical weekly pawn cycle, with Saturday being the 
heaviest redemption day and Monday the highest volume of pledging. By the 
week’s end Dicker had advanced £522, redeemed £582, collected £36 in 
interest and £6 in ticket fees. 
 
Table 4 John Dicker, transactions for the week ending 7 May 1870 
 Pledges Pledges 
 out in 
   
Monday 249 725 
Tuesday 163 482 
Wednesday 134 437 
Thursday 130 446 
Friday 189 371 
Saturday 1,899 225 
Total 2,764 2,686 
 
Source: PBSC 1870, appendix 14. 
 
                                            
14 PBSC 1870, 720-721. 
15 PBSC 1870, 867-873. 
16 PBSC 1870, 4532. 
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Dealing with the counterfeit market was one of the most difficult aspects 
of Victorian pawnbroking. 17  A complete financial loss occurred when a 
pawnbroker had been deceived into accepting a stolen, fraudulent or ‘duffed’ 
manufactured good. London and Manchester were known production centres 
for counterfeit goods. From there products were sent round the country for 
resale or pledging.18 In the case of stolen goods, a pawnbroker could be 
convicted of knowingly receiving stolen goods and imprisoned with hard labour. 
During a Bouverie Society meeting, a Mr Bullworthy discussed a scheme 
whereby criminals pawned metal chains as platinum, and he demonstrated how 
certain chemicals when applied to metal made an object appear older.19 Mr 
Chapman showed attendees a chain that was filled with white lead and not 
gold. Knowledge of these schemes, however, did not ensure that pawnbrokers 
could avoid fraudulent goods. Most pawnbrokers had several employees and 
processed hundreds of pledges daily. Thus it was impossible for pawnbrokers 
themselves to approve every loan. 
The PBA 1800 limited pawnshop hours of operation and required each 
location to be licensed annually. Licences cost £10 in London and £7 10s in the 
provinces. Although the state did not require its citizens to carry identification, 
a pawnbroker was expected to verify a pawner’s name, address and status as 
either a householder or lodger. It was assumed by legislators that high-value 
items pledged by lodgers were stolen goods. Pawnbrokers could not accept a 
pledge from children. Financial penalties and/or prison sentences were issued 
for even minor clerical infractions in violation of the law.20 In certain jurisdictions, 
the police could enter and search a pawnshop without a warrant.  
                                            
17 PBSC 1870, 952. 
18 PBSC 1870, 700-701, 2844-2845, 2866. 
19  The Bouverie Society, Minute book, 7 January 1870, London Metropolitan Archives 
CLC/034/MS22322. The Bouverie Society (hereafter Bouverie) was a social and business club 
for pawnbrokers. 
20 An unintended consequence of the regulation enacted under PBA 1800 was the formation of 
a secondary industry known as ‘informants’. Informants were individuals or commissioned men 
who earned income by pledging goods and turning into the police pawn tickets that failed to 
conform to the exact formality of the law. The penalty was not less than 40s and could approach 
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The consequences of the PBA 1800 price controls included credit 
rationing and market segmentation. 21  Pawnbrokers argued that ‘over-
protection’ had ‘cut them off’ and illegal lenders had filled the void.22 These 
brokers were known as dolly-shops, leaving shops and, in Scotland, wee-
pawns. In 1863, the Metropolitan Pawnbroker Protection Society (MPPS) 
reported that dolly-shops were ‘fast becoming a great public scandal’.23 While 
Alexander Beresford MP (Conservative) suggested that dolly-shops charged 
lower rates, pawnbrokers argued that illegal lenders charged more on goods 
that licensed lenders could not profitably transact. 24  William Scoular, a 
pawnbroker in Glasgow, added that wee-pawns also made large loans at high 
interest during hours when regulation forbade licensed lenders from trading.25 
Charles Dickens was no friend of the trade either, writing in 1835 that ‘of 
the numerous receptacles for misery and distress with which the streets of 
London unhappily abound, there are, perhaps, none which present such 
striking scenes as the pawnbrokers' shops’. 26 However, in a letter to John 
Dicker, he wrote that borrowing  from unlicensed lenders and neighbours was 
‘infinitely worse’ than borrowing from pawnshops.27 George Gillman agreed, 
saying that dolly-shops charged higher fees and ‘take pledges from anyone’, 
whereas pawnbrokers ‘in his neighbourhood turn away people who are 
disreputable, thieves and drunkards’.28 Pawnbrokers believed that the only way 
to eradicate the black market was to remove, or at least raise, the artificial 
                                            
£10, with the informant receiving one-half the penalty. Eventually, the informant business 
became offensive to the judiciary and the public at large, and through an Act of Parliament, 22 
and 23 Vict., cap. 71 sec. 34, it was made illegal so that no monies were paid to an informant 
not being the party aggrieved. 
21 These market conditions are examined further in section C. 
22 PBG, 24 August 1868.  
23  Metropolitan Pawnbrokers’ Protection Society, Society minutes 1863, The London 
Metropolitan Archives CLC/093/MS22329 (hereafter MPPS). 
24 PBSC 1870, 413-416. 
25 PBSC 1870, 4445-4406. 
26 Published as Sketches of London No. 35 in The Evening Standard, June 1835. 
27 PBSC 1870, 625. 
28 PBSC 1872, 122-127. 
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market segmentation created by price controls. While recognising that their 
trade was imperfect, they believed it was better than the alternatives.29 
Pawnbrokers argued that the PBA 1800 was unsuitable for the times. In 
addition to burdensome administrative procedures and stringent penalties, 
price controls failed to reflect market conditions. However, the reform process 
was not without complication. Section B analyses the political and economic 
motivations, conflicts, compromises and strategy that developed within the 
industry before Parliament was approached to revise the PBA 1800. 
 
B. Conflict, compromise and the case for reform 
Most pawnbrokers agreed that the economy had changed dramatically since 
the enactment of PBA 1800. However, there was disagreement about what 
needed to be done. Why was this considered the right time for reform? Which 
factions existed within the trade? How did these small businesses understand 
‘free trade’ and ‘freedom of contract’? How far would pawnbrokers push for a 
laissez-faire agenda? Did any pawnbrokers benefit from regulation? Which 
compromises were reached and what was their approach to Parliament? 
Having established how the market functioned under PBA 1800, this section 
examines the motivations, conflicts and compromises made as pawnbrokers 
sought reform. While certain ideas are analysed in depth, many of the wider 
trends and motivations are examined in the context of the Select Committee 
and are engaged with in section C.  
Pawnbrokers were an organised trade. Although a national trade 
association had not yet been founded, large regional groups had co-operated 
on legislative proposals.30 There was one in the 1860s, when pawnbrokers 
sought to raise the PBA 1800 price ceiling. An executive committee 
representing pawnbrokers met the Home Secretary, George Lewis, and several 
                                            
29 PBSC 1870, 677-680. 
30 The National Pawnbrokers Association was founded in 1892. 
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MPs.31 Through their networks, lobbying efforts and with significant, though not 
unanimous, support within the trade, pawnbrokers crafted what became the 
1860 Halfpenny Act. This Act increased ticket charges (though not interest 
rates) for loans of less than 5s by 0.5d. During the process pawnbrokers gained 
organisational and lobbying experience. Pawnbrokers kept informed of wider 
economic and business trends. As early as 1867, there was hope that 
Parliament would 
remove all trade restrictions which are proved to be hurtful or unnecessary 
… as usury laws have been repealed, and remuneration which was once 
thought excessive now scarcely draws attention and the rate of discount 
little more than twelve months ago was for a period of three months as 
high as ten to twelve per cent on the best paper at the Bank of England.32 
 
Though pawnbrokers did not borrow from the Bank of England, as most 
were funded through owner capital, subscribers to the PBG were kept informed 
of the financial markets, including the price of silver, deposit and discount rates 
and bullion supplies held by the Bank of England and the Bank of France. In 
1867, the PBG reprinted an article first published in the Economist concerning 
the Railway Mania of 1844-1866.33 Pawnbrokers believed that their reform 
efforts fitted nicely into an economic narrative that supported the normalisation 
of free trade after the repeal of the Usury Act. 
Pawnbrokers appreciated that business-friendly reform required outside 
support. They were quick to correct what they felt were misrepresentations of 
their industry and build a rapport with other trades. In 1870, a speaker at the 
Annual Congress for the Promotion of Social Science claimed that pawnbrokers 
‘willingly received stolen goods’. 34  At the following year’s conference, in 
response and by invitation, the MPPS honorary secretary challenged this 
assertion. His findings were ‘exceedingly well received by the Congress’. 
Pawnbrokers received support from William Raynor, Superintendent of the 
                                            
31 Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 103-105. 
32 Ibid., 119-120. 
33 PBG, 28 January 1867, 3 June 1867 and 10 February 1868. 
34 MPPS, 1870-1871; PBG, 16 October 1871. 
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Police of Nottingham, and Lucas Stubbs, a magistrate in Liverpool, who were 
unaware of any pawnbroker having been convicted of knowingly receiving 
stolen goods.35 Pawnbrokers kept informed of their reputation, protecting it 
when necessary and enhancing it where possible.  
Pawnbrokers sought cooperation with other industries. In 1869, the 
MPPS informed the Goldsmith Company that large numbers of electroplated 
goods bearing imitation silver hallmarks were being produced. The Goldsmith 
Company agreed to prosecute the parties if they were arrested. Additionally, to 
combat forgeries, the instrument manufacturer Messrs. Chappell & Co. wrote 
to the MPPS offering to certify any musical instrument bearing its name.36 To 
improve their chance of a successful reform measure, pawnbrokers used their 
contacts and networks to understand the socio-political climate and build 
outside support.  
It was in this environment that pawnbrokers pursued price control and 
administrative regulatory reform. However, while most agreed that the PBA 
1800 was fundamentally flawed, owing to personal interests and historical 
tension certain groups were opposed to reform. Historically, divergent interests 
between London and the provincial cities were difficult to overcome. In 1866, 
the MPPS annual report recalled a failed effort in 1842 to form a national 
association.37 Fearing that London’s interests would overtake the industry, 
provincial pawnbrokers withheld their support. Financial statements from that 
time reveal that more than 350 London pawnbrokers provided £227 of funding 
to establish a national association whereas provincial pawnbrokers contributed 
a mere £80 19s. Of the 1842 failure, Hardaker wrote: 
  
                                            
35 PBSC 1870, 3053-3055, 4201. 
36 MPPS, 1869, 1870, 1906; For the importance of authenticity in the second-hand market see 
Heidi Egginton, ‘Popular antique collecting and the second-hand trade in Britain’, unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Cambridge (2016).  
37 MPPS, 1866. 
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a speaker in very sarcastic language characterised the conduct of the 
Country Trade as anything but creditable, for, he said, the London Trade 
had contributed something like 15s per head while the County 
pawnbrokers had only subscribed 1s each… the whole scheme sank… 
mostly due to the … country’ trade.38 
 
The fact that the 1842 failure was reported again in 1866 demonstrated 
the continuous tension between London and the provinces. In the 1868 MPPS 
annual report, John Russell commented on the ‘anxiety’ surrounding the 
regulatory reform movement. MPPS hosted a meeting of the London trade from 
which was formed the London Pawnbroking Reform Committee. This 
committee would represent London’s interests in the reform movement. This 
was no easy task as disagreement existed even within London, especially 
between the wealthy West End pawnbrokers, low-end traders, the MPPS and 
the London reform committee.39 As late as 1869 there was no consensus on 
the reform agenda in London, much less between London and the provinces. 
Within the trade, many referred to the opposition mounted by wealthy 
West End pawnbrokers as the ‘London trade’.40 High-end pawnbrokers were 
little affected by the economics of low-value pawning. Although not necessarily 
supportive of regulation, high-end traders in London preferred to maintain the 
status quo and avoid parliamentary and media scrutiny. Across the spectrum, 
both low- and high-end London pawnbrokers feared that unfettered free trade 
would be an incentive to aspiring market entrants. High-end pawnbrokers 
feared that well-capitalised associated companies might disrupt their business, 
while low-end pawnbrokers were concerned that dolly-shops would seek to join 
the ‘respectable’ pawnbroking trade. The London trade issued 430 circulars 
asking its members to vote for or against free trade legislation. With a 21 per 
cent response rate, 91 pawnbrokers replied; 53 were against complete free 
trade and 22 in support, the others were undecided.41 London’s reluctance to 
                                            
38 Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 61-63. 
39 MPPS, 1869. 
40 PBSC 1870, 689. 
41 Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 133. 
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support reform that might increase competition was present throughout the 
reform process. 
This placed them at odds with pawnbrokers campaigning for ‘complete 
free trade’.42 Pawnbrokers had long operated under price controls and were the 
only form of credit exempted from the repeal of the Usury Act in 1854. The 
rationale behind the repeal was to facilitate commercial transactions that were 
demanding larger and more sophisticated loan products. The intellectual 
foundation of the repeal was the work of the philosopher and social reformer 
Jeremy Bentham. Bentham argued that the terms of credit should be left to the 
negotiating parties and competitive forces. However, he suggested that if an 
exception did exist to a laissez-faire market structure, it was pawnbroking. In 
Discourse upon Usury letter VIII.6, he wrote, ‘If there be a case in which the 
allowing of extraordinary interest is attended with more danger than another, it 
must be this.’ Bentham believed that because the collateral remained in their 
possession, pawnbrokers had no reason to charge more than the ordinary 
market rate. Notwithstanding, he did not think rate caps were necessary as 
competition would keep rates low. It was those very controls that extreme free 
trade pawnbrokers wanted removed. Mr Heys, a pawnbroker in Manchester, 
reflected this extreme: 
[I] am in favour of free trade and freedom of contract … there exists no 
other the profits of which were fixed by Act of Parliament, and if all other 
trades were free to follow the natural laws of Commerce, why should the 
pawnbrokers be prevented from doing so too? As for protecting the 
working classes, they [are] well qualified to protect them. 
 
Citing the works of the philosopher and economist Adam Smith and Bentham, 
pawnbrokers supporting complete free trade saw no reason why they should 
be treated differently. 43  George Attenborough and like-minded supporters 
believed that competitive forces best regulated pawnbroker behaviour and 
                                            
42 How pawnbrokers understood free trade is examined below. Often what was meant by free 
trade was the freedom to enter a pawn negotiation without government control over the interest 
rate, fees or forfeiture term. Notwithstanding, extreme positions of complete free trade and 
those advocating the status quo were present. 
43 PBG, 12 June 1871. 
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charges while protecting borrowers.44 In this market, ‘buyer and seller having 
opposite interests stand face-to-face … competition is considered to hold the 
balance between the two parties’ and ‘everything was up for negotiation’.45 
Their hope was the removal of all regulation, licensing and restrictions.46 Under 
this ideal, any man with capital could compete without a licence and with no 
restrictions other than those imposed by criminal law. Extreme free traders 
assumed that lenders were trustworthy and would not ‘abuse the position 
conceded to them’.47 Proponents believed this framework would encourage ‘a 
cheaper and a better market’. 48  Although they recognised that a sizeable 
minority would fail, the overall trade and its borrowers would benefit. Based on 
the reception of the 1866 Royal Commission report on the Irish pawnbroking 
market, free traders believed that the public and legislature would support their 
position.49 
 Many pawnbrokers believed regulatory reform required unity within the 
trade and a compromise between London, the provinces and the ideological 
extremes. Even Attenborough, though a ‘champion of free trade’, admitted that 
‘Parliament will require that the trade be united’.50 The PBG agreed, advising 
that it would be better ‘to give up’ approaching Parliament if opposing factions 
existed. 51  Under that premise, 56 pawnbrokers delegated from 23 trade 
associations met in Nottingham on 23 April 1868. 52  Although there was 
sympathy for unfettered freedom, the practicality of its application was 
                                            
44  George Attenborough opened his first pawnshop in 1835. As of this writing the third 
generation operates two shops in London. See PBSC 1870, 682 and 
www.attenboroughjewellers.co.uk; PBSC 1870, 2234-2249. 
45 PBG, 13 January 1868, 1 February 1869, 5 April 1869, 13 June 1870. 
46 PBG, 5 April 1869. 
47 PBG, 24 February 1868. 
48 PBG, 13 April 1868, 4 May 1868.  
49  Pawnbroking Parliamentary Reform Association, Minute book 23 April 1868, London 
Metropolitan Archives CLC/097/MS22331 (hereafter PPRA). The ‘Irish report’ was authored by 
Dr Neilson Hancock. He argued that price controls on pawn should be lifted as they did not 
provide a sufficient remuneration and encouraged a black market. 
50 MPPS, 1869. 
51 Ibid. 
52 PPRA, 23 April 1868. 
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questioned.53 This position reflected an understanding that Parliament was 
unlikely to rescind the PBA 1800. At the extremes were free traders who were 
emboldened by the Irish pawnbroking report (issued one month before the 
Nottingham session) and others who wanted to avoid reform completely. 
With London demonstrating a willingness to participate, the Nottingham 
debates were between supporters of complete free trade and those seeking 
less radical relief. Both sides were prepared to compromise.54 Free traders 
argued that the merits of reform were proved in theory and practice and that 
fixed pricing had failed because it could not adjust to changing market 
conditions. Trade associations from Manchester and Liverpool presented 
compromise proposals. Manchester offered free trade in pricing and borrower 
protection in the form of a six-month forfeiture period. Instead of a bill, they 
suggested lobbying Parliament for a committee of inquiry. Their assumption 
was that an inquiry would lead the committee to support the trade’s reform 
agenda. Liverpool offered a ‘two-tiered’ plan of fixed pricing and flexible pricing 
for loans above 40s. For loans of more than 40s, the proposal also offered the 
option of an ‘implied contract’ whereby the fixed pricing applied, unless a 
special contract was agreed. Many pawnbrokers welcomed an adequate fixed 
rate component and implied contract as these would facilitate quick transaction 
times for common items.55 Otherwise, having to negotiate every loan would 
take a considerable amount of time. Mr Eaton, a pawnbroker from Sheffield, 
believed that Parliament would support a two-tiered system as they had with 
railways, which offered reduced pricing for labourers.56 Essentially, arguments 
in support of freedom of trade had evolved towards freedom of contract limited 
to the ability to negotiate loan terms for principal amounts above a certain value. 
                                            
53 Minutes reprinted in William Weir, The First Hundred Years 1851-1951 (Glasgow: A. Duncan 
& Sons, 1952), 22. 
54 PPRA, 23 April 1868; Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 123-125.  
55 PPRA, 23 April 1868. 
56 PBG, ‘The Nottingham sessions’, 27 April 1868. 
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As the first day of deliberation closed, the Manchester proposal, with a 
vote of 31 to 25, received the most support.57 The vote also authorised the 
formation of a lobbying entity with responsibility for the industry’s agenda. In 
response, the Pawnbroker Parliamentary Reform Association (PPRA) was 
formed and charged with designing a comprehensive reform bill. The slim 
majority did not go unnoticed as opponents from Liverpool, London and 
Nottingham questioned whether a majority of six was to ‘be the means of 
bringing disaster upon upwards of the three thousand pawnbrokers in Great 
Britain’.58 If complete free trade in pricing was pursued, Liverpool and Sheffield 
would offer no support. In an open letter received by more than 3,000 
pawnbrokers, the non-free-traders of London wrote that the Nottingham 
session would ‘destroy the trade’ and believed that the low rates at the Bank of 
England, together with a generally poor economic environment, made it unlikely 
that Parliament would increase the rates.59 Fears of more competition, the entry 
of associated companies and the reputational risk of having dolly-shops evolve 
into legal pawnbrokers remained at the fore. 
Having heard from regional trade associations, the PPRA was convinced 
that a two-tiered price schedule was the only way forward. Many believed that 
complete free trade in pricing was not a viable operational or political option. 
Seemingly, practical realities had prevailed over the ‘perfection’ of laissez-faire 
theory. In part, this can be explained by what the Nottingham delegates did. 
They had been instructed by their members to vote against complete free trade, 
but it seems that some delegates had ignored the wishes of their membership 
and voted for free trade in pricing. By this point, even passionate free traders 
admitted that without compromise they would be left operating under the 
problematic PBA 1800. Under a two-tiered system, their goal was to increase 
                                            
57 PBG, ‘The Nottingham sessions’, 27 April 1868. 
58 Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 126-143. 
59 PBG, 1 February 1869 and 3 February 1869. 
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fixed rates at the low end and to simplify the low business by removing 
confusing fractional and split monthly charges.  
Having settled their differences, 594 guarantors and 164 subscribers 
committed in excess of £2,200 in funding to the PPRA.60 Table 5 demonstrates 
the distribution of funding. That Manchester provided almost one quarter of the 
group’s funding comes as no surprise, as they were predominantly a low-value 
pledge city and had long held that profits needed to be increased.61 
 
Table 5 Top ten PPRA funding support by city 
  Amount  Amount  
  Guaranteed  Subscribed % 
 Place £ s d  £ s d of total 
          
1. Manchester 522 1 0  12 16 0 24% 
2. London 337 10 0  4 12 0 15% 
3. Liverpool 232 14 0  9 4 6 11% 
4. Sheffield 143 17 0  10 19 6 7% 
5. Glasgow 116 4 0  5 1 0 5% 
6. Nottingham 112 16 0  1 1 0 5% 
7. Leeds 103 5 0  0 0 0 5% 
8. Bradford 53 0 0  0 0 0 2% 
9. Bolton 50 8 0  0 0 0 2% 
10. Exeter 45 0 0  0 0 0 2% 
 
Source: PPRA, 26 October 1870. 
 
After reviewing the 36 sections of the PBA 1800, the PPRA decided that 
14 sections should remain and 22 be repealed. They began working on a draft 
bill for approval at the next meeting of the trade. Upon completion of a draft, the 
PPRA enlisted the services of Messrs Coates and Reilly of Dyson and 
                                            
60  PPRA, 26 October 1870. Guaranteed funding was committed over time, whereas 
subscription constituted one-off donations. Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 144. 
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Company, a parliamentary drafting agent. 62  In Victorian Britain, as in the 
present, parliamentary agents help design and promote private member bills. 
The major objectives of the draft bill were to raise the interest rate, enable the 
negotiation of special contracts and shorten the forfeiture period to six months. 
Essentially, the draft reflected a combination of the Manchester and Liverpool 
proposals from the Nottingham session. Even a reluctant London did not carry 
enough weight to counter a compromise agreement between the two provincial 
cities, that, combined, provided more than double London’s PPRA funding. 
With the draft completed, on 11 February 1869 161 pawnbrokers from 
43 towns and cities met at the Midland Hotel, Derby to discuss and debate the 
draft. The first four clauses were agreed without debate; the ‘real business of 
the day began’ with clause 5.63 Clause 5 outlined fixed rates for loans of less 
than 42s. After considering six scales, scales A and B were submitted for 
debate.64 Scale A was rejected as too complicated and for continuing the 
industry’s reliance on farthings, a coinage whose importance had declined 
since 1800. In certain provincial areas farthings were difficult to obtain. 65 
Furthermore, scale A too closely resembled the graduated fraction system of 
the PBA 1800 which pawnbrokers wanted to discard. 
Instead, a point-to-point scale (e.g., 0.5d for every 2s lent) was sought. 
Scale B allowed for a 25 pcpa for loans of less than 42s (5 per cent over the 20 
per cent PBA 1800 rate) and a 20 pcpa for loans of more than 42s (5 per cent 
over the 15 per cent PBA 1800 rate). Table 6 illustrates the agreed Derby scale. 
  
                                            
62 PBG, 18 May 1868. Today, Bircham Dyson Bell is the largest authorised Roll ‘A’ parliamentary 
agent and the only agent to offer legal and political consultancy. 
63 Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 152-156; PBG, 15 February 1869; PPRA, January and 
February 1869. 
64 PPRA, 2-3 July 1868. 
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Table 6 The Derby scale 
Principal < 42s  Interest  Principal 42s <  £10  Interest 
(in shillings)  (in dimes)  (in s.d)   
           
- - 2  0.5  42 < 42.6  8.5d 
2 < 4  1  42.6 < 45  9d 
4 < 6  1.5  45 < 47.6  9.5d 
6 < 8  2  47.6 < 50  10d 
...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
36 < 38  9.5  90 < 92.6  1s 6.5d 
38 < 40  10  92.6 < 95  1s 7d 
40 < 42  10.5  95 < 97.6  1s 7.5d 
42 - -  11  0.5d monthly for every 2s 6d < £10 
 
Source: PPRA, 2-3 July 1868; PBG, March 15 1869. 
 
The rate chargeable was monthly, or any part of a month, excluding a 
period of grace. One attendee, Mr Starling, believed this was one-sided. He 
suggested that the first seven days of a calendar month should not be 
chargeable for additional interest. After seven days, an entire month’s interest 
would be incurred, thus eliminating fractional charges. Other areas of debate 
included ticket charges, bookkeeping procedures, disclosure norms, auction 
procedures and terms of forfeiture.66 Even the London delegates agreed with 
the proposal, saying, ‘We are not unreasonable men and do not want to fight 
blindly against all change.’67  
With the Derby bill agreed, the PPRA executive committee sought the 
support of government through the Home Secretary, Henry Bruce (Liberal). 
Bruce agreed to schedule a date to meet representatives to learn more. Several 
months went by without correspondence from the Home Office. If not for the 
persistence of the reform committee, there might have been no meeting as a 
clerk at the Home Office had failed to respond. Having admitted its mistake, on 
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18 February 1870 Bruce said he would reconsider the matter and did so two 
days later. 68  In the meantime, the PPRA invited 15 MPs from large 
constituencies to the Westminster Palace Hotel to review the bill. Ten MPs 
agreed to accompany the PPRA during their meeting at the Home Office.69 
Bruce offered to support the convening of a select committee to investigate the 
market impact of the PBA 1800. This was the original goal of the Manchester 
trade association. Manchester believed that the public and Parliament would 
trust the findings of a select committee. It assumed those findings would view 
the demands of pawnbrokers favourably. To help the process pawnbrokers 
rallied the support of peers and MPs from Liverpool, Manchester and Derby. 
Samuel Plimsoll MP (Liberal) and James Sidebotham MP (Conservative), along 
with Bruce, initiated the process of forming a select committee. Charles Hambro 
MP (Conservative), who held extremely negative views of the industry, 
mounted opposition by moving that the bill be read a second time six months 
later. In response, pawnbrokers across the country travelled to London and 
lobbied their local MPs. Hambro was countered by, among others, Dudley 
Ryder MP (Conservative, Lord Sandon), Edward Baines MP (Conservative) 
and David Chadwick MP (Liberal), and on 9 May 1870 17 MPs were nominated 
to sit on the select committee.70 
With the select committee appointed, the PBG urged its readers to 
refrain from criticising the bill.71 The movement would not, however, escape 
outside criticism. The Daily Telegraph was sceptical of the pawnbrokers’ 
intentions: ‘Uncle and his Little Bill should be closely looked after.’72 An editorial 
from the same issue claimed that the pawnbrokers’ greed would lead them to 
                                            
68 At this stage the PPRA received assistance from Sheffield MP Anthony Mundella (Liberal), 
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69 Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 178; PPRA, 26 October 1870. 
70 PPRA, 22 April 1869; Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 179-189. Hambro was appointed to 
the select committee. 
71 PBG, 24 March 1870. 
72 Daily Telegraph, Saturday, 9 April 1870. At the time, pawnbrokers were often referred to as 
‘Uncle’. 
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the same ‘evil example of Overend, Gurney and Company, who refused to let 
well alone’. The Latest News was more optimistic: ‘Not long ago the public 
ignored prostitution … but now, however unpleasant the topic may be, 
recognises it’, and that even though pawnbroking is the ‘evil of the day’, it did 
benefit the working poor.73 Although the Spectator supported free trade, it 
criticised the pawnbrokers: ‘In their distress … like everybody else, turn[ed] to 
the House of Commons for relief.’74 
Emboldened by their success in having ticket charges raised in 1860, 
pawnbrokers felt that, by 1869, there was sufficient support within the industry 
and Parliament for an overhaul of the PBA 1800. To do so required a 
compromise between the divergent interests of London, the provincial cities 
and those supporting the two extremes. Although there was almost unanimous 
support for free trade theory, its practical application and effect on the industry 
were questioned.  
While the extreme free trade element held that their beliefs were 
superior, compromises led to a two-tiered system of fixed and flexible pricing. 
The evidence demonstrates that these Victorian small business leaders 
understood the theoretical economic concerns of the day, yet determined that 
it was in their best interest to reach a compromise. This reflected the fact that 
Parliament was unlikely to abandon protective measures altogether and that 
there were disagreements within the trade. Pawnbrokers had long been 
regulated and were exempt from the repeal of the Usury Act, two realities that 
were unlikely to shift. However, the financial and administrative pressures 
under the PBA 1800 did require change. After debating the options, a two-tiered 
price schedule was agreed. The schedule was expected to increase profits, 
ease the administrative burden and avoid a complete overhaul of the 
competitive landscape. The trade sought outside expertise and lobbied 
Parliament to help advance their cause. Their approach was methodological 
                                            
73 ‘Pawnbrokers’, The Latest News, 25 April 1870. 
74 ‘Mr Plimsoll’s pawnbroking bill’, Spectator, 2 May 1870. 
  
66 
and professional. They believed that their draft bill remedied the financial and 
operational needs of the industry while balancing Parliament’s desire to protect 
poor borrowers. What follows analyses the political and economic motivations, 
conflicts and compromises that occurred during the period of the Select 
Committee. 
 
C. The Select Committee and the Act 
Beginning on 13 June, the PBSC 1870 sat over twelve days and interviewed 
36 witnesses. The committee was appointed to investigate the law affecting the 
pawnbroking trade with a view to its reform. The committee members for the 
most part demonstrated knowledge of the existing legislation, having at their 
disposal over 300 years of English pawnbroking legislation, with the most 
recent enactment in 1800.75 Witnesses included pawnbrokers, magistrates, 
barristers, newspaper editors, high-ranking police officers, independent 
experts, auctioneers and charity workers. At least one-third of the witnesses 
were from outside the industry. Committee members and the witnesses held 
diverse opinions concerning the trade. 
Samuel Plimsoll understood the grievances of the industry and had 
published pamphlets in support of pawnbroking.76 George Gillman knew the 
pawnbrokers in his district of Drury Lane and Peckham. Gillman believed the 
industry was helpful as it relieved pressure on those suffering from ‘sickness or 
loss of work’.77 Sympathisers, and pawnbrokers themselves, often referred to 
the trade as the banker to the poor. A Glasgow pawnbroker reversed the 
analogy and argued that ‘bankers are but pawnbrokers on a larger scale ... I 
                                            
75 In 1546 Henry VIII capped the pawn interest rate at 10 per cent, James I reduced the rate to 
8 per cent, Charles II to 6 per cent and under Queen Anne the rate was reduced to 5 per cent. 
Beyond the interest rate, in 1603 the first comprehensive regulatory framework was enacted to 
cover stolen goods and redemption procedures. 
76 Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 183-185. Plimsoll was an active social reformer, perhaps 
best known for the ‘Plimsoll line’, a regulatory measure intended to improve safety standards 
in the shipping industry. As an MP for Derby, he represented a significant pawnbroking 
constituency. 
77 PBSC 1872, 374. 
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hold that the poor man in distress has as much right to borrow money on his 
watch, or coat, as the rich have to borrow on their lands, and very often a much 
better excuse for so doing.’ 78 Few policymakers considered pawnbrokers as 
‘real’ bankers, even if the chairman, Acton Smee Ayrton MP (Liberal), 
suggested that ‘the pawnbroker is a kind of banker for people in a small sort of 
way’.79  
Archibald Orr-Ewing, at the same time, sought to eradicate what he 
believed was an evil and immoral business.80 During a House of Commons 
debate, Orr-Ewing declared that ‘this system of pawnbroking for these small 
sums is a black spot upon our social system. It is degrading and demoralising 
to the people who deal in it; it does not limit any suffering; it only increases 
those gross passions which we all wish to see improved.’81 The Salford Weekly 
wrote that pawnbrokers had ‘infested’ the large towns.82 Alexander McCall, 
Chief Constable of Glasgow, believed it would not be ‘a loss to the country’ if 
pawnbroking was eliminated.83 However, when pressed on his interactions with 
pawnbrokers, he deemed them a respectable class of men. He admitted that 
only three of the 109 pawnbrokers operating in Glasgow deserved to have their 
licences revoked. 84  Throughout the proceedings several of the industry’s 
antagonists held views of the ‘evil pawn system’ and the respectable 
pawnbrokers with whom they were acquainted that contradicted each other. 
Were pawnbrokers evil and their loans morally corrupting, or did these 
bankers to the poor provide a financial service to hard-working, rational and 
capable adults? How did the committee members understand the benefits and 
drawbacks of free trade in the pawnbroking context? During this era of 
supposed ‘free trade’, pawnbrokers were a private market solution to a demand 
                                            
78 PBG, 18 February 1867. 
79 PBSC 1870, 1791, 1803. Emphasis added. 
80 PBSC 1870, 1537-1551, 3666-3671. 
81 HC deb. 15 July 1872, vol. 212; Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 264. 
82 Reprinted in PBG, 26 September 1870. 
83 PBSC 1870, 1417. 
84 PBSC 1870, 1256-1258, 1349. 
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for cash. Arguably, pawnbrokers kept people from seeking charity and, in the 
extreme, the Poor Law. Why did the provision of small cash loans cause such 
divergent viewpoints and how did these opinions affect regulation? Did the 
perspective of certain policymakers fail to understand the lived realities of the 
working poor? 
There was little dispute that the demand for small loans was driven by 
poverty. Whether the conditions of poverty were created by structural economic 
features, such as unstable labour markets and low wages, or were the result of 
improvidence and irrational behaviour was debated. This research argues that 
these competing perceptions of poverty influenced the proposed regulatory 
response. The following paragraphs argue that those seeking to keep or 
enhance regulation understood the pawn market from a framework that viewed 
borrowers as ‘the undeserving poor’. Their position argued that pawnbrokers, 
like indiscriminate charity, contributed to the demoralisation of the lower 
classes, which, in turn affected all British society.85 Conversely, pawnbrokers 
and their supporters sought reform favourable to the industry based on their 
understanding of pro-business and free market principles. Concerning Victorian 
pawnbrokers and regulation, how did theoretical laissez-faire beliefs interact 
with the poverty debate? Was the debate structured as an economic policy 
question, that is, should the price of money be regulated? Or was regulation 
considered to be necessary to improve the conditions of poverty? 
 
  
                                            
85  Melanie Tebbutt reached a similar conclusion in Making Ends Meet: Pawnbroking and 
Working-Class Credit (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983). See the literature review 
for the distinction between Tebbutt’s work and this research. 
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Regulation or freedom of contract? 
 
I think it would be a most desirable thing to have a law even to prevent 
people from making themselves and their children so poor and miserable 
as they are at present.86 
William Miller, Magistrate of the City of Glasgow 
 
The poor are able to detect for themselves very well, they are very 
intelligent with regard to the amount which they have to pay.87 
Sir Thomas Henry, Chief Magistrate of the Metropolitan Police Courts 
 
Two opposing viewpoints were debated. Either the working poor had the 
ability to negotiate freely in their best interest or they did not. The former 
position suggested that freely competitive markets generated optimal loan 
outcomes for both pawnbrokers and borrowers. Orr-Ewing and Hambro argued 
that the working poor needed regulatory protection. The motivations underlying 
the latter position varied and were not necessarily mutually exclusive. A minority 
suggested that pawnbrokers could take advantage of the ‘necessities of the 
poor’ and thus demanded regulation because the parties entered into contracts 
on unequal terms. 88  Others held that the working poor were intellectually 
inferior and morally improvident. From this perspective regulating the pawn 
market reined in prejudicial behaviour. It was believed that by providing cash to 
the working poor, pawnbrokers caused and encouraged morally deficient 
actions that reflected poorly ‘on the whole state of the country’.89 Hambro 
argued that pawning was ‘injurious to the moral welfare of the lower classes’.90 
Orr-Ewing, Hambro, McCall and Stubbs linked poverty to a lack of thrift, 
irrationality, drunkenness, crime and other types of vice. For them, the problem 
was not the structure of the industrial urban economy, but the decay of morality, 
including self-reliance, savings and sobriety. This type of poverty was 
associated with pauperism, ‘the irregularly employed and semi-criminal 
elements’, which were distinguished from the ‘authentic’ and self-supporting 
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88 PBSC 1870, 3579. 
89 PBSC 1870, 394-406. 
90 PBSC 1870, 1357. 
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working class.91 In this framework, conditions of pauperism were a choice, and 
while many of the working class had improved their standard of living, these 
borrowers ‘chose’ not to.92 Samuel Smiles, whose book Self-Help was the ‘bible 
of mid-Victorian liberalism’, believed that ‘any class of men that lives hand to 
mouth will ever be an inferior’.93 Smiles related economic outcomes to the 
inherent value of a person. This view of the working poor can be understood as 
functional in so far as ‘people were subsumed within’ economic terminology.94 
Those who practised abstinence and self-control were rewarded, while moral 
deviance resulted in poverty. Policies that supported individual freedom and 
moral responsibility, along with a laissez-faire government, were the key 
components of ‘Gladstonian liberalism’.95 However, unlike Gladstonian policy, 
many on the PBSC 1870 sought to counter ‘the destructive’ pawn system 
through regulation. 
If friendly societies were an indication of the working class striving for 
the higher moral values and economic stability of the middle class, 
pawnbrokers provided easy cash to the ‘degenerate poor’, allowing them to 
avoid honest and hard work.96 Given that a loan occurred without inquiry into a 
borrower’s intended use of the funds, pawn loans were considered no better 
than indiscriminate charity. Pawn allowed the able-bodied poor to perpetuate 
the conditions that Orr-Ewing and others wanted to eliminate. An example of 
this involved pawning bed sheets. This debate demonstrated a lack of 
understanding of the reality of the lives of the poor by those seeking strict 
                                            
91 David Englander, Poverty and Poor Law Reform In 19th Century Britain, 1834-1914: From 
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94 Geoffrey Searle, Morality and the Market in Victorian Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 31-34; Gordon Bigelow, Fiction, Famine, and the Rise of Economics in Victorian Britain 
and Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2-4. 
95 Michael Winstanley, Gladstone and the Liberal Party (London: Routledge, 1992), 12-13; 
Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1979), 509. 
96 Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State: A History of Social Policy since the 
Industrial Revolution (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 130. 
  
71 
regulation. For Orr-Ewing, McCall and William Hughes MP (Liberal), to pawn a 
necessity of such low value was evidence enough of improvidence.97 Johnston 
suggested that even the poorest person owned articles worth more than 3s.98 
This point failed to appreciate that the working poor pawned only what they 
could manage without. It does no good to pawn the family’s only frying pan to 
purchase food that required cooking or the father’s tools if he is to work. 
McCall testified that a ‘drunken wife’ had pawned ‘every article of 
furniture and every stitch of clothing’  the family owned.99 McCall believed that 
there were ‘very few cases of provident well-behaved people’ living in such 
destitution that they had to pledge low-value clothing and bedding.100 Miller and 
McCall argued that the demand for small loans would disappear if it were not 
for improvidence. 101  These borrowers, argued Lucas Stubbs, a Liverpool 
magistrate, required the same protection as ‘children who cannot take care of 
themselves’. 102  Hector, Henry and Robert Johnson, Procurator Fiscal for 
Edinburgh, and others linked the need for small sums with alcohol 
consumption.103  Although no supporter of social regulation or commenting 
directly on pawn, William Gladstone, then Prime Minister, believed that alcohol 
abuse among the working class threatened financial stability and self-help.104 
Thomas Arnold, a London magistrate, countered that the working poor 
were ‘so often short’ of money for ‘ordinary purposes’ that pawnbrokers 
provided a much-needed service to the community.105 Scoular, a pawnbroker, 
suggested that the weekly pawn cycle was not linked to alcohol as most people 
redeemed on a Saturday evening, leaving less income available for the public 
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houses, which were well attended during the weekend.106 Moreover, Scoular 
clarified that pawnbrokers avoided bedding. He estimated that two-thirds of 
pledged blankets in Glasgow were from ‘club purchases’, which meant that they 
were purchased on credit then pawned to raise cash.107 The oversupply of club 
bedding meant that it carried little value and was difficult to resell. The working 
poor were not without bedding, but used club purchases creatively to raise 
cash. This demonstrated that the working poor utilised credit and made 
economic decisions in a way that many policymakers failed to appreciate. 
William Holford, a charity worker in London who interacted with the poor 
on a daily basis, denied the link between poverty, pawn and drinking.108 James 
Parker, 16 years a London City missionary in Marylebone, Hanover Square, 
Chelsea and Paddington, said those taking small loans were not intemperate, 
but were irregularly employed or ‘under pressure from sickness’.109 The North 
British Daily Mail suggested that Hector too easily and inappropriately 
associated ‘all the evils that afflict humanity’ with pawnbroking. 110  These 
rebuttals challenged much of the immoral dimension of pawning, shed light on 
the operations of the market with detailed testimony and recognised that Hector 
and others held the pawn market in such a low regard that their opinion was 
unlikely to shift. 
Many on the Select Committee demonstrated a Gladstonian link 
between economic success and moral ‘rightness’.111 However, Gladstone did 
not support social regulation or state interference in the market. He believed 
that people ‘should not look … to the government for the radical removal of the 
evils which affect human life’. 112  Regardless, certain committee members 
demanded regulation to control ‘evil pawnbrokers’ and ‘immoral borrowers’. 
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From this perspective regulation mirrored the 1834 Poor Law concept of ‘less 
eligible’ and efforts to eliminate ‘indiscriminate charity’ and replace it with a 
system of sanctions to encourage thrift and hard work.113 Pawnbrokers enabled 
the able-bodied working poor to avoid those sanctions and incentives. Like 
indiscriminate charity, pawnbrokers created a type of spiralling dependency, 
which in part is why they were dubbed ‘evil’. The need for such small sums, 
coupled with a high interest rate, was evidence of irrationality and immorality. 
In a challenge to borrower rationality and intelligence, Orr-Ewing asked 
John May, a pawnbroker: ‘Do you think that the poor people who come to you 
and pledge their articles for small sums … are in a … position to deal with the 
clever men in your profession?’ May replied that all men possess common 
sense and that some of the ‘sharpest bargains’ were to be found among working 
people. 114  Orr-Ewing’s position reflected a normative understanding of 
Victorian rationality.115 From this perspective behaviour was determined by 
those ‘in power’ and any deviation was considered irrational and immoral. A 
moral person would have no need for such a loan and, moreover, should the 
need exist, engaging at such a high interest rate was an utter failure of reason. 
While other members of the working class had advanced owing to rational, 
thrifty and sobriety, these borrowers had failed. 116  Those seeking strict 
regulation saw borrowers as, if not paupers, at least borderline cases whose 
ignorance had led them into destitution. Regulation would limit, if not reverse, 
the moral and economic decay of the undeserving poor. 
Arguing the opposite position, in 1867 the Manchester Examiner and 
Times suggested that ‘commercial depression’ affected even the ‘best workers’ 
and that pawnbroker loans enabled them to maintain their independence.117 
                                            
113 Steadman Jones, Outcast London. 
114 PBSC 1870, 1034-1035. 
115 Steadman Jones, Outcast London, 268. 
116 Steadman Jones argued that Marshall, Toynbee and Green were optimistic in their hopes 
for the working class. This optimism departed from the pessimism of Malthusian thought. See 
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Many on the committee agreed. Far from entrapment, pawning kept borrowers’ 
independent of charity and government relief. Far from the immoral poor, these 
hard-working families needed cash to ‘equalise their wages’, which were 
irregular owing to casual employment and a fluctuating labour market. 118 
Ayrton, the committee chairman, suggested that small loans met the 
‘reasonable requirements of the working-classes’.119  
Pawnbrokers and their allies suggested that the working poor were 
intellectually and morally capable of transacting with fewer regulations. An 
exchange between Ayrton and William Hancock, an independent expert on 
pawnbroking, demonstrated this: 
Hancock: I think that the poorer people, on the whole would get fairer 
terms, and more money and more convenient arrangements, and that the 
contracts, if worked out under a perfectly free system, would be better 
suited to both parties. 
 
Chair: Then would you reply upon competition to enable the parties to get 
the most they could and at the lowest rate of interest? 
 
Hancock: Yes, certainly.120 
 
Thomas Chambers MP (Liberal) and Gillman believed that freedom of 
trade protected the poor ‘better than now given to him by the regular law’.121 It 
was expected that competitive markets would drive inefficient, dishonest and 
low-end lenders out of the market. Regulations that limited profitability only 
pushed borrowers towards illegal lenders or forced them to sell. 122 It was 
argued that if a borrower had the intelligence to purchase personal goods 
without legal interference, that same intelligence was available for pawning.123 
A different picture of the borrower emerged; they were rational, clever and able 
to cope with unpredictable wages and expenses. These borrowers were 
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independent decision-makers who had the ability to maximise their welfare 
without state interference. 
Accordingly, borrowers were not living beyond their means or spending 
wastefully, but were competent members of society who required a small loan 
to cover a short-term need. The pawnbroker, far from being evil, fulfilled a 
needed service. William Knight, an assistant judge of the Middlesex Court of 
Session, who on balance was antagonistic to the industry, said that certain 
people ‘would be dreadfully distressed if they could not raise even 1s on some 
article of dress to provide them food’.124 Others agreed with William Shaw, an 
assistant pawnbroker: ‘plenty of poor people would starve’ without pawn 
loans.125 Holford, a London City missionary, testified that a man in his district 
pledged his blanket for food. However, Robert Johnston refused to believe that 
one’s ‘necessities can be so great as they can possibly be relieved … by so 
paltry an advance as 2s 6d’.126 For charity workers in daily contact with the poor 
and the supporters of pawn, knew that money was needed for necessities such 
as medical, food and household expenses. For them, while an extremely small 
minority might borrow to purchase alcohol, most borrowers were hard-working 
family men. 
Similarly, although Orr-Ewing held that pawners were ‘as a rule’ the ‘very 
lowest’ members of society, pawnbrokers retorted that it was ‘no use dealing 
with those who have nothing’.127 Lists of bankrupt persons appeared regularly 
in the PBG and supported the notion that pawnbrokers avoided contracting with 
people who had very little.128 If borrowers were not ‘the lowest’, then they were 
unlikely to be paupers. Accordingly, any regulation to combat pauperism would 
be misguided. Diverging views existed, in part, by where in the class structure 
one placed the borrowing population. The lower the perceived status, the more 
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likely it was for a committee member or witness to seek strict regulation. The 
rationale, however, was not simply to protect ‘vulnerable’ borrowers, but to 
control ‘immoral and irrational’ behaviour that affected the entire economy and 
well-being of society. The status of the pawnbroker was determined by the 
same logic. Pawnbrokers were evil because they ‘indiscriminately’ supported 
‘pauperism’. Alternatively, pawnbrokers provided small cash loans for working 
families. These ‘bankers to the poor’ assisted hard-working family men by 
providing much needed cash to cover basic expenses. Proponents of this logic 
argued for regulation more favourable to business. The interaction between 
theoretical concerns over state interference in the economy, the practicalities 
of business operations and conflicting views of poverty were present during the 
debate over the benefits and drawbacks of price controls, which are explored 
in the following subsection. 
 
Price controls 
Raising the price ceiling was the primary motivating factor of the reform 
movement. Pawnbrokers held that price controls under the PBA 1800 provided 
insufficient compensation and a low return on invested capital, and were difficult 
to administer. Pawnbrokers’ call for increased profits was met with both ridicule 
and support. This subsection discusses whether low-value pledges were 
unprofitable. Proving this was vital if pawnbrokers were to have the price ceiling 
raised. How did the committee respond to the financial ‘proof’ presented by 
pawnbrokers? What were the perceived benefits and drawbacks of price 
controls? How did price controls influence the structure of the pawn market? 
Did price controls encourage credit rationing and sustain an illegal market? 
Price controls influence a market in various ways. Price caps restrict the 
return on invested capital and, when set below the market clearing price, reduce 
the supply of credit. This leaves some of the demand unsatisfied and leads to 
credit rationing and market segmentation. Although credit risk was mitigated 
through collateral, pawnbrokers can and did experience payment risk. 
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Pawnbrokers argued that low-value pledges redeemed within a month were 
unprofitable. These loans were paid before accrued interest exceeded fixed 
expenses. While revenue was fixed through legislation at a point in time, 
pawnbrokers operated with fixed and variable costs, which changed over time. 
Without price restrictions, the market would price payment or time risk at a 
higher level. Payment risk, rising labour costs, credit rationing and market 
segmentation were present in the pawn market and are analysed below. 
Pawnbrokers transacting in the low trade argued that price controls 
under the PBA 1800 were inadequate. John Dicker, owner of four houses in 
London (Poplar, Limehouse, Commercial Road East and Clerkenwell) said: 
seventy years ago the expenses connected with the pawnbroking 
business were entirely different… expenses with the staff are now very 
much increased. In addition to that, one’s rent and every other thing is 
altered; and either the profit must have been excessive at the time when 
the law was adopted, or else the business having grown in one direction, 
whilst being tied in the other.129 
 
Dicker had £11,182 of invested capital, generating a net profit of £629 or 
5.6 per cent ROE and a 2.6 per cent return on a sum advanced of £23,594 
collateralised by 69,656 pledges. 130  Many of the testifying pawnbrokers 
believed that a 5 per cent return on invested capital was widely available.131 It 
was argued that considering the amount of work that went into running a pawn 
business, a fair return ought to exceed 5 per cent. In Dicker’s case he earned 
0.6 per cent above the ‘market rate’ of return, which he considered too low. A 
summary of Dicker’s certified financial position is found in Table 7. 
 
  
                                            
129 PBSC 1870, 435-436. 
130 PBSC 1870, 461, appendix 14 and author calculations. 
131 In 1870 the Bank rate was 2.5 per cent, in 1871 3 per cent and in 1872 5 per cent. See 
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Table 7 John Dicker business analysis, June 1870 
Pledges taken in 69,656 
Sum advanced £23,594 
Capital turnover (a) 2.6x 
Average pledge 6s 11d 
 
Capital investment £ s d % total 
     
Pledge stock £8,919 0 7 62.7% 
Premium on stock (b) 800 0 0 5.6% 
Lease on premise 890 0 0 6.3% 
Cash 573 11 0 4.0% 
Pawnbroker capital £11,182 11 7 78.7% 
Sale stock 3,034 14 5 21.3% 
Invested capital £14,217 6 0 100.0% 
 
 
£ s d % total 
     
Interest fee £1,406 15 1 87.9% 
Ticket fee 193 2 5 12.1% 
Total 1,599 17 6 100.0% 
Expenses 970 5 3  
Total £629 12 3  
Return on capital 5.6%    
Return on sum advanced 2.6%    
 
Source: PBSC 1870, 426, appendix 14 and author calculations. Represents 12 months of 
business. (a) Sum advanced / capital investment in pledged stock. (b) Capitalised interest. It 
is unclear if the expense category included a salary for Dicker. 
 
Dicker’s results were not uncommon. As Table 8 demonstrates, 
pawnbrokers were operating at or near a 5 per cent return on invested capital. 
The limited data supported arguments that pawnbrokers with low loan averages 
earned less money than higher volume brokers with higher average loans. 
McKay’s low pledge stock and high capital turnover ratio suggested that his 
business was based on low-value weekly transactions. Comparing McKay’s 
low-end business with Russell and Telfer’s (higher average loan size) and 
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Barnett’s (high volume and loan average), the returns varied as expected, with 
McKay earning less than the other six pawnbrokers. 
 
Table 8 Summary returns of six testifying pawnbrokers 
 
Barnett 
(a) Russell Dicker Dicker Telfer Blackwood 
McKay
(b) 
 Lambeth Edinburgh London 1 London 2 London Bradford Glasgow 
        
Pledges in 134,505 72,000 69,656 65,824 69,784 58,601 53,884 
Average loan 4s 3d 11s 3d 6s 11d 5s 9d 6s 3d 5s 3s 1d 
Sum advanced £28,608 - £23,594 £18,840 £21,663 £16,821 £8,372 
Pledge stock £8,726    £8,919  £7,897  £8,201  - £3,500  
Total capital £11,896  £27,000  £11,182  £10,560  - - £4,482  
Capital turnover 3.3x - 2.6x 2.4x - - 5.6x 
Interest fee £1,706  - £1,406  £1,180  £1,146  £647  £477  
Ticket fee £320  - £193  £164  £195  £138  £136  
Capital return 6.4% 7.2% 5.6% 6.1% 7.1% - 3.6% 
Est. fair return 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% - 5.0% 
Adjusted return 1.4% 2.2% 0.6% 1.1% 2.1% - -1.4% 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from PBSC 1870. Unless noted otherwise, it is unclear if the 
adjusted return included an owner-operator salary expense. 
(a) Financial information submitted anonymously to Parliament. The pawnbroker was later 
identified as Mr Barnett. 
(b) Expenses exclude deductions for McKay’s salary and that of his two sons, both key 
managers, thus overstating profitability. 
 
Pledges required the same amount of labour and administration 
regardless of the loan size. Labour was a considerable proportion of fixed costs. 
It was estimated that six or seven employees were needed for every 1,000 
pledges received daily. One of the employees would be a manager or a ‘First’. 
In busy pawnshops a First was charged with managing other employees, who 
could include a second, a third and boys performing menial tasks.132 A First 
earned approximately £2 a week and in some cases a profit dividend. In 1867, 
a First working in South London at a shop taking in 96,000 pledges annually 
                                            
132 PBSC 1870 373, 461-483, 520, 4822. 
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earned £100 in annual salary and £26 in kind for room and board.133 William 
Charley MP (Conservative), a former judge, suggested that high labour costs 
meant that managers needed accountancy skills. Dicker responded that 
bookkeeping was not so much a requirement as the need for appraisal skills 
and a trustworthy character as managers handled cash unsupervised.134 Again, 
the evidence points to policymakers’ failure to understand how the industry 
operated. 
Demonstrating the labour exerted on a typical Saturday (7 May 1870), 
Dicker produced 1,899 strung together pawn tickets.135 The exhibit measured 
approximately 58 feet and was dubbed ‘the serpent’. The serpent revealed that 
only 346 (18 per cent) out of 1,889 loans were profitable. Gross remuneration 
was equal to 4.88 per cent on loans, totalling approximately £304. The business 
expense of 4.36 per cent or an approximate cost of 2.25d per pledge absorbed 
nearly the whole of the remuneration. The serpent was intended to demonstrate 
how much work went into so little profit. Table 9 demonstrates that low-value 
pledges held for less than one month were unprofitable. The average loan size 
on this day was 3s 11d. 
  
                                            
133 PBG, 18 November 1867.  
134 PBSC 1870, 520. 
135 PBSC 1870, 524; Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 199-200. 
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Table 9 Saturday, 7 May 1870 loan summary 
              % of principal 
Time in  Principal Interest Ticket fees Total Intake Loan 
Pledge  Pledges £ s d £ s d £ s d £ s d expense profit 
                
1 month 1,553 304 17 4 5 18 8.5 3 8 0.5 9 6 9 4.36% -3.05% 
>1 month 346 72 8 2 8 6 2.5 0 14 11.5 9 1 2 4.36% 12.57% 
 1,889 377 5 6 14 4 11 4 3 0 18 7 11 4.36% 4.88% 
              Gain 0.52% 
 
Sources: PBSC 1870, 524-526; Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 199-200. 
 
Robert Carter understood the dynamics of the labour-intensive business, 
saying that the process required valuation, issued tickets, storage and 
collection upon redemption, all of which left little profit on low pledges. Others, 
such as Alexander Beresford, did not. Beresford said that while one transaction 
might yield little profit, ‘when you have a great number of transactions the profits 
must be enormous’.136 Hardaker replied that the small pledges provided no 
profit at all, higher-volume shops required more staff, and ‘it is very well to speak 
of percentages; but if one transaction does not pay, multiplying it will not make 
it pay’.137 This begs the question whether British pawnbrokers were operating 
efficiently. When compared to their charity counterparts in Ireland and France, 
with an average cost per pawn of 3s 7.5d, and no less than 9d, British providers 
had a lower expense structure.138 It was estimated that if a weekly 6d pledge 
was to be profitable, a minimum of 1.5d was required in compensation per 
transaction.139 
Pawnbrokers argued that on a weekly pledge it was matter of covering 
labour costs, and not a matter ‘of percentages … but of labour bestowed upon’ 
the pledge.140 While the maximum chargeable rate for loans of less than 42s 
                                            
136 PBSC 1870, 321-322. 
137 PBSC 1870, 437-439. 
138 PBG, 16 and 30 September 1867. 
139 PBSC 1870, 321-322, 437-439. 
140 PBSC 1870, 413-416. 
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was approximately 20 pcpa, and at or more than 42s was approximately 15 
pcpa, analysing the interest rate in percentage terms was misleading. The PBA 
1800 stated a monetary not a percentage limit. If an article were redeemed the 
day it was pledged it would pay a rate of approximately 600 pcpa, and if the 
loan was only 6d, the protective statute allowed 3,000 pcpa.141 
Data from 30 Liverpool-based pawnbrokers supported the claim that 
low-pledge businesses earned a smaller ROE than the high-pledge 
businesses. This sample from 1869 represents 1.4 million pledges out of a total 
of approximately 9 million or 15.6 per cent of the total loan volume in Liverpool 
that year. Thirty pawnbrokers were surveyed and the results are presented in 
Table 10. Four pawnbrokers have been excluded, resulting in a sample set of 
26 respondents and an adjusted average ROE of 4 per cent.142 Fifteen of the 
26 (57.7 per cent of the adjusted sample) had ROEs greater than the adjusted 
average ROE of 4 per cent. Thirteen of the 15 (86.7 per cent) experienced 3 
per cent or more of loan volumes within the high-pledge category. Of the eleven 
pawnbrokers with below-average returns, six (55.4 per cent) experienced 
above-average loan volumes in the lowest category of pledge. These results 
indicate that even a small percentage of high-pledge business substantially 
improved financial returns. 
 
  
                                            
141 PBG, 27 April 1868.  
142 Data compiled from PBSC 1870, appendix 9. Pawnbrokers 5, 14 and 21 were excluded 
owing to incomplete expense data. Pawnbroker 12 was excluded owing to low-pledge volume 
accompanied by an abnormally high percentage of over 10s pledges. Note: The total loss from 
the sale of forfeits was £859. Owing to missing data, the column summation of £835 is £24 
lower. It is unclear whether the estimated ROE included an owner-operator salary expense. 
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Table 10 Financial return for 30 Liverpool pawnbrokers, 1869 
  % pledged by size      
PB Total < 
2s 6d 
< 10s < Ticket Interest Sale of Total Invested Est. 
Num pledges 2s 6d 10s £10  Fee Charge Forfeits Expns Capital ROE 
1 72,000 61.7% 38.3% 0.0% £130 £485 -£96 £500 £4,000 0.5% 
2 61,780 79.4% 16.5% 4.1% 126 410 -56 270 3,050 6.9% 
3 58,000 69.0% 25.9% 5.2% 180 600 -200 400 4,000 4.5% 
4 68,426 33.1% 64.3% 2.6% 156 419 -20 550 3,000 0.2% 
5 38,500 37.4% 56.1% 6.5% 85 240 0 0 2,560 12.7% 
6 50,000 20.0% 80.0% 0.0% 120 600 -50 500 3,000 5.7% 
7 31,872 51.5% 40.2% 8.3% 84 360 0 323 3,000 4.0% 
8 49,330 59.4% 39.4% 1.2% 124 664 -297 349 5,000 2.8% 
9 37,640 47.6% 48.6% 3.8% 85 255 -15 257 1,350 5.0% 
10 24,550 58.7% 39.1% 2.2% 64 220 -34 317 1,190 -5.6% 
11 61,835 42.6% 46.9% 10.6% 160 1,087 -65 620 7,500 7.5% 
12 23,012 21.7% 50.4% 27.9% 93 1,400 132 520 9,000 12.3% 
13 28,500 38.6% 49.1% 12.3% 60 698 124 847 5,200 0.7% 
14 54,712 54.9% 45.1% 0.0% 123 325 20 189 1,860 15.0% 
15 31,056 40.8% 49.4% 9.8% 82 551 -17 401 3,268 6.6% 
16 19,224 36.0% 56.8% 7.2% 43 320 120 400 2,400 3.5% 
17 37,642 47.1% 48.6% 4.3% 90 318 0 320 2,000 4.4% 
18 47,591 46.2% 48.7% 5.1% 96 495 -55 300 3,000 4.9% 
19 47,801 52.5% 44.2% 3.3% 213 251 -65 300 1,701 5.8% 
20 46,416 39.7% 50.2% 10.1% 130 969 -69 644 6,469 6.0% 
21 20,617 50.1% 45.7% 4.3% 44 160 26 85 800 18.1% 
22 26,100 18.4% 56.3% 25.3% 120 1,367 -26 743 8,500 8.4% 
23 46,128 51.6% 42.4% 6.0% 106 447 -75 401 5,000 1.5% 
24 58,250 62.4% 33.7% 3.9% 122 715 -4 725 4,000 2.7% 
25 43,292 39.2% 51.6% 9.1% 102 300 -29 316 3,100 1.8% 
26 72,782 44.0% 54.5% 1.5% 157 491 -130 462 5,000 1.1% 
27 97,800 55.2% 40.5% 4.3% 228 852 0 750 5,400 6.1% 
28 75,532 58.4% 38.6% 3.0% 163 416 -21 455 2,700 3.8% 
29 48,220 43.7% 48.4% 7.9% 105 507 52 346 4,000 8.0% 
30 37,056 68.5% 30.1% 1.4% 77 164 15 195 1,020 6.0% 
Total 1,415,664 49.6% 45.1% 5.3% £3,378 £16,091 -£859 £12,485 £112,068 5.5% 
 
Source: Data compiled from PBSC 1870, appendix 9. It is unclear if the estimated ROE 
included an owner-operator salary expense.   
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Under price controls pawnbrokers struggled to make a profit from low-
value pledges. Many believed that returns should be well above the often cited 
5 per cent market rate. Pawnbrokers presented evidence to support the claim 
that theirs was a labour-intensive business and expenses had increased since 
the 1800s. Holt and Miller were not convinced. Miller could not understand why 
a pawnbroker who had ‘good security for the money advanced’ needed to 
charge even the 20 per cent authorised by the PBA 1800 and called for a 
reduction. 143  More measured than Orr-Ewing, Holt and Miller failed to 
appreciate the cost of running a pawn business.144 They were not alone. Hector 
could not ‘conceive that carrying on a business with forty thousand pledges a 
year should not yield a sufficient livelihood’.145 Henry believed that it was a 
‘matter of common repute’ that pawnbrokers have a ‘very good trade’ and ‘some 
of them make a large fortune’. 146  An article in the Dudley Herald and 
Wednesbury Borough News affirmed the widespread belief that pawnbrokers 
experienced high levels of profitability. ‘What we are certain of is … they either 
get it back with interest, or get more than double its value often, in the goods 
that are forfeited.’147 Pawnbrokers believed that many understood the PBA 
1800 rate of ‘20 per cent’ as a profit margin.148 
There is little indication that committee members and witnesses who 
were opposed to the industry were swayed by the evidence. An interaction 
between Raymond Storr and Orr-Ewing demonstrated this. Storr, an owner of 
a London auction house, said, ‘I do not think it [pawnbroking] would be a very 
profitable trade; I should not like to embark in it myself if I were cut off from any 
other means of livelihood.’ A sceptical Orr-Ewing challenged Storr’s knowledge 
of the financial position of pawnbrokers, querying if he had ever examined their 
                                            
143 PBSC 1870, 1503-1517, 1551. 
144 PBSC 1870, 1680, 3885-3886. 
145 PBSC 1870, 1958-1963. 
146 PBSC 1870, 3583-3585. 
147 Reprinted in PBG, 1 July 1872. 
148 PBG, 6 February and 13 February 1871. 
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books. Storr responded that he had examined the financial position of many 
pawnbrokers.149  
At times, even the pro-business chairman, Ayrton, did not fully agree 
with the pawnbrokers: 
Mr May: Everybody has an idea that pawnbroking is exceedingly 
remunerative and they do it because in the Pawnbrokers’ Act, a 
pawnbroker’s profits are laid down. For instance, I, as a pawnbroker would 
lend a pound for a month or for five weeks, which is the legal time for 4d. 
If I were to lend a man 30s on a watch for a month or five weeks (for there 
are seven days’ grace), I should get 6d for that transaction. The butcher 
says you are getting rare profits, you pawnbrokers, but I have said you 
bought a sheep for 30s would you like to have all the trouble with that 
sheep and to sell it at the end of a month for 30s 6d? Would you like to say 
on Saturday night when you had cut up that sheep and weighed it that you 
got 6d for your investment? 
 
Chairman: Do you know any butcher that kills 76,603 sheep in a year? 
 
Pawnbrokers took issue with the increasing administrative burden that 
price controls were placing on their profitability. The PBA 1800 scale created 
fractions that were difficult to calculate and often resulted in fractions for which 
no coin existed. The scale included farthings (a quarter of a penny), a coinage 
with limited provincial circulation.150 Lending £2 entitled a pawnbroker to charge 
8d, whereas lending £2 3s could be charged 6.25d plus 4/5 of a farthing for the 
same period. Having to calculate the charge and coin issues in pawnshops 
processing 40,000-60,000 annually was time-consuming and required 
judgement on how to comply with price controls. Hambro asked Hardaker why 
he did not round down in the customer’s favour to comply with the Act. Hardaker 
replied that even when rounding up he failed to make money. 151  This 
administrative burden further decreased low profit margins. 
Pawnbrokers argued that the PBA 1800 compensation scheme 
artificially limited collateral options. One of the strongest arguments against 
price controls is that a single rate cannot be applied across an entire credit 
                                            
149 PBSC 1870, 3228-3236. 
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class. Often, having to apply a single rate led to credit rationing and market 
segmentation. Without adequate compensation pawnbrokers rejected 
extremely low-value goods and bulky items.152 Despite their increased labour 
and warehouse requirements, large goods were charged at the same rate as a 
pocket watch or overcoat. In many instances a porter was paid more to carry 
the good to the house than a pawnbroker who would value, ticket, store and 
lend money on the item.153 Dicker explained: 
I have two instances here which will show how inconveniently it works; I 
have here a ticket for £6 for a pianoforte, which was taken in by a 
pawnbroker, the interest and all that he would be allowed to charge for 
warehouse-room and other things, would be 1s 6d a month. Before that 
pianoforte was redeemed 15 months had expired, and the interest that he 
would be allowed to charge, and which he did charge was 22s 6d (£1 1s 
6d). I have a bill here from Peachey of Bishopsgate street for warehousing 
a pianoforte for the same time and it is £3.154 
 
Presumably, those who needed the smallest sums but who were 
rationed out of the market were financially vulnerable and still needed cash. 
This led to the creation of an illegal (i.e., unlicensed) market. These dolly-shops 
operated outside price controls and regulated trading hours. Pawnbrokers 
argued that, along with second-hand dealers, these shops ‘plundered’ the 
needy.155 Price controls segmented the pawn market such that a select group 
of borrowers benefited through lower pricing at the expense of the others.  
Given these negative effects, why were price controls considered 
necessary? For some, price controls were implemented to protect the ‘irrational’ 
working poor from ‘sophisticated’ pawnbrokers.156 Often, this argument was 
based on the perceived existence of bargaining inequity. The presence of 
bargaining inequity directly challenged the notion that borrowers ‘freely’ 
engaged and negotiated with pawnbrokers. In response, price controls meant 
that ‘some poor creature with an empty stomach, who has denuded herself of 
                                            
152 PBG, 4 May 1868. 
153 PBSC 1870, 20, 596-599, 2208. 
154 PBSC 1870, 592-593. 
155 PBSC 1870, 53-54, 2707. 
156 ‘Pawnbrokers’, Daily Telegraph, 21 August 1871. 
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every rag of clothing that decency will permit … to raise a few pence to provide 
food. How can she bargain with any chance of equity?’157 This research argues 
that there was another motivation. If price controls were necessary owing to 
borrower ‘irrationality’, then perhaps credit rationing was welcomed. Since 
certain policymakers believed that the pawn market served the ‘undeserving’ 
poor, any reduction in supply would have been viewed favourably. In effect, 
those borrowers rationed out of the market were better off without a loan. 
Committee members queried why pawnbrokers were petitioning 
Parliament when they could refuse the unprofitable business and reduce their 
loan advancements. 158  The answer was owing to repeat business and 
uncertainty. McKay suggested that if you refuse him once, next time, perhaps 
with a larger more profitable item, the pledger ‘passes your door’.159 On more 
than one occasion a pawnbroker stated that if he were to refuse a pledge 
because ‘it might’ go out in a month, he would never have any pledges for 
longer. 160  Competitive factors were cited for high-loan advances. Dicker 
indicated that ‘competition regulates’ which house people frequent. People 
would visit the shop with the highest advancements.161 Gillman agreed: ‘It 
would be generally known among the people where the best bargain was to be 
had.’162 While higher advanced sums benefited pawnbrokers by increasing 
their capital turnover, inflated collateral value also increased the loss-given-
default.  
In response, Ayrton believed that the public should have ‘every 
convenience of having money advanced on every conceivable article’.163 In a 
letter to the PBG editor, a pawnbroker argued that small loans should not be 
treated differently from other commerce because it was ‘undeniable’ that trade 
                                            
157 ‘Pawnbrokers’, The Sheffield and Rotherham Independent, 28 August 1871. 
158 PBSC 1870, 596-597. 
159 PBSC 1870, 2078. 
160 PBSC 1870, 526, 720. 
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without restriction benefited all parties.164 From this perspective, negotiations 
between buyer and seller produced ‘fair’ results in a way that regulation could 
not.165 Essentially, this Smithian framework permitted individuals to maximise 
their own interest without state interference. ‘Freedom of choice’ encouraged 
competition between providers and kept prices low. 
However, not all pawnbrokers supported unfettered freedom. It was 
believed that price controls and licensing requirements had limited market entry. 
Certain pawnbrokers recognised that price controls, yielding low returns, 
discouraged associated companies from entering the market. In 1870, one 
pawnbroker believed that, should returns increase, savings banks would enter 
the pawn market.166 These pawnbrokers sought a balanced increase in profit 
that, while relieving the low end, would not attract new players into the market. 
In support of their efforts to have price controls modified, pawnbrokers 
presented a coherent narrative, backed by financial information. Based on the 
evidence it was difficult to refute that low-value pledges held in pawn for less 
than one month were unprofitable. However, those who linked poverty and 
pauperism believed that the pawn market should be limited, if not eliminated. 
From this perspective, limited returns on capital, credit rationing and market 
segmentation were tolerated because they limited the pawn market. The benefit 
of fewer transactions and limited pricing outweighed the negative effects of 
credit rationing and the black market. Certain pawnbrokers were not completely 
against price controls and sought to balance the need for increased profits with 
the quasi-monopolistic barrier supported by low returns. Pawnbrokers believed 
that their two-tiered pricing system balanced borrower protection against 
compromise between the various parties within the trade. 
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Forfeiture 
Forfeiture restrictions were considered a basic form of borrower protection. 
Many committee members were reluctant to reduce the 15-month minimum 
holding period. However, the time required had an impact on business 
operations such as working capital, resale values and profitability. If 
pawnbrokers struggled to profit from loans, they might benefit from retailing 
forfeitures. If sales were generally profitable, then pawnbrokers were more akin 
to retailers than lenders. If so, then accusations that pawnbrokers encouraged 
borrower default were credible. This debate highlighted the balance between 
borrower protection and financial performance. 
 Again, there was a disparity between policymakers and pawnbrokers, 
and scepticism concerning the evidence. Hector believed that ‘the number of 
articles that are forfeited is very large and the loss to the poor through forfeiture 
is very great’. 167  Table 11, which includes PBSC 1870 testimony and 
information reported in the PBG, challenges this. Annual redemption rates for 
pawned goods ranged from 93 to 98 per cent. Two pawnbrokers testified that 
80 per cent of items were redeemed within three months and 85 per cent 
redeemed within six months. Data from a low-end business revealed that 92 
per cent were redeemed within six months and an additional 6 per cent were 
redeemed between months 6 and 12.168 With regard to the lowest end of the 
trade, Gillman countered Hector’s claim: ‘A great number of pledges are 
redeemed within a week.’169 
 The data suggest a high redemption rate in the low-, medium- and high-
end trade. Accusations that pawnbrokers aggressively sought borrower 
property for resale were unfounded. 
 
  
                                            
167 PBSC 1870, 1971-1974. 
168 PBG, 29 June 1868. 
169 PBSC 1872, 17-22. 
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Table 11 Estimated redemption rates 
   Redemption 
Location Pawnbroker Time Rate 
    
Liverpool Hardaker < 3 months 80% 
Glasgow A. McKay < 6 months 85% 
Bradford Blackwood Annually 98% 
Edinburgh Russell Annually 90-95% 
Glasgow A. McKay Annually 93% 
Glasgow Scoular Annually 90-95% 
Leeds Scotson Annually 93% 
Liverpool Hardaker 1870 90-95% 
Liverpool Hardaker 1856-1869 95.5% 
London G. Attenborough Annually 95% 
London R. Attenborough Annually 95% 
Pollokshaws G. McKay Annually 93-95% 
Salford May Annually 96% 
 
Source: PBSC 1870, 191, 203, 696, 946, 1685, 2030, 2040-2048, 2731, 4278, 4527, 4738, 
5027. 
 
Given that most goods were redeemed, why did pawnbrokers want to 
adjust the redemption period?170 Pawnbrokers argued that mass-produced 
clothing did not hold its value, thus depressing secondary market prices. 
George Scotson, a pawnbroker and member of Leeds town council, suggested 
that manufactured clothing made of ‘shoddy wool’ quickly lost its value. 171 
When combined with low margin loans, even slight losses on the sale of 
forfeited goods put financial pressure on pawnbrokers. 
Seasonality was also a concern. Pawners understandably raised cash 
on the most valuable good needed the least. A winter coat pawned in the 
summer was financially valuable and not otherwise in use. From the 
pawnbroker’s perspective, the twelve-month holding cycle put their sale into the 
depressed portion of a seasonal market. Attenborough remarked, ‘I have 
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seventeen month goods in my house … unsold, because from December last I 
have been unable to sell any of the winter goods, and I cannot touch them until 
about September.’172 Alternatively, a pawnbroker could hold on to the goods 
and sell in seasonally-driven demand cycles. This tactic, however, tied up 
working capital, decreased the supply of loanable funds and reduced capital 
turnover. From the borrower’s perspective, a shorter holding period would lead 
to higher sums per article as forfeited goods could be resold at a higher price 
later.173 Conversely, borrowers would have to pay their loan sooner, but having 
accrued less interest. 
William Hughes was sceptical that the resale of acquired pledges on the 
secondary market was unprofitable.174 In addition to Table 10, which shows that 
in 1869 the Liverpool sample lost £859 on auction resales, during that same 
year Hardaker (£117), Lambeth (£147) and Telfer (£167) incurred losses.175 
According to Dicker, ‘it is a mistake altogether to imagine that the pawnbrokers 
look to unredeemed pledges for profit’.176 Despite the evidence showing losses 
on the resale of forfeited items, John Simon MP (Liberal) questioned this: ‘You 
[i.e., Dicker] generally make gains on your sales, do you not?’177 MPs focused 
on a few book entries showing profitable resales such as a £7 pledged item 
sold for £17 and the sale of a telescope at £2 on which 15s had been lent.178 It 
was suggested that pawnbrokers rigged auction sales in their favour only to 
acquire and later resell goods for a gain. 179  Orr-Ewing asked whether 
pawnbrokers ‘send a stranger to purchase’ auction goods on their behalf. 
Raynor Storr, a London auctioneer, made it clear that the majority of items were 
purchased by members of the general public.180  
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While Stubbs thought a six-month period might induce the poor to take 
their winter clothes out of pawn before the cold set in, few others supported a 
reduction in the redemption period by half.181 Much of the committee, even 
those generally well disposed to the trade, were reluctant to reduce the 
forfeiture period. Gillman, having surveyed pawners in his neighbourhood, 
suggested the ‘longer the better’.182 If cash were raised to cover an immediate 
emergency need, as was often argued, and goods were redeemed ‘when work 
was plentiful and wages decent’, Gillman’s claim that the one-year period plus 
three months’ grace better suited the working poor was difficult to refute. The 
forfeiture debate confirmed that some policymakers misunderstood the 
pawnbroking business model. The data and testimony of pawnbrokers indicate 
that they did not earn substantial profits from the resale of forfeitures. Whether 
reducing the forfeiture period to six months would benefit borrowers was a 
matter of opinion.  
 
The Pawnbrokers Act 1872 
The select committee report was published in August 1871. Although they 
concluded that regulation remained necessary, the Select Committee 
nonetheless believed it should ‘be kept within the narrowest limits’ and that 
lending money on items should be left to the individual actors as they saw fit.183 
Orr-Ewing and Hambro opposed the measure during the committee stage. 
Suggesting that all politics are local, Hambro dropped his opposition after a 
pawnbroker from his constituency convinced him of the bill’s merits.184 Lord 
Salisbury voiced certain objections to the bill. His overriding concern was that 
Parliament was moving ‘in the wrong direction’ and that complete free trade 
should be adopted.185 ‘At present, our legislation hampered the trade and 
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hampered the customers with a number of regulations; but it did not do what a 
thoroughly paternal Government would do - protect the poor man against the 
necessity of going to the pawnbroker.’ This perspective understood that if 
Parliament wanted to protect the poor, a deeper examination of the structural 
issues driving demand for small loans was needed. His challenge went 
unanswered. The Earls of Harrowby and Morley countered that the bill had 
been examined thoroughly and that adequate protections were in place for 
loans of less than 40s.186 Thanks to a parliamentary procedural manoeuvre 
initiated by Charles Forster MP (Liberal), Orr-Ewing’s blockage of the third 
reading was overcome. Without much more concern, the bill received Royal 
Assent on 10 August 1872 and was enacted as the Pawnbrokers Act 1872, 35 
& 36 Vict. c. 93.  
The 1872 Act was applicable to any loan of less than £10, unless a 
special contract was executed. Special contracts were permitted for loans of 
more than 40s. which were to be signed by both parties and the borrower 
provided with a duplicate.187 Every pledge of less than 10s was redeemable 
within twelve months with an additional seven days’ grace, after which the 
pledged item became the absolute property of the pawnbroker. Pledges of more 
than 10s were redeemable at any time until they were sold at auction, to occur 
no sooner than twelve months and seven days after the contract date. Other 
than special contracts, items could not be forfeited before twelve months. 
Pawnbrokers had failed to secure a six-month forfeiture period. Even 
committee members and witnesses who were generally supportive pushed 
back on this measure. Adding to the mix, a small fraction of the wealthy London 
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187 The record is unclear why the 40s rate and not the PPRA proposed 42s was selected. Recall 
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trade had worked behind the scenes to ensure that the six-month proposal 
would fail.188 
After the first calendar month, any time not exceeding 14 days was 
charged as a half-month. A table of rates was to be displayed. Permitted 
charges for loans of 10s and less included a 0.5d ticket charge and 0.5d for 
each 2s or part of 2s lent monthly. Permitted charges for loans of 10s and not 
more than 40s included a 0.5d ticket charge and 0.5d for each 2s or part of 2s 
lent monthly. For a loan of more than 40s charges included a 1d ticket charge 
and 0.5d for each 2s or part of 2s lent monthly. The rates were just over 2 per 
cent monthly or 25 pcpa on loans up to 40s and 1 2/3 per cent monthly or 20 
pcpa on loans of more than 40s. 
Clause 51 of the Act, which dealt with penalties, can be considered a 
victory for the pawnbrokers. The clause relieved pawnbrokers of a total financial 
loss owing to minor clerical infractions. Although it was not particularly 
controversial during the process, the law also contained a schedule detailing 
the information that a pawn ticket (which served as a contract) had to include. 
These were, among others, the name and address of the shop and borrower, 
the amount, the item pawned, the interest schedule and forfeiture procedures. 
Information disclosure such as this was debated in the reform of the 
moneylending market and pre-dates modern lending requirements. 
While more detailed than the draft bill produced by the parliamentary 
agents Dyson and Company, in terms of the major goals, the PBA 1872 did not 
substantially differ.189 The Derby scale of 0.5d for every 2s lent had become 
law. However, based on her reading of the evidence, Margot Finn suggested 
that the increased rate was insignificant for low-value pawnbrokers.190 Although 
certain industry voices made clear at the time, it is worth recognising that the 
                                            
188 Hardaker, History of Pawnbroking, 247. 
189 PPRA, ‘Draft of a bill to amend the law relating to pawnbrokers of Great Britain’ written by 
F. S. Reilly, 27 October 1868. The draft bill focused on the areas where reform was sought, but 
did not repeal any clauses that pawnbrokers believed should remain in effect. 
190 PBG, 14 November 1870; Tebbutt, Making Ends Meet, 129. 
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Act reflected the Derby scale, which was heavily influenced by Liverpool and 
Manchester, both low-value pawn cities. For Dicker, a 5 per cent increase on 
Saturday, 7 May 1870 (see Table 9) might have made his low-value business 
profitable. Moreover, while regulation alone did not determine the industry’s 
development from 1872 to 1914, licensing grew year on year in 38 of the 40 
years, with an overall CAGR of 70 per cent.191 Such growth would have been 
hard to achieve if low-value businesses did not in some way gain from the 
increased rates.  
Figure 1 shows the number of pawnbroking licences issued from 1870 
to 1930. The series shows an upward trend until the First World War and a 
decline thereafter.192  
  
                                            
191 Annual report of the Commissioners of HM Inland Revenue, 1870-1909 and HM Customs & 
Excise thereafter. Further research is needed to understand the economic variables that 
influenced this expansion. A working paper examining this growth from a quantitative 
perspective is forthcoming from Craig McMahon and Walter Jansson of the University of 
Cambridge. 
192 The reasons for this decline are analysed in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 1 Pawnbroking licences, 1870-1930 
 
 
Sources: Annual report of the Commissioners of HM Inland Revenue, 1870-1909; and HM 
Customer & Excise thereafter. 
 
 
D. Conclusion 
While pawnbroking reform did not generate as much interest as the Poor Law 
or Factory Acts, with 200 million loans made annually, their impact was 
substantial.193 Pawnbrokers found that operating under the PBA 1800 was 
increasingly burdensome and eroding their profitability. Pawnbrokers claimed 
that the PBA 1800 price cap prohibited them from lending on bulky items and 
that low-value pledges were unprofitable. Regulation had limited the collateral 
options for borrowers without addressing the urgent need for cash, which 
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resulted in a supply shift to the illegal market. More technically, pawnbrokers 
argued that price controls had encouraged credit rationing and market 
segmentation. To improve their profitability and increase collateral options for 
borrowers, pawnbrokers wanted to reform the PBA 1800 price cap. 
With usury having been repealed 18 years earlier, pawnbrokers believed 
their cause would gain widespread support. Before seeking that support they 
needed to overcome the long-time tensions between London and the provinces 
and bring together disparate interests within the trade. At one extreme were the 
complete free traders and at the other were pawnbrokers seeking to maintain 
the status quo. The former believed that regulation distorted the market and 
that commerce functioned best without state interference. Competitive markets 
would provide the optimal outcome for lenders and borrowers alike. They found 
it unfair that pawnbroking was exempted from the repeal of the Usury Act, while 
moneylenders operated freely. Within the London trade, however, many wanted 
to avoid attention, less their lucrative high-end trade be disrupted. Even so-
called free traders feared that a substantial rise in profits would attract 
unwanted competition. In that respect, there were perceived benefits to 
regulation. 
Negotiations within the trade took place at the local, regional and 
national levels. Even after a framework was in place, amid much protest further 
compromise was required. Ultimately, through the PPRA, a two-tiered price 
system, which included the option to negotiate a special contract, was agreed. 
After receiving expert advice, pawnbrokers approached Parliament. They 
believed their dual approach of fixed and flexible pricing would satisfy 
Parliament’s need to protect borrowers and increase profits without attracting 
unwanted competition. At every point in the process, pawnbrokers readily and 
methodically lobbied MPs to ensure that their reform did not fall by the wayside. 
How that reform would be received by policymakers depended in part on 
one’s understanding of how the demand for small sums related to poverty. 
There was little debate that many urban working-class families struggled to 
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obtain a reasonable standard of living. In an emergency, these families had few 
savings from which to draw or access to the banking system. The Victorian 
understanding of urban poverty was complicated and does not fit easily into 
well-defined categories. Speaking generally, poverty had evolved from what 
was once considered a natural condition into a social problem in need of a 
policy response. Whether poverty was a crime or a disease, a natural state or 
an institutional by-product, a class or a distinct culture, absolute or relative and 
whether social policy was part of the problem were all debated. Distinctions 
were being made between the ‘undeserving’ and the ‘deserving’ poor, with 
many considering that pawnbrokers served the former. Responses to sort out 
the ‘problem of poverty’ varied from limiting the immoral temptations of 
pauperism to restricting relief to the ‘truly’ vulnerable, Factory and Child Labour 
Acts and encouraging ‘right behaviour’ by increasing participation in the free 
market economy. 194  Many of these suggestions were present in the 
pawnbroking debate. 
Whether the poverty policy atmosphere was primarily driven by fear, as 
Stedman Jones argued, or guilt, as suggested by Himmelfarb, is debatable. In 
the case of pawnbroking, it is likely that both factors were at play. The Daily 
Telegraph suggested that pawnbrokers invoked guilt in the wealthy, as the 
shops reminded them of the ‘painful necessities amongst the poor’. 195 
However, fear better explains both the visceral anti-pawnbroking reaction and 
doubt about the financial evidence presented by Orr-Ewing and others. There 
was a disagreement between this attitude and the lived realities of the working 
poor. Charles Mills MP (Conservative) believed that pledgers wore expensive 
Sunday clothes above their means and needed cash as a result. Holford 
countered, saying that they simply wanted to wear clean clothes on Sunday 
                                            
194 Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age (London: 
Faber, 1984). 
195 Daily Telegraph, reprinted in PBG, 5 August 1872. 
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and pledged them on Monday to keep them clean.196 Pledging was used as a 
storage facility for families living in insanitary and cramped conditions. 
Those with deeply held beliefs about the link between debt, morality and 
the ‘undeserving poor’ were not likely to have their mind changed by 
pawnbrokers, charity workers or others in favour of reform. McCall went so far 
as to say that people who pawn more than 10s were from a different moral class 
from those that pawned for 10s or less. 197  These people believed that 
borrowers were irrational and irresponsible and that ‘indiscriminate’ pawn credit 
led to pauperism. It was irrational to need small sums and pay such high rates 
for them. Like indiscriminate charity, pawnbrokers enticed workers away from 
thrift, savings and temperance, values that, if practised, led to success and 
economic advancement. The policymakers supporting greater regulation 
wanted to limit the industry and protect borrowers ‘from themselves’, neither of 
which related to the structural features of the economy. This scenario differed 
from efforts to regulate the railways. The impetus for the Railway Regulation 
Act 1844 was to counter monopolistic pricing power and subsidise travel for the 
working class.198 
As Martin Daunton argued, while middle-class observers viewed 
pawning as irrational, for the lower classes it was a rational strategy utilised to 
overcome unavoidable budget shortfalls.199 Surprisingly to many committee 
members, charity workers most familiar with the lives of the working poor 
countered anti-pawnbroker rhetoric and fought against attempts to link 
improvidence and poverty. Those in support of free trade were more likely to 
view lenders and borrowers as rational and responsible and to consider pawn 
credit as useful. William Miller, a magistrate, suggested that the poor and the 
rich alike needed access to banking facilities.200 Some pawnbrokers, politicians 
                                            
196 PBSC 1872, 341-342, 867-873. 
197 PBSC 1870, 1434-1435. 
198 Johnson, Victorian Market, 16. 
199 Martin Daunton, Wealth and Welfare: An Economic and Social History of Britain, 1851-1951 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 396. 
200 PBSC 1870, 1547-1551. 
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and charity workers argued that removing price controls would best serve the 
working poor, a class that could control its own affairs. In this case lifting 
regulations was based on the belief that market competition provided the best 
form of borrower protection. From this vantage point neither borrower nor 
lender was considered evil, immoral or degenerate. 
Although the process saw these Victorian small businessmen debate 
free trade theories, practical concerns and evidence proved more important. 
While many within the trade, certain MPs and other witnesses preferred 
unfettered market competition, they recognised that there was little political will, 
as well as resistance within the trade, for such a framework. Removing existing 
regulations would be an entirely different political process from updating 
aspects of a 72-year-old law. Although laissez-faire and poverty theory were 
engaged, the reform process advanced methodologically and practical 
concerns were at the fore. 
It was believed that the PBA 1872 price schedule, forfeiture period, 
licensing system and disclosure requirements would protect borrowers while 
allowing the freedom to negotiate special contracts when appropriate. This 
supports Daunton’s argument that the Victorian period was not simply a triumph 
of laissez-faire over moral economic principles. 201  In fact, for Orr-Ewing, 
morality and economic outcomes were interdependent. The efforts of the PPRA 
cannot be overestimated. Even if MPs were well disposed to free trade, more 
than a few needed to be convinced that the poor were helped by the 
pawnbroking system. Moreover, pawnbrokers had to overcome long-standing 
internal disagreements. The PPRA helped to form the PBA 1872, an Act that 
raised the price ceiling and required fewer administrative procedures. The 
organisation of the reform movement and its clarity of vision contrast with late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century moneylenders. This and related topics 
are examined in Chapter 3. 
                                            
201  Martin Daunton, State and Market in Victorian Britain: War, Welfare and Capitalism 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2008), 4. 
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3 The Moneylenders Acts 1900-1927 
 
This chapter analyses the Moneylenders Select Committee 1897 (MLSC 1897), 
the Moneylenders Act 1900 (MLA 1900), the Moneylenders Select Committee 
(MLSC 1925) and the Moneylenders Act 1927 (MLA 1927). In 1897, 
policymakers were motivated to reform moneylending as a result of growth in 
loan volume, prolific advertising and judicial conflicts concerning small debt 
claims. Their intention was to restrict the ‘evil’ industry. How far, though, was 
Parliament willing to regulate? Did policymakers use the price cap on 
pawnbrokers as a point of reference? Which options did they consider and what 
constraints did they face? Why were loan rates so high? Which evidence did 
moneylenders present to justify those rates and how was it received? If 
moneylenders were considered evil, why were price controls rejected? Did 
policymakers consider how market segmentation, credit rationing and price 
clustering would influence marginal borrowers? This research argues that the 
implementation of price controls was constrained by a preference for freedom 
of contract, which was considered a British value, as well as anti-usury 
sentiment. Instead, the MLA 1900 clarified the role of the judiciary in rewriting 
moneylending contracts. Policymakers did not institute a licensing requirement 
as they considered it would legitimise the industry and indicate government 
approval of the business model. 
In the 1920s, the motivation for reform was to correct the ineffective MLA 
1900 and limit the ‘evil’ industry. While politicians and the public were frustrated 
by the industry, were they focusing on the same issues as those expressed 25 
years earlier? Did a fierce debate rage between the ‘protectors of capitalism’ 
and social reformers? How were high interest rates understood and what 
solutions were considered to relieve borrowers? Would they appeal to fraud 
laws or seek additional regulation against advertising? Did moneylenders 
consider certain regulations to be beneficial? Was the industry better organised 
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than in 1900? This research argues that, unlike the MLA 1900 which was 
constrained by theoretical concerns over freedom of contract, price controls 
were rejected in 1925 owing to practical concerns about their implementation 
and fears of credit rationing. Instead, to help judges alleviate borrowers 
burdened with high rate loans, the MLA 1927 provided a 48 per cent guidance 
rate. This was intended to provide a benchmark without unduly interfering in 
the market’s pricing mechanism. Also, to restrict the industry, the MLA 1927 
limited advertising and enacted licensing requirements. Compared to 1900, 
there was greater willingness to regulate the ‘dark methods’ of capitalism.1  
This chapter analyses what motivated reform and how regulation was 
formed. Key areas of interest include price controls, advertising, disclosure 
terms and enforcement mechanisms. 
 
A. The judiciary and market intervention 
Unlike pawn, obtaining a small unsecured cash loan required an 
application. The intent was to assess an applicant’s ability to repay through a 
series of small regular payments, spread out over a period of many months. 
The repayment terms catered to borrowers living on low-wages and without 
adequate savings. It was paramount for a moneylender to understand an 
applicant’s wage and expense obligations. While certain critics disparaged 
moneylenders for having created ‘insulting’ application procedures, 
moneylenders argued that in-depth questioning was part of the risk-
assessment process.2 Victorian lenders inquired as to an applicant’s marital 
status, annual income, rent owed, rent accrued, employment details, an 
estimated value of furniture and effects, the utmost amount of debts and 
liabilities owed and past borrowing history.3 Occasionally, especially for new 
                                            
1 HC deb. 23 April 1926, vol. 194. 
2 Thomas Farrow, In the Money Lender’s Clutches (London: Yeoman Company, 1896), 15-
16.  
3 Ibid; Thomas Farrow, The Money-Lender Unmasked (London: Roxburghe Press, 1895), 
213-214.
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customers, a moneylender confirmed certain details through a home visitation. 
Successful applicants received cash on site. While these small loans were 
considered as ‘scraps from the banker’s plate’, moneylenders had developed a 
business model responding to the unique borrowing needs of the working poor.4 
Despite their high cost, costs moneylenders argued exceeded bank rates owing 
to high administration expenses and the risk associated with unsecured 
lending, in the late nineteenth century, loan volumes were growing. 
In the 1890s, the media devoted attention to the industry’s growth, high 
interest rates and advertising.5 The enormous number of advertisements was 
proof enough that the industry had grown. The Daily Telegraph and Standard 
carried an estimated 18,000 moneylending advertisements annually.6 Certain 
policymakers considered the industry’s growth to be excessive and the 
advertising content was believed to seduce people with misleading terms. From 
1895 to 1896, scarcely a day passed without reports of a moneylending contract 
that had carried ‘extortionate’ terms. Newspaper articles such as ‘Interest at 
400 per cent’ and ‘Ruined by Exorbitant Interest’ made for sensational 
headlines.7 The latter article recounted that in 1897, Simpson and Co. lent £5 
16s to Arthur Slater, a railway fitter earning approximately £84 annually. Slater 
had borrowed the money to pay medical bills. After paying £9 12s to Simpson, 
a balance of £9 10s remained. The Liverpool Mercury categorised such 
transactions as abusive.8  
Certain moneylenders, such as Isaac Gordon of Liverpool, relied on the 
court system to pursue their claims. Gordon was not alone. Isaac Samuel 
estimated that over a six-year period he had issued 34,344 loans and had sued 
                                            
4 Dorothy Orchard and Geoffrey May, Moneylending in Great Britain (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1933), 31. The high cost of loans and the lender’s expense structure are detailed 
in sections B. and C. of this chapter. 
5 ‘Alleged legal abuse’, Liverpool Mercury, 3 January 1895; ‘The moneylending business’, Pall 
Mall Gazette, 9 January 1895. 
6 ‘Moneylenders’, Cheshire Observer, 15 May 1897. 
7  ‘Interest at 400 per cent’, Lloyd’s Weekly, 1 July 1900; ‘Ruined by Exorbitant Interest’, 
Leicester Chronicle and Mercury, 20 February 1897. 
8 ‘Alleged Legal Abuse’, Liverpool Mercury, 3 January 1895. 
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4,694 debtors.9 On average, he pursued legal recourse on two loans a day. 
Gordon’s and Samuel’s use of the court system generated much interest in their 
affairs, the role of courts in amending loan contracts and moneylenders more 
generally.10 Thomas Farrow’s The Moneylender Unmasked, was critical of the 
industry and received considerable attention. He found a friendly audience in 
newspaper reviews and political circles. Farrow had been the private secretary 
of William Smith MP (Conservative, Leader of the Commons) and later Robert 
Yerburgh MP’s (Conservative) political secretary. 11  As a political insider, 
Farrow’s categorisation of the industry as evil and his call for an investigation 
did not go unnoticed. As early as June 1895, politicians asked the government 
to set up a commission to investigate the ‘evil’ industry.12 On 16 April 1895, the 
Shields Daily Gazette reported that ‘there is not one of the numerous class 
which preys upon society in general either so numerous or so aggressive as 
the unscrupulous moneylender’. 
 
Market intervention and the judiciary 
Alongside the rapid growth of the industry, two legislative Acts contributed to 
the industry’s development. First was the repeal of the Usury Act in 1854. 
Legislators appeared not have to have considered how the repeal would affect 
the small loan market. One theory suggested that, at the time of repeal, the 
demand for small loans was insignificant. 13  It is more likely that few 
policymakers considered the borrowing needs of the working poor. Regardless, 
the repeal of the usury laws contributed to the development of the 
moneylending market. A county court judge reflected that ‘the repeal of usury 
laws has brought into existence these swarms of moneylenders, who like 
                                            
9 MLSC 1897, 1914. 
10 ‘Money-lending revelations, 350 per cent interest’, Sheffield Evening Telegraph, 27 February 
1896. 
11 See the British Banking History Society entry concerning ‘Farrow’s Bank’. Ironically, in 1921, 
Farrow was convicted of bank fraud, having lost approximately £2.8 million (£124 million in 
2015 terms) of investor funds.  
12 ‘The usury laws’, Northern Echo, 18 June 1895. 
13 MLSC 1897, 4522-4523. 
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parasites breed on animals, injure their vital power, and impair the health of the 
commercial body’.14 Accompanying the repeal was a shift towards contractual 
relationships between unrelated parties. An institutional evolution was required 
to support the rise of contracts among the working class. This is reflected in the 
establishment of county courts, which were formed partly to handle an increase 
in small debt claims.15 
County court judges were on the front line of the nascent consumer- and 
contractual-based society. Found in the legal system were ‘liberal’ judges who 
refused to interfere with contracts executed by able-minded adults on the one 
hand, and, on the other, ‘revisionist’ judges who proactively revised contracts 
in favour of the borrower. These opposing approaches created legal quandaries 
and public confusion concerning the small loan market. Margot Finn suggested 
that while classical theorists championed the ‘freedom of contract’, the daily 
interaction of individual economic activities with a ‘malleable’ legal system 
reflected a complex interaction between the law, commerce, class and 
gender.16 
Finn argued that the ‘outright refusals’ of some county court judges to 
enforce small debt contracts demonstrated the complexity of personal credit 
relations in nineteenth-century Britain.17 Revisionist judges showed sympathy 
for small loan borrowers and intervened to revise small debt contractual 
obligations in their favour. Judge Atkinson of Leeds County Court was one. His 
goal was to balance the contractual debts owed to lenders against the 
economic exigencies of the borrower. 18  James Mathew, a judge, rewrote 
contracts to avoid the judicial system acting as a ‘lever of oppression’.19 These 
                                            
14  Thomas Farrow, The Money-Lender Unmasked (London: Roxburghe Press, 1895), 
prefatory. 
15  Margot Finn, The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 280. 
16 Ibid., 7. 
17 Ibid., 259. 
18 Finn, The Character of Credit, 262. 
19 MLSC 1898, 1441. 
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judges based their power to revise private contracts on a legal precedent known 
as ‘equitable jurisdiction’.  
Equitable jurisdiction originated in the Court of Chancery, which enjoyed 
unique jurisdiction regarding ‘fiduciary relations, protecting persons who were 
unable to protect themselves’.20 Previously, equitable jurisdiction was applied 
to nullify contracts for wealthy heirs who had borrowed against a reversion. By 
the late 1800s revisionist judges applied the same legal principle in the county 
court system. In doing so they breached more than juridical boundaries; the 
legal principle shifted from supporting the wealthy to supporting the poor and 
the middle classes. The application of this principle was limited. A judge could 
only investigate a transaction if he suspected fraud and if the amounts were for 
less than £500.21 He could not, for example, hear a complaint based on the 
interest rate or because a borrower had incurred excessive loan renewal fees. 
The activity of revisionist judges generated debate in Parliament. 
Notably, MPs took little issue with judicial intervention to stave off the financial 
disaster of wealthy families whose male heir had contracted under high rates 
of interest. Judge Owens recounted the case of Lord Aylesford, an heir, who 
contracted with a moneylender at an exorbitant rate. 22  The court set the 
moneylending transaction aside, requiring only the repayment of principal and 
5 per cent interest. This was a well-known and often cited case in support of 
judicial interference. The debate turned on whether ‘ordinary’ transactions 
executed by the ‘poor and ignorant’ should be dealt with in the same way.23 
Judge Frederick Falkiner testified that while ‘it is easy’ to find cases when 
the court had interfered in the case of wealthy heirs, it was ‘not easy’ to find 
cases of others who have borrowed, however ‘usurious’ the loan or for whatever 
‘foolish’ purposes.24 He believed the courts had drawn a clear legal distinction 
                                            
20 MLSC 1897, 3660. 
21 MLSC 1897, 3659-3660, 4432-4436. 
22 MLSC 1897, 4431. 
23 MLSC 1897, 3661. 
24 MLSC 1898, 241-242. 
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between the two types of case. Activist judges countered with legal precedent, 
citing Nevill v. Snelling. 25  It was argued that this case applied equitable 
jurisdiction further than liberal theorists acknowledged. In 1898, George Lewis, 
a City lawyer who focused on financial institutions and was known for his 
prosecution of the directors of the Overend and Gurney Bank, testified that he 
failed to understand why a court of equity would set aside a harsh and 
unconscionable bargain for expectant heirs but was ‘forbidden’ to do so on 
behalf of the ‘public’.26 
While activist judges could not nullify a contract, ‘reopen’ past 
transactions or relieve against default interest, they could change the 
instalment due. By decreasing the instalment to a nugatory sum, the contract 
in practice became worthless.27 In one case the judge decreased the instalment 
to 1d a month, thereby extending the loan maturity to more than 140 years.28 
The aim of this intervention was to ‘protect those who are not capable of 
protecting themselves’.29 Supporters argued that the execution of contracts by 
‘unequal parties’ committed ‘under duress’ required judicial intervention. 30 
Bargaining inequity, or when one party was ‘weak’ and the other a usurer or 
‘extortioner’, presumed that the weak party was being taken advantage of. As 
with expectant heirs, the main point was not the legal doctrine of fraud, but 
satisfaction that the bargain was harsh and unconscionable.31 
It can be argued that revisionist judges intervened because of bargaining 
inequity. Owing to economic need, the borrower had not entered a contract 
freely, and under the legal concept of harsh and unconscionable some judges 
were willing ‘to correct’ this failure. On a case-by-case basis, they implemented 
‘reform’ according to their view of inequitable bargains and to protect the poor. 
                                            
25 Nevill v. Snelling (1880) LR 15 CH D 679. 
26 MLSC 1898, 7-8. 
27 MLSC 1898, 228. 
28 MLSC 1897, 826, 931. 
29 MLSC 1897, 3450-3451. 
30 MLSC 1897, 4493, 4542. 
31 MLSC 1897, 4659; MLSC 1898, 1440. 
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These judges were not alone in their belief that a social economy existed within 
the market system. Farrow sought reform because the moneylending system 
‘gnaws at the vitals of our social economy’.32 This belief showed that the fair 
price of money differed from the market price. 
The second judicial approach was influenced by classic economic 
theory. This view held that commercial transactions, industry and commerce 
should be free from regulation.33 Proponents of this school found contractual 
interference particularly offensive and asked that if judges interfered with 
moneylending, what was to stop them from rewriting other contracts?34 This 
school believed that transactional outcomes were efficient and that government 
interference distorted naturally occurring market incentives.35 It was argued 
that criminal law dealing with fraud gave borrowers sufficient protection. 
Accordingly, moneylenders should be treated in the same way as other 
commodity traders. 
  
                                            
32 ‘Literary notes review’, Birmingham Daily Post, 15 February 1895. 
33 HC deb. 21 June 1900, vol. 84. 
34 MLSC 1898, 303-304. 
35  E. Philip Davis and Miguel Sanchez-Martinez, ‘Economic theories of poverty’, Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation (June 2015), 15-18. 
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B. The formation of regulation 1897–1900 
 
After diligent enquiry and long research, I am bound to come to the 
conclusion that a deeply rooted evil exists in our midst – an evil that eats 
into the bone and sinew of the poorer class, an evil that corrodes the 
happiness and comfort of many working men. 
 
‘Victims of usury’, Sheffield Independent, 8 January 1896 
The repeal of the usury laws and the conflict between liberal and revisionist 
judges created uncertainty that impacted the moneylending market. How far 
should judges intervene in private contracts? Furthermore, media attention, the 
rapid growth of the industry and the proliferation of advertisements contributed 
to the calls for a parliamentary investigation. In 1894, Yerburgh, along with his 
secretary, Farrow, pushed the Board of Trade to prosecute ‘so-called banks’ 
that charged usurious rates.36 Although sympathetic, the Board responded that 
it lacked the power to do so. Yerburgh then pressed for a Royal Commission to 
investigate usury and the ‘grave abuses’ of moneylenders whose ‘victims’ were 
the working class.37 In 1895, William Harcourt MP (Liberal, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer), denied Yerburgh’s request for an investigation. Harcourt doubted 
that regulation could prevent moneylenders from making victims of people in 
desperate need of money. By 1896, however, Arthur Balfour MP (Conservative, 
Leader of the Commons, Prime Minister 1902-1905) agreed to form a select 
committee, which was commissioned on 6 April 1897 to uncover the ‘alleged 
evils’ of high interest loans and alleviate the ‘oppressive’ conditions of 
repayment between the poor and moneylenders.38 
Over the course of 26 hearings the committee interviewed judges, 
magistrates, bureaucrats, lawyers, lenders and borrowers.39 Given Gordon’s 
                                            
36 HC deb. 10 May 1894, vol. 24; HC deb. 1 April 1895, vol. 32.  
37 ‘Money-lenders’, Western Mail, 2 April 1895. 
38 HC deb. 8 June 1896, vol. 41; HC deb. 6 April 1897, vol. 48; MLSC 1897, Introduction. The 
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and Samuel’s use of the court system, it is not surprising that they were called 
to testify. In his opening remarks, Lord James of Hereford drew attention to the 
‘many distinguished judges’ and officers of the court that had testified. The 
judiciary and lawyers were presented as having considerable knowledge of the 
moneylending market. Farrow based some of his testimony on 574 
moneylending transactions that had appeared in the court system.40 However, 
this sample was biased in that moneylending transactions that required 
recourse to the judiciary were more contentious than those remaining outside 
the legal system. The Select Committee held the opinion of the judiciary and 
legal profession in the highest regard. Revisionist and liberal judges, the ideas 
they espoused and the type of transactions that reached the court system 
influenced how the committee understood the moneylending industry.  
After concluding slightly more than half of its scheduled hearings, the 
committee published its preliminary findings. The following excerpt 
demonstrates its thinking: 
The Committee unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the system of 
money lending by professional money lenders at high rates of interest is 
productive of crime, bankruptcy, unfair advantage over other creditors of the 
borrower, extortion from the borrower’s family and friends, and other serious 
injuries to the community and although your Committee are satisfied that the 
system is sometimes honestly conducted they are of opinion that only in rare 
cases is a person benefited by a loan obtained from a professional money-
lender and that the evil attendant upon the system far outweighs the good.41 
 
Before the 1897 committee was completed, many policymakers had 
rendered judgement on moneylenders and their trade. So strong was the anti-
moneylending sentiment that George Lewis, with 40 years of ‘great’ judicial 
experience, argued that he ‘[had] never known a single instance in which the 
borrower has benefitted’.42 Farrow claimed that no man had ‘righted’ himself by 
borrowing from a moneylender.43 Unlike pawnbrokers, moneylenders failed to 
overturn the widespread belief that they encouraged crime, bankruptcy, 
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extortion and injury. Henry Marks MP (Conservative) believed that the recent 
exposure of ‘money-lending vampires’ demanded urgent attention.44 During 
that same debate it was argued that ‘depriving the poor amongst the working-
class of all moneylenders’ would be ‘distinctly good’. Marks, then, was not alone 
in seeking to bring an end to moneylending. The verdict was clear: small cash 
loans were of no benefit to the borrower. 
How far, though, was Parliament willing to regulate? Which options did 
they consider and what constraints did they face? Why were loan rates so high? 
What evidence did moneylenders present to justify their rates and how was it 
received? The following subsections analyse the committee’s investigation into 
high interest rates, price controls, disclosure terms and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
 
High interest rates  
Newspaper headlines reported APRs of 200 and 300 per cent and even rising 
into the thousands. The problem for policymakers was to decide why rates were 
so high, whether government should regulate and, if so, how. The evidence 
indicated that British moneylenders charged a wide range of interest. Data from 
40 moneylenders showed rates of 60 to 170 pcpa.45 These rates were on 
issued bills of sale and, as required by law, were registered with the local 
municipality. In 1897, 881 bills of sale were registered in the 15 courts that 
comprised district 36.46 Of the 881 bills, 487 held rates not exceeding 5 pcpa 
and 169 held rates not exceeding 60 pcpa. However, the overwhelming majority 
of lending was in the form of promissory notes, which demanded a higher rate 
of return. In East London, the poor borrowed from professional moneylenders 
at 1d in the shilling a week (approximately 400 pcpa). In similar 
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neighbourhoods, larger loans were offered at lower rates. Often, these loans 
followed a pattern of £12 lent on a £18 promissory note with 30s due in twelve 
monthly instalments.47  
In other cases, promissory notes were priced at 0.5d in the shilling a 
pound per week or 216 pcpa. 48  The highest rate admitted during the 
proceedings approached 3,000 pcpa.49 Judge Francis Roxburgh of the Lord 
Mayor’s Court of London suggested a range of 60-600 pcpa.50 George Lewis, 
a solicitor, testified that the usual rate was 60 pcpa, but admitted to seeing rates 
exceeding 2,000 pcpa.51 Farrow estimated that the usual interest rate was 60 
pcpa.52 Issac Samuel, a moneylender and principal owner of Fieldings Limited, 
confirmed Farrow’s estimate. Over seven years and six months, Samuel issued 
34,344 loans, 99.2 per cent of which were on promissory notes with an average 
rate of 60 pcpa.53 
When James Caldwell MP (Liberal), a committee member, asked 
Gordon whether a loan of £100 with £100 interest due in three months was 
excessive, Gordon replied, ‘Certainly not’. 54 Gordon believed that the interest 
rate reflected the risky nature of the business. In that transaction, he had lost 
not only the interest, but also the whole of his principal. Matching rates to 
perceived credit risk, Gordon charged men of ‘good character in solvent 
positions’ 15-20 pcpa.55 By comparison, pawnbrokers were permitted to charge 
up to 25 pcpa on collateralised loans. When asked if moneylenders should be 
operating at the same rate as pawnbrokers, Judge Stevenson Owen declared 
that if a moneylender could not operate at 25 pcpa, ‘he should put his shutters 
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up’.56 Another judge testified that, for moneylending, ‘20 per cent seems high’.57 
These comments demonstrated a misunderstanding of the risk differential 
between collateralised and promissory lending. Unlike pawnbrokers, 
moneylenders failed to counter those assumptions with concrete evidence.  
Some moneylenders justified the cost of their loans by citing high 
expense ratios. As a percentage of the principal, moneylender loans were 
expensive to administer. John Kirkwood, a moneylender, cited expenses as 
justification for his interest charges: ‘Rent, rates, and taxes, salaries, 
advertisements, law costs, commissions, travelling, hotel and incidental 
working expenses, all of which have to come out of whatever interest is 
obtained.’58 During a parliamentary debate, it was estimated that expenses 
were 15-20 per cent of gross interest.59 Samuel concurred with that range and 
submitted his accountancy-certified income statement, which showed 
expenses of 22 per cent.60 Samuel explained that when he lent 1s and earned 
1s one week later, his profit was ‘but a shilling’.61 The rate of interest of 1s on 
1s was required to cover the risk of loss and operating expenses. Some 
politicians agreed with this. Augustine Birrell MP (Liberal) said that high interest 
rates were a result of office expenses and bad debt. Samuel compared 
moneylending to insurance underwriting, as both employed risk-based 
pricing.62 Pushing the analogy further, Gordon claimed that he did not charge 
interest, ‘but an insurance premium on sold money’.63 
Another analogy treated moneylenders as money retailers. In this 
framework deposit-based commercial bankers, or wholesalers of money, had a 
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lower cost of capital and thus operated profitably at lower interest rates. 
Continuing the retail model, and utilising a similar example as did John May, a 
pawnbroker, during the PBSC 1870, Samuel explained, ‘We sell £5 for £6 5s ... 
if a butcher sold 5s worth of meat and it cost him 4s that would be a shilling on 
the transaction; that is 20 per cent. If that was multiplied as you multiply 
moneylender’s interest that would be 7,000 pcpa.’64 According to this logic, the 
principal is the product with an associated wholesale cost, whereas the interest 
charged is the product mark-up. Like retailers, lenders’ gross profit had to cover 
all expenses, including bad debt, administration, the owner’s salary and a return 
on capital. 
Even with the support of Augustine Birrell, James Maclean MP (Liberal) 
and Walter Wormersley MP (Conservative), moneylenders failed to convince 
the majority that the interest rate charged on small sums had to cover expenses 
and default risk and provide a sufficient return on capital. There was little 
appreciation that most borrowers could not obtain finance elsewhere. 65 
Although more support was offered during House debates than in the 
committee, it was impossible to overcome the shock value of newspaper 
headlines quoting interest rates into the thousands. Many considered that 
moneylenders were ‘unscrupulous men who prey’ and ‘entrap’ borrowers. 
Thomas Bayley MP (Liberal) believed that the high interest rate was ‘a sore 
eating in the very life of the working-class’.66 
While some evidence suggested that moneylenders charged a range of 
rates based on risk categories and expenses, their business model drew little 
sympathy and contributed to hostility against it. Ultimately, the Select 
Committee reported that the usual interest rate was 60 pcpa.67 Their conclusion 
set the first boundary for what might be considered a ‘normal’ market rate. 
Whether that charge was based on real expenses or reflected extortion was 
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debated. For those that believed moneylenders charged exorbitant rates, one 
option was to reinstate price controls. But if moneylenders were considered 
‘evil’, why were price controls rejected? The next subsection analyses that 
question. 
 
Price controls 
Price controls were proposed to ‘remedy the evils’ of high-cost loans. 68 
Advocates of price controls proposed a range of rates: 25 pcpa received the 
most support. However, this rate barely exceeded the lowest charge that 
Gordon had told the committee, which was 15-20 pcpa.69 A rate of 25 pcpa 
demonstrated the committee’s mind, which was set in favour of legal precedent 
and demonstrated its continued misunderstanding of the industry. The former 
claim is substantiated by reference to the PBA 1872 and its capped rate of 25 
pcpa.70 The latter was supported by the committee’s refusal, in this instance, to 
acknowledge the risk differential between pawn and promissory lending. The 
repeal of the usury laws was a major constraint. To overcome that constraint, 
supporters of price controls cited pawnbroking legislation as legal precedent 
and argued that they were extending an approved restriction on economic 
activity.71 
Gordon argued that usury was an affront to freedom of contract and that 
risk profiles should determine the interest rate.72 Gordon’s argument mirrored 
that of liberal judges. From a practical standpoint, he argued that price controls 
would limit the supply of funds and, through credit rationing, harm those most 
in need of emergency loans.73 Lenders predicted that price controls would 
render 7-14 day loans unprofitable, and thus they would cease to be offered.74 
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While it can be considered in the best interest of lenders to make such 
predictions, that price controls encouraged credit rationing was also an 
economic reality. Unlike their PBA 1872 counterparts, who were aware that 
price controls encouraged a black market, few policymakers voiced concern 
about the effects of market segmentation. Judge William Owen was an 
exception. He supported price controls and believed that the effects of credit 
rationing would be of benefit. He argued that borrowers no longer able to 
access credit were better off and that such loans simply deferred ‘the evil day’ 
of reckoning.75 Whereas in 1897 his argument gained little support, this line 
resurfaced in 2014 and proved crucial to the implementation of price controls 
in 2015. Whether credit rationing helped or harmed borrowers is a recurring 
theme in the period covered by this research. 
Another recurring theme was bargaining inequity. It was debated 
whether regulation could mitigate situations when the cost of a loan was 
secondary to non-price features such as speed and access. Judge Lumley 
Smith suggested that rates were high owing to bargaining inequity between 
lenders and working men making their 30s to 40s a week.76 According to the 
chairman, ‘[E]verybody who has heard the evidence must feel that when people 
are hard pressed for money, and must get it, they will give anything for it. It is 
very hard for the law to protect people in that position.’77 The MLSC 1897 
concluded that price controls were not an appropriate solution. Although it was 
recognised that legislation could address the social needs of the people, 
Bentham’s argument that usury made lenders and borrowers worse off, and the 
practical difficulties of implementing a single rate across an entire market were 
difficult to overcome.78  Citing Jeremy Bentham and the economists Adam 
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Smith and David Ricardo, Vicary Gibbs MP (Conservative) said that price 
controls were an attempt to ‘knock … against’ natural law.79 Mackay Graham, 
the Official Receiver in Bankruptcy for Hereford, supported price controls, but 
refused to propose a single rate.80 His reluctance reflected the difficulty of 
implementing a price ceiling that was an incentive to market activity, yet 
protected borrowers from extortionate bargains. The MLSC 1897 did not 
recommend price controls and reported: 
Your Committee consider that a high rate of interest is not in itself 
incompatible with fair dealing, and that no limit of interest can be 
prescribed which would be adapted to the widely different conditions under 
which these loans are contracted, and further, that if a maximum rate were 
fixed by statute, the interest would tend in all cases to rise to that 
maximum.81 
 
Price controls were rejected for a variety of reasons. Foremost, there 
was an appeal to freedom of contract and a strong resistance to usury. Many 
felt the issue had been settled in 1854. Secondary considerations included fear 
that price caps would encroach on banking and commerce, and that rates 
tended to cluster around the ceiling thus reducing market competition. It was 
believed that the implementation of a cap, much less choosing a single rate, 
would have proved extremely difficult. It was impossible for the committee to 
determine where the line was drawn, what rate was ‘too high’ and what the just 
price of money was.  
Despite the rhetoric, the committee believed that a high interest rate did 
not necessarily indicate an extortionate bargain. If not all high rates were 
extortionate, then applying a single price cap across the entire market was an 
inappropriate solution. Nevertheless, it was recognised that bargaining inequity 
existed. The St. James’s Gazette reported that ‘the borrower has no real 
freedom, or, at least, that he is about as unable under certain circumstances, 
to refuse a loan as he would as he would be to refrain from jumping into the 
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sea from a burning ship.’82 Accordingly, this conclusion narrowed from ‘the 
market price of money was too high’, to: Was a rate of interest charged in a 
specific transaction ‘too high’? 
 
Revising harsh and unconscionable contracts 
After rejecting price controls, the committee supported the application of 
equitable jurisdiction already used by revisionary judges. The proposal sought 
acceptance of the practice and provided further legal powers to relieve harsh 
and unconscionable moneylending.83 The committee’s conclusion was clear: 
judges should have the power to rewrite private moneylending contracts. 
Despite its lack of precision, the phrase ‘harsh and unconscionable’ was 
recognised legal terminology.84 The committee believed that the only effective 
‘remedy for the evils in the system of moneylending by professionals is to give 
the courts absolute and unfettered discretion in dealing with these 
transactions’.85 Although the features of this proposal were new, the committee 
stressed that the proposal was based on legal precedent.86 
The discretionary terms of revision included the power to revise the 
amount due, the interest rate and instalment frequency. Several judges 
requested the power to ‘go behind’ transactions.87 This would allow them to 
take into account past dealings between moneylenders and borrowers. They 
were concerned with renewals. To avoid default, borrowers would take out 
renewals that included the former principal owed, penalty fees and interest 
charges on a new loan. In a renewal, the whole of back interest was made 
capital. This feature increased the principal amount of the new loan. By 
examining the structure of a renewal, a judge could take into consideration the 
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principal and interest already paid. With this information, he could decide 
whether a transaction was harsh and unconscionable and revise the terms of 
the contract accordingly. For liberals, this proposal far exceeded the already 
controversial practice of judicial discretion practised in the county courts.88  
In terms of execution, Charles Inman, a solicitor, believed that there was 
‘nothing easier’ than giving judges the power to revise ‘the whole agreement’.89 
Farrow argued that while implementation could be difficult, the outcome ‘cannot 
very well be worse’ than the current situation.90 Others were less sanguine. 
Hamilton Cuffee, solicitor to the Treasury, cautioned that while public opinion 
supported laws that protected the vulnerable, the application of an interest rate 
test would be applied inconsistently and was very near to usury.91 Judge Collier 
of Liverpool believed that each judge would have his own opinion, thus 
jeopardising the consistency of the legal system.92 If Collier was right, legal 
inconsistency would add to lenders’ business risk. Moreover, a small lender 
disagreed with giving additional powers to a court system that he viewed as 
inherently biased.93 It is difficult to determine whether the courts were biased 
against moneylenders. However, Paul Johnson’s analysis of Victorian small 
debt claims suggested that the courts rarely ruled in favour of the borrower.94 
This, it can be argued, demonstrated that while judges might not hold 
moneylenders in high regard, their rulings followed the facts of a case. 
Despite the repeal of the usury law, and with little support for its return, 
reformers decided that the line of demarcation between useful and extortionate 
moneylending in part depended on the interest rate.95 The goal was a single 
interest rate that would, if met or exceeded, grant a judicial review without 
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directly or indirectly capping the interest rate charged. How that rate could be 
determined and administered without a return to usury proved difficult. Among 
the witnesses and within the committee there was no agreement on what this 
review threshold rate should be. There was some agreement on how the 
process could work. A transaction could not be reviewed unless the interest rate 
exceeded a guidance rate and the judge believed that the transaction was 
harsh and unconscionable.96 
The moneylender was not breaking the law by contracting at an interest 
rate that exceeded the guidance rate. An interest rate above the review level 
was not to be considered prima facie exorbitant. Instead, the rate acted as a 
trigger, which, if exceeded, allowed for a judicial review. To determine if a 
transaction was harsh and unconscionable the risk profile of the borrower and 
return requirements of the moneylender had to be considered. If the lender 
charged a rate above the guidance rate, and the transaction was considered 
fair, the lender could expect to recover the debt. But if a lender charged a rate 
higher than the guidance rate and the transaction was found to be harsh and 
unconscionable, a judge had ‘absolute and unfettered discretion’ to deal with 
the transaction.97 
Selecting the guidance rate generated debate. The committee was 
adamant that the threshold not be so ‘ridiculously’ low that it would threaten, 
even unintentionally, commercial transactions. 98  The committee sought to 
divide the overall credit market into ‘useful loans’ and loans that ‘created 
victims’.99 Within useful lending a clear distinction was made. Bankers were 
considered useful lenders. There is not a single incident of a banker being 
accused of creating victims. One of the testifying judges remarked, ‘No 
respectable bank ever acts oppressively or takes an exorbitant rate of 
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interest.’100 Without defined boundaries, how could the review process apply to 
small lenders and not bankers? Even supporters of judicial review did not seek 
to influence banking activities. 
The committee proposed a guidance rate of 15 pcpa on loans of more 
than £10.101 The moneylenders’ response was not unanimous. Samuel, for 
example, found the rate low and sought a statute of limitation on reopening past 
transactions.102 It is likely that he wanted to limit the judicial power of going 
behind transactions; and Gordon claimed that if the review rate was set below 
30 pcpa, he would immediately leave the moneylending business.103 Notably, 
30 pcpa was half what was considered normal. Echoing the liberal approach, 
Alfred Moore, a moneylender, said that when ‘two sane men enter into a 
contract’ it would be ‘unfair for anyone to interfere between them’.104 Kirkwood 
argued that such powers would be ‘ruinous’ to the market and interest rates 
charged would ‘have to be enormous’ to cover losses due to judicial 
interference. The passage of these powers would be a ‘gross interference with 
the liberty of British subjects’.105 Kirkwood’s appeal to liberty chimed with the 
ideals of freedom of contract, which many sought to preserve. Kirkwood’s 
second point was lost on the committee.106 In so far as the cost of regulation 
had to be paid for, the lender had to experience lower returns or charge higher 
rates. In the latter case, those who would have been approved (i.e., borrowers 
well above the margin) bore the cost of regulation. While the MLSC 1897 did 
not consider Kirkwood’s concern, in 2014 the FCA considered how the cost of 
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regulation would affect borrowers. The FCA’s findings are analysed in Chapter 
5. 
After the committee was concluded, a draft bill proposed the 15 pcpa 
rate, which was strongly disapproved and denounced as ‘an absurdly small and 
unreasonable’ charge to be made for profitably administrating a small loan.107 
The schedule began with the pawnbroking rate of 25 pcpa, which was then 
scaled down.108 
 
Table 12 Schedule of guidance interest rate 
In respect of a loan (whether made by one or more advances) 
Not exceeding 40s 25 pcpa 
Exceeding 40s, but not exceeding £10 20 pcpa 
Exceeding £10 15 pcpa 
 
Source: 1899 Bill 215 Money-lending (HL). 
 
Parliament debated the application of the harsh and unconscionable 
test. Birrell and Sydney Gedge MP (Conservative) argued that the test would 
burden the industry and reduce the supply of small loans to the poor.109 Unlike 
Birrell, Frederick Maddison MP (Liberal) believed that fewer loans would be 
good for the working class.110 He suggested that poor workers were being 
exploited and that the review process would help borrowers overcome 
bargaining inequity. By contrast, Terrance Russell MP (Liberal) believed 
moneylenders were being targeted unfairly and questioned why bargains from 
every branch of trade should not be reviewed.111 He suggested that the laws 
dealing with fraud offered borrower protection. The main debate was over the 
relationship between the guidance rate, price controls and freedom of contract. 
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Ultimately, the ‘price control light’ guidance rate proved impossible to get 
through the Commons. Opponents argued that it was an attempt to reinstate 
usury. Arthur Balfour stated: 
Where we differ is as to whether the particular machinery which the Bill 
provides for dealing with harsh and unconscionable bargains is of a kind 
which interferes illegitimately with freedom of contract between adult 
human beings … we have no desire to revive the usury laws in any 
disguise whatever.112  
 
Once the guidance interest rate was removed, opposition to the bill 
collapsed. The enacted MLA 1900 granted powers of judicial review without 
stating a guidance rate. The guidance rate had been resisted owing to a strong 
belief in freedom of contract and concerns about interference in commercial 
activities. Although many policymakers were offended by high interest rates, 
the committee concluded that high rates were not necessarily harsh and 
unconscionable. Arguably, the review process was a compromise that provided 
borrower recourse, while respecting freedom of contract. Whereas price 
controls were too blunt, judicial review was considered to be precise. This 
research argues, however, that the overarching concern for freedom of contract 
outweighed state intervention aimed at borrower protection. This explains why 
the committee’s preference for a guidance rate was overruled by MPs when the 
bill was debated in Parliament. In doing so, the final measure failed to address 
the key question: When was an interest rate too high? 
 
Disclosure terms and licensing 
Reformers believed that moneylenders frequently committed fraud. Farrow 
testified that ‘These evils would not be, perhaps, so great if they were 
accompanied by a lower interest rate; but accompanied as they are by a 
minimum of sixty per cent they do become evils.’113 The committee chairman, 
Thomas Russell MP (Liberal), who before the hearings was committed to the 
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‘free trade’ of money and believed that it was impossible to ‘save a [fool] from 
his own folly’, switched sides, now believing that regulation was necessary to 
combat fraud.114 How important were advertisements to the business model? 
Which features were considered problematic and which goals were disclosure 
requirements expected to achieve? Why were there such divergent opinions on 
APR disclosure? Why did the committee support a registry but not licensing? 
This subsection analyses debates on advertisements, terms and conditions, 
trade names and licensing. First, it analyses the perceived problem and, finally, 
the proposed solutions.  
 
Advertisements 
Moneylenders generated business by advertising and with circulars. The 
importance of advertisements to the moneylending business was recognised 
by both policymakers and lenders.115 So strong was this relationship that James 
Dodwell, a lender of small sums, denied being a moneylender because he did 
not advertise. 116  Newspaper advertisements targeted low- to middle-end 
borrowers, while London’s West End sought high-end borrowers via circulars. 
Farrow claimed that advertisements were ‘framed chiefly with the purpose of 
deceiving the … poor and ignorant’.117 Advertisements indicating a 5 per cent 
rate were commonplace, but it was suggested this was a fraudulent teaser 
rate.118 It was believed that the actual contracted interest rate was 5 per cent a 
month, annualising at 60 pcpa. 119  It was these advertisements that took 
advantage of the working man, enticing and ‘entrapping’ him to borrow.120 
Worse were ‘fee-snatchers’ who advertised and charged application fees with 
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no intention of lending. 121  Robert Finlay, Attorney-General, argued that 
misleading advertisements caused ‘great mischief’ and needed to be dealt 
with.122 
To measure the relationship between loan demand and advertising 
effectiveness, Farrow conducted two experiments. In the first, he offered money 
to lend at 10 per cent in four London daily newspapers, to which he received 
283 replies in a single day. In the second instance, he placed three 
advertisements in a London weekly, for which he received 450 replies. The 
replies came from ‘bank clerks, civil servants, small tradesmen, and the working 
class’.123 Farrow’s experiment confirmed the effectiveness of advertising. He 
and his supporters, however, did not appreciate that it also demonstrated the 
fact that small loans were in great demand. Unlike the PBSC 1870, this 
committee showed little interest in examining the market’s demand features. 
Related to borrower demand and advertisements, some policymakers 
believed that ‘only an idiot’ would fail to ask the actual interest rate and 
repayment terms of a loan.124 This demonstrated a misunderstanding of the 
borrowing needs of the working poor. For those in need of emergency cash, the 
cost and terms of a loan were secondary to securing the money. While there 
was consensus on the importance of advertising to generate new business, 
there was disagreement about how unambiguous the information was. 
However, policymakers and moneylenders agreed that fraudulent advertisers 
should be prosecuted.125 The extent of that fraud was debated.  
 
Terms and conditions 
Lenders were accused of failing to disclose the interest rate expressed as a 
percentage, amortisation schedules and default terms.126 The committee heard 
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extensive evidence on all three topics. Given the often dire straits of the 
borrower, reformers believed that lenders should disclose the terms and 
conditions more explicitly. By placing the onus on the lender, deception and 
fraud would be reduced. Moneylenders retorted that borrowers were welcome 
to request a copy of loan contracts and that nothing was ever hidden from them. 
John Faux, one of four borrowers interviewed, believed many of the important 
details were concealed and that he did not understand the terms to which he 
had agreed.127 These issues raised points about how much and what types of 
information needed to be disclosed to encourage informed borrowing. An 
assumption, then, was that borrowers used such information when making 
credit decisions and that regulation could improve the process. 
Key to this debate, lenders were accused of deception owing to their 
practice of quoting the interest rate as stated in currency terms; for example, a 
£7 loan would carry a £3 interest charge. However, under this disclosure 
method lenders informed the borrower of ‘exactly what [he had] to pay’.128 
Debate ensued concerning the merits of stating the interest charge in 
percentage terms rather than in monetary terms. The committee received 
almost unanimous advice that the interest rate should be stated on the note 
and in percentage terms.129 Moneylenders understood their business as a 
short-term ‘retail operation’ and strongly opposed giving percentage terms.130 
They suggested that since retailers of other commodities were not required to 
state their costs in percentage terms, they should not be either. More practical 
reasons were offered. Two lenders admitted that they were unable to work out 
the interest rate. Another dealt in ‘lump sums, not percentages’ as percentages 
would be ‘very difficult and confusing’.131 Whether the committee appreciated 
how difficult it was to calculate an APR, and the result was open to various 
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factors and required a high degree of standardisation to be implemented, was 
not fully engaged during the hearings. 
In a heated exchange, one moneylender argued that any legal 
requirement forcing percentage disclosure would require two more clerks in 
each office.132 To this a committee member responded, ‘You could surely afford 
that expense at 179 per cent interest.’ The moneylender reminded the 
committee that his net profit margin was 11 per cent and additional regulatory 
burdens would only decrease that already low rate. Evidence was presented 
that the borrowers were concerned with ‘how much they will owe’ and not the 
rate expressed in percentage terms.133 This debate illustrates how different 
market participants and politicians understood the business of lending small 
sums. Curiously, neither the committee members nor the moneylenders 
mentioned that the PBA 1872 cited the interest rate in monetary terms. The 
APR debate - that is, whether it was a suitable to small loans issued on a short-
term basis - resurfaced throughout the period covered by this research.134 
There was also concern about interest-only payments. Some held that 
repayment terms were stacked against the borrower such that default was likely 
to occur.135 Committee members believed that because most borrowers did not 
want others to know they had resorted to a moneylender, exposure through the 
court system practically ensured that loan renewal terms would be agreed.136 If 
the borrower refused to take a rollover loan, lenders would threaten public 
exposure and a lawsuit. Exposure threats were particularly effective with public 
sector clerks, whose contract of employment forbade recourse to a 
moneylender.137 If a clerk was found to have engaged a moneylender, he could 
be dismissed. Several references were made to the instant dismissal terms of 
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clerks employed by the Bank of England.138 On one occasion, Robert Linnell, a 
moneylender, took his collection efforts too far, having written a letter to the 
senior managers of Messrs Pulham and Cooke, clerks at the Inland Revenue 
and the Ministry of Health, respectively.139 Linnell complained of Pulham and 
Cooke’s failure to repay. Refusing to succumb to ‘this kind of blackmail’, the 
Inland Revenue pursued legal resource against the lender. Linnell was found 
guilty by Mr Dummett, a magistrate of the Bow Street Court. Dummett referred 
to Linnell as a ‘blood-sucking usurer’. For the most part, however, so feared 
was the threat of exposure that, according to James Mathew, ‘the present state 
of the law leads to crime, gambling and suicides’, all with the help of a court 
biased in favour of the lender.140 Here again there was disagreement. Most 
moneylenders found the court system biased against them, while others 
believed it operated in their favour. This begs the question, if borrowers feared 
the court system, would the MLA 1900 judicial review process provide relief? 
 
Trade names 
Moneylenders often assumed multiple trade names and used the terms ‘bank’, 
‘finance’ or ‘trust company’. One moneylender admitted to trading under nine 
names, none of which was his own. Another conducted business using seven 
‘bank’ names. 141  One bone of contention was that borrowers and the 
government should know the lender’s identity. Owen and Lewis testified that 
the only reason to trade under multiple names was to commit fraud.142  
The committee was critical of consolidation loans issued by the same 
moneylender under different names.143 The committee heard of a woman who 
had trouble repaying a £50 note owed to a Chester-based lender. With the 
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intention of paying this lender she secured a £70 loan from a Liverpool concern. 
Further troubles caused her to default on that note too. In Birmingham, she 
acquired a third loan of £100 to repay the Liverpool-based lender. All three 
offices were owned by Isaac Gordon. Gordon was questioned aggressively 
about these transactions, and when asked if this was a ‘legitimate business 
practice’, he replied, ‘I risk my money … and I have a perfect right to make any 
bargain I see fit … and give to that lady [under] forty names … I can do it.’144 
Not only was the committee surprised that Gordon failed to deny his actions, 
but also by his cavalier attitude to issuing renewals. Other lenders defended 
their use of multiple names, claiming that it improved the information flow and 
helped keep track of poor borrowers who ‘skedaddle’ from city to city.145 While 
these transactions were legal, they were considered abusive. It was difficult for 
policymakers to determine how many loans a borrower should be permitted to 
transact. 
Arguably of greater concern was the use of banking terminology in trade 
names. It was made clear that moneylenders were businesses that transacted 
at exorbitant rates of interest and should not be considered as bankers. Class 
distinction, anti-Semitism and xenophobia were all present in these 
discussions.146 Throughout the investigation the banking profession was held 
in the highest regard and every effort was made to ensure that it was not to be 
confused with moneylending. William Anson MP (Liberal) declared that ‘no one 
ever talks of a banker as a moneylender’, and Lewis added that it was 
‘impossible’ to mistake a professional moneylender for a banker.147 While it was 
feasible to restrict the use of trade names without clearly defining a 
moneylender, it would be difficult to apply. 
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Solutions 
There was no agreement concerning remedies for the issues of fraud and 
transparency. Proposals included banning advertisements, licensing schemes 
and a requirement that transactions be filed with a local authority. A ban on 
advertising would be a draconian measure.148 Lewis and Archie Loyd argued 
that if advertisements were ‘attacked’, then ‘fewer people would come in 
contact’ with moneylenders.149 This was an attempt to limit, or even eliminate, 
moneylending. 150  Importantly, because bona fide bankers did not issue 
advertisements or circulars, this measure would not interfere with banking.151 
Like many of the reforms under consideration, the power to ban 
advertisements was supported by legal precedent. Proponents were extending 
clause 2 of the Betting and Loans (Infants) Act. This Act forbade advertising to 
minors (those under the age of 21).152 Its selection indicated the committee’s 
paternalistic attitude to borrowers. Judge Francis Roxburgh testified that ‘these 
borrowers are quite as childish and quite as foolish as persons under twenty-
one … these persons require protection as much as legal infants.’153 If the 
borrower was thought to be childlike and the lender a ‘financial wolf and 
rapacious shark’, there were grounds to regulate.154 Instead, taking the liberal 
position, moneylenders asked why they should be precluded from advertising 
in ‘any way they think proper’.155 Liberal theorists suggested that criminal law 
already had the power necessary to prosecute false statements and thus no 
further measures were necessary. 156  Like high interest rates, although 
moneylending advertisements were held suspect, interfering at this level was 
resisted. 
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The MLA 1900 did not address the interest rate in percentage terms, 
amortisation schedules, default terms or renewal loans. While it can be argued 
that these issues were dealt with under MLA 1900, clause 4, the wording of this 
section is vague. The clause failed to provide a legal test to determine whether 
a moneylender had ‘fraudulently induced a person to borrow money’; 
essentially, the clause relied on the law relating to fraud. Although Ernest 
Beckett MP (Conservative) proposed regulation related to renewal, it was not 
included in the final Act. 157  As with advertising, there was resistance to 
interfering in legally conducted businesses.158 Hugo Charteris, Lord Elcho of 
Wemyss (Conservative), believed there was a ‘modern tendency’ to support 
popular bills, which he argued against because ‘legislation should be liberty, 
and this was the only sound basis upon which they could properly legislate’.159 
It was believed that the interest rate would be covered by judicial review and 
disclosure matters would be handled by fraud statutes.160 If fraud or deception 
was proved in a court of law, then judges could nullify the contract. Thus, there 
was no need for further restriction. 
In response to the use of trade names, many policymakers saw value in 
creating a registry. Henry Hawkins, a judge sitting in the High Court of Justice, 
declared that, like pawnbrokers, moneylenders should register, and if they 
fought the proposal, it only showed how ashamed they were of their 
business.161 This proposal was based on legal precedent – the PBA 1872, 
sections 37-44. The proposal required that each moneylender register under a 
single name and file each location of their business.162 Only registered offices 
could transact legally. The Inland Revenue was named as the agency in charge 
of the registration process. However, the MLA 1900 required that a 
moneylender file under a single name, without specifying whether that name 
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was given or assumed. It is likely that the liberal elements sought to avoid 
damaging moneylending concerns with brand equity. 
A definition of moneylenders was required for the registry. But defining 
moneylenders proved extremely difficult. Attempts at defining moneylending 
began by comparing it to banking. Bankers were defined as people who 
engaged in the activity of banking.163 One witness identified that the source of 
capital distinguished bankers from moneylenders with the former taking 
deposits while the latter did not.164 Others believed the profession was so 
readily understood that a definition was unnecessary. 165  The committee 
disagreed and, working from the legal phraseology assigned to bankers, 
defined moneylenders as, ‘every person whose business is that of money-
lending’.166 But, how does that differ from the function of a banker? 
The MLA 1900 also defined the industry by exclusion, that is, four 
specific industries were mentioned as not being moneylenders. These were 
pawnbrokers, friendly societies, any group granted special powers by 
Parliament to lend money and ‘any person bona fide carrying on the business 
of banking or insurance’.167 Ultimately, although a definition was included in the 
MLA 1900, Parliament failed to provide a working definition of moneylenders, 
nor did it develop an effective registry system. As a regulatory measure the Act 
did not require that a moneylender operate under his given name. Moreover, 
the Inland Revenue had no power to deny an applicant or to remove a 
moneylender from the registry. Even a lender with a criminal conviction under 
the Act itself could not be removed. In 1911, the Act was amended and clarified 
so that a moneylender whose registration name implied that he carried on the 
business of banking could be removed from the registry and subject to a fine 
and imprisonment. 
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Moving beyond the registry, during the MLSC 1897 several witnesses, 
including moneylenders, asked for licensing and proposed enhanced 
regulation, including a supervisory authority to deny or revoke a licence, audit 
financial statements and required moneylenders to post bond and maintain 
capital reserves.168 Samuel agreed with the licensing scheme and argued that 
‘£500-£1000 should be deposited in Consols to prove’ that they had money to 
lend.169 Samuel also believed that rooting out troublesome lenders would add 
to the stability of the industry, reduce transaction costs and keep more cases 
out of court. 170  Like pawnbrokers, moneylenders believed that enhanced 
licensing requirements would rein in unacceptable behaviour and improve the 
status of the industry. In that regard both groups saw aspects of regulation as 
beneficial. 
Prima facie registration and licensing may seem secondary to interest 
rates and advertising. However, they proved crucial to the development of the 
market. The non-discriminatory registry implemented by the MLA 1900 and the 
committee’s outright rejection of a licensing scheme reflected Parliament’s 
unwillingness to legitimise moneylenders. The MLA 1900 required the Inland 
Revenue to compile a list of the names and locations of moneylenders and 
nothing more. The Inland Revenue had no supervisory role. It was recognised 
that a government licence implied implicit approval of the applicant and by 
extension the industry. Although the proposed licensing scheme was minimal, 
it was considered a step too far towards legitimation. The judiciary and 
committee were adamantly against any licensing scheme as ‘some sort of 
approval or badge of respectability’.171 Years later, Ernley Blackwell, Assistant 
Under Secretary at the Home Office, said that licensing was rejected because 
‘it [gave the] impression that moneylenders had a sort of guarantee by the 
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Government’.172 Licensing requirements were not included in the MLA 1900 as 
fear of legitimising the market was too great. 
 
Conclusion to section B. The Formation of Regulation 1897-1900 
The committee concluded that moneylenders were evil and that their loans 
were detrimental to borrowers. However evil, there were limits to how far 
politicians were willing to regulate. Regulation was constrained by a strong 
belief in freedom of contract, an opposition to usury and fear of interfering in 
banking. Price controls were rejected as an affront to freedom of contract, a 
belief that the issue had been settled in 1854, rate clustering and the difficulty 
of implementation. Parliament was unwilling to regulate the price of money on 
a market-wide basis. Although high rates were considered problematic, they 
did not entail a harsh and unconscionable bargain. It was believed that there 
was no single rate that could accommodate the variation in risk. Conversely, 
George Murnaghan MP (Anti-Parnellite) argued for strong restrictions and 
believed that those concerned with the ‘encroachment of personal liberty’ 
represented only the wealthy.173 Few shared his view. 
Paramount in this debate was freedom of contract - that is, the ability to 
negotiate the price of money and conditions of contract. Once that freedom had 
been exercised, should the borrower seek legal recourse, the Act granted 
judges the power to determine whether the contract was harsh and 
unconscionable. Although no rate was set, it was believed that the review 
process would be effective.174 It was assumed that the Act would encourage 
borrowers to utilise the court system. However, as the next section 
demonstrates, that assumption was wrong and, along with the failure to include 
a guidance rate, contributed to the need for regulation in 1927. 
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Parliament spent much of its time focusing on the high interest rate, 
usury and judiciary power. As a result, there was very little debate on the non-
price loan features, such as advertising and disclosure terms. Their focus on 
the judiciary review mechanism at the expense of other considerations supports 
the claim of this research that the starting point - that is, the conflict between 
liberal and revisionist judges - framed the debate. Despite support for mandated 
disclosure terms such as the percentage rate, the MLA 1900 relied on existing 
standards of fraud. While moneylenders believed stringent regulation would 
keep marginal lenders out of the market, Parliament did not enact them. In 
many respects, this was less a systematic analysis of moneylending than it was 
a debate on the role of the judiciary in a market economy, with a focus on why, 
and through which process, judges could review and rewrite a contract. Unlike 
blanket price control, it was left to individual judges to determine whether the 
interest rate was too high. This is not surprising given that much of the debate 
and calls for reform were based on transactions that had been contested in 
court. 
Unlike the PBA 1872, the MLA 1900 did not debate the moral conduct of 
borrowers. That does not mean, however, that Parliament was unwilling to 
protect vulnerable borrowers; on the contrary, the Act was intended to do just 
that. Reform took place during a shift in poverty studies reflected in the work of 
Joseph Rowntree, Sidney and Beatrice Webb and William Beveridge, in which 
character played a smaller role.175 The involvement of government coincided 
with a belief that the ‘problem of poverty’ was larger than the charitable sector 
could handle.176 While the MLSC 1897 did not engage in the poverty debate 
directly, the MLA 1900 followed a series of Acts relating to working-class 
education, housing and factory conditions. Still, during the MLA 1900, 
policymakers were more interested in the lender than in the credit product and 
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its users. Ensuring that moneylenders were not thought of as bankers and that 
the MLA 1900 would not interfere with proper commerce were important. 
Overall, the intention was to limit an ‘evil’ industry without directly 
interfering in the market’s price mechanism. It was expected that with less fraud 
and recourse to the courts, borrowers would be better protected. As Derek 
Fraser argued, by 1895 the government was willing to solve social problems 
related to the excesses of capitalism. 177  Nevertheless, individual liberties 
remained important and government interference met strong opposition. 
Accordingly, state intervention tended to be preventative rather than supportive 
as would be later seen in the welfare state and labour exchanges.178 While price 
controls were imposed on the railway companies, regulating the price of money 
was believed to be a step too far. The price control debate reflected wider 
tensions between the role of the state and the individual.179 Notwithstanding, 
the government believed that moneylending was the type of ‘excessive’ 
capitalism that required social policy. In this case, the solution was to provide 
borrower relief through the application of the harsh and unconscionable 
doctrine. In theory, the case-by-case approach provided relief to individual 
borrowers without offending market operations overall. This research suggests 
that concerns about freedom of contract outweighed borrower protection as is 
evident in the debates over, and removal of, a guidance rate. 
 
Aftermath (1900-1924) 
Not long after its passage the Act’s shortcomings became apparent. In 1901, 
Horace Mansfield MP (Liberal) asked why the Inland Revenue had not 
prosecuted a single moneylender for failing to register.180 This reveals how 
misunderstood and ill-crafted the Act was. The Inland Revenue was charged 
                                            
177 Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the Welfare State: A History of Social Policy since the 
Industrial Revolution (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 167. 
178 Stephen Lee, Aspects of British Political History, 1815-1914 (London: Routledge, 2004), 
284-287.  
179 Daunton, Wealth and Welfare, 543. 
180 HC deb. 18 June 1901, vol. 11. 
  
137 
with registering moneylenders, but had no power to prosecute failure to do so. 
In 1907, the Metropolitan Police brought to the attention of the Inland Revenue 
a Bethnal Green resident who, while legally registered as a moneylender, had 
served two terms of penal servitude and was under arrest for receiving stolen 
goods.181 In 1910, Rufus Isaacs and John Simon, lawyers with the Board of 
Trade, expressed frustration that the MLA 1900 usual trade name clause 
allowed ‘a great many persons’ to register under false names. Later that same 
year, the Board of Trade did not know whether it should prosecute Yorkshire 
Discount Bank and Cardiff Advance Bank for violation of trade name use.182 
While the harsh and unconscionable clause provided a theoretical 
framework, it did little to advise judges in specific cases. Asked how he had 
arrived at a decision regarding a moneylending case, Justice Scrutton replied 
that ‘he did not propose to give a reason … [it would] only be reported and used 
against him and other judges’.183 As expected, the interest rate was pivotal in 
the exercise of judicial review. Judges were left to determine how much a 
borrower understood the transaction, whether the lender had fulfilled the 
burden of proof and what constituted excessive interest. In practice the Act did 
little to settle the legal issues it was created to solve.184 
Based on trade group data and government documents, it is likely that 
professional moneylenders numbered between 4,000 and 6,000 operating in 
approximately 8,000 offices. 185  While the Inland Revenue kept a central 
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registry, the official figures were never released. In theory, within the 
Metropolitan area a list was forwarded to each Office of a Collector of Inland 
Revenue and in the provinces Collectors of Customs & Excise were required to 
send district inspectors details of new registrants under the MLA 1900. It seems 
that the process was never fully developed and was disrupted again during the 
First World War. In 1931, Mr Wilcock, an employee of the Chief Inspector of 
Taxes, after several failed attempts, said, ‘Further enquiries have been made 
and it does not seem to be possible to do anything more in England with regard 
to obtaining lists of registered moneylenders.’186 
 
C. The formation of regulation 1925-1927 
The world at large has recently had plenty of advertisements so far as 
the higher branches of blackmail are concerned. And presumably it is 
these revelations that prompted a Parliamentary effort to check the 
widespread and insidious evil… moneylenders are callous, bloodsucking 
parasites, without moral sense…lurking about in search of innocent 
victims. 
’Upon usury’, Hull Daily Mail, 27 March 1925 
 
On all hands there appears to be a substantial measure of agreement 
that the Act of 1900 has hopelessly broken down, and that more drastic 
legislation is necessary in order to curb the machinations of sharks … 
who wax fat on the misfortunes of others. 
Aberdeen Journal, 18 March 1925 
During the 1920s moneylending was expanding rapidly. Between 1922 and 
1924 there were 4,647 new registrations.187 The Edinburgh Evening News 
feared for ‘the shark’s prey’ and claimed that existing regulation was ‘no 
effective curb on the social evil’. 188  Edward Carson, Lord Carson (Ulster 
Unionist Party) observed that judges believed that their powers were ‘utterly 
useless’ to control moneylenders.189 Concerns that the MLA 1900 was failing 
were warranted as from 1920 to 1925 the Home Office was unaware of any 
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prosecutions concerning false advertising.190 As before, advertising and court 
cases drew attention to the industry. Many parliamentarians were frustrated by 
the incessant ‘siren’ and ‘plague’ of moneylending circulars received in the 
post.191 Carson cited how a single moneylender had sent 190,000 circulars in 
six months, a practice that Carson vowed to end.192 Newspaper headlines and 
articles called moneylenders evil, Shylocks, satanic and loan sharks. Ralph 
Glyn MP (Conservative) disagreed. He believed that most moneylenders met 
the needs of working men who, without access to banking facilities, had no 
other option in a dire emergency.193 His opinion remained in the minority. 
Carson was offended by moneylenders who targeted civil servants and 
Crown employees.194 He was concerned about civil servants such as Fred 
Webb, who had filed for bankruptcy after borrowing from a moneylender, and a 
naval commander who paid exorbitant interest over three years before the loan 
was paid.195 It was assumed that a debt burden would encroach on their ability 
to carry out their work.196 At any point, Carson feared, these civil servants could 
face bankruptcy and be ‘driven out’ of their careers. After investigating many 
cases of ‘hardship and poverty’, Carson doubted that moneylenders benefited 
society.197 Despite his preference for eliminating the industry, he was willing to 
compromise and sought urgent action to curtail the moneylending machine.198 
In response, by 1925 two moneylending bills, one proposed by Richard Wells 
MP (Conservative) and the other by Carson himself, attracted enough 
parliamentary interest to warrant a joint select committee (MLSC 1925). 
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Although Carson was concerned that the committee was a ‘shelving 
procedure’, the Home Secretary, William Joynson-Hicks MP (Conservative), 
assured him that the intention was to draft a consolidated bill.199 
Unlike the MLSC 1897, many interested parties testified, including trade 
associations and charitable organisations. The MLSC 1925 acknowledged the 
anti-moneylending bias of the 1900 proceedings.200 Its mandate was to include 
moneylenders in the reform process. Notwithstanding the industry was held in 
disdain, it was claimed that ‘moneylenders … are the scum of the earth’ and 
that ‘to look into the face of a moneylender … is to see the picture of the devil 
incarnate’. 201  As before, many select committee members considered 
moneylenders as not being part of traditional banking and treated the industry 
as criminal. While politicians and the public were frustrated by the industry, were 
they focused on the same issues as 25 years earlier? Was there a fierce debate 
between the ‘protectors of capitalism’ and social reformers?202 How were high 
interest rates understood and what solutions were believed to relieve 
borrowers? Would they appeal to fraud laws or seek additional regulation of 
advertising? Did moneylenders consider certain regulations to be beneficial? 
Was the industry better organised than in 1900? 
 
High interest rates, price controls and judicial review 
Leslie Scott MP (Conservative) believed that high interest rates were 
degrading and that ‘fear and the continual misery of the people who get into the 
toils of these financial meshes from which they cannot escape’ had to be 
stopped. 203  There is little indication, however, that moneylenders earned 
abnormally high rates of return. Data on 15 moneylending firms over a five-year 
period revealed an average interest rate of 60 pcpa and a 15.3 per cent return 
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on invested capital (ROIC).204 The ROIC did not include a salary expense for 
the principal-owner and thus overstated the return. Comparatively speaking, a 
15.3 per cent return was less than the banks and discount houses received.205 
A London moneylender (not in the sample in Table 13) submitted three years of 
financials showing a great variation in returns. He hoped to convince the 
committee that ‘the risk is ever flowing’.206 Moneylenders argued that their rates 
took into account bad debts and an expensive administrative structure 
designed to process weekly payments.207 Table 13 gives the available data. 
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Table 13 Data on 15 moneylenders 
 
 % of charged interest % 
Lender Bad debts Expenses Return* 
1 47.5 30.0 25.1 
2 34.8 45.0 15.5 
3 38.1 36.8 14.4 
4 6.3 81.2 7.9 
5 55.0 25.3 19.1 
6 14.6 66.3 9.3 
7 45.2 35.1 23.5 
8 58.3 31.6 11.4 
9 30.4 59.3 7.5 
10 35.0 23.0 19.8 
11 17.5 39.3 16.7 
12 24.5 33.3 17.1 
13 18.2 47.4 18.6 
14 17.7 54.4 14.8 
15 25.4 54.8 8.9 
Average 31.2 44.2 15.3 
 
Sources: MLSC 1925, 263-265, 274-275.  
*Excluded salary for the principal-owner and in some instances family members working for 
the firm. Unfortunately, the evidence does not explain why lender 4 experienced relatively low 
levels of bad debt and a high expense ratio. Intuitively, higher levels of due diligence expense 
could lead to less bad debt. 
 
Carson and others believed that the MLA 1900 had failed to mitigate high 
interest charges or improve on the Victorian market.208  Charles James, a 
moneylender, stated that under the MLA 1900 there was ‘no uniformity’ in the 
county courts.209 Determining whether a moneylending transaction was harsh 
and unconscionable varied widely. MPs were highly critical of the way in which 
the system had developed, claiming that the framers of the MLA 1900 ‘never 
intended to give such wide powers to county courts’.210 While these frustrations 
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were understandable, the judiciary’s discretion and resulting inconsistencies 
were predictable. As this research demonstrates, the MLA 1900 framers 
created the system to review transactions individually and were aware of the 
potential for discrepancy. Despite Carson’s assertion that in the 1900s 
‘everybody foretold that such a provision … would … not solve the question’, 
the judicial system was operating as designed.211  
Like the MLSC 1897, the 1925 debate centred on a solution to high 
interest rates. Politicians cited transactions such as a woman who borrowed 
30s and owed £5 17s in return.212 Another woman had borrowed £2 to pay for 
medical expenses for a sick child. Over 12 months she paid 4s a week, totalling 
£12. Ernest Greenhill of the Financiers’ Association of Scotland argued that the 
problems associated with moneylending, especially the high interest rate, had 
not been dealt with because, instead of recognising that moneylenders were a 
‘necessary condition of modern’ life, they were considered evil. 213  Citing 
research from both England and the United States, Greenhill suggested a fixed 
interest rate of 5 pcpm. He believed that a fixed rate of 60 pcpa allowed for a 
reasonable, but not excessive, return on capital and would mitigate abusive 
lending.  
Greenhill aside, few others pushed for price controls. This time the ghost 
of Bentham was not raised, nor were there many objections based on liberal 
ideology. The Home Office argued that implementing a single rate that would 
compensate for the wide range of risks was impractical, if not impossible.214 
Also from a practical standpoint, Judge Mackenzie Chalmers, a Permanent 
Secretary at the Home Office, believed that usury did not work as it was easy 
to evade, failed to compensate moneylenders for the risk of lending on a note 
of hand (i.e., a promissory note) and encouraged credit rationing.215 Richard 
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Haldane, Lord Haldane (Labour) recounted that, historically, usury was avoided 
through the issue of annuities and cautioned policymakers to be prepared for 
similar evasion.216 Instead, policymakers focused on supporting the harsh and 
unconscionable test by implementing a guidance rate. 
For guidance rates, Wells and Carson proposed 20 and 15 pcpa, 
respectively. The Moneylenders Association considered these rates too low. In 
so far as every transaction appearing in court was likely to exceed 15 pcpa, 
moneylenders feared undue legal prejudice.217 H. W. Bagwell, an accountant 
and member of a friendly society, believed it was impossible to carry on a 
moneylending concern at Carson’s rate.218 Instead, the Yorkshire Association 
indicated that 60 pcpa was the lowest rate at which an adequate return could 
be earned.219 Albert Partridge, a chartered accountant, affirmed the 60 pcpa 
rate.220 So often quoted was the 60 pcpa rate that Lord Hunsdon claimed 
moneylenders must have conspired to present such consistent evidence.221 
Given that moneylenders quoted 60 pcpa during the MLSC 1897, Hunsdon’s 
allegations were probably incorrect. Furthermore, this rate received support 
from an unlikely source. Dorothy Keeling, chairwoman and secretary of a 
Liverpool-based charity providing social services, testified that, ‘60 per cent for 
unsecured loans would give a fair but not exorbitant profit’ to moneylenders.222 
Keeling supported the rate based on her experience of administering a 
charitable loan fund, which, owing to low rates, was operating at a loss.223 
Keeling suspected that the lowest end of the business would not be able to 
operate profitably at the 60 per cent rate. She believed that a contraction in the 
market and credit rationing would benefit marginal borrowers. Because 
borrowing high-interest money caused ‘agony of mind’ and many had ‘no hope’ 
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of repaying under the current model, she advocated a regulated, respectable 
and profitable moneylending industry.224 Ralph Glyn encouraged MPs in similar 
fashion. He argued demand for loans would always exist and that legislation 
would help moneylenders conduct their business properly and should not be 
seen as ‘vindictive’.225 
More dramatically, Mark Wilson, a moneylender in Brighton, believed 
that a guidance rate would restrain the supply of capital and ‘kill in entirety’ the 
moneylending trade. He reminded the committee that the money obtained by 
borrowers was ‘not buried in the garden’, but spent in the community.226 Ellis 
Hume-Williams MP (Conservative) protested for a different reason. He 
suggested that a guidance rate implied that any lower rate was conscionable 
and that rates would therefore tend to cluster around the maximum.227 Overall, 
when compared to earlier debates, practical issues were of greater concern 
than ideology. 
In the end, the committee set the review threshold at 4 per cent a month 
(which in their view equated to 48 pcpa) and shifted the burden of proof by 
placing the onus on the moneylender to demonstrate that a transaction was not 
harsh and unconscionable. According to Ronald Barnes, Lord Gorell (Liberal), 
the 48 pcpa figure was arrived at by subtracting advertising circular costs (which 
the Act would ban) from the 60 per cent average rate.228 By quoting the rate in 
monthly terms, there was recognition of the short-term nature of the business. 
The MLA 1900 did not state a threshold interest rate, nor was the base 
assumption one of guilt. Now, it was for the moneylender to prove that his rates 
were not excessive. Arguably, the presumption of guilt codified legislators’ 
negative perceptions of the industry. Underlying this proposal was a belief that 
owing to costs and publicity, borrowers remained reluctant to resort to the court 
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system. By shifting the burden of proof, legislators hoped that borrowers would 
exercise their legal rights. This proposal divided moneylenders. Some found 
the county court system fair and believed they could satisfy the burden of proof 
without much effort. Others argued that the county court system was already 
biased against them and the proposal would only make matters worse.229 It is 
unlikely that this provision would have encouraged borrowers to use the courts. 
In practice, borrowers were reluctant because of privacy concerns and the cost 
of litigation, issues this clause failed to address. 
Setting the guidance rate at 48 pcpa, below the commonly cited 60 pcpa, 
demonstrated Parliament’s intention to limit, but not eliminate, the supply 
channel. However, the 48 per cent level was higher than both Wells’s and 
Carson’s original proposals. 230  Although Carson privately lobbied Glyn to 
reduce the guidance rate, he and Wells were willing to compromise.231 Joseph 
Kenworthy MP (Labour) argued that in a perfect world moneylenders, 
prostitutes and gambling would be eliminated, but the world was not perfect.232 
Moneylending required attention. The regulatory response was not seen as an 
affront to freedom of contract, but a practical response to a social issue that 
their predecessors had failed to address. 
 
Advertising 
Wells’s bill prohibited all forms of advertising. Even letters addressed to former 
clients were banned.233 Moneylenders argued that a restriction of this kind 
would make ‘it impossible to carry on the trade’.234 They argued that if a sudden 
need for funds arose, such as a death in the family, it was only through 
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advertisements that a man could find a moneylender. Moreover, without the 
ability to attract clientele, new entrants to the market would cease. The clause 
in effect intended to shut down the industry. Charles James, representing the 
Moneylenders Association and the Yorkshire Moneylenders’ Association, 
reminded the committee that similarly controversial alcohol and gambling 
concerns issued circulars without restriction. Instead, he argued that ‘deceptive 
and misleading’ statements were to blame, but not advertising per se. 235 
Moneylenders also warned that a ban on advertising would ‘weed out’ the 
‘better type of moneylender’ and that only the ‘less worthy [would] remain’.236 
Many in the trade argued that if the public prosecutor enforced fraud laws, 
additional regulation would not be needed.237 
To gain respectability and avoid deception, James suggested limiting 
advertisements to descriptive information such as name, address, statement of 
occupation as a moneylender and the foundation year of the business. Other 
moneylenders supported these restrictions.238  Holding the liberal line, one 
moneylender claimed that other traders advertised freely and that the same 
should apply to moneylenders.239 There was also disagreement concerning the 
banning of circulars. London West End lenders protested, while representatives 
of the Lancashire, Cheshire and Bristol moneylending association sought to 
ban them.240 While it is understandable that the lower end of the market saw 
no need for high-end circulars, they showed little regard for the overall market, 
nor did they offer solidarity to their London counterparts. 
The committee’s final proposal was harsh. It banned circulars and 
narrowed newspaper advertisements to registered names, address, statement 
of occupation and the date of establishment.241 During a Commons debate 
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Robert Dennison MP (Labour) remarked, ‘This is the most important clause in 
the Bill.’ 242  In opposition, and based on practicality and legal fairness, 
Kenworthy protested that it was ‘ridiculous’ and ‘perfectly absurd’ to prevent 
people from sending out circulars.243 In the MLA 1927 ban, although not as 
developed as contemporary truth in lending, there is an indication that it was 
meant to improve the quality of information.244 However, this research suggests 
that there is only limited evidence that advertising requirements were meant to 
overcome a market failure such as asymmetric information. Instead, the 
banning of unsolicited circulars targeted at wealthy borrowers was meant to rid 
their recipients of a nuisance that disturbed the ritual of reading their mail during 
breakfast.245 By eliminating the nuisance and limiting the type of information, 
the intention was to restrict moneylending and to limit fraud. The clause was a 
restriction to protect borrowers from deception and not information 
requirements to improve competition.246 
 
Terms and conditions 
The APR debate was also revisited. It was believed that borrowers were being 
deceived by the monetary method. Many moneylenders claimed that they were 
incapable of calculating the rate, or if they could, it would be prohibitively 
expensive to do so.247 In an honest exchange one moneylender admitted that 
he was rather ‘bad at percentages’ and could not do the calculation.248 Proving 
how difficult it was to calculate the interest rate, one academic journal invited 
chartered accountants to calculate the interest on a small loan. Ten accountants 
responded, each with a different answer. Their answers ranged from 234 pcpa 
                                            
242 HC deb. 4 March 1927, vol. 203. 
243 HC deb. 23 April 1926, vol. 194.  
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid. Under the MLA 1927, lenders were permitted to send solicited circulars. 
246 The effectiveness of mandatory information disclosure is debated. This topic is covered in 
Chapter 5. 
247 MLSC 1925, 14, 831. 
248 MLSC 1925, 13, 1479-1489. 
  
149 
to 1,564 pcpa. 249  The instalment nature of differing amounts with various 
methods of amortisation made calculating the interest rate a difficult task. 
A third argument against this clause was based on consumer demand. 
A moneylender of 40 years remarked that rarely were customers interested in 
the interest rate expressed as a percentage. Instead, they wanted to know ‘how 
much they will owe in pounds and pennies’.250 The qualitative data support this 
opinion.251 Moneylenders proposed a compromise, suggesting that the term 
‘gross profit’ be used. This harks back to the retail analogy, whereby it is from 
gross profit that expenses were deducted. 252  Committee members were 
sympathetic to the calculation difficulties, but the proposed alternatives were 
not entertained. The committee’s insistence on expressing the cost of funds as 
a percentage indicates its misunderstanding of customer demand. It was 
assumed that if customers knew the cost as a percentage they would forgo the 
loan. However, the demand for loanable funds was not driven by a ‘rational 
comparison’ between available loan options, but to meet an unavoidable need 
for cash. It is understandable that the borrower would want to know how much 
it would cost. Knowing this allowed for an easy comparison with wages. 
Beyond the APR debate, the MLA 1927 terms and conditions regulations 
departed from past practices. The Act prohibited preliminary fees and required 
that a contract state the loan date, the principal and the pcpa as calculated by 
a statutory formula. A copy of the contract was to be provided within seven 
days. Contracts that failed to comply could not be enforced. Suggestions were 
made requiring moneylending offices to display a pre-approved table providing 
a close estimate of the interest rate based on the terms and loan principal. This 
was not enshrined in the Act, yet soon after its passage these tables were made 
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available.253  At the borrower’s request, and at a cost of 1s, lenders were 
required to furnish statements detailing the original contract, payments received 
and balances owed. Other than debates surrounding the APR, moneylenders 
responded with little protest.  
In certain cases, lenders asked for more stringent measures than 
Parliament did. These measures were intended to increase transparency, but 
in large part they were driven by a desire to reduce fraud as opposed to 
empowering consumers to make ‘rational’ decisions based on key financial 
metrics. That is, fraud vulnerability is distinct from information vulnerability. This 
research argues that because many policymakers linked moneylenders with 
the court system and crime, the motivation for regulation was to decrease fraud, 
as opposed to improving market competition. As before, the state used 
regulation to limit behaviour rather than provide support for market operations. 
 
Licensing and enforcement mechanisms 
Under the MLA 1900 the registration fee was £1. In 1925, the Yorkshire 
Moneylenders’ Association sought to increase this to £25.254 It was argued that 
a higher fee would deter undercapitalised lenders from participating in the 
market. In turn, the entire industry would benefit by having rooted out 
problematic lenders. Several moneylending associations supported the 
increase.255 In pursuit of a ‘respectable trade’, the Yorkshire group backed 
Wells’s amendment requiring a pre-registration police background check.256 
Police certification informed the Inland Revenue whether the applicant was a 
person of good moral character. To be denied a police certificate one had to be 
either a suspected or a convicted criminal. It was hoped that the local police 
would be aware of a moneylender’s behaviour and standing in the community. 
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This proposal was meant to combat lenders such as Mersey Financial, a 
company convicted of issuing pension draft-backed loans.257  Despite their 
offence, they were operating ‘quite cheerfully’ as there was no government 
authority to prevent them doing so. 
Certain moneylending associations, solicitors and government agencies 
took issue with this proposal.258 The Moneylenders’ Association would rather 
Somerset House [the Inland Revenue] retain registration powers. They also 
sought a procedure to appeal a denied application. Under Wells’s and Carson’s 
bills denied registration was considered final. The Moneylenders’ Association 
believed that, with its financial and human resources, in conjunction with the 
Magistrate and Quarter Sessions for appeal, Somerset House was in the best 
position to administer registration procedures. 259  Sir Ernley Blackwell, a 
Permanent Assistant Under Secretary at the Home Office, and the 
Moneylenders’ Association agreed that the local police were not in a position to 
administer a registry. 260  Bearing that in mind, the weight of Blackwell’s 
testimony should be taken lightly as he lacked insight into the moneylending 
market. Blackwell admitted that he and the Home Office had ‘very little 
knowledge’ of moneylending transactions. Notwithstanding, he proceeded to 
testify extensively. 
More general protests concerned the role of government in the 
registration process. Josiah Wedgwood MP (Labour) asked whether the Home 
Office would ask, ‘Who was your father? What school did you study [at]?’ 
Cautioning against the registration process as an affront to free trade and 
commerce, he added that Parliament should not make it ‘more difficult for a 
man to take risks. Safety first never made England.’261 Wedgwood’s stance 
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reflected his firm commitment to self-reliance and individualism.262 Wedgwood 
believed that Shylock was only getting back what was legally his and claimed 
that moneylenders were acting no differently from British war reparation 
collection efforts from France. Wedgwood concluded that ‘he hates [it when] 
superior people try to make workers moral’.263 His opinions were reminiscent of 
the Victorian liberal and poverty debates. While not without supporters, the 
liberal position gained little traction. It was clear that the MLA 1900 had failed 
and the path forward was for more state intervention. 
One London solicitor suggested that a national control board could help 
support the judiciary system.264 It was argued that self-regulation was in the 
interest of respectable lenders and that industry participants could better limit 
criminal activity than outside government supervisors. While Parliament would 
determine the rules of operation and standards of membership, the control 
board would ensure their implementation. 265  Theoretically, a control board 
under parliamentary scrutiny could have helped legitimise the industry. 
However, associations were localised and had limited membership. Even the 
largest association in London, with its developed moneylending market and 
extensive borrowing population, had fewer than 300 members, and it was 
believed that ‘no association in the country’ was strong enough to bring about 
reform pressure from within.266 Although many regional groups testified, they 
offered competing goals and there was conflict within and between 
associations.267 Despite the support of numerous parties, a control board was 
not seriously considered. The Home Office believed that an association would 
fail because society generally lacked confidence in the industry.268  
                                            
262 Paul Mulvey, The Political Life of Josiah C. Wedgwood: Land, Liberty and Empire, 1872-
1943 (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2010). 
263 HC deb. 23 April 1926, vol. 194. 
264 MLSC 1925, 584. 
265 MLSC 1925, 972. 
266 MLSC 1925, 159, 1839. 
267 MLSC 1925, 1672. 
268 MLSC 1925, 1191-1192. 
  
153 
The MLSC 1925 debated enhanced licensing and regulatory schemes 
such as capital requirements and posted bonds.269 Under this requirement a 
lender had to prove he had a balance of liquid funds. In the event of a fine, the 
monies in escrow ensured payment. With capital at risk, it was expected that 
moneylenders would follow the letter and spirit of the Act. A licence could be 
denied or revoked if there was failure to post bond or capital requirements were 
breached. The intention was to remove ‘dud firms’ from the system.270 More 
precisely, any firm without a capital base was considered to be fee-snatching. 
These firms would collect application fees with no intention or ability to lend 
money. Moneylenders and government officials alike sought to close their 
operations.  
However, having entertained enhanced regulatory features, Parliament 
failed to enact measures beyond an augmented version of the existing 
registration model. The MLA 1927 required every moneylender to obtain an 
annually renewed excise licence at a cost of £15 per location.271 Despite its 
name, this required only descriptive information. In addition to the address of 
the business, the licence itself was ‘to be taken out in his [the moneylender’s] 
true name’ and display all additional trade names.272 Trade taking place under 
a false name or unregistered address incurred a £100 fine and the risk of 
imprisonment. To register for an excise licence, a certificate granted by a petty 
sessional court was required. However, the information and restrictions on 
obtaining a certificate were almost a verbatim repeat of the registration clause. 
For example, the issue of a certificate required a lender’s true name, all trade 
names and disclosure of every office location. The difference was in the 
jurisdiction. Each moneylending office required its own certificate issued by the 
local petty sessional court. Certificates could be refused if the applicant was not 
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‘of good character’, ‘nor fit to hold a certificate’, ‘or the applicant has been 
ordered by a court disqualified for holding a certificate’. The certificate clause 
also forbade the use of the term or any implication that a moneylender operated 
as a bank. Given that Parliament considered the banking industry to be 
responsible and ethically moral lenders, it is not surprising that on three 
occasions the bill addressed the relationship between moneylenders and 
bankers.273  
Although more robust than its 1900 counterpart, the registration reform 
of the MLA 1927 was minimal. The excise licence required only that the 
government be aware of the actual name and location of the lender. While court 
certificates addressed the government’s prior inability to deny an application, 
the terminology was vague and provided little guidance to the judiciary. Despite 
including a ‘morality test’, the certificate did little more than ensure that the 
applicant was not a convicted criminal. Many moneylenders sought enhanced 
reform, such as capital requirements, bond posting and supervision roles, such 
as office inspections and financial audits. 274  Parliament thought these 
measures would be impractical and impossible in practice.275 
 
Conclusion to section C. The Formation of Regulation 1925-1927 
There was agreement that the market had grown rapidly and that the MLA 1900 
had failed. As before, many newspaper editorials and some in Parliament 
viewed moneylenders as evil. The Select Committee and much of the House 
debate were more measured. Although traces of liberal thought and Victorian 
poverty concepts were present, the main goal was to improve on existing 
regulation. As Sir Henry Slesser MP (Labour, Appeals Court judge and former 
Solicitor-General) suggested, the debate was settled in 1900, when it was 
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determined that moneylending was a ‘peculiar kind of contract’.276 How far, 
then, were they willing to go and why? 
Kenworthy was cautious and suggested that too heavy an approach 
would drive out competition and encourage credit rationing. After all, he 
remarked, the Charleston was known to kill people, but that did not mean 
dancing should be regulated.277 Reflecting aspects of new Liberalism, Glyn 
wanted to avoid creating a culture of ‘grandmotherly’ government 
intervention.278 Glyn’s support of moneylenders paralleled those who believed 
Victorian pawnbrokers were a form of independent self-help. This finding 
supports Daunton’s argument that continuity existed between the Victorian 
moral economy and new Liberal social policy. Wider trends aside, Wells 
remained focused on the issue and argued that the final bill was meant to 
increase credit standards, reduce ‘unnecessary’ borrowing and decrease the 
costs for qualified borrowers.279 In Wells’s opinion, encouraging the market to 
ration credit away from marginal borrowers was a positive development. That 
is to say, marginal borrowers were better off without a loan. As a result, 
moneylenders would enjoy a better reputation as there would be fewer 
fraudulent lenders and stronger trade associations, as well as less bad debt. 
Wells argued that the guidance rate, which he called a ‘limitation on interest’, 
banning circulars and licensing together would accomplish that end. 
Moneylenders saw value in regulations that would improve market standards. 
Similarly, Rhys Davies MP (Labour), while recognising the merits of capitalism, 
believed the system produced ‘doubtful ways and dark methods’ and that 
regulation was required to protect the ignorant poor.280 It is unlikely that Davies 
would suggest that the market had failed, but would instead categorise the 
regulation as social reform. Wells articulated a similar position.281  
                                            
276 HL deb. 3 February 1926, vol. 63. 
277 HL deb. 4 March 1927, vol. 203. 
278 HC deb. 23 April 1926, vol. 194; Daunton, Wealth and Welfare, 532-533, 546-547. 
279 HC deb. 23 April 1926, vol. 194. 
280 Ibid. 
281 HC deb. 4 March 1927, vol. 203. 
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Walter Phillimore, Lord Phillimore of Shiplake, protested. He believed 
that advertising and interest rate restrictions would cause the market to contract 
and leave ‘honest men who have no security’ with few options.282 William 
Wedgwood argued that the purpose of the Act was to limit moneylenders, a 
class that was viewed with contempt, without considering the implication for 
borrowers. He suggested that moneylenders provided loans to cover 
emergency medical, funeral and food needs and that regulation would make 
securing funds more difficult. Throughout the period covered by this research 
there was disagreement over whether regulation that limited the supply of 
loanable funds helped or harmed borrowers. For some, credit rationing drove 
marginal borrowers out of the market and away from harmful products. Others 
believed that since the demand for funds remained, market segmentation left 
borrowers with far worse alternatives. 
Finally, few moneylenders or policymakers supported price controls. It 
was believed that price controls would not address the variety of lending risk 
factors, were easily evaded and encouraged credit rationing. They were viewed 
as impractical and received little attention. Instead, the debate focused on the 
harsh and unconscionable test. While some moneylenders challenged the 
concept of a guidance rate, more effort was focused on its selection. These 
efforts were successful in so far as the rate selected exceeded Carson’s and 
Wells’s original proposals. Although not as organised as their 1870 
pawnbroking counterparts, moneylenders had convinced enough politicians 
that moneylending incurred high administrative and bad debt expenses. 
Although moneylenders remained outside the banking system and were not 
well liked, their case was given more consideration than in 1900.  
Along with the onus of guilt placed on moneylenders, the implementation 
of the guidance rate was a sharp departure from the past. It was believed that 
the ineffectiveness of the MLA 1900 and inconsistency in the court system 
                                            
282 HL deb. 1 December 1925, vol. 62. 
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would be mitigated by the guidance rate. Along with disclosure terms, 
enhanced licensing and advertising restrictions, the supply of funds and fraud 
would decrease. The Act had addressed the problems of high rates, advertising 
and the industry’s growth. Glyn, Wells and others believed that raising industry 
standards would lead to better outcomes, but that was not the driving force 
behind regulation and probably explains why enhanced features were not 
considered. This research argues that the Act did not generate much theoretical 
debate over freedom of contract and market intervention because, after 27 
years of failed regulation, more practical measures were called for. While 
Carson’s bill was considered to be unnecessarily aggressive, few if any 
proposed that the best option was to repeal all regulation. As before, small 
loans to the working poor were considered peculiar and required a regulatory 
response to limit lending activity and poor behaviour. 
Without a strong liberal opposition there was little interest in revisiting 
‘the poverty debate’. Arguably, Conservative silence on the issue indicated that 
conditions of poverty were not necessarily self-created and reflected ‘One 
Nation Conservativism’.283 The Act’s banning of circulars and protection of the 
working poor dovetailed with efforts by the new Conservatives to build a cross-
class voting base and enact ‘undogmatic social reform’. 284  Regardless of 
poverty’s origin, moneylending was a specific problem that required an 
immediate and practical response. As Fraser argued, after the First World War 
people began to expect government action in new areas of social and economic 
life. 285  The effect of the MLA 1927, and in particular the guidance rate, 
advertising restrictions and licensing are examined in Chapter 4. 
                                            
283 Peter Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London: IB 
Tauris, 2011), chapter 1. 
284 Andrew Taylor, ‘Stanley Baldwin, heresthetics and the realignment of British politics’, British 
Journal of Political Sciences 35/3 (2005), 441; Stuart Ball, Portrait of a Party: The Conservative 
Party in Britain 1918-1945 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), 30. 
285 Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State, 211. 
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D. Conclusion 
In the 1900s and the 1920s a strong anti-moneylending sentiment prevailed. In 
both decades calls for an inquiry were based on an increase in moneylending, 
high interest rates and prolific advertising. High interest rates gave rise to 
sensational newspaper headlines. Moneylenders had few allies and were often 
categorised as evil. The parliamentary mandate authorising the MLSC 1897 
was targeted at combating an ‘evil’ industry which encouraged gambling and 
fraud. MPs associated moneylenders so strongly with crime that they stated as 
much in their summary findings. In 1927, Wedgwood said that moneylenders 
were so vilified that he received more letters against his opposition to Carson’s 
bill than in the entirety of his political career.286 Moneylenders and their allies 
argued that only a small minority of providers behaved badly. Many sought 
targeted regulation to rid themselves of these rogue businesses. To that end, a 
number of lenders proposed more stringent rules, such as capital requirements, 
than Parliament was willing to entertain. 
In 1897, the starting point and trajectory of reform were influenced by 
the judiciary. There were varying opinions about how far judges should 
intervene in private financial contracts. Liberal theorists held contracts to be 
sacrosanct and argued against government interference in private agreements, 
unless crime was involved. Revisionists and reformers were willing to protect 
poor borrowers by rewriting contracts that were deemed harsh and 
unconscionable. When compared to the PBSC 1870, these arguments were 
less concerned with borrower rationality and responsible credit usage. Although 
many policymakers believed small loans were harmful to borrowers, 
moneylenders themselves, as a ‘personified’ group, were considered a social 
ill. While there were calls to protect vulnerable borrowers, this research argues 
that it was the judiciary, with its theoretical underpinnings, that framed the 
debate. Unlike pawnbroking, there was no collateral or business operations 
                                            
286 HC deb. 4 March 1927, vol. 203. 
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beyond the cash loan. Moneylending reform was about trade in money, which 
directed the debate towards theory, especially theory concerning the role of the 
state and market intervention. Arguably, this led the committee away from 
investigating the source of borrower demand and the conditions of poverty, as 
was seen in 1872. 
In the 1900s, the purpose of regulation was to clarify the judiciary’s role 
and limit the evil industry. If the intention was to limit the trade, and it was 
believed that price controls would constrain the market, why were they 
rejected? Many considered usury an affront to British values (i.e., freedom of 
contract); controls would be difficult to implement (how would they select and 
enforce the rate?) and infringe competition (i.e., rate clustering). Furthermore, 
although high rates were undesirable, they were not all considered extortionate. 
For their part, lenders believed that price controls would force them to withdraw 
from the lowest end of the market. This debate revealed diverging opinions 
concerning credit rationing and market segmentation. Were marginal borrowers 
better off without a loan? Some argued that rationing helped them avoid the 
debt trap, while others believed that since the demand for loans remained, 
moneylenders were a better option than resort to an illegal lender or selling 
possessions to raise cash. 
Instead of price controls, the Select Committee proposed a guidance 
rate. The rate was to guide the judiciary in determining whether a transaction 
was harsh and unconscionable. Moneylenders argued that legal costs 
associated with defending their charges under the guidance rate would limit the 
supply of loanable funds, increase borrowing costs and encourage the black 
market. It was debated whether the guidance rate or any regulation could 
overcome bargaining inequity, which in this case meant that in so far as 
borrowers desperately needed cash, the price was of secondary concern. 
Nevertheless, the committee believed that the guidance rate would alleviate 
abusive, high-rate lending. Although select committee members argued that 
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the guidance rate was not a form of usury, sceptical colleagues were unwilling 
to implement the measure and it was removed. 
Price controls and the guidance rate resurfaced during the MLSC 1925. 
Compared to the 1900s, few policymakers offered ideological opposition or 
support. Price controls were rejected because they were difficult to implement, 
easy to evade and would segment the market. Unlike before, the guidance rate 
received broad support. While there was concern that rates would cluster 
towards the maximum and the selection of the rate proved complicated, it was 
passed in the MLA 1927. The guidance rate was not seen as an affront to 
freedom of contract or the free trade of money, but as a practical response to 
what policymakers understood to be the damaging effects of a high interest rate 
and failed regulation. 
Both the MLSC 1897 and 1925 debated advertising disclosure terms. 
Viewpoints ranged from those seeking a total ban to those who believed 
restricting advertising was an attack on the free market. It was argued that by 
limiting or banning advertising the market would contract as would-be 
borrowers would find it hard to access money. In 1900, it was argued that the 
legal precedent of protecting children from advertisements could be extended 
to poor borrowers, whose limitations were much the same. Although 
demeaning, this type of regulatory intervention demonstrated an ethic to protect 
those who could not protect themselves. However, this was not the dominant 
narrative. Instead, advertising restrictions were viewed as a mechanism to 
control the supply channel. Without sufficient support to intervene in ‘market 
freedom’, the MLA 1900 relied on the standards of fraud to punish misleading 
statements. By 1925, however, the proliferation of circulars and newspapers 
advertisements led Parliament to ban the former and limit the latter. Circulars 
were seen as a nuisance and newspapers advertisements were believed to lure 
people to unscrupulous moneylenders. While the newspaper measure was 
intended to improve the ‘truth’ of information, the aim was more to restrict 
activity and limit fraud than to improve the market’s efficiency. 
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Believing that their business model was analogous to retail and citing 
the challenge of calculating the rate, moneylenders argued against disclosing 
their rates in APR form. Customers, they argued, were more interested in how 
much they would owe in cash terms. Proponents countered that the disclosure 
of high rates would deter borrowing. Policymakers asserted that the APR was 
something that borrowers should ‘rationally’ want to know and that 
moneylenders intentionally withheld the rate from them. This measure would 
correct their irrational behaviour. The intention behind the requirement that 
moneylenders register under a single name and were prohibited from implying 
that they were bankers was clearer still. These measures were intended to 
correct abusive rollover terms and asymmetric information (i.e., multiple trade 
names) and prevent moneylenders from acquiring the legitimacy of bankers. 
Whether they were bankers or not, moneylenders sought legitimacy. By 1925, 
regional trade groups were actively involved in the reform process. To improve 
the lending environment and their image, moneylenders proposed advanced 
licensing features, among them capital requirements, posted bonds and an 
industry standards board. Fearful of legitimising the industry, Parliament 
rejected these measures.  
Overall, the MLA 1900 and 1927 were intended to restrict what many 
viewed as an unsavoury business and pernicious product. That is not to say 
that a protective ethic, especially among revisionist judges, was not present. 
The focal point was to restrict the market and limit fraud. Both Acts failed to 
create an effective enforcement mechanism and relied on the borrower to 
pursue punitive action. That the once rejected guidance rate was adopted in 
1927 can be considered a pragmatic response to the ineffectiveness of the MLA 
1900. The aftermath of the regulation and the market’s development since 1927 
is covered in Chapter 4. 
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4 The Consumer Credit Act 1974 
 
In the 1970s, the purpose of reform was to create a unified consumer credit 
regulatory structure that would enhance the market’s efficiency and increase 
access to credit. Although small loans contributed little to overall credit 
volumes, the MLA 1900-1927 and the PBA 1872 were seen as outdated and 
unnecessarily restrictive, which in turn hampered the credit market, standards 
of living and growth in the economy. The Crowther Committee was appointed 
to investigate the regulatory structure. 1  With regard to moneylending and 
pawnbroking: What was the goal of Crowther? Which features of the PBA 1872 
and MLA 1900-1927 were examined and what were the results? How did 
Crowther view low-income borrowers? How were lenders seen and did trade 
associations contribute to the regulatory process? What prevented Crowther 
from implementing price controls? How did Crowther understand the harsh and 
unconscionable test, the guidance rate, advertising and licensing? 
Crowther had a strong preference for less government interference in 
the credit market. It was believed that credit allowed many families to maintain 
a high standard of living. Crowther believed that even the lowest income groups 
utilised credit to their benefit. This research argues that price controls were 
rejected because Crowther was more concerned with consumers’ freedom to 
choose than social policy obligations to protect the minority of users who 
struggled with indebtedness. In other words, credit access overrode other 
considerations. It was argued that protecting borrowers by means of lower 
pricing enacted by price controls would require market interference that would 
limit the supply of credit and need product-specific legislation. These end-points 
ran contrary to the goals of increased credit access and regulatory unity. The 
                                            
1  Hereafter Crowther refers to the committee and the Consumer Credit: Report of the 
Committee 1971 (4596). References to the person will appear as Lord Crowther. The other 
committee members were Andrew Carnwath, George Clayton, Cyril Colton, Royston Goode, 
Desmond Hirshfield, Kenneth Mackenzie, Millie Miller and Douglas Steen. 
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CCA 1974 considered all forms of consumer credit, even moneylenders and 
pawnbrokers, as legitimate finance. Under the CCA 1974, providers could issue 
all forms of consumer credit under a single licence. Advertising and disclosure 
requirements specific to moneylenders and pawnbrokers were lifted. For the 
first time in centuries, pawnbrokers operated without a price cap. Few 
considered small lenders as evil. The CCA 1974 sought to balance the need 
for regulation to redress bargaining inequality through disclosure against 
increasing the market’s efficiency. Theoretically, greater transparency, 
especially concerning the APR, encouraged consumers to compare credit 
products, which would increase competition, prevent extremely high-risk 
lending and lower pricing. In short, the best form of consumer protection was a 
unified regulatory structure that encouraged competition. 
This chapter analyses the market and political developments since the 
MLA 1927, the Crowther Committee and the CCA 1974.  
 
A. Market and political developments 
Market background 
Beginning in the 1940s, the small loan industry experienced a decline in volume 
and loan providers. In 1953, Aron Minkes, an economist, noted that the 
pawnbroking market had peaked in 1914, with shops taking 6,000-8,000 
pledges monthly, and declined thereafter.2 It was argued that the welfare state 
had brought an end to ‘real poverty’ and with it the need for small loans.3 
According to the John Hilton Bureau while historically moneylenders performed 
a useful function as a ‘child could die or a family be put out on the street for the 
want of a few shillings’, by the 1970s the state provided for those basic 
                                            
2 Aron Minkes, ‘The decline of pawnbroking’, Economica 20 (1953). 
3 BT 250/38 (National Pawnbrokers’ Association), ‘Oral Evidence’, 20 March 1970; BT 250/52 
(Beneficial Finance Company), ‘Memorandum to Crowther’, 26 September 1968; BT 250/66 
(Provident Clothing and Supply Company), ‘Oral Evidence’, 20 March 1969; and FV 62/29 
(Consumer Sale and Loan Group), ‘Department of Trade and Industry, Pawnbrokers Special 
Provisions, Internal Report’ 19 June 1972, The National Archives (hereafter TNA). 
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necessities.4 In 1968, the Treasury stated that ‘the basis for small under £50 
emergency loans in the last century, most often the pawn … is now a dying 
trade’.5 Most commentators agreed that the welfare state, regular employment, 
slum clearances, New Towns, higher wages and more credit options had 
lessened the need for pawnbroking and moneylending.  
In the 1970s consumer credit statistics were lacking and unreliable. 
Information concerning the small loan market proved no exception. Under the 
Finance Act 1949 the power to license had devolved to the local authorities, 
making it difficult to collect information. However, even before 1949 very little 
data were made available. The Registrar of Companies and the Customs & 
Excise Department debated which group was in control of licensing. Moreover, 
the available data are of little value as they fail to distinguish between 
professional moneylenders and individuals who issued loans from time to time. 
Although the latter group was numerically larger, lending was not their primary 
business. As of 31 December 1927, there were 28,236 registered 
moneylenders; however, only an estimated 4,000 were considered 
professionals.6 In 1969, while there were 2,500 licences outstanding, only 500  
  
                                            
4 BT 250/100-101 (Newspaper Advice Bureaux), ‘Letter from Mr Gray, Board of Trade, to 
Royston Goode, Crowther Committee’, 3 July 1970, TNA. 
5 BT 250/4 (Official Bodies), ‘Background Memorandum on the Scope of Enquiry, Board of 
Trade and HM Treasury’, 1968, TNA. 
6 IR 40/3555 (Inland Revenue), ‘Office of Chief Inspector of Taxes, Letter from Mr Wilcox to Mr 
Pool’, 28 November 1929, TNA. 
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or so were issued to professionals.7 In that year, the National Association of 
Moneylenders estimated that 25 per cent of licences were held by 
professionals. 8  Despite these statistical issues, it is certain that the 
moneylending trade declined between 1927 and 1969. 
Table 14 shows the distribution of licences issued in 1969. London 
remained the most active small loan market. Figure 2 combines a variety of 
sources to demonstrate the decline in the pawnbroking market. 
 
Table 14 Licencing distribution, 1969 
 PB ML 
Greater London 108 730 
Rest of South East 26 122 
North West 64 464 
Yorkshire 38 403 
Northern 29 124 
West Midlands 24 117 
East Midlands 16 85 
South West 11 78 
East Anglia 6 13 
Scotland 74 152 
Wales 6 180 
Total 402 2,468 
 
Source: BT 250/93 (Councils on Moneylending and Pawnbroking), ‘Licensing Data, Board of 
Trade Letter from Robin Gray to Peter Dewey’, 12 March 1970, TNA. 
 
  
                                            
7 BT 250/34 (National Association of Moneylenders), ‘Oral Evidence, R.B. Selig, Chairman, 
C.A. Yonwin, Secretary’, 20 March 1969, TNA. ‘Non-professionals’ were lenders who issued 
loans infrequently and/or loans of extremely low value. 
8 Ibid. 
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Figure 2 Pawnbroking licences, 1800-1970 
 
 
Sources: Annual report of the Commissioners of HM Inland Revenue and HM Customs & 
Excise, 1870-1970; Crowther testimony; National Pawnbrokers Association; and the PBSC 
1870. 
By 1970 the pawn market was at levels not seen since the early 1800s. 
Not only were there fewer pawnbrokers, but overall loan volumes had 
collapsed. According to a Crowther-commissioned NOP Market Research 
survey, 50 per cent of pawnbrokers issued fewer than 9,000 loans annually.9 
At the beginning of the twentieth century many pawnbrokers would have issued 
that number monthly. In 1969, the NPA estimated that a busy shop would 
transact 20-30 pawns a day. 10  The magnitude of this decrease can be 
appreciated by recalling that, on 2 May 1870, Mr Barnett of Lambeth took in 
725 pledges and delivered 249. On Saturday of that week he delivered 1,899 
and took in 225. In 1969, almost 80 per cent of pawnbrokers had been operating 
                                            
9 NOP randomly sampled 373 moneylenders and 115 pawnbrokers of whom 276 moneylenders 
and 85 pawnbrokers responded. See ‘Pawnbrokers and moneylenders’, a report for the 
Department of Trade and Industry by NOP Market Research (1971) (hereafter NOP Research). 
10 BT 250/38 (National Pawnbrokers’ Association), ‘“The Pawnbroker” by Ruth Brandon of New 
Society’, 16 June 1970, TNA. 
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for at least 25 years, indicating few new market entrants. In that year it was 
estimated that the 402 licensed pawnbrokers had issued approximately £6.3 
million in loans on 1.4 million pledges, with an average pledge of £4.33. A 
century earlier, 30 pawnbrokers in Liverpool issued 1.4 million pledges valued 
at £300,000. Adjusted for inflation the £300,000 in 1869 was worth 
approximately £2.2 million in 1969.11 The average pledge in the Liverpool 
sample was 4s 7.5d, which in 1969 terms was approximately £1.80. The NPA 
estimated that for a typical shop in London the average pledge was £5.12 
Beyond adjusting for inflation, the increase in average pledge size 
corresponded to an increase in the value of pledged items. No longer did 
pawnbrokers participate in a weekly pledge cycle consisting of low-value 
clothing, but took in items such as radios, cameras, tape recorders, typewriters 
and jewellery. The NPA claimed that ‘only one firm in London will take clothes 
at all, and then only brand new … You have to auction them … and you’ll likely 
only get a £3 for a £40 suit … they took so long to parcel up, and then they’re 
so bulky to store.’13 The increase in average pawn loans supported the NPA’s 
qualitative narrative. Table 15 and Table 16 show the breakdown and average 
value of low, auction and contract pledges. While low pledges comprised the 
highest volume, contract pledges were the most valuable. The trend for fewer, 
but high-value pledges contributing the most to market value is evident from 
1869 to 1969.14 Unlike before, when the redemption rates were a relatively 
uniform 90-98 per cent, in 1972 the NPA estimated a range of 75-95 per cent.15 
The wider spread and higher rate of default (lower redemption) may indicate 
                                            
11 The Bank of England inflation calculator. 
12 BT 250/38 (National Pawnbrokers’ Association), ‘Oral Evidence’, 20 March 1970, TNA. 
13 Ibid. 
14 After 1872, small parts of the PBA were amended. The last was the Pawnbrokers Act 1960: 
8 & 9 Eliz.2. Ch.25. This Act increased allowable charges and the loan maximum from £10 to 
£50. Because the Act is considered minor, was enacted with little debate and was rescinded 
by the CCA 1974, it is not covered by this research. 
15 FV 62/34 (Moneylenders, Cheque Traders and Pawnbrokers trade associations), ‘National 
Pawnbrokers’ Association’, 21 November 1972, TNA. 
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that pawnbrokers issued more risky loans to compensate for lower loan 
volumes. 
 
Table 15 Pawnbroking market estimates, 1970 
 
 Volume Market Value 
Avg. 
pledge 
Pledge 
type as a % £m  as a % range 
Low  48% 0.89  14% 20-35s 
Auction 30% 1.84  29% £2-£4 
Contract 21% 3.61  57% £10-£20 
 100% 6.34  100% - 
 
Source: NOP Research. 
 
Table 16 Pledge analysis, 1970 
 
Avg. 
value 
Number 
of 
Avg. 
value 
Number 
of 
Avg. 
value 
Number 
of 
Low PBs Auction PBs Contract PBs 
      
10s 2 £2 1 £5 8 
15s 4 £2 10s 13 £10 29 
£1  24 £3 16 £15 13 
25s 22 £3 10s 24 £20 7 
30s 15 £4 13 £25-£30 4 
35s 3 £4 10s 0 £31-£40 3 
£2  4 £5 4 £41-£50 1 
NR 10 NR 14 NR 21 
 85  85  85 
 
Source: NOP Research. NR (No response). 
 
The moneylending industry also declined. The increase in licensing after 
the MLA 1927 was arguably a result of small, non-professional lenders joining 
the legal system. Over time, owing to lack of enforcement, fewer participants 
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registered. The downturn in moneylending began to reverse in 1946. Figure 3 
demonstrates this trend. The upward trend corresponded to a sharp decline in 
pawnbroking. This dynamic coincided with the New Towns Act 1946, which 
relocated low-income families from urban to newly constructed population 
centres. Minkes suggested that these programmes contributed to the pawn 
industry’s rapid decline after 1946. Given the limited data, it is difficult to 
demonstrate definitively that moneylenders benefited from the decline in 
pawnbroking, however Table 17 shows that in 1946 the moneylending industry 
began to expand, and at the same time the pawn market experienced an 
increase in the rate of its decline. From 1946 to 1969, the pawn industry had 
contracted by 79 per cent, compared to a 74 per cent increase in moneylending. 
Figure 3 Moneylending licences, 1925-1970 
 
 
 
Sources: NOP Research; and author estimates using data from the MLSC 1925 and Customs 
& Excise, England and Wales. 
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Table 17 Pawnbroking and moneylending licenses, 1942-1970 
 
 Pawnbrokers  Moneylenders 
    
1942 2,256  1,548 
1943 -  1,472 
1945 -  1,389 
1946 1,932  1,414 
1950 1,654  1,459 
1964 632  1,869 
1968 -  2,342 
1969 402  2,468 
 
Sources: NOP Research; Author estimates using data from the MLSC 1925; Customs & Excise, 
England and Wales (1929-1950); Crowther testimony; and the National Pawnbrokers 
Association. 
 
Survey data from NOP Research confirmed that the moneylending 
industry took in new market entrants. Of the 276 sampled, 40 per cent had been 
in business for less than five years, 66 per cent for less than ten years and 76 
per cent for less than 16 years. Pawnbrokers argued that price controls put 
them at a disadvantage compared to moneylenders. Although it is impossible 
to confirm, it is likely that more attractive financial returns and a general trend 
towards unsecured lending benefited moneylenders. Notwithstanding, 
moneylenders issued less in total loan value than their pawnbroker 
counterparts. In the late 1960s, the Treasury and the Board of Trade estimated 
that moneylenders issued £2.5 million annually.16 The National Association of 
Moneylenders provided a higher estimate of £5 million annually.17 Of the NOP 
sample (276 lenders), approximately 16 per cent issued less than £2,000 
annually, 40 per cent issued less than £10,000 annually, 60 per cent issued 
less than £20,000 annually and only 11 per cent issued more than £50,000 
                                            
16 BT 250/4 (Official Bodies), ‘Background Memorandum on the Scope of Enquiry, Board of 
Trade and HM Treasury’, 1968, TNA. 
17 BT 250/34 (National Association of Moneylenders), ‘Letter from RB Selig, Chairman, to Mr 
Gray, Board of Trade, Committee on Consumer Credit’, 23 April 1970, TNA. 
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annually. Few lenders occupied a middle ground (more than £20,000 but less 
than £50,000), indicating that the market’s structure was similar to its 
composition in 1927 when most lenders issued small loans, with a minority 
providing large loans to a wealthier clientele. 
Approximately 100 of the 276 lenders said that more than 75 per cent of 
their business was the issue of unsecured loans of less than £50. Table 18 
shows the average interest rate on unsecured loans in the NOP sample, with 
166 of the 276 lenders charging, on average, 10-50 pcpa. Table 19 summarises 
data provided during the National Association of Moneylenders oral testimony 
on 20 March 1969. It supports average loan sizes of £20-£50 and that most 
loans were issued on a short-term basis.18 The estimated average income of 
borrowers of between £18-£35 a week is higher than the results provided by 
the John Hilton Bureau of £12-£13 a week. This is not surprising as the 
Bureau’s data were provided by customers who had defaulted or found the 
terms and conditions difficult to comply with. 
 
  
                                            
18 Ibid. 
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Table 18 Average rates on unsecured loans 
 
Average 
Number 
of  
pcpa MLs % 
   
10-20% 69 25% 
21-30% 33 12% 
31-40% 25 9% 
41-50% 39 14% 
51-60% 8 3% 
61-70% 3 1% 
71-80% 0 0% 
81-90% 6 2% 
91-100% 3 1% 
100%+ 0 0% 
No unsecured 50 18% 
Do not know 41 15% 
Total 276 100% 
 
Source: NOP Research. 
 
Table 19 Unsecured loan profile 
 
Range of duration 1-24 months 
Common duration 6-18 months 
Average duration 3-6 months 
Range of loan size £5-£1,000 
Common range £30-£150 
Average range £20-£50 
 
Source: BT 250/34 (National Association of Moneylenders), ‘Letter from RB Selig, Chairman, 
to Mr Gray, Board of Trade, Committee on Consumer Credit’, 23 April 1970, TNA. 
 
As discussed below, opponents of the MLA 1927’s 48 per cent guidance 
rate, and of usury more generally, argued that ceilings deterred lenders from 
competing on price. The Consumer Council investigated loan rates and found 
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a typical rate of 48 pcpa and a range of 20-90 pcpa.19 Their findings provide 
evidence of price clustering. The National Association of Moneylenders found 
a normal rate range of 20-100 pcpa, which is not far off the Consumer Council, 
but higher than the NOP sample.20  Based on a consumer complaint, the 
Islington Consumer Group found a £20 loan was repayable in eleven weekly 
instalments of 50s or approximately 54 pcpa. A second study found that a loan 
of £100 repayable by instalments of £5 weekly over seven months gave a rate 
of approximately 145 pcpa. 21  They, however, incorrectly stated that ‘it is 
extremely unlikely that the moneylender could enforce this interest in court, as 
he has to prove that a rate of 48 per cent is reasonable’.22 It is impossible to 
state what a court would have decided as they had sided for and against 
lenders since the implementation of the guidance rate in 1927. Regardless, the 
consumer group concluded that ‘this method of borrowing is not 
recommended’. 
Moving from rates to expenses, the National Association of 
Moneylenders suggested that ‘the average cost of administering any loan was 
£9 and with the current rate of inflation it was necessary to charge 18 per cent 
interest even to stand still on a below average risk loan’. 23  Concerning 
profitability, the Lancashire and Cheshire Moneylenders Association estimated 
that its members earned, on average, a 15.2 per cent return on capital 
employed.24 This result is similar to data provided during the MLSC 1925, as 
shown in Table 13. Unfortunately, the sample size limits any meaningful 
conclusion. The gains from capital, as with pawnbrokers, were distributed to 
                                            
19 BT 250/47 (Consumer Council), ‘Consumer Council: About Credit’, Undated, TNA. 
20 BT 250/34 (National Association of Moneylenders), ‘Oral Evidence, RB Selig, Chairman, CA 
Yonwin, Secretary’, 20 March 1969, TNA. 
21 BT 250/50 (National Federation of Consumer Groups), ‘The Islington Consumers’ Group: 
Fair Deal’, 1967, TNA. 
22 Ibid. 
23 FV 62/34 (Moneylenders, Cheque Traders and Pawnbrokers trade associations), ‘Board of 
Trade Meeting with the National Moneylenders Association’, 19 April 1971, TNA. 
24 BT 250/27 (Lancashire and Cheshire Moneylenders Association), ‘Letter from MH Watson, 
Secretary, to NH Nail, Secretary, Board of Trade, Committee on Consumer Credit’, 12 June 
1969, TNA. 
  
174 
the principals, as both credit providers were funded primarily from their own 
capital.25 While their capital structure had changed little since the 1870s, by the 
turn of the twenty-first century external funding from public and private equity 
had entered the market.  
After the Second World War the pawnbroking and moneylending 
markets underwent significant changes. Developments in the welfare state, 
rising wages, slum clearances, urban redevelopment and an increase in 
alternative credit products led to smaller loan volumes and less market 
participation. By the time of Crowther, the pawnbroking market was a shadow 
of its former self. Only 400 or so pawnbrokers remained active compared to a 
peak of 5,087 in 1914. However, the NPA reminded Crowther that for people 
without a bank account and in need of cash urgently, pawnbrokers remained 
an important source of funds.26  As before, pawn loan interest rates were 
considered high by many observers. Crowther positioned moneylenders 
similarly, saying that they were ‘at the end of the credit line … and his clients 
could usually not secure accommodation elsewhere’.27  
 
Political background 
By the late 1960s there was a sense of urgency about the legal status of finance 
houses, hire-purchase companies and instalment credit under the restrictive 
and poorly designed MLA 1927. At risk were billions in credit contracts.28 The 
MLA 1927 had failed to differentiate between ‘proper’ banking and 
moneylending. As the credit markets became increasingly complex and 
diverse, it was unclear whether banks, discount houses and merchant banks 
required an MLA 1927 licence. While section 123 of the Companies Act 1967 
exempted certain finance houses from the MLA 1927, a long-term solution was 
needed. It was argued that regulation based on the form of lender created 
                                            
25 Crowther, 2.4.21. 
26 BT 250/38 (National Pawnbrokers’ Association), ‘Oral Evidence’, 20 March 1970, TNA. 
27 Crowther, 2.4.15. 
28 BT 250/2 (Consumer Credit), ‘Summary Conclusions from the Department of Trade and 
Industry’, March 1971, TNA. 
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inefficiencies, including high pricing, misleading advertising and questionable 
APR disclosure.29 George Darling MP (Labour, Minister of State at the Board 
of Trade), his predecessor, Niall Macpherson, Lord Drumalbyn of Whitesands 
(Conservative) and the Consumer Council pushed to overhaul the outdated and 
patchwork of legislation. 30  While Lord Chancellor Gerald Gardiner, Lord 
Gardiner of Kittisford (Labour) stated (incorrectly as this research has 
demonstrated) that historically policymakers easily distinguished between a 
banker and a moneylender, he, along with Frank Soskice, Lord Stow Hill of 
Newport (former Home Secretary and Lord Privy Seal, Labour) and Thomas 
Jay MP (Labour, President Board of Trade) urged Parliament to stop 
distinguishing among forms of lender.31  
These issues only added to the government’s concern over the volume 
of credit available to the consumer and its ability to manage the economy 
through monetary policy, terms controls and minimum down-payments. 32 
Robert Painter of the Treasury remarked that the significance of consumer 
credit to the economy and its growth in recent years ‘could alone justify’ a 
review of the relevant laws and policies.33 The government and the Bank of 
England sought unified credit regulation such that it could ‘achieve the desired 
                                            
29 ‘High cost of credit to be reviewed’, Guardian, 3 July 1968; ‘Tighter law on loan advertising’, 
Guardian, 12 September 1968; Michael Blanden, ‘What is the cost of credit?’, Guardian, 5 
October 1968. 
30 HC deb. 12 July 1967, vol. 650; HC deb. 19 July 1967, vol. 750; AJ 10/60 (Consumer 
Council), ‘Memorandum to the Committee on Consumer Credit’, Undated, TNA. Ultimately, the 
CCA 1974 repealed the PBA 1872, MLA 1900, MLA 1927, PBA 1960, Hire-Purchase Act 1965 
and Advertisement (Hire Purchase) Act 1967. 
31 HL 22 November 1966, vol. 278; HC deb. 14 February 1967, 741. 
32 BT 250/2 (Consumer Credit), ‘Summary Conclusions from the Department of Trade and 
Industry’, ‘Bank of England, Memorandum’, 1969, ‘Bank of England, Oral Evidence’, 18 July 
1969, and BT 250/4 (Official Bodies) ‘Board of Trade, Committee on Consumer Credit, Minutes’ 
25 September 1968; ‘Letter from FW Glaves-Smith to RJ Painter, HM Treasury, TNA; ‘MPs told 
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33 BT 250/2 (Consumer Credit), ‘Summary Conclusions from the Department of Trade and 
Industry’, March 1971 and BT 250/4 (Official Bodies), ‘Background Memorandum on the Scope 
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176 
effects of economic policy’.34 Although the Bank agreed that controlling ‘quasi’ 
financial institutions was necessary, it believed other agencies would be better 
suited to the task.35  
Crowther and the CCA 1974 took place between two periods of 
economic and social change. In the 1940s and 1950s Britain saw the extension 
of the welfare state (the Education Act, The Beveridge Report, the NHS, etc.) 
while towards the end of the 1970s the mantra of deregulation had taken root.36 
From a financial regulatory perspective, the once dominant narrative, 
suggesting that the government could correct market failure, was, by the late 
1970s, in question.37  Now, social scientists and policymakers argued that 
government intervention made matters worse. Referring to this period, Jim 
Tomlinson, an economic historian, described the government’s role in the 
economy as modernising rather than coercive.38 
Crowther was appointed by a Labour government led by Harold Wilson 
and completed under Edward Heath’s Conservative government. The CCA 
1974 was enacted during Wilson’s second premiership. Anthony Seldon, a 
political historian, has suggested that during this period economic and social 
institutional reform was in vogue. Heath was committed to organisational 
reform, streamlining and the modernisation of government and industry. 39 
Although it sought less state interference in the economy, Crowther identified 
                                            
34 Ibid. 
35 BT 250/2 (Consumer Credit), ‘Bank of England, Memorandum’, July 1969, TNA. 
36  The Institute for Economic Affairs among others challenged the so-called ‘Big Bang’ 
deregulation of financial services under the Thatcher government. See Larry Elliot, ‘Margaret 
Thatcher's deregulation of the City a myth, says think tank’, Guardian, 25 May 2015. 
37 Edward Balleisen and David A. Moss, ‘Introduction’, in Government and Markets: Toward a 
New Theory of Regulation, 1-10, eds. Edward Balleisen and David Moss (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
38 Jim Tomlinson, ‘Managing the economy, managing the people’, in 20th-Century Britain, 
Economic, Cultural and Social Change, 234-246, eds. Francesca Carnevali and Julie-Marie 
Strange (London: Pearson Longman, 2007). 
39 Anthony Seldon, ‘The Heath government in history’, in The Heath Government 1970-74: A 
Reprisal, 1-20, eds. Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (London: Routledge, 2013).  
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similar goals before Heath’s administration took office.40 Nor was Crowther 
influenced by the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ in the 1960s.41 Crowther was a 
technocratic process whereby a group of experts sought to solve the problem 
assigned to it. The evidence does not suggest that any one political group 
guided Crowther. Alongside changes in government, the Crowther process 
continued and was well received across the political spectrum. 
What, then, was Crowther’s goal? Which features of the PBA 1872 and 
MLA 1900-1927 were examined and what were the results? Concerning 
moneylending and pawnbroking, how did Crowther understand the borrower? 
How were lenders viewed and did trade associations contribute to the 
regulatory process? What prevented Crowther from implementing price 
controls? How did Crowther understand the harsh and unconscionable test, the 
guidance rate, advertising and licensing? What was the government’s response 
to Crowther and did the CCA 1974 substantially differ from its 
recommendations? 
 
B. The Crowther Committee 1968-1971 
With Geoffrey Crowther as chairman, the committee was appointed by the 
Treasury and the Board of Trade in September 1968. 42  Its parliamentary 
mandate was to investigate the consumer credit regulatory structure, explore 
possible alternatives and consider amending the Moneylenders Act.43  The 
                                            
40  Peter Sloman, ‘The pragmatist’s solution to poverty: The Heath government tax credit 
scheme and the politics of social policy in the 1970s’, Twentieth Century British History 27:2 
(2016), 223. 
41 Crowther 9.3.2; Keith Banting, Poverty, Politics and Policy: Britain in the 1960s (London: 
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42 On 19 October 1970, The Board of Trade was merged with the Ministry of Technology, 
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committee held 34 days of formal meetings and an unspecified number of 
informal meetings. Forty-two organisations presented oral evidence and 80 
individuals and organisations submitted written evidence. Organisational 
testimony included groups as diverse as the Federation of British Carpet 
Manufacturers, the Leeds Junior Chamber of Commerce, the Law Society of 
Scotland, the Finance Houses Association, the clearing banks, the National 
Association of Moneylenders and the National Pawnbrokers Association. 
Government departments providing evidence included the Treasury, the Board 
of Trade, the Bank of England and local councils. Although Crowther was 
appointed by the Treasury, the Treasury approached the process cautiously. 
An internal Treasury memorandum stated:  
I think it would be unwise to give the impression that we are positively 
inviting Crowther to solve these particular problems for us, since we might 
then find it more difficult at a later stage to disregard any of the 
Committee’s findings which were embarrassing to us.44 
 
On 11 November 1968, Lord Crowther warned the Treasury and the 
Board of Trade that there would be ‘consequences’ if facts were ‘concealed’.45 
Tensions aside, never before had government or private industry investigated 
the consumer credit market in detail. Since the PBA 1872, only eight 
committees had analysed any aspect of the market.  
Crowther was Britain’s first systematic study of the consumer credit 
market.46 Roy Goode, a member of the committee, recalled their efforts to 
understand the social and economic aspects of consumer credit.47 Based on 
the volume of his published works, Goode was the most active and arguably 
the most influential member of the committee. If not for the timely delivery of an 
academic paper dealing with regulatory reform it is likely that the Treasury 
                                            
44 BT 250/4 (Official Bodies), ‘HM Treasury, Internal Letter RJ Painter to Mr Michelson’, 29 
October 1968, TNA. 
45 BT 250/4 (Official Bodies), ‘Board of Trade, Internal Memorandum’, 11 November 1968, TNA. 
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would not have appointed him to Crowther.48 Concerning that paper, the Law 
Society remarked that Goode’s analysis was ‘a bold and imaginative approach 
to a restructuring of the law’.49 Within weeks of presenting the paper at the 
University of Cambridge, the Treasury, the Bank of England and judicial 
organisations supported his candidacy.50  
Innovative for its time, Crowther understood that regulating the 
consumer credit market required an appreciation of its economic and social 
implications. Attention was given to levels of consumer indebtedness and family 
well-being. Managing an investigation into such a complex industry chimed well 
with Lord Crowther’s ‘tremendous capacity for work’.51 When integrating their 
findings proved difficult, Lord Crowther convened a weekend retreat of senior 
committee members held at a hotel outside London. Without support staff, the 
members discussed, debated and synthesised their ideas, helping them to form 
a policy recommendation.52 Ultimately, Crowther found that consumer credit 
legislation was ‘gravely defective’, too technical, created legal ambiguities and 
unnecessarily restricted lending activities.53 They concluded that legislation 
had failed to perform in the real world. 
The existing regulation lacked a ‘functional basis’ and distinguished 
among credit products based on ‘legal abstractions’ and business reality.54 
Although the framers of the MLA 1927 sought to avoid restricting ‘proper 
commerce’, it had done just that. 55  Moreover, the MLA 1927 made no 
                                            
48 T 326/805 (Setting up of Crowther Committee), ‘HM Treasury, Consumer Credit Committee’, 
31 August 1967, ‘HM Treasury, Internal Memorandum’, 5 September 1967, ‘HM Treasury, 
“R.M. Goode” Letter from Mr Gordon to RJ Painter’, 24 October 1967, ‘Consumer Credit 
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52 Ibid. 
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distinction between a minor breach and a grave infringement, both of which 
voided a contract. The Treasury found that many judges relieved borrowers not 
because their contracts were harsh and unconscionable or with any relation to 
inequity based on the 48 per cent guidance rate, but owing to legal 
technicalities.56 The Law Society found this unfair, as the ‘draconian manner’ in 
which the Act was enforced allowed borrowers to discharge debts that were 
entered knowingly and freely.57 Regulation focused on the legal form of a 
lending entity was fragmented, ineffective and outdated. It was argued that new 
regulation should focus on the function and effect of consumer credit products. 
Consumer credit regulation, including pawnbroking and moneylending, 
required a complete overhaul.58 
A second criticism was that the MLA 1927 lacked an effective 
enforcement mechanism. Crowther wrote: ‘Laws and regulations are useless 
unless they are enforced with some regularity and consistency.’59 This was not 
simply an intellectual or legal abstraction. Concerned that a moneylender 
executed a contract in violation of the MLA 1927, the National Citizens Advice 
Bureau Council contacted the Board of Trade. The case involved a lender who 
had required a deposit of £30 for a loan of £300. The Advice Bureau was 
dismayed to learn that, in the words of the Board of Trade, ‘no one is charged’ 
with enforcing the Act. 60  In 1901, Horace Mansfield MP (Liberal) was 
disconcerted when he learned that the MLA 1900 did not provide the Inland 
Revenue with powers of prosecution.61  For almost 75 years, government, 
advocacy and lenders had expressed frustration that the MLA 1900-1927 
lacked an enforcement mechanism. 
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Without an effective licensing system, the government had little control 
over moneylenders. From 1900 to 1968, for reasons of privacy, legal costs, 
time away from work and unfamiliarity with the law, consumers were unwilling 
and unable to utilise the court system. There are no records of any major police 
force having systematically dedicated resources to enforcing the MLA 1927. As 
a result, there were few if any suspensions of licences. Of 170 licensing 
authorities surveyed by Crowther, only one had suspended a licence between 
1958 and 1968.62 Without police enforcement or judicial proceedings initiated 
by the debtor, Crowther found that the law failed to protect vulnerable 
borrowers. The harsh and unconscionable test, along with its 48 per cent 
guidance rate, had ‘rarely been invoked successfully’. 63  The Islington 
Consumer Group found that moneylenders rarely had to justify their rates, even 
those exceeding 145 pcpa.64 While rich in legal theory, in practice the MLA 
1927 was of little use to borrowers. 
The deficiencies in the regulation led interested parties to examine the 
rationale behind the PBA 1872 and MLA 1900-1927. The Treasury and the 
Board of Trade found that while ‘the evil which the Acts aimed to control was 
the exploitation of borrowers who were in extremis’, the regulation was not 
appropriate for contemporary needs.65 Pawnbrokers argued that price controls 
had distorted competition and restricted new market entrants. The Treasury 
reached a similar conclusion. It was believed that the historical conditions that 
once required detailed protection were no longer relevant.66 The Consumer 
Protection and Licencing Committee of the County Council of West Sussex 
believed that fewer regulations were needed. They suggested that since 
moneylenders were no longer regarded as ‘vultures from whom poor and 
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feckless required protection’, there was no valid reason to impose heavy 
restrictions on them.67  
Few of the testifying parties categorised moneylenders or pawnbrokers 
as evil. The MLA 1927 and its effects on the market were used as a ‘warning’ 
of the systematic failure to demarcate the consumer credit industry by form of 
lender. 68  If lenders were no longer seen as evil and borrowers were not 
teetering on the brink of destitution, the existing regulation was ill suited to the 
needs of consumers in the 1970s. The extreme technical requirements of the 
MLA 1927, patchwork exemptions, restrictions on advertising, lack of an 
enforcement mechanism and usury in the pawnbroking market were seen as 
deficiencies. As a result, lenders of small sums argued that they were at a 
disadvantage in an increasingly competitive consumer credit market. 
While Crowther believed it necessary to protect consumers, it held a 
strong preference for less government interference in the credit markets. 
Crowther reported:  
the existing legal tangle is badly overdue, and that liberation of the 
consumer credit industry from the antiquated provisions, and from the 
official restrictions, that hobble it will enable it to make an increasing 
contribution to the efficiency of the national economy and to the standard 
of living of the public.69 
 
In no uncertain terms, the state was to ‘interfere’ as little as possible with 
consumer choice and it remained ‘a basic tenet of a free society that people 
themselves must be the judge of what contributes to their material welfare’.70 
Such thinking was different from the days when credit use was stigmatised and 
regulators sought to restrict the ‘evil’ small loan market. It was believed that 
credit enabled many families to maintain a high standard of living.71 Linking 
credit use and standards of living assumed that the primary function of 
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consumer credit was income smoothing and that borrowers agreed to a regime 
of budgetary discipline in order to repay. This contrasts with earlier periods 
when personal credit was associated with moral failings and for many its use 
was to avoid destitution.72 
For Crowther the purpose of financial regulation was to enhance 
consumer freedom, increase the market’s efficiency and protect the consumer. 
According to Crowther, ‘Our principal concern is that this mechanism should 
operate as efficiently as possible, by enabling the transfer of funds to be 
completed with the minimal use of real resources.’73 For its part, government 
would unify regulation and simplify disclosure terms. Theoretically, increased 
transparency encouraged consumers to compare credit products, which in turn 
increased competition, prevented extremely high-risk lending and reduced 
pricing. 74  In this model mandated disclosure terms mitigated asymmetric 
information. In turn, consumer protection occurred naturally in an increasingly 
competitive market. Crowther argued that a competitive environment would 
price credit ‘sufficiently’ without yielding excessive profits.75 Borrowers would 
benefit from more competition and through regulatory features such as an 
updated licensing system and consistent enforcement of the Act. 
For the first time in British history all forms of consumer credit were 
considered to be part of the wider financial system. The evidence identifies a 
shift in policy from the PBA 1872 and MLA 1900-1927, and demonstrates that 
moneylenders and pawnbrokers were to be considered as participants in the 
financial system.  
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184 
In section 7.2.5 Crowther stated: 
Since we recommend that the Moneylenders and Pawnbrokers Acts 
should be repealed, these categories of lenders would, for the purpose of 
licensing, be treated on an equal footing to all others. Our reasons for this 
are partly to avoid the practical difficulties have arisen over the problem of 
defining certain categories of institutions that are exempted from the 
Moneylenders Act, especially banks, and partly because of our belief that 
the general principle that all lenders, and all forms of lending, should be 
treated as nearly as possible alike.76 
 
Unlike parliamentary investigations in 1872 and 1900-1927, Crowther 
was not attempting to remedy the inherent evil of the moneylending industry or 
root out suspected criminal participation in the pawn market, but to improve the 
market’s efficiency, reduce costs and ease the transfer of resources from 
savers to borrowers. Crowther believed that regulation should allow the market 
and the lenders competing in it the ‘maximum freedom to develop’.77 This begs 
the question: If lenders were to be treated uniformly, what was Crowther’s 
opinion of borrowers of small sums? 
 
The borrower 
Crowther argued that most of the working poor managed unpredictable budgets 
and utilised credit to avoid disaster when ‘as little as ten shillings on the wrong 
side’ was of great consequence.78 On an extremely limited budget, the working 
poor have ‘little scope’ to deal with unpredictable income streams and yet to a 
‘striking degree’ manage without incurring ‘excessive debt’. Crowther found that 
small sums were borrowed to purchase food, pay heating bills and care for a 
sick relative. The demand for cash was driven primarily by ‘insufficient income 
… illness of the wage-earner … or loss through fraud’. NOP Research 
suggested that 56 per cent of pawnshop loans and 43 per cent of moneylending 
loans were issued to pay immediately due bills.79 The Beneficial Financial 
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Company suggested that its small loans went towards ‘the needs of the 
necessitous borrower confronted by bills, personal and family needs and 
emergencies’. 80  The Consumers Association (Which?) believed that these 
borrowers lacked assets and bank accounts, and earned incomes well below 
the national average.81 Beyond emergency need, Crowther found that in certain 
circumstances credit could ‘tempt’ a small minority of the less fortunate to ‘taste 
… material prosperity’.82 
Crowther argued that incurring debt to secure non-emergency needs 
such as a holiday, television or for recreation could be understood as rational. 
While this type of spending might be seen as indulgent and ill advised, these 
quality-of-life experiences ‘from time to time’ made life ‘bearable’ for low-income 
consumers. In the Victorian era, even supporters of moneylenders would have 
been unlikely to express a similar sentiment. Crowther cautioned against 
applying ‘too rational a regime’ to low-income consumers.83 This way of thinking 
reflected behavioural economics which appreciates that ‘borrowing decisions 
are not an unambiguously rational consumption optimisation’.84 Whether small 
sums were needed to fulfil an essential obligation or to purchase a luxury item, 
neoclassical theory does not consider rational credit use by those who have no 
viable way of improving their financial situation.85 Credit may be expensive, but 
neoclassical economics argues that a consumer will not borrow more than he 
can service and thus his credit decisions are optimal. According to Udo Reifner, 
an economist, in this framework ‘credit demand is not simply a shortage of 
funds’, but includes expectations of future income.86 Crowther was using the 
term ‘rational’ in a way that extends beyond the neoclassical framework, 
appreciating that quality-of-life decisions may override repayment factors. 
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Notwithstanding that certain consumers borrowed for recreation, there was an 
overriding belief that small sums were borrowed to fulfil immediate and 
unavoidable cash needs. Crowther also appreciated that borrowers ‘rationally 
optimised’ their use of HCSTC such that it was considered helpful when 
compared to the alternatives, such as failing to pay a bill. 
If in the past the use of personal credit was thought a moral failing, a 
failure to repay was worse. By the 1970s this was no longer the case. Crowther 
even went as far as to categorise certain kinds of default as honest. Honest 
default was associated with conditions of unavoidable poverty.87 Across all 
credit categories, survey data supported this belief as the main cause of default 
was illness followed by unemployment. 88  The Standing Conference on 
Organisation of Social Workers suggested that small loan borrowing occurred 
as a result of ‘difficulties which arise in a family due to a sudden change in 
circumstances, perhaps from death, illness or unemployment’.89 One such 
case was reported by the John Hilton Bureau. The Bureau recounted the debts 
of a father of four owed to a moneylender. The moneylender loan was issued 
to consolidate hire purchase (HP) debts. He could not repay the HP obligations 
because his wife had become ill and, without adequate savings and suffering a 
loss of income, he diverted spending towards medical expenses and 
necessities. Wanting to avoid repossession of HP-acquired goods, he borrowed 
£20 from a moneylender. Owing to several late payments, he incurred total 
charges of £60.90 In total John Hilton studied 70 moneylender loans. It found 
that people who defaulted were ill, unemployed, widowed or earned between 
£12 and £13 a week.91  This type of default was considered ‘honest’ and 
occurred for reasons beyond the borrower’s control. Any association of honesty 
                                            
87 Crowther, 3.7.16, 6.1.8. 
88 Crowther, 3.83-3.85. 
89 BT 250/46 (Association of Family Case Workers), ‘Memorandum’, 1969, TNA. 
90 BT 250/100-101 (Newspaper Advice Bureaux), ‘Summary Report’, 3 July 1970, TNA. 
91 Ibid. Note, the sample set was composed of 70 borrowers who experienced problems with 
their loan and took the initiative to recount their troubles to the John Hilton Bureau. 
  
187 
with a defaulting borrower would not likely have occurred during the PBA 1872 
and MLA 1900-1927 regulatory episodes.  
When Crowther used terms such as ‘improvident’ it did so in a different 
way from previous policymakers’ use. For Crowther, improvidence referred 
more to a ‘lack of ability’ than to a moral failing or intellectual deficiency. In 
theory, educational programmes could give a borrower the ability to understand 
value propositions offered by competing credit providers.92 Both rich and poor 
borrowers were believed to possess the mental capacity to learn about credit. 
The Home Office agreed, observing that regulation under the MLA 1900 was 
introduced to protect a ‘largely ignorant clientele without the knowledge that 
now exists as to how to obtain individual justice’.93 By the 1970s, borrowers 
were not considered immoral, nor were they irresponsible to incur debts. 
Crowther’s assumption of rationality and belief that low-income borrowers could 
use credit responsibly dovetailed with its attempts to gain support for a unified 
regulatory system that treated all lenders equally. This stands in contrast to 
Lucas Stubbs, a Liverpool magistrate, who during the PBSC 1870 had said, 
‘On the same principle that we shelter children who cannot take care of 
themselves, we ought to protect weak and ignorant men.’94 
For Crowther, a typical small loan borrower, while income-constrained, 
had the ability, or at least the potential, to evaluate credit transactions rationally. 
In this instance rationality referred to the ability to discern that the utility of credit 
use exceeded that of forgoing the loan.95 In terms of small loans, irrespective 
of cost, it may be considered rational for a ‘heavily in debt’ householder to 
borrow at high rates ‘not for some extravagance but to pay the electricity bill’.96 
However, Crowther argued that small loan borrowers should avoid low-value 
credit, a situation in which the lender earned a return higher than that required 
                                            
92 Crowther, 3.7.13, 6.1.7. 
93 FV 62/52 (Consideration of Pawnbrokers), ‘Home Office Memorandum’, 17 November 1971, 
TNA. 
94 PBSC 1870, 3138-3148. 
95 Crowther, 3.2.6, 3.7.17. 
96 Crowther, 1.2.11; Goode, The Consumer Credit Act, 339. 
  
188 
to compensate for the risk. Crowther believed this occurred when borrowers 
failed to search for alternative, albeit still high-cost, creditors. Crowther reported 
that ‘the less-educated and poorer members of the community, through their 
ignorance of the credit market and of the protection of legislation, combined 
with their unwillingness to shop around, are frequently paying higher rates than 
is justified by their relative credit-worthiness.’97 These findings were mitigated 
somewhat by results suggesting that while some borrowers were aware of 
lower-cost options, they believed they were unobtainable owing to travel costs, 
feeling unwelcome in a traditional bank setting and a preference to maintain 
relations with an existing provider.98 Seemingly, borrowers valued convenience 
and maintaining their existing line of credit at least, if not more than, the total 
cost of that credit. The evidence confirmed that the market was driven by non-
price factors. As before, policymakers in the 1970s struggled to make sense of 
this market feature. 
Unlike previous generations, the need for small sums was not 
associated with immorality. As Steven Finlay and Dawn Burton argued, towards 
the middle of the twentieth century consumer debt became a sanctioned and 
acceptable part of daily life.99 Crowther followed this thinking. In one of the only 
direct applications of morality concerning HCSTC, Crowther cautioned the 
upper classes against lecturing the poor on the avoidance of debt and asserted 
that applying morality to financial decision-making was a luxury of the wealthy. 
If the PBA 1872 and MLA 1900-1927 were designed in part to protect ignorant 
borrowers from unscrupulous lenders, Crowther assumed that borrowers were 
capable but ignorant of their legal rights, and failed to compare the price of 
competing credit products. In this context, the term ‘ignorant’ can be understood 
as ‘unaware of’ and not a limitation on intellectual capacity or an indication of 
recklessness. Surveys revealed that 20 per cent of lower-class borrowers 
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admitted to ‘not understanding’ the terms and conditions of executed contracts. 
Comparatively, across all income groups, 20 per cent of people failed to identify 
which forms of credit charged a comparatively high interest rate.100 However, 
Crowther found that low-income borrowers were ‘woefully unaware’ of or 
unwilling to pursue their legal rights.101  Concerning those legal rights, the 
Consumer Council found that of 1,238 consumer-related cases heard in the 
county courts in Leeds, Bolton, Leicester, Cambridge, Guildford and Worcester 
(including but not limited to credit), only 9 per cent were initiated by 
individuals.102 The Association of County Court Registrars found that individual 
debtor defendants rarely appeared in court. 103  Much like their Victorian 
counterparts, debtors did not utilise the court system owing to fear of publicity, 
cost and a lack of knowledge concerning legal protection.104  
Unlike a typical borrower, Crowther recognised that a small percentage 
of the population would get into trouble through their use of credit. The 
committee suggested that this type of borrower should be ‘carefully watched’ 
and, if it could be demonstrated that a ‘substantial number of borrowers’ 
suffered from ‘undesirable hardship’, then there would be a ‘strong case on 
social grounds’ to implement restrictive regulation.105 Crowther called for further 
research on borrowers who got ‘into difficulty’ with over-indebtedness. 106 
However, for the super-majority access to credit was cited as beneficial and, in 
aggregate, low-income borrowers used credit rationally.  
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Price controls, the harsh and unconscionable test and the guidance rate  
Did Crowther’s view of lenders and borrowers challenge earlier debates 
concerning price controls, the guidance rate and the harsh and unconscionable 
test? Crowther recognised that low-income borrowers valued convenience and 
maintaining their existing line of credit more than the total cost of that credit, 
which made ‘the question of statutory control of interest rates extremely difficult 
to resolve’.107 Prior to his appointment on Crowther, Goode suggested that 
owing to a lack of price competition, an interest rate cap would ‘probably’ be 
the only effective remedy.108 Crowther argued that in certain scenarios, even if 
risk was priced appropriately, the social cost of high rates was higher still.109 It 
understood that a socially desirable interest rate was ‘quite a different thing 
from’ a rate that was reasonable for a lender to charge after taking into 
consideration costs and risk factors.110 Tension was found between Crowther’s 
belief that moneylenders and pawnbrokers should be included in the financial 
system without prejudice and its recognition that high-cost credit could result in 
social harm. 
However, Crowther showed an understanding of the high expense as 
well as the high and diverse risks associated with lending small sums. This led 
it to appreciate the difficulties of selecting, much less applying, a single 
maximum rate across all consumer credit products. A single rate could never 
account for the variety of loan sizes, counterparty risks and credit duration. 
Crowther believed that rates tended to gravitate towards statutory maximums 
and thus inhibited price competition.111 Like the evidence provided during the 
PBSC 1872 and the MLSC 1897, Crowther explained that while a £10 loan 
repayable with £1 charges in 20 weekly instalments of 11s seemed reasonable, 
and would not be considered socially harmful, it carried with it an effective 
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interest rate of 61 pcpa.112 The Law Society sympathised: ‘Prima facie interest 
rates could sometimes appear extortionate but that was no reason for setting 
an upper limit on rates.’113 The NPA, a group that had long studied the effects 
of price controls, believed that as long as licensing schemes controlled market 
entry, pawnbrokers should have a ‘free hand to quote whatever interest rate 
they liked’.114 There was an overriding belief that competition through improved 
disclosure and a consistent enforcement mechanism was preferable to price 
controls. Limiting competition also conflicted with the intentions of Crowther to 
create a modern and rational regulatory system. Crowther found that 
reinstatement of price controls was ‘not the answer to the problem’ and they 
were rejected.115 Accordingly, for the first time in centuries, Crowther advocated 
that pawnbrokers operate without an interest rate cap. 
This research argues that price controls were rejected because 
Crowther was more concerned with a consumer’s freedom to choose than with 
social policy obligations to protect the minority of users who struggled with 
indebtedness. In the 1970s, credit access overrode other considerations. 
Accordingly, price control-induced credit rationing would harm borrowers. 
Similarly, it was argued that to protect ‘honest borrowers’ from default through 
lower pricing enacted by price controls would require interference that would 
‘deprive much larger numbers of consumers’ of the benefits of credit.116 While 
the source of poverty was debated in 1872, and in 1900 and 1927 moneylender 
loans were considered harmful, Crowther believed that it was ‘socially desirable 
that credit should be freely available’.117 
With price controls rejected, the debate focused on the guidance rate 
and the harsh and unconscionable test.118 In line with the MLA 1900-1927, 
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Goode believed that beyond seeming unreasonable, a harsh and 
unconscionable transaction was one that carried with it the notion of ‘moral 
reprehensible conduct’ and when the profit was ‘far beyond’ the risk involved.119 
It was unclear how those terms and concepts could be applied in such a way 
as to provide fair and consistent justice across the entire market. While certain 
borrower circumstances, such as age of consent and diminished mental 
capacity, were unambiguous, determining the influence of other factors proved 
problematic. How to assess, for example, whether a potential borrower was 
suffering from ill health or extreme pressure to meet a financial need, especially 
if those conditions were the likely cause of the demand for funds.  
A written exchange between Mr Hyde of the DTI’s policy division and Mr 
Holmes of the Lord Chancellor’s Office highlighted the difficulty in applying such 
notions. On 30 January 1973 Holmes wrote to Hyde, ‘How, for example, can 
the lender know about the circumstances of the borrower at the time of 
transaction … is the enforceability of the contract to depend, for example, on 
the number of children the borrower has …?’120 One week later, Holmes asked 
Hyde how the entire system would operate if identical transactions were to be 
treated differently based on the personal circumstances of the borrower, where 
a contract between ‘A and X is valid’, but between ‘A and Y is void’ owing to Y’s 
personal circumstances.121  In 1897, Judge Collier of Liverpool had voiced 
similar concerns. He questioned the wisdom of providing county court judges 
such discretion which would breed ‘untold’ confusion in the system.122 Goode 
suggested that a small loan borrower experienced ‘conditions which make him 
particularly vulnerable to acceptance of a harsh agreement; but on the other 
hand, it is these self-same conditions that may generate an urgent need for 
financial assistance, while making it difficult for the debtor to obtain credit 
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because of his poor income prospects’.123 Seemingly, the practicality of working 
in the harsh and unconscionable framework was no less erroneous in the 1970s 
than in the 1900s. 
The Institute of Credit Management, the National Association of 
Retailers, the Hire Purchase Association, the John Hilton Bureau and the 
Consumers Association encouraged Crowther to maintain or lower the 48 per 
cent guidance rate and to extend it to all consumer credit transactions.124 The 
National Association of Moneylenders was ‘very strongly’ against carrying 
forward the ‘mischievous figure’ of 48 per cent as ‘it had no substance at all’.125 
The Association believed that the rate would have little effect on borrowers as 
almost all moneylending transactions would exceed that rate. They argued that 
in so far as the High Court had often found rates exceeding 48 per cent 
acceptable, the value of any guidance rate was questionable. Alternatively, they 
suggested that an entire range of loan factors should be used in deciding the 
merit of a transaction, including the size of the loan, its duration, repayment 
schedule, flexibility in default, the age, sex, marital status, income, stability of 
employment, owner or rental status, and educational background of the 
borrower and the lender’s overheads and percentage return on capital. 
In total, the National Association of Moneylenders suggested 33 factors, 
which were ‘no more than the factors considered by a manager of a loan 
office’.126 Guided by these factors, if an authority found a transaction to be 
harsh and unconscionable, a court could revise its terms. During a meeting with 
the National Association of Moneylenders, the Board of Trade said it would be 
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politically difficult to remove the guidance rate. After being enshrined in law for 
43 years, doing so would require a ‘substantive argument’ and a suitable 
alternative proposal. 127  However, unlike before, when government officials 
were hostile to moneylenders, the Board of Trade took special note that the 
only class of lenders with experience of the guidance rate reported how 
unrealistic and ineffective its application was.128 Notwithstanding, at this stage 
the Board of Trade and the Treasury believed that the regulation of the cost of 
credit needed a yardstick that reflected market reality where short-term small 
loans carried a 90-120 pcpa interest rate.129 
Crowther proposed that any rate over 48 pcpa be considered prima facie 
harsh and unconscionable, and for those terms to be applied across all forms 
of consumer credit.130 Lenders that consistently charged above the guidance 
rate would be required to submit quarterly returns to a newly created 
government department under the authority of a Consumer Credit 
Commissioner. To overcome the historical challenges associated with 
borrower-led court action, the Commissioner could initiate proceedings if a 
credit arrangement was deemed to be harsh and unconscionable.131  This 
framework would reduce abuses of a small loan borrower who, when operating 
under severe bargaining inequity, accepted a high rate without negotiation.132 
As seen in 1927, the proposed guidance rate relied on the judiciary to relieve 
borrowers of extortionate transactions without capping the credit on a market-
wide basis. 
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Disclosure terms 
Unlike the guidance rate and usury debate, consensus was reached that 
uniform disclosure of the total cost of credit would improve market 
competitiveness and lower prices.133 Not only would this minimise misleading 
and inaccurate quotes, it would also allow a rational choice to be made among 
credit options, which would in turn allocate capital more efficiently.134 The 
Institute of Credit Management suggested that ‘if it were possible for the 
consumer to make a fair comparison … on the basis of the true interest rate 
alone this would provide an extremely useful and worthwhile guide’. 135 
According to the Consumers Association, clearly presented costs expressed as 
a ‘true’ APR would allow for the ‘increasingly educated public’ to compare prices 
and thus keep overall interest at appropriate levels.136 This is different from 
earlier periods when disclosure was, in part, meant to limit fraud. 
Overall, moneylenders and pawnbrokers supported a uniform APR 
calculation.137 Unlike in earlier periods they scarcely protested. However, as 
before, a bone of contention was that small loan borrowers did not demand 
such information. Not only did moneylenders and pawnbrokers raise this point, 
but consumer advocates, banks and cheque traders, to name a few, did so too. 
The National Citizens Advice Bureau Council believed that no matter what the 
quoted interest rate was, consumers were ‘more concerned with whether or not 
they can afford what is being asked’.138 Midland Bank believed that ‘most 
people appeared to be interested only in the amount they had to repay and over 
what period’.139 As in earlier periods, there was little quantitative data to support 
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the claim that consumers preferred monetary over percentage quotations.140 
Crowther pushed back, saying that the situation was circular - consumers did 
not want the information because the information was not available. In turn, the 
information was not available because consumers do not demand it.141 It was 
argued then, almost as a matter of course, that APR disclosure would 
encourage rational consumer credit decisions. 
Historically, a second objection was the difficulty calculating an APR. In 
1897, a moneylender estimated that percentage disclosures would require two 
more clerks in each office. 142  Similar concerns were expressed by 
moneylenders and pawnbrokers of the day. That small loan lenders were 
concerned with mathematical complexities aligns them with their historical 
counterparts. However, that government and outside bodies agreed was, for 
the most part, a break from the past. The Home and Social Affairs Committee 
recognised the difficulties involved and noted that there was ‘no ideal 
formula’.143 For example, the APR on a £100 loan due in one month’s time at 5 
per cent interest with a £10 application fee can be expressed without the fee as 
approximately 80 per cent and with the fee as approximately 435 per cent. 
There was much debate about which type of fee should be included. The only 
accurate rate is found using an actuarial approach, which takes into 
consideration the ratio of interest to funds available to the borrower. In fact, the 
entire Crowther and CCA 1974 process was delayed owing to this issue, which 
had grown more, not less, complex over time.144 
In 1968, the Board of Trade was less concerned with the formula if it was 
universally employed, but by 1972 the DTI was focusing on the formula.145 
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While it agreed that finding a formula that was suitable for all consumer credit 
transactions was difficult, it believed that without one there was little chance 
that the government would be interested in the bill.146 A uniform APR was 
paramount to Crowther. It was anticipated that uniformity in calculation and 
disclosure would increase the quantity and quality of information, resulting in 
an increase in lender competition and market efficiency. Theoretically, a 
uniform APR would serve as a powerful consumer protection tool. For all the 
criticism levied against the MLA 1927, few parties recognised that it required 
disclosure of the cost of credit. 
The disclosure of rates of interest in advertisements was also discussed. 
The Board of Trade was concerned with protecting the public from misleading 
advertisements, especially when these involved costs and fees. 147 
Moneylenders argued that MLA 1927 advertisement restrictions put them at a 
disadvantage and demanded the removal of most, but not all, restrictions.148 
As late as 1969, they believed lenders should not advertise interest rates.149 
They were concerned that rates based on the borrower’s personal risk profile 
would differ from advertised rates such that moneylenders would be accused 
of misleading consumers.150 For example, they could not advertise a lower rate 
than the median charge based on a typical borrower profile else they be 
accused of displaying a teaser rate. 
Under the premise of equality and to improve competition among lenders 
Crowther recommended that prohibiting quoting an interest rate for non-
purchase money loans and the ban on postal advertising be repealed. In other 
words, all lenders would be subject to the same advertising regulation. 
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Addressing the concerns of moneylenders, advertised effective rates would be 
accompanied by a set of qualifying criteria to borrow at that rate. Lenders were 
committed to advertised rates for one month. Should they contract at a rate 
higher than that advertised, the onus was on the lender to justify the rate. 
Crowther reported that the MLA 1927 advertisement restrictions were too 
‘inhibiting and inflexible’ for the present day and that over the past 40 years 
advertising of all kinds had increased and become the norm.151 Instead, it was 
suggested that false and misleading credit statements be considered a criminal 
offence.152 As in 1900, controlling advertisements was left to fraud law. 
In its final report, Crowther suggested that adequate advertising and 
contractual information would protect the consumer.153 A central component 
was the APR. The Government Actuary’s Department provided seven pages of 
calculation guidance. Unlike the MLA 1927 constant ratio formula that assumed 
each payment was divided between principal and interest at a fixed rate, 
Crowther proposed a rate inclusive of all borrowing costs, as calculated on an 
actuarial basis that incorporated annual compounding. 154  Other mandated 
disclosure terms included the size of the loan, a summary of fees and charges, 
the total charge expressed as a percentage rate calculated actuarially, the total 
amount the borrower had to pay and the amount of each instalment and its due 
date.155 APR and clear and concise disclosure terms were central to Crowther’s 
desire to increase the competitiveness of the market. While certain features 
were products of the time, the idea that borrowers should have access to 
information, especially concerning price expressed in percentage terms, was 
similar to 1900 and 1927. 
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Enforcement and licensing 
Starting in the 1920s the British consumer credit market grew in both volume 
and diversity. Part of the rationale behind Crowther was to consolidate and 
update the ‘chaotic’ law and the government ministries responsible for 
enforcing the law.156 Crowther’s solution was to argue for the creation of an 
agency that would be autonomous of current government departments. 
Britain’s first independent regulator dates back to 1954 with the creation of the 
Independent Television Authority. 157  Crowther’s plan was for a Consumer 
Credit Commissioner who would head the agency and be empowered to 
administer the licensing scheme, regulate possible changing circumstances, 
enforce the Act, collect statistical data and educate the public about consumer 
credit.158 The Commissioner would be appointed by the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry. It was argued that an independent agency was better suited 
to the complex business aspects of the consumer credit market and the semi-
juridical functions needed to regulate it.159 Crowther was concerned that the 
civil service employment structure was too narrow and would inhibit the 
recruitment of qualified experts. Crowther’s advocacy of an independent 
agency led by experts and its critique of the ‘generalist’ civil service echoed the 
Fulton Committee’s findings (1968).160 
One of the main features of Crowther was the implementation of a 
uniform licensing system. Despite Crowther’s belief that business should 
operate with little government interference, the licensing of pawnbrokers and 
moneylenders during a period of a ‘universal belief in laissez-faire’ set a 
precedent that Crowther was unwilling to overturn.161 That is not to say, as was 
the case during the PBA 1872, that policymakers were unwilling to overturn 
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legal precedent as a matter of course. Quite the contrary, Crowther was created 
to investigate the regulatory framework with the aim of dismantling outdated 
provisions. Under Crowther, entities issuing loans of not more than £2,000 
made to an individual or partnership carrying an interest rate of 2.5 per cent 
above Bank rate for unconnected loans or repayable in three or more 
instalments on connected loans required a licence. Loans falling under those 
conditions issued without a licence were illegal.162 The Bank rate test excluded 
building societies, life assurers and small loan societies. With the repeal of the 
PBA 1872 and MLA 1900-1927, small lenders would be equal to all others. 
Should banks enter the consumer credit market, they too would need a licence. 
Crowther critiqued the ‘aloofness of the British banks from direct involvement 
with the financing of the consumer credit’.163 It was hoped that, like their US 
counterparts, British banks would enter the field and increase competition. 
With the inclusion of 220 banks, it was expected that 50,000-60,000 
entities would require licensing.164 Licences would be valid for three years and 
cover all branches. Regardless of market conditions, a licence would be 
granted to first-time applicants unless his ‘record or known character’ indicated 
that he was unsuitable.165 The Home and Social Affairs Committee supported 
this ‘negative vetting basis’ whereby a licence was automatically granted unless 
the applicant demonstrated a history of inappropriate behaviour.166 Crowther 
did not provide guidance on what constituted grounds for denial, refusal to 
renew or revocation of a licence. Instead, it granted the Commissioner wide 
latitude to exercise his judgement. Crowther argued that ‘his power to revoke a 
licence, or to refuse to renew it, will be by itself a powerful weapon, and will no 
doubt prove to be the one that he most frequently uses’.167 Recognising the 
                                            
162 See Crowther, 7.2.3 for the complete listing. 
163 Crowther, 2.1.28. 
164 Crowther, 7.2.8. 
165 Crowther, 7.2.9. 
166 FV 62/102 (Major Policy Papers on the Whole of Proposed Legislation), ‘Home and Social 
Affairs Committee’, 12 June 1972, TNA. 
167 Crowther, 7.4.3. 
  
201 
rights of lenders, the Commissioner’s decisions were subject to appeal. This 
centralised power, sitting outside the judiciary, is in stark contrast to the 
judiciary-led system that hitherto had controlled licensing. Like the aggrieved 
parties, the Commissioner could seek recourse through the court system. While 
Crowther believed that the Commissioner should be empowered to initiate civil 
proceedings, a measure found in some countries with no comparable provision 
in British law, it felt such a provision should be decided by Parliament.168 
With few exceptions, the Lancashire and Cheshire Moneylenders 
Association (the earliest known moneylenders association) and the National 
Association of Moneylenders supported Crowther’s licensing and enforcement 
recommendations. The Lancashire Association lobbied to end the requirement 
that renewals take place in person. 169  Crowther believed that almost all 
licensing would be by post. The National Association of Moneylenders sought 
a more substantial control mechanism than Crowther thought worthwhile. They 
sought licensing for each branch manager and proprietor. Under this scheme 
an individual would be held accountable for unacceptable conduct. Crowther 
believed that licensing at the business level, with a requirement that all office 
and branch locations be included in the application, sufficed. As before, the 
trade desired more stringent regulation than the government was willing to 
provide. Moneylenders had long viewed regulation as a route to legitimacy. 
While small loan lenders supported the plan, several government 
agencies voiced strong opposition to the power granted to the Credit 
Commissioner. The DTI believed that the scheme would not be ‘in accord with 
our constitutional practice’. 170  It argued that there was no basis for an 
independent agency to create or adapt statutory provisions based on evolving 
market conditions without approval of a government minister. Turning to 
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licensing, the DTI preferred that the enforcement mechanisms be used at the 
local level through the Weights and Measures authorities. Moreover, it was 
argued that the civil service was qualified to administer the licensing scheme 
and would do so more economically. The DTI estimated that an independent 
commissioner would cost an additional £50,000 a year and suggested after the 
first year that the licensing function could be administered on a part-time basis, 
leaving Crowther’s ideal and highly capable executive with very little to do.171 
Finally, they saw no reason to duplicate data collection and education 
programmes that could be performed by other agencies. As will be 
demonstrated, their opposition shaped the outcome of CCA 1974. 
 
Conclusion to section B. The Crowther Committee, 1968-1971 
It was believed that consumer credit legislation had failed to define the market, 
encourage competition among lenders, stifled innovation and gave consumers 
inadequate protection. While the value of moneylending and pawnbroking was 
of little consequence to the economy, the financial regulation governing the 
industry was the starting point of reform. Over the decades following the MLA 
1927 various amendments and exclusions (e.g., section 123 of the Companies 
Act) were enacted in response to its poor design and the ever-evolving credit 
markets. Crowther sought to unify regulation and increase competition, which 
in turn would better protect borrowers while allowing for more flexibility for 
lenders to innovate. As opposed to restricting behaviour, Crowther viewed 
regulation as enabling the market to compete more efficiently through 
increased information.172 This corresponds to Friedrich Hayek’s understanding 
that, given all relevant information, rational actors will choose an optimal 
economic outcome. 173  Intervention of this sort fits within a neoclassical 
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understanding that government intervention is warranted when the efficient 
allocation of resources is distorted by information asymmetry.174 
Crowther’s default position was to interfere as little as possible. 
However, it understood that small loan borrowers required protection. Minutes 
from a meeting held on 20 December 1968, attended by representatives from 
Crowther, the Treasury and the Board of Trade, show an appreciation that 
HCSTC demand features differed from other borrowers. Whereas higher-
income groups borrowed to enhance their standard of living, lower-income 
groups did so ‘in a desperate effort to maintain an existing standard’.175 From a 
regulatory viewpoint it was recognised that distinguishing among demand 
features was difficult. Some argued that consumer credit legislation could do 
little to protect those ‘who through no fault of their own’ have an insufficient 
income.176 Notwithstanding, the Treasury, the Board of Trade and Crowther 
believed that certain measures could mitigate inequality between lenders and 
low-income borrowers. The Home Office was less confident. As late as January 
1972, it argued that borrowers were not so disadvantaged as to warrant a social 
policy response. As in 1897, it was doubted that regulation could mitigate the 
unique demand features of small loan borrowers. 
Since 1872, policymakers believed percentage disclosure was important 
and struggled to believe that borrowers were more interested in the total cost 
of credit as expressed in monetary rather than percentage terms. Crowther 
argued that a uniform APR would increase competition and cut prices. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, it was not until 2015 that policymakers confirmed what 
lenders argued: access to credit, the speed of approval and the quick delivery 
of funds were and are still more important to borrowers than the cost of credit 
and its related APR. 
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By empowering a Consumer Credit Commissioner to control the 
licensing process and initiate enforcement proceedings, Crowther broke with 
the norms that relied on the judiciary. This was an attempt to overcome the 
strict and binding nature of regulation in the past, which had failed to appreciate 
the dynamic nature of the market. Crowther was unwilling to recommend a 
statutory price cap on the cost of small loans. It believed that a price cap would 
lead to market segmentation and price clustering. Even more, Crowther 
suggested that the lone remnant of statutory usury - the profit restrictions placed 
on pawnbrokers - be rescinded. Instead, and linking APR, disclosure terms and 
lender behaviour, Crowther extended the 48 per cent guidance rate and the 
harsh and unconscionable test to the entire field of consumer credit. However, 
Crowther did not provide strict rules for the Commissioner to enforce. It believed 
that lenders and borrowers would be better served by a flexible mechanism, 
one that encouraged innovation yet would intervene to protect consumers by 
revoking a licence or through the court system if necessary. The use of 
licensing and punishment for violation are considered a ‘micro-prudential’ 
financial regulatory response that seeks to influence behaviour at the firm 
level.177 By consolidating regulatory power in one agency, Crowther tried to 
make rules uniform and enforce them consistently. These are among the 
reasons why small loan lenders were admitted into the wider financial system 
and, at least from a regulatory viewpoint, the borrowers of small sums were not 
judged by a nineteenth-century moral matrix. 
Section C. analyses responses to Crowther and aspects of the CCA 
1974 pertaining to moneylenders and pawnbrokers.  
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C. The Consumer Credit Act 1974 
The Crowther Report was published in March 1971.178 There was widespread 
agreement that its systematic approach and integrated recommendations 
offered ample consumer protection and provided lenders with the structure they 
required if they were to grow. As the Hire Purchase Association remarked, ‘The 
Committee were given a task of truly herculean proportions; few we believe will 
disagree with the view that they have done it superbly well.’179 The Observer 
claimed, ‘Seldom has a report of such a complex subject been greeted with 
such a chorus of approval.’180 In more muted terms, John Davies, Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry, wrote to Prime Minister Heath that the Report ‘as 
a whole has not had an unfriendly reception from commercial interests’.181 
The government responded by issuing ‘Reform of the Law on Consumer 
Credit’. 182  In agreement with Crowther, the first paragraph stated that the 
current piecemeal regulations were no longer appropriate. In the second 
paragraph, the PBA 1872 and MLA 1927 were deemed deficient. The MLA 
1927 was believed to have inhibited the growth of credit and funding for 
industry.183 The government announced a bill that would offer a unified yet 
flexible framework that would be applied to the whole consumer credit system. 
It was expected that legislation would release ‘the credit industry from existing 
outdated’ regulation, encourage competition and protect consumers.184 Much 
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of the business community saw the reform as a balanced package and resisted 
political efforts to regulate by product.185 
Crowther and the government’s bill were not uncontroversial. An 
unnamed employee at the DTI argued that Parliament would not engage in 
wholesale reform of the credit markets ‘simply on the grounds that [the] existing 
law is untidy’.186 F. J. Broomfield of the Board of Trade agreed with Crowther’s 
findings, yet averred that reform efforts of this magnitude were impractical.187 
The Home and Social Affairs Committee suggested that any proposed bill 
longer than 50 clauses stood little chance in Parliament.188 R. J. Meadway, 
Minister for Trade and Consumer Affairs, retorted that while an early draft of 
the bill was 84 pages long, it removed 126 pages of legislation, giving a loss of 
42 pages.189 Meadway also believed that ‘there might be considerable sex-
appeal’ in focusing attention on the government’s efforts to help people who 
‘run up excessive debts’.190 The Conservative Research Department agreed, 
stating that attention should be given to the protection benefits the CCA 1974 
would bring to the poor.191 
Motives aside, they were not alone in expressing interest in protecting 
the poor and controlling the working practice of lenders. Harold Davies, Lord 
Davies of Leek (Labour), while sympathetic to the idea that credit facilitated the 
acquisition of the ‘necessities for a good life’, argued that it was the duty of 
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legislation to keep an eye on ‘the sharks and cheats’. 192 John Roper MP 
(Labour), while not opposed to the bill, dissented and challenged the basic 
‘philosophy of economics’ that had ‘glorified’ the role of credit in society.193 He 
remarked, ‘To allow a situation in which all the essentials of life get more 
expensive and at the same time to talk of protecting the consumer is not 
keeping the faith with the public.’194 Most, however, would have agreed with 
Geoffrey Howe MP (Conservative), who found little difference in Crowther, the 
White Paper and the proposed CCA 1974 bill, all of which sought to improve 
competition and protect the consumer.195 
The government’s bill applied to the whole of the UK for loans valued 
between £30 and £5,000 issued to individuals and non-corporate bodies. Loans 
for the acquisition of goods or services (purchase loans or supplier credit) of 
less than £30 were exempted from certain requirements. Cash loans of any 
value charging less than 10 pcpa were exempted. William Williams MP 
(Labour) and Janet Fookes, Baroness Fookes of Plymouth (Conservative) 
believed that the government’s loan floor of £30 was too high. Williams argued 
that the ‘poorest among us … borrow small amounts because they need the 
money as a lifeline’ and deserved protection from excessive charges. 196 
Apparently, many of his constituents owed more in interest and charges than 
the original small loan. Baroness Fookes proposed that the floor value be set 
at £10. The Consumers Association proposed that all CCA 1974 provisions 
apply to small cash loans of £10 or more, but unsecured credit for goods and 
services provided through cheque traders and mail order companies be 
exempted. Concerns were raised that the cost of regulating small loans would 
be passed on to those least able to afford it. It is unclear why moneylenders 
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and their clients could afford the cost of regulation, but cheque traders could 
not.  
The CCA 1974 repealed six Acts, including the Moneylenders, 
Pawnbrokers and the Hire-Purchase Acts.197 Unlike the MLA 1900-1927, the 
Act defined the market by size and recipient. It also provided a table listing the 
common credit products that came within its jurisdiction.198 Specific to pledged 
items but not pawnbrokers per se, as the form of lender was no longer relevant, 
the CCA 1974 removed price controls. Pledged goods were redeemable for six 
months or longer if the parties agreed. Upon default, items pledged for £15 or 
less became the immediate property of the creditor. For an amount of more 
than £15 the creditor had to ‘take reasonable care to obtain a proper price when 
disposing’ of the good.199 Any surplus from a sale, less expenses, was given to 
the borrower.  
The following paragraphs analyse the key parliamentary debates, White 
Paper and early draft legislation concerning price controls, the guidance rate 
and the grossly exorbitant test. 
 
Price controls, the guidance rate, grossly exorbitant and grossly contravening 
credit transactions 
Debates concerning the interest rate followed a similar pattern to previous 
periods. There was limited support for usury and disagreement about a 
guidance interest rate.200 The government did not implement price controls or 
provide a guidance rate.201 It was argued that a single interest rate would fail to 
account for the diversity of credit products and would narrow the judicial review 
process. The White Paper cited an example: a £10, two-day loan, carrying a 
charge of 10p, would not be considered harsh, yet it works out at 100 pcpa. 
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Patrick Pery, Lord Pery of Limerick (Conservative, Under Secretary of State for 
Trade) believed that no single rate could cover a loan for the purchase of a car 
and a ‘loan granted to someone in a very straitened circumstance to tide him 
over the weekend’.202 It was expected that by removing the guidance rate the 
courts would have wider latitude to review a transaction. 203  This mirrors 
arguments made in favour of removing the guidance rate from the MLA 1900. 
Under the CCA 1974 the onus was on the lender to prove that a transaction 
was not extortionate based on these criteria: loan size and duration, current 
interest rates, collateral-backed versus unsecured loans and the credit profit of 
a borrower.204 Though more specific than past efforts, the rationale was similar 
to the MLA 1900. 
Under CCA 1974 sections 137-140, the court had the power to reopen 
a consumer credit transaction when the debtor or surety alleged extortion.205 
Though the CCA 1974 did not provide a guidance rate, it specified the power 
of the courts to intervene in the market. It balanced this expansion by requiring 
the debtor to provide evidential burden of his claim. Accordingly, any credit 
transaction could be reviewed and the onus was on the lender to account for 
his charges. The courts were empowered to take into account the main credit 
agreement and auxiliary bargains dealing with compulsory charges. Past 
transactions (e.g., rollovers) were insufficient grounds to reopen a current 
transaction.206 However, nothing precluded a borrower from presenting a past 
transaction as an additional grievance. Section 138(1) defined a credit bargain 
as extortionate if, 
(a) it requires the debtor or a relative of his to make payments which are 
grossly exorbitant, or 
(b) otherwise grossly contravenes ordinary principles of fair dealing. 
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The CCA 1974 did not define ‘grossly exorbitant’ or ‘grossly contravenes 
ordinary principles’. Instead, section 138(2) required the court to consider a 
range of factors when determining whether a transaction was extortionate, 
including the prevailing interest rate at the time of a contract was made and risk 
levels, age, experience, business acumen, financial position and overall health 
of the borrower. As Goode pointed out, to be considered extortionate the lender 
must have been aware of the borrower’s specific situation when the loan was 
issued.207 Importantly, the court could not open a case on its own motion; it had 
to rely on the debtor or a surety. The court could revise, in part or whole, any 
obligation of the borrower. The creditor could be required to repay, in part or 
whole, money received from the borrower. 
In terms of small agreements, after considerable debate, the CCA 1974 
section 17 granted special provisions for certain contracts under £30. 208 
However, there were no exemptions for small cash loans, including pawn. 
Exempted were low-value debtor-creditor-supplier agreements (e.g., a milk 
delivery), cheque traders and mail order companies. For those traders the 
requirement for periodic account statements, cooling-off provisions and 
contract formalities were waived. The Consumers Association was vital in 
securing the exemption. Without it, it was argued that consumers would be 
worse off owing to an increase in the cost of credit and a decrease in the supply 
of credit for loans of less than £30. 
 
Terms of disclosure 
The White Paper suggested that the full cost of credit be disclosed in 
both cash and pcpa terms. The total cost had to include interest and all 
compulsory charges. Misleading advertisements became a criminal offence. 
The Commissioner was empowered to ban the use of certain words and 
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phrases. As far as possible, the bill made provisions to ensure that the borrower 
was aware of the terms and conditions.209 Disclosure requirements included 
the sum borrowed, the total owed, payment schedules, the date of execution, 
creditor information, debtor information, the type of credit offered and the 
duration. Prior to default penalties, for secured loans of more than £15 and all 
cash loans the lender had to issue a notice of default.210 As with Crowther, it 
was argued that clear information enabled the consumer to make a rational 
choice among competing credit products.211  
This argument also received support from MPs. Sally Oppenheim 
(Conservative) suggested that truth in lending was key for consumer welfare.212 
William Montgomery (Conservative), a director of a consumer credit company 
as well as an MP, believed that respectable firms would support disclosing the 
total cost of credit, inclusive of fees and charges. He expected that only the 
‘sharks … who bleed dry unsuspecting and naive’ people will protest.213 What 
Montgomery failed to appreciate was that ‘respectable firms’ differed on how 
the rate should be calculated. Table 20 demonstrates the difference between 
nominal as advertised rates and the equivalent effective rate as calculated by 
each bank. Note that while Midland’s actual rate was lower than Lloyds’s, its 
effective rate was higher.214 The proposed bill provided a standardised APR for 
use in advertisements and contracts. The borrower was to be supplied with 
copies of executed documents. The agreements were to state clearly the rights 
and duties of the lender and borrower. 
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Table 20 Actual versus effective rates 
 
 Interest Rate 
 Actual  Effective 
 pcpa  pcpa 
    
Natwest 8.0%  15.7% 
Midland 9.0%  17.7% 
Lloyds 9.5%  17.2% 
 
Source: Kevin Lindgren, ‘The Consumer Credit Act 1974: Its scope’, The Modern Law Review 
40 (1977). 
 
Agreeing with Crowther, the rationale behind truth in lending was to 
increase competition. The government’s position was made clear by Alan 
Williams MP (Labour), who on the floor of the Commons stated,  
We want to give greater equality in bargaining between the debtor and the 
creditor, and we believe, as did the Conservative Government, that we can 
achieve this greater protection and this greater equality in bargaining only 
by establishing greater truth in lending. Through truth in lending, we hope 
that we shall have open disclosure of all the terms which are involved in 
an agreement. We hope that this will make for true competition and will 
avoid some of the grosser examples that we have had of interest rates in 
the last few years.215 
 
As opposed to price controls or a guidance rate, the government 
believed that bargaining inequity would be mitigated by increased competition 
driven by information disclosure.  
 
Enforcement and licensing 
The White Paper supported Crowther’s recommendation that an independent 
Consumer Credit Commissioner be appointed. His main function would be to 
administer the licensing system and monitor developments in the consumer 
credit industry. However, the White Paper curtailed the Commissioner’s 
independence by making his appointment subject to the Secretary of State who 
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would issue formal directions to the Commissioner. 216  At the local level, 
Weights and Measures would prosecute individuals, leaving the Commissioner 
to deal with systemic issues.217 Importantly, the Director, the Commissioner 
and Weights and Measures had prosecutorial powers.218 The Commissioner, 
under the scrutiny of Parliament, could issue regulatory orders in response to 
developments in the field. The Fair Trading Act and the Director General of Fair 
Trading were cited as precedents.219 The minister would be given power to set 
rules of conduct, and the Commissioner would issue, suspend or revoke a 
licence. 220  Applicants found to be unfit would be denied a licence. Unfit 
behaviour included violation under the Act or similar consumer legislation, 
charging excessive interest, conduct unfair to the consumer or refusing credit 
based on the borrower’s race, creed or gender.221 An appeal process was 
provided. Oliver Kitson, Lord Airedale of Gledhow (Liberal) questioned whether 
the Director would have enough ‘local knowledge’ to make an informed 
decision. 222  His concerns echoed Josiah Wedgwood MP’s (Labour), who, 
during the MLSC 1927, inquired whether the Home Office would send 
inspectors to ask ‘Who was your father? What school did you study [in]?’223 
Although criteria were provided, the subjective concept of a ‘fit’ person, or the 
use of terms from the 1920s (e.g., ‘of good moral character’), was an obstacle 
for some lawmakers. Since 1900, policymakers had debated the merits of 
providing the judiciary with specific criteria versus the use of general but 
accepted legal terminology. The latter was intended to offer judges wider 
latitude to relieve borrowers.  
Despite reassurance that the civil service could manage the licensing 
system, the DTI expressed concern that there would be great difficulty in 
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operating ‘on the scale envisioned’.224 The DTI was reminded that it had lobbied 
for a ‘less identifiable’ unit to handle licensing, while Crowther had argued for a 
full department. As before, a small minority of members baulked at the idea of 
licensing. In response, Howe reminded members that moneylenders and 
pawnbrokers were already licensed. Licensing, he argued, was a flexible 
regulatory tool that could respond to the ever-evolving credit markets.225 A 
licence enabled a lender to issue all forms of consumer credit. This provision 
would have a substantial impact on the moneylending and pawnbroking 
markets. As discussed below, within a relatively short period small loan lenders 
evolved from proprietor and partnerships into corporations offering multiple 
products, including payday, pawnbroking, cheque cashing, automobile title and 
similar loans.  
 
D. Conclusion 
Given that Crowther, the White Paper and the CCA 1974 sought to modernise, 
consolidate and rationalise the then fragmented consumer credit regulatory 
framework, it is not surprising that they were at or near agreement concerning 
economic and social policy. Crowther’s equal treatment of lenders, including 
providers of small loans, provoked little debate. A handful of legislators used 
terms such as ‘sharks’ to describe particular lenders; however, only a few 
categorised the entire industry as evil or parasitic. The ideology underpinning 
Crowther was adopted by the government. Both believed that truth in lending 
would overcome information vulnerability. It was believed that the disclosure of 
clear and truthful information would facilitate rational decision-making. 
Regulation that mitigated asymmetric information would encourage 
competition among credit providers, resulting in a decrease in the cost of credit. 
It was argued that a high level of competition offered the best form of consumer 
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protection as dubious lenders would be forced out of the market. This is not 
completely dissimilar to Judge Charles Darling, Lord Darling’s (Conservative) 
argument that the MLA 1927 system would ‘protect those who are forced to 
borrow money by improving the class of people who are permitted to lend it’.226 
However, the MLA 1900-1927 episode viewed the market with suspicion and 
sought to limit its size and scope. In that regard, the purpose of the MLA 1900-
1927 and the CCA 1974 differed. 
Complementing the improved competitive environment was an 
enhanced licensing system, an enforcement regime headed by the Director 
General of Fair Trading and an expansion of powers to deal with extortionate 
agreements. The CCA 1974 licensing system shifted power from local 
administration to a centralised ministry. This decision fitted with the 
government’s and industry’s desire for a consolidated and consistently 
enforced regulatory procedure. It was believed that a single regulator would 
better track market trends. By granting a multi-year licence, the industry faced 
a smaller administrative burden. However, like the MLA 1927 system, some 
legislators challenged the fitness criteria for applicant approval. The MLA 1927 
tested for good character, and a magistrate could refuse a certificate if the 
applicant was deemed unfit. Similarly, the CCA 1974 tested the fitness of an 
applicant to hold a licence. The appeal process notwithstanding, the power to 
deny a licence on such poorly defined terms was a matter of concern. 
Opponents countered that a narrow test parameter was less likely to achieve 
its goal. The CCA 1974 sought maximum flexibility both to increase market 
competition and protect the consumer.227  The regulation was designed to 
encourage and respond to credit product innovation. Advocates believed the 
best way to achieve its goals was to give the Director of Fair Trade wide-ranging 
powers in granting, suspending and revoking a licence. Similarly, the reason 
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why the guidance rate was dropped was to expand the courts’ ability to protect 
the consumer. The same reasoning could be found in 1900. 
For moneylenders, the lifting of advertising restrictions was another 
indication of their admittance into mainstream finance. While the MLA 1927 
limited their ability to seek business, the CCA 1974 facilitated more equal terms. 
For disclosure requirements, it is worth nothing that the PBA 1872 and MLA 
1927 provided details on agreement form and content. While the CCA 1974 
provisions reflected the needs of the period, the concept of truth in lending was 
not new. Similarly, the PBA 1872, MLA 1900-1927 and CCA 1974 focused on 
the APR and how it was calculated. These facts seem to have been lost in the 
critique of the existing legislation and the policy solutions put forth. 
In other respects the CCA 1974 was a departure from the past. 
Understanding the industry from the perspective of the credit product as 
opposed to the form of lending was key to legitimising moneylending and 
pawnbroking. In this case legitimacy meant that moneylenders and 
pawnbrokers were afforded the same protections and subjected to 
standardised rules of conduct. For pawnbrokers this also occurred with the 
lifting of interest rate restrictions. Small loan lenders and borrowers were 
treated in the same way as other market participants. Although it is impossible 
to verify, perhaps small loan borrowers were of less concern because the 
industry contributed marginally to overall credit volume. Some expected the 
pawn industry to disappear, while others believed mainstream credit providers 
would overtake moneylenders in providing short-term credit to low-income 
borrowers. Another possibility is that the policymakers recognised the limitation 
of the law to affect small loan borrowers. According to Goode, ‘The law cannot 
by itself redress bargaining inequality, educate the ignorant, eliminate trading 
malpractice or remove hardship caused by sheer inadequacy of a consumer’s 
financial resources.’228 What is clear is that Crowther was unwilling to regulate 
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HCSTC on behalf of the few who might suffer from credit use. While specific 
protections were implemented, moneylenders were not singled out and low-
income borrowers were deemed to be rational and responsible users of credit. 
With a preference for less government interference and an enhanced 
competitive environment, price controls, and later in Parliament, the guidance 
rate, stood little chance of implementation. It was believed that competition, 
judicial powers over grossly exorbitant transactions and the licensing system 
would protect borrowers. Clear, transparent and consistent information would 
encourage product comparison in a borrowing class that, for the most part, 
benefited from readily accessible credit. While the CCA 1974 revamped the 
regulatory framework, it was a market-friendly process, one that included 
moneylenders and pawnbrokers. 
 
  
218 
5 Financial Inclusion and the Great Recession 
 
This chapter focuses on the Consumer Credit Act 2006 (CCA 2006), the Great 
Recession and its aftermath as they related to moneylending (now called 
payday lending), pawnbroking regulation and market development. It analyses 
how the financial inclusion agenda interacted with the belief that regulation 
could add to consumer protection and enhance the market’s efficiency. 
Concerning the CCA 2006 the chapter asks: Were price controls considered? 
Which position did consumer advocacy groups support? Would ethical 
concerns influence the process? Were vulnerable borrowers considered 
‘rational maximising agents’ or morally degenerate and unable to make sense 
of interest rates approaching an APR of 3,000 per cent? If the CCA 1974 was 
believed to have failed, what changes would the CCA 2006 consider 
concerning the APR, extortionate test, licensing and enforcement 
mechanisms? 
Turning to moneylending and pawnbroking, this chapter argues that the 
CCA 2006 was motivated by the financial inclusion agenda and the belief that 
regulation could ‘enhance the market’. To reduce poverty, the former was 
concerned with increasing access to mainstream banking, affordable credit and 
financial competence. The latter believed legislation in the past had failed and 
sought to improve information disclosure and licensing requirements to 
encourage competition and lower prices. Both agendas considered the market 
to be normative, yet certain ‘irresponsible’ lenders were believed to target 
vulnerable borrowers and challenged the view that credit use had raised living 
standards across the board and contributed to economic growth. In response, 
the CCA 2006 broke with Crowther and required stringent licensing of high-risk 
lenders. In 2006, regulation was enacted to encourage a specific kind of market, 
one in which responsible lenders competed on price and issued affordable 
credit, which in turn was expected to reduce poverty. 
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In 2007-2008, as loan volume grew, regulators would again focus on 
moneylending. Did this growth encourage a response, as seen in 1900 and 
1927 when regulators sought to restrict the market? Which factors were 
analysed concerning the effect of price controls? Was there any evidence of 
lenders earning an exorbitant return from vulnerable borrowers during a period 
of financial crisis? 
The Great Recession and its aftermath increased payday loan volume. 
Increasingly, policymakers viewed the industry as predatory, their product 
harmful and its users, by definition, vulnerable. ‘Irresponsible’ finance not only 
targeted the working poor, it had a negative impact on the economic and social 
conditions of poverty. The newly created Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
sought to restrict marginal borrowers from accessing payday loans. There was 
widespread political though not economic consensus that the ‘normal’ laws of 
economics (e.g. price competition) did not apply to payday loans and that direct 
intervention in the market’s pricing mechanism and restricting credit access 
were the only solutions to provide relief for vulnerable borrowers. 
Section A. analyses the political and market developments following 
enactment of the CCA 1974; section B. analyses the CCA 2006; and section C. 
covers the Great Recession and its aftermath. The chapter’s conclusion is 
presented in section D. 
 
A. Political and market developments 
Political developments 
The consumer credit landscape changed dramatically in the decades following 
the CCA 1974. Beginning in the 1980s, British banking and consumer credit 
were influenced by global trends and the deregulation of the UK financial 
system. Both were credited for offering increasing market competitiveness and 
product diversity.1 The amount of unsecured credit more than doubled between 
                                            
1 Elaine Kempson et al., ‘In or out? Financial exclusion: A literature and research review’, 
Financial Services Authority (2000), 14-15; Richard Berthoud and Elaine Kempson, Credit and 
  
220 
1994 and 2001.2 In 2004, for the first time, British personal debt exceeded £1 
trillion.3 In 1974, the credit card system was in its infancy, with one provider, 
Barclays, issuing £32 million.4 By 2003, there were over 1,300 credit card 
products with £49 billion outstanding.5 In 2004-2005, the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) had issued 16,568 consumer credit licences. 6  It was believed that 
consumer credit had contributed to economic growth and rising real incomes. 
Patricia Hewitt MP (Labour, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) argued 
that a competitive financial system was vital for ‘sustainable economic growth’ 
and that an ‘innovative consumer credit market’ had contributed to ‘robust 
growth’ in consumer spending.7 
However, the Bank of England expressed concern over the high levels 
of unsecured debt held by low-income households.8 It was suggested that 
these debts would prove problematic during an economic downturn. Between 
2001 and 2004, the DTI published three reports on over-indebtedness and 
encouraged ‘responsible’ lending.9 Much of the government’s efforts were led 
by Melanie Johnson MP (Labour) when she was first Economic Secretary to 
                                            
Debt (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1992), 46; Richard Davies and Peter Richardson, 
‘Evolution of the UK banking system’, The Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (2010), Q4. 
2 Elaine Kempson, ‘Over-indebtedness in Britain’, A report issued to the Department of Trade 
and Industry (2002), i-iv. Adjusted for inflation. 
3 HC deb. 9 June 2005, vol. 434. 
4 Ibid. 
5 ‘The consumer credit market in the 21st century: Fair, clear and competitive’, Department of 
Trade and Industry CMD 6040 (2003), 4. 
6 HL select committee on European Union 36th annual report 2007, Chapter 4 UK Consumer 
credit legislation, 64-65. 
7 ‘Fair, clear and competitive’, 10. In The Challenge of Affluence (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), Avner Offer challenges the assumption that as affluence rises society develops 
an increased capacity for ‘rational’ and prudent (or less fallible) decision making. Inherent in 
Hewitt’s statement is a link between higher income, growth, standards of living and the 
responsible use of credit akin to the life-cycle theory of credit. This research has demonstrated 
that there is a distinction between credit use to secure consumer wants versus credit use to 
satisfy an immediate need, such as rent or a utility bill. Whether it is ‘prudent’ or ‘rational’ to use 
HCSTC for an emergency payment is questionable. 
8  Speech by Professor Stephen Nickell (BOE Monetary Policy Committee), ‘Two Current 
Monetary Policy Issues’, 16 September 2003. 
9  Responsible lending was understood as ‘more than just meeting the minimum legal 
requirements. It is also about driving forward best practice and treating customers fairly.’ See 
‘Transparency of credit charges’, House of Commons Treasury Committee First Report of 
Session 2003-2004 vol. 1, section 83. 
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the Treasury and later in the DTI as Minister for Competition and Consumers. 
Charles Hendry MP (Conservative) cautioned that while debt was not 
necessarily ‘a bad thing’, it was rising at a rate of £1 million every four minutes.10 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, regulators were increasingly 
concerned that the CCA 1974 was ill equipped to function in the much larger 
and diverse credit market, especially for credit cards users (the UK represented 
50 per cent of the EU credit card market) and credit designed for ‘vulnerable’ 
borrowers.11 There is tension, then, between the belief that consumer credit 
had raised living standards and supported economic growth, yet at some point 
‘too much’ debt was harmful. For decades policymakers had struggled to 
determine when an interest rate was ‘too high’ and, in the twenty-first century, 
it was questioned whether there was too much available credit. 
Starting under the 1997 Labour government, a financial inclusion 
initiative sought access to basic banking facilities, affordable credit and financial 
literacy.12 The financial inclusion agenda considered the market as normative 
and believed access to mainstream banking in an increasingly competitive 
environment was an effective poverty reduction strategy.13 Donncha Marron 
argued that, as opposed to the socialisation of ‘harmful’ risk found in the state 
welfare system, financial inclusion relied on the market to price and profit from 
‘opportunity’ risk.14 New Labour believed that the right kind of market would 
                                            
10 HC deb. 9 June 2005, vol. 434. 
11 HC deb. 13 January 2005, vol. 429. 
12 According to the FSA, the financial inclusion agenda was stimulated by the 1997 Labour 
government’s Social Exclusion Unit initiative. See ‘In or out?’ The first government strategy 
report, ‘Promoting financial inclusion’, was issued by HM Treasury in 2004. While the initial 
focus was on increasing access to basic banking facilities, ATMs and affordable credit, it was 
expected that insurance and related products would follow. Alternatives to the banks were also 
promoted, including the Post Office, Community Development Finance Initiatives and credit 
unions. Financial illiteracy was to be addressed in school-based programmes and money 
advice centres. 
13 The financial inclusion agenda is critiqued for that reason. A critique and comparison with the 
Victorian period are found in section D. of this chapter. 
14 Donncha Marron, ‘Governing poverty in a neoliberal age: New Labour and the case of 
financial exclusion’, New Political Economy 18:6 (2013), 789-790. 
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reduce poverty and decrease government welfare expenditure. 15  It was 
expected that consumers and financial institutions would benefit from such an 
arrangement. To the extent that payday loans contributed to poverty, they were 
considered the wrong kind of credit. In the 1990s, New Labour directed its 
efforts to removing barriers that kept individuals from engaging meaningfully in 
economic and social affairs. Supply-side barriers included bank branch 
closures, account minimums and a lack of affordable credit options. Demand-
side barriers were related to financial ignorance and poor decision-making.16 
As in the Victorian era, it was recognised that the cost of poverty was 
borne at both the individual and societal level. However, despite the Treasury 
claiming that certain market failures (e.g., information asymmetry, externalities 
and distributional concerns) as opposed to state welfare, had encouraged 
exclusion, the government wanted to improve the capacity of vulnerable 
individuals to participate ‘freely’ in a globalised finance system.17 Drawing from 
the sociologist and social theorist Nikolas Rose, Marron argued that in its early 
form financial inclusion was a manifestation of the political link made between 
individual consumer freedom, economic growth and societal well-being. 18 
While in 1900-1927 vulnerable borrowers were to be protected by restricting 
access to credit, leading up to the CCA 2006 the agenda was to increase 
access to the right kind of market. 
                                            
15 In 2003-2004, the majority of households lacking access to basic banking facilities were also 
supported by the government: 64 per cent received council tax benefit, 62 per cent received 
housing benefit and 48 per cent received income support. See ‘Promoting financial inclusion’, 
HM Treasury (2004), 12. 
16 Kempson and Whyley categorised exclusion by access (bank closures or high-risk factors), 
conditions (i.e., attached to a financial product), price (lack of affordability) and marketing 
(financial firms ignoring some groups). Elaine Kempson and Claire Whyley, Kept In or Opted 
Out? Understanding and Combating Financial Exclusion (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 
1999). 
17 Marron, ‘Governing poverty’, 789-792. ‘Promoting financial inclusion’, HM Treasury (2004), 
3; ‘Access to financial services,’ HM Treasury (1999); ‘Promoting financial exclusion’, HM 
Treasury (2004), 3. 
18 See Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999).  
  
223 
Although not statutory, the Treasury ‘encouraged’ mainstream banks to 
offer basic current accounts and to increase product diversity to low income 
households.19 In 1975, only 45 per cent of adults held a current account; by 
1998 that figure had risen to approximately 85 per cent.20 Once a ‘preserve of 
the rich’, financial services had become mainstream.21 Moreover, the House of 
Commons Treasury Committee argued that financial inclusion was an effective 
way to combat poverty. 22  The Treasury Committee identified access to 
affordable credit as a pillar of the financial inclusion agenda and believed that 
the government should ‘spearhead action to tackle high-cost credit’.23 
Ironically, the vast expansion of financial services had left a minority of 
households more excluded than ever.24 As financial inclusion spread, it became 
more expensive to pay bills and store or save money outside the current 
account system. Whereas in the past those outside traditional banking paid 
high rates for credit, by the 1990s they were also penalised for lacking access 
to basic banking facilities.25 As mainstream lenders quit the lowest end of the 
market, both physically by closing branches in low-income neighbourhoods and 
by raising account minimums, so the alternative lending industry grew. The DTI 
argued that over-indebtedness ‘fuelled’ by poverty was ‘often linked’ to financial 
exclusion and was contrary to the government’s objectives on social justice.26 
As this chapter argues, in 2006 the financial inclusion agenda blended with 
‘regulation as [a] market enhancing’ precedent and encouraged regulators to 
                                            
19 HL select committee on financial inclusion, evidence, session 11, 25 October 2016; HC 
Library, ‘The consumer credit bill’, Research paper 05/03, 11 January 2005. 
20 Kempson, ‘In or out?’, 11. See also Kempson and Whyley, Kept In or Opted Out? This 
increase was attributed to the Financial Inclusion Taskforce and HM Treasury pressure, so that 
by 2010 fewer than 890,000 adults were without a current account. See Marron, ‘Governing 
poverty’, 789-790. 
21  Kempson, ‘In or out?’, 1; Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift, ‘Geographies of financial 
exclusion: Financial abandonment in Britain and the United States’, Transactions of the Institute 
of British Geographers 20 (2005), 316-317. 
22 ‘Financial inclusion: Credit, savings, advice and insurance’, House of Commons Treasury 
Committee Twelfth Report of the Session 2005-2006 vol. 1, 3. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Kempson, ‘In or out?’, 11. 
25 See Leyshon and Thrift 1993, 1994, 1995 and 2005. 
26 ‘Fair, clear and competitive’, 24, 74. 
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organise credit providers into risk categories and implement stringent measures 
on high-risk payday lenders. The solution to protect borrowers and reduce 
poverty was access to a specific type of ‘proper’ credit. A priority of financial 
inclusion - access to mainstream banking to reduce poverty, fit alongside the 
belief that credit use raised standards of living and that updated regulation 
would encourage competition and lower the cost of borrowing. 
 
Market developments, 1970s-2006 
This subsection analyses the economic conditions of borrowers and the 
business environment since the CCA 1974. While average real incomes rose 
by approximately 40 per cent between 1979 and 1995, they were not distributed 
evenly. The income of the bottom 10 per cent grew by 10 per cent, whereas the 
top 10 per cent grew by 60-68 per cent. Richard Berthoud and Elaine Kempson 
found that between 1979 and 1988 the bottom 10 per cent gained a ‘mere half 
of one per cent of the increase in national disposable income’.27 If housing costs 
are taken into consideration, the poorest 10 per cent experienced an 8 per cent 
decrease in real income.28 From 1979 to 2005 the Gini coefficient increased 
from 0.25 to 0.35.29 Figure 4 demonstrates this. 
  
                                            
27 Berthoud and Kempson, Credit and Debt, 9. 
28 Kempson, ‘In or out?’, 11. 
29 Jonathan Cribb, ‘Income inequality in the UK’, Institute for Fiscal Studies (2013). 
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Figure 4 Gini coefficient 
 
 
Source: Institute of Fiscal Studies, Gini coefficient data set, accessed 28 August 2016. 
 
This income inequality can be partly explained by changes in the labour 
market conditions, including a higher premium on skilled labour, the contraction 
of some trade unions, an increase in flexible or part-time labour and a widening 
of the pay gap between senior managers and employees. 30  In addition, 
according to the economist Jonathan Cribb, tax, welfare and trade policy 
contributed to greater inequality. 31  Various studies confirmed that half of 
working-age adults living in poverty could be found in households with at least 
one adult in paid work.32 This supports the concept of the working poor. 
Those experiencing insecure and low incomes were at high risk of 
financial exclusion. In 1998, approximately 20 per cent of adults were without a 
current account, 31-37 per cent had no savings and 29 per cent had no access 
                                            
30 Kempson, ‘In or out?’, 11-12. 
31 Cribb, ‘Income inequality’. 
32  Gary Palmer et al., ‘Monitoring poverty and social exclusion 2006’, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation (2006), i-iv. Poverty was defined as households with an income of less than 60 per 
cent of the median. 
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to credit from a mainstream provider.33 Those with low incomes were most 
likely to be without a mainstream bank account and to manage weekly 
budgets.34 In 2002, Kempson found that 25 per cent of households reported 
having been in financial difficulties in the last twelve months, with 18 per cent 
on at least one occasion in arrears on household bills.35 Another study found 
that 7.7 million people were in debt to utility companies and that more than 1 
million had their telephone service disconnected owing to late payments.36 
Certain findings concerning low-income households and borrowers in 
their twenties challenged the life-cycle theory: those on low incomes used credit 
differently from higher-income families.37 These findings support claims that 
certain economic theory does not fully appreciate the borrowing pattern of the 
lower classes. Berthoud and Kempson found that households with low incomes 
accessed half as many credit sources as higher-income families. Unlike 
wealthy households, households living in hardship scored low on a 
consumerism index designed to measure the value of durable goods purchased 
in the previous twelve months. The evidence suggested that poor households 
used credit to overcome poverty rather than to raise their standard of living. 
John Caskey, an economist, found similar patterns in the United States. 
Caskey’s research suggested that, beginning in the 1980s, alternative lending 
expanded owing to financial market deregulation, income inequality and 
financial exclusion.38 
While these borrowers were aware that lenders charged high rates, they 
valued the convenience, speed and repayment options. There is agreement in 
the contemporary literature that alternative credit providers tailored their 
                                            
33 ‘Financial inclusion: Credit, savings, advice and insurance’, House of Commons Treasury 
Committee Twelfth Report of the Session 2005-2006 vol. 1, 21. 
34 Berthoud and Kempson, Credit and Debt, 14. 
35 Kempson, ‘Over-indebtedness’, v. 
36  Jenny Rossiter and Niall Cooper, ‘Scaling up for financial inclusion’, Church Action on 
Poverty: Debt on Our Doorstep Campaign (2005), 7. 
37 Berthoud and Kempson, Credit and Debt, 56. 
38 John Caskey, Fringe Banking: Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and the Poor (New York: 
The Russell Sage Foundation, 1994). 
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products to meet the needs of low-income borrowers in a way that banks, credit 
unions and the Social Fund failed to.39 HSBC told the Treasury Committee that 
it could not lend small sums on a short-term basis cost-effectively as it would 
need a ‘very high APR’ to cover the cost.40  
Kempson and Whyley argued that borrowers seek HCSTC for both 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ reasons.41 From the borrower’s perspective, lenders 
provide a fast service as the application process is simple and there is a high 
level of confidence that the loan application will be approved, the loan is 
convenient as the outlet is close to home or work and offers extended trading 
hours, and is transparent as the principle and amount owed are stated clearly. 
As before, high prices were viewed negatively, with typical APRs ranging from 
100-400 per cent.42 However, as pawnbrokers and moneylenders explained 
over a century ago, APRs and the cost of credit were not the main factors in 
considering a small loan. This research has demonstrated that, since 1872, 
lenders have questioned the value of APR disclosure when applied to short-
term loans. Instead, borrowers have valued their convenience, speed and 
repayment terms. Also, and relatively consistently, politicians and experts have 
struggled to understand why borrowers appreciate non-price loan factors a lot 
more than price. As late as 2005, Kempson and Whyley wrote that the reasons 
were ‘not well understood’.43  
While certain market data are more readily available than previously, no 
agency tracks the HCSTC sector. Since the CCA 1974, licensing data have not 
identified pawnbroking separately and no definitive data exist on the total 
market size. In 2005, the NPA estimated that there were approximately 800 
pawnshops in the UK, approximately double the number in the early 1970s as 
                                            
39 The Social Fund was established in 1987 to provide loans for immediate and exceptional 
need. The fund did not effectively compete with the alternative loan industry as it was limited in 
scope and required a lengthy application process. 
40 ‘Financial inclusion: Credit, savings, advice and insurance’, House of Commons Treasury 
Committee Twelfth Report of the Session 2005-2006 vol. 1,13-14. 
41 Kempson and Whyley, ‘Extortionate credit’, iii. 
42 Collard and Kempson, ‘Affordable credit’, 1. 
43 Ibid. 
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recorded by Crowther.44 Nevertheless, in terms of loan volume and market 
participants, the 2006 industry remained smaller than it was at its peak of 5,087 
licensed providers in 1914. In 2006, OC&C Strategy Consultants estimated that 
the UK pawnbroking market earned £130 million in revenues and expected that 
to reach £165 million by 2008.45 Typical APRs ranged from 5 to 12 per cent a 
month; based on a loan of £100, this equates to an APR of some 70-200 per 
cent.46 
Like their Victorian predecessors, modern pawnbrokers provide cash 
loans collateralised by a pledged item, without a credit application or inquiry 
into the borrower’s intended use of funds. As before, pawnbrokers assessed 
the value of the pledged good, the advance rate and the forfeiture risk. While 
the CCA 1974 required disclosure of the loan terms and conditions, essentially, 
the customer was provided with a pawn-receipt that differed little from 
documents issued in Victorian times. Though the Internet has altered the 
competitive dynamic, borrowers continue to visit pawnshops that are 
conveniently located. In 2005, one owner of a multi-location pawnshop 
business suggested that 90 per cent of his customers lived within two miles of 
his outlets.47 The Personal Finance Research Centre found that advertising and 
trade directories played a minor role in attracting pawn customers.48 While long-
standing and well-established pawnbrokers, such as T.M. Sutton, founded in 
1800, and George Attenborough Company, advertised in the London Yellow 
Pages, few others followed suit. From 1975 to 1990, London Yellow Page 
listings averaged less than twenty pawnshop locations annually.49 Over the 
centuries, the business model and the importance of conveniently located 
shops, have remained remarkably stable. 
                                            
44 Collard and Kempson, ‘Affordable credit’, 3. 
45 Ibid., 6. 
46 Memorandum of Association, H&T Group plc (1 May 2006), 6.  
47 Kempson and Whyley, ‘Extortionate credit’, 18-19. 
48 ‘Pawnbroking customers in 2010’, A report for the National Pawnbrokers Association 
prepared by the Personal Finance Research Centre, University of Bristol (2010), 20. 
49 A 42 DIR 57, London Yellow Pages, Guildhall Library, 1975-1990. 
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Notwithstanding the stability of the pawn business model, the market 
structure and certain operational features have evolved, which has contributed 
to the industry’s resurgence since the 1970s. Owing to the CCA 1974 single 
license provision, the structure of the market shifted from self-funded 
proprietorships towards international companies funded by banks and the 
capital markets. By 2006 demand for small loans was being fulfilled by multi-
location ‘supermarket’ providers. Many pawnbrokers now offered cheque 
cashing, prepaid debit cards, payday and unsecured loans. Accompanying 
these structural changes, pawnbrokers have adopted modern retailing methods 
including high-street retail locations, modern floor plans, sophisticated 
accounting software, high-end security systems and e-commerce.50  These 
infrastructure investments coincided with a shift in collateral from low-value 
clothing and home goods towards jewellery, gold and watches. These items 
were easily appraised and stored, generally held their value and could be sold 
on the second-hand market. The majority of shops retailed forfeited gold and 
jewellery through modern display windows and internal counters. While 
financial exclusion and economic inequality have contributed towards the 
industry’s growth since the 1970s, likewise capital investment, extensive 
rebranding and refurbishment and innovative retail management have helped 
to satisfy unmet consumer demand.51 The NPA believed that the above factors, 
coupled with the recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s, sparked an 
expansion of the HCSTC.52 These market developments and claims can be 
                                            
50 ‘The pawnbrokers guide’, The National Pawnbrokers Association (1999), 20; Albemarle & 
Bond Holdings plc annual report, 2005 and 2006; Memorandum of Association, H&T Group 
plc (1 May 2006), 8-11; ‘Information package’, The National Pawnbrokers Association (March 
2017), 6. Similar developments occurred in the modern American market, see Wendy 
Woloson, In Hock: Pawning in America from Independence through the Great Depression 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009, 1-20. 
51 In addition to Leyshon and Thrift, see Dawn Burton, Credit and Consumer Society (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2008), 61. 
52 Steve Boggan, ‘Pawn again’, Guardian, 20 October 2016. The early 1990s recession was 
the longest in Britain since the Great Depression, during which unemployment rose from 1.6 
million in 1990 to approximately 3 million in 1993. See Jamie Jenkins, ‘The labour market in 
the 1980s, 1990s and 2008/09 recessions’, Economic & Labour Market Review 4:8 (2010).  
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better understood by examining H&T Group and Albemarle & Bond, two of 
Britain’s largest pawnbrokers. 
In 2006, the largest player as measured by number of stores and its 
pledge book, H&T Group, founded in 1897, was listed on the AIM stock 
exchange.53 At the time it operated 69 outlets, up from 27 in 1992. Only three 
other companies operated more than 20. In 1992, H&T was acquired by Cash 
America Inc. Shortly thereafter it had been transformed into a multi-channel 
provider of small loans.54 Like its competitors, H&T focused on customers that 
did not satisfy the lending requirements of high street banks. It also retailed 
forfeited and new goods. In 2004, Rutland Partners, a private equity fund, led 
a management buyout. From 2001 to 2005, net revenue and earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) grew at an annualised 
compound rate of 14.1 and 14.9 per cent, respectively. Between 2003 and 2005 
revenue increased from £16.4 million to £20.1 million and EBITDA from £5 
million to £7.4 million. Over 70 per cent of the business was from pawn services. 
Over the same period, H&T’s pledge book grew from £21.3 million to £24.4 
million, 98 per cent of which was secured by gold or jewellery.55 This confirms 
that the days of pledging coats, flat irons and trousers had ended. In 2005, they 
charged between 7 and 9 pcpm, with an average of 7.1 per cent. 
For the three months ending 31 March 2005, by value, approximately 22 
per cent of pledges were forfeited after an average of 8.7 months in pawn.56 
H&T’s forfeiture level of 22 per cent was higher than most in the Victorian era 
and in line with the Crowther study. In Crowther’s pawnbroker sample set, and 
for H&T, approximately 50 per cent of items were redeemed within three 
months. Both results are lower than in the Victorian and Edwardian eras, when 
they were approximately 80-85 per cent. This could be because there was a 
greater likelihood of redemption of lower-value goods in the weekly pawn cycle 
                                            
53 A pledge book is the amount lent of pledged items in the pawnbroker’s possession. 
54 Unsecured loans offer a longer repayment period than unsecured payday loans. 
55 Memorandum of Association, H&T Group plc (1 May 2006), 6, 10. 
56 Ibid., 13. 
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than higher valued, less frequent pawns. Only 85 per cent of H&T’s customers 
had pawned in the last twelve months.57 In 2005, H&T cashed £27 million in 
cheques, with an average value of £356 at an average fee of £23. A typical 
payday loan was £365, carrying with it an average fee of £47.58 This compares 
with an industry-wide average of £75 for a £300 loan.59 In terms of capital 
structure, prior to the equity offering (£18.2 million in new shares), H&T had a 
term loan and revolving facility with Barclays Bank. Post-equity, Barclays 
intended to offer a working capital facility. Unlike in the past, pawnbrokers were 
no longer limited to internal funding. 
In 2005-2006, H&T’s closest competitor, Albemarle & Bond, had a 
pledge book of £11 million, up from £496,000 in 1988.60 In 2005-2006, it 
acquired eleven shops and increased its pre-tax profit by 18 per cent year on 
year to £6.7 million. Across its entire network, on average, it loaned £96 per 
pawn on 135,000 loans. By comparison, a single shop in nineteenth-century 
Liverpool issued almost as many loans annually. Like H&T, Albemarle & Bond 
offered a range of services, including cheque cashing, payday loans and retail 
sales. Over the previous twelve months, secured, unsecured and cheque 
cashing services had grown. Albemarle & Bond operated 62 of the estimated 
550 cheque cashing outlets in the UK.61 Bearing in mind the limitations of the 
data, H&T’s public listing and Albemarle & Bond’s annual accounts offer some 
insight into the small loan market, which was growing and profitable, leading up 
to the CCA 2006. 
Like their historical counterparts, borrowers also sought unsecured small 
loans. By the late 1990s, the term ‘payday lending’ had gained in usage over 
the traditional form of ‘moneylender’. However, the main loan features and the 
typical borrower profile of moneylenders and payday lenders are similar. Both 
                                            
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 15. 
59 Kempson, ‘Financial exclusion’, 13-14. 
60 Albemarle & Bond Holdings plc annual report, 1989 and 30 June 2006. 
61 Ibid.; Kempson and Whyley, ‘Extortionate credit’, 2-6. 
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providers offered/offer high-cost, small value, short-term unsecured loans. 
Based on these features, the essential loan product is identical. Since the 
1890s, a typical borrower will have struggled to cover basic expenses and was 
without savings to cover an emergency expenditure.62 Though standards of 
living have increased since Victorian times, the typical borrower profile is 
consistent. Though payday lenders rely on sophisticated credit check software, 
the input’s analysed are similar to that of decades past, including an applicant’s 
financial, personal and borrowing history. Notwithstanding, differences in the 
two businesses exist. Though certain payday lenders provide ‘cash on site’ in 
retail locations, many issue loans and collect repayment by accessing a 
borrower’s current account. Also, payday loans are repaid in a single instalment 
inclusive of the loan principal and interest. This ‘bullet structure’ differs from 
earlier when repayment occurred through a series of small weekly instalments. 
The ‘payday’ namesake brings together these two loan features, that is, the 
single instalment falls due on the borrowers ‘pay day’ and it is electronically 
deducted from a current account. While the payday lending market structure 
and its growth are analysed in Section C., as seen in pawnbroking and 
beginning in the 1990s, multi-location loan providers offering a wide range of 
credit products had, for the most, replaced single shop proprietorships. 
Although still relatively fragmented, international and domestic corporations 
had emerged, bringing with them capital market and bank financing. These 
corporations deployed expansion capital and had invested in e-commerce 
platforms. However, the key loan features and the typical borrower profile are 
consistent overtime, which facilitates a comparison of the moneylending and 
payday loan markets. 
Since 1974, the overall consumer credit market had grown in volume 
and in the range of products it offered. Small loan providers, while contributing 
little to the total volume of credit issued, played an important role in the 
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everyday financial life of the working poor. Before the CCA 1974, a licence was 
required for each pawnshop and across products (e.g., moneylending and 
pawn). The CCA 1974 removed those barriers. As mentioned, without licensing 
data and with unreliable trade directory information, it is difficult to estimate 
market participation.63 Nonetheless, the available data indicates that, beginning 
in the 1990s, in response to growing inequality, financial exclusion and a 
generally overlooked market niche, the pawn and unsecured loan market was 
growing. The industry’s growth soon prompted the Office of Fair Trading to 
investigate the effectiveness of the CCA 1974 to regulate HCSTC.64 These 
initial government findings were the first steps of the CCA 2006 regulatory 
process. 
This remained of this chapter asks: In light of the financial inclusion 
agenda, how were moneylenders understood? Had the definition of ‘vulnerable 
borrower’ evolved since the CCA 1974? If borrowers were considered 
vulnerable, why were price controls rejected in 2006? Was the APR debate 
revisited? If the CCA 1974 was believed to have failed, what changes would 
the CCA 2006 consider concerning the extortionate credit test and enforcement 
mechanism? The next section B. addresses these questions by focusing on the 
development of the CCA 2006 as it related to moneylenders.   
                                            
63 Before the CCA 1974, the Yellow Page trade directory provided a moneylenders category. 
By 1980, moneylenders were listed within the ‘Credit and Finance Companies’ section. As a 
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See A 42 DIR 57, London Yellow Pages, Guildhall Library, 1975-1990.  
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B. The Consumer Credit Act 2006 
 
There will be casework that shows the level of abuse by unscrupulous 
lenders who prey on the vulnerable, and on the poorly informed 
consumer… They highlight the real human misery that underlies the 
statistics on debt... no humane society’ should allow predatory lenders to 
operate.65 
 
Gerry Sutcliffe MP (Labour), Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry 
 
In 2003, the government linked improved financial regulation, especially 
targeted at the HCSTC sector, with its anti-poverty campaign. As seen in the 
1970s, higher volume and value credit - in this case credit cards - had become 
a matter of concern. However, as in 1900 and 1927, and unlike the 1970s, 
moneylenders came under considerable scrutiny. In her introductory letter to 
the government’s DTI white paper ‘Fair, Clear and Competitive: The Consumer 
Credit Market in the 21st Century’, Patricia Hewitt wrote, ‘It is simply not 
possible to escape from poverty if what little you have is asset-stripped by 
predatory lenders.’66 Hewitt’s use of the word ‘predatory’ would not have been 
out of place in the Victoria era, yet during the Crowther process few in 
government would have used it. Two years later, the House of Commons 
Treasury Committee stated that the ‘first priority area’ of financial inclusion was 
to improve access to affordable credit, in the belief that ‘an effective and 
coherent strategy to promote financial inclusion can make a substantial 
contribution to the fight against poverty’.67 Hendry believed that the poorest 10 
per cent in Britain were vulnerable to high-cost providers and suffered from 
‘financial shocks’ daily.68 By bringing the CCA 1974 up to date, the government 
sought to mitigate the effects of moneylending, help borrowers with issues 
related to over-indebtedness and tackle illegal moneylending.69 Still, it was 
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68 HC deb. 9 June 2005, vol. 434. 
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believed that most lenders acted responsibly. The HCSTC sector was not 
considered to be inherently flawed. The ideal was to rely on the market to 
allocate credit, yet to mitigate its most damaging effects by encouraging 
competition and increasing the supply of ‘proper’ banking facilities. The 
financial inclusion agenda and the belief that regulation could encourage price 
competition were both operative. 
In many respects, the government’s vision for improved regulation 
echoed that of policymakers in the 1970s. The goal was to create a framework 
that encouraged innovation, improved competition and provided ample 
consumer protection. In turn, these goals would achieve poverty reduction as 
desired by the twenty-first-century financial inclusion agenda. However, other 
than encouraging mainstream finance to offer banking facilities to the working 
poor, as previously, the reform efforts focused on information disclosure to 
enhance the competitive environment. In 2003, the DTI found that 56 per cent 
of consumers did not understand the terms used in credit agreements and 77 
per cent found credit advertisements confusing.70 As before, it was argued that 
more transparency would enable consumers to make better decisions. In turn, 
better-informed consumers would drive the market towards more efficient 
outcomes or ‘fairer deals’ for consumers. 71  It was argued that ‘vigorous 
competition’ among lenders would result in lower prices and more choice.72 So 
too, clearly stated and consistently applied regulation would ‘level the playing 
field’ for lenders.73 Like previous legislation, the CCA 1974 was deemed to be 
too technical; as a result some lenders were unfairly penalised. Sutcliffe argued 
for regulation that balanced the needs of consumers and lenders.74 Although 
the financial inclusion agenda recognised that the market had excluded the 
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working poor from ‘affordable’ credit, to what extent was the price control 
debate influenced? 
 
Price controls 
How did the financial inclusion agenda and the ‘market-enhancing regulatory’ 
framework influence the price control debate? Was competition viewed as the 
ultimate arbiter of the price of money or was capping the cost of credit 
considered a viable option? Would ethical concerns, seen during the Victorian 
era, influence the process? Which position did consumer advocacy groups 
support? As demonstrated below, there was very little support for implementing 
price controls. Price controls that restricted the supply of credit were contrary 
to the goal of increased access to ‘proper’ credit and the belief that, on average, 
credit use raised the standard of living. As before, the government believed that 
price controls would fail to mitigate excessive credit. As in 1900-1927, the 
government suggested that a high APR was not necessarily indicative of an 
unfair transaction. Some believed that a cap would encourage lenders to 
increase costs falling outside the APR calculation. John Battle MP (Labour) saw 
no reason to cap rates at 30 per cent if a lender could charge a 29.9 APR and 
add-on fees.75 As seen in 1900, 1927 and 1974, controlling the cost of credit 
was viewed as too complex and unlikely to reduce the total cost of credit. 
As seen previously, the government was concerned that rates would 
gravitate towards the ceiling and inhibit product diversity. The market would 
then segment away from the poor, who would be left with few alternatives other 
than illegal lenders. Hendry was concerned that caps would ‘close down whole 
sections of the credit industry’, including pawnbrokers. 76  The government 
provided evidence that several EU countries and US states with interest caps 
had a less diverse market and more illegal lending.77 For many policymakers, 
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access to credit and the freedom to choose from among a variety of products 
were more important than capping the cost to the benefit of the few. Consumer 
groups including the Consumers Association, Citizens Advice Bureaux and the 
National Consumer Council, alongside academics such as Kempson and 
Collard, argued against price controls.78 There was concern that consumers 
would be harmed by a decrease in credit supply and would turn to illegal lenders 
to fill the gap. 
Unlike in the 1970s, some supporters of capping challenged high interest 
rates owing to their ethical concerns. David Chaytor MP (Labour) and Edward 
Vaizey MP (Conservative) believed there was ‘no moral case’ to allow 
excessive rates of interest. 79  Although Vaizey believed borrowers were 
responsible for their behaviour, he argued that lenders’ ‘use of loans and debt 
effectively to enslave people in debt is reprehensible’. He went on to argue that 
even in a free market 1,000 per cent rates could not be justified. Stephen 
Hepburn MP (Labour) argued for caps and likened them to limits on speeding. 
He added that when drivers were caught speeding, they paid severely for their 
indiscretion; so too lenders should be ‘hammered’ for excessive charges.80 
Such thinking suggested that a line existed when the market price shifted from 
acceptable to unacceptable, and like excessive speeding, was harmful to both 
individual and society. Reminiscent of Archibald Orr-Ewing, Michael Foster MP 
(Labour) believed that a high interest rate indicated that a loan should not be 
extended and that reining in the market would be a positive development.81 
Despite the government’s research, which found that interest rate caps 
had failed to protect consumers in the European Union, Australia, the United 
States and Canada, Adam Price MP (Plaid Cymru) argued that a cap would 
eliminate exploitative lending.82 Vaizey was in a quandary as his instinct was to 
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avoid ‘interfering with the free market’, yet he found that ‘obeisance at the altar 
of the free market’ when it comes to protecting vulnerable people was 
unacceptable. Vaizey supported interest rate caps to protect people who were 
vulnerable when taking out a loan and for longer-standing factors such as 
educational background.83 Such thinking demonstrated a broad understanding 
of vulnerability. Sutcliffe agreed to keep the issue under review, but there were 
few signs that the government was seriously considering price controls. As was 
the case in 1900, 1927 and 1974, the government believed that enhanced 
licensing, disclosure requirements and the unfair relationship test would protect 
the consumer without interfering unduly in the market. This research also 
suggests that price controls were rejected because it was believed that poverty 
reduction and borrower protection were best achieved through increased 
access to ‘the right kind of market’ credit, the price of which would fall as a result 
of increased competition. This period is unique in that the association between 
‘irresponsible’ finance, exclusion and poverty was articulated in policy. 
However, it mirrors the CCA 1974 in that the goal of regulation was an 
enhanced competitive environment that reduced costs and increased access 
to credit. 
 
APR disclosure 
If the government was to rely on information disclosure to improve price 
competition, what did they think of the contemporary regulation and to what did 
they attribute its failure? Were vulnerable borrowers seen as ‘rational 
maximising agents’ or as morally degenerate and incapable of making sense 
of interest rates approaching 3,000 per cent APR? As was the case during 
Crowther, the entire consumer credit market was analysed. Prior to the CCA 
2006 process, the government had investigated APR disclosure in credit card 
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advertisements.84 That and similar investigations suggested that the system 
was too technical and had areas of ambiguity. Advertisements that met the 
requirements of the CCA 1974 were found to be confusing and lacking in 
transparency.85 Recall that similar charges were made against the MLA 1900 
and 1927. The government wanted to ‘ensure greater consistency and 
transparency in credit advertising, so that consumers can compare … 
products’.86 As before, advertisements would have to state an APR, but with an 
eye to making them easier to understand, the amount of ‘small print’ would be 
reduced.87 
Since 1900, the calculation of APR had been baffling and this period 
proved no exception. John McFall MP (Labour) argued that the draft CCA 2006 
bill failed to address the problem of a single APR, without which there could not 
be an informed consumer and competitive market.88 Norman Lamb MP (Liberal 
Democrat) believed that the calculation of interest had to be standardised. 
Moving against decades of government policy and echoing the desire of 
moneylenders and pawnbrokers a century earlier, Lamb also suggested that 
the cost of credit should be disclosed in pounds and pence, so that consumers 
could see what they had to pay.89 Although the CCA 2006 updated some of the 
disclosure requirements, including mandatory annual statements for credit 
contracts of more than twelve months’ duration, the requirements for the total 
charge for credit and the calculation of APR remained relatively unchanged 
from the CCA 1974, the statutory implementation of which had taken place in 
1977 and updated in 1980.90 
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The CCA 2006 increased the amount of information lenders had to 
provide.91 John Battle challenged this. He questioned the entire rationale of 
information disclosure and informed choice, saying, ‘We have two images of 
the person taking out a loan. Sometimes we think that they can absorb 
incredible amounts of information and detail and analyse the fine print, and then 
are OK. That is not the reality.’ 92  His assumption is supported by Peter 
Cartwright, a legal scholar, who suggested that it is difficult to know how many 
consumers are equipped to understand complex disclosure terms.93 
The intention of a standardised APR calculation was to provide better 
information to consumers. Although in 2006 there was more agreement that the 
APR was not borrowers’ primary concern, and that for small short-term loans it 
often ‘distorted the apparent’ cost of credit, few suggested suitable 
alternatives. 94  While Kempson, Whyley and Lamb argued that cash flow 
information was more relevant, their ideas were not adopted in the legislation. 
The edifice of APR as the universal indicator of credit value was questioned, 
but it remained in place. As was the case for over century, there was an 
expectation that if only borrowers would use the information to their advantage, 
the price of credit would fall. Unlike before, low-income borrowers were not 
categorised as unintelligent; instead, the rationale to regulate was framed 
around vulnerability and poverty on the one hand, and encouraging the ‘right 
kind’ of market on the other. To that end it was hoped that better information 
disclosure would motivate borrowers to look for cheaper credit. This begs the 
                                            
91 ‘A guide to the Consumer Credit Act 2006’, Glovers Solicitors (October 2006). 
92  HC Standing Committee D, 15 June 2005. See also Matthew Hilton, Consumerism in 
Twentieth-century Britain: The Search for a Historical Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). Hilton asked a similar question, ‘How much responsibility ought to be 
expected of the individual in the exercise of his or her consuming duties and how much should 
the state seek to protect the rights of the collective mass of all consumers?’ (p. 14). Like this 
research, Hilton was trying to understand the inherent tension between a consumer’s freedom 
of choice and the role of the state in structuring such decisions. 
93 Peter Cartwright, ‘Understanding and protecting vulnerable financial consumers’, Journal of 
Consumer Policy 38 (2015), 126. 
94 Kempson and Whyley, ‘Extortionate credit’, 21-22. 
  
241 
question: How did policymakers understand the role of APR in determining 
whether a transaction was extortionate and unfair? 
 
From extortionate lending to unfair relationships 
In 1999, Kempson and Whyley reported to the DTI that the extortionate credit 
bargain test under the CCA 1974 had failed to protect consumers.95 It was 
believed that the legal test to prove a transaction was grossly exorbitant was 
too high and the wording of the CCA 1974 was imprecise. Accordingly, the 
courts took a restrictive view and focused disproportionately on the interest 
rate.96 So ineffective was the test that, since 1974, a mere 26-30 cases had 
reached the courts, with ten finding in favour of the borrower.97 Battle argued 
that the CCA 1974 was crippled because ‘no one could define the terms, so 
there were no extortionate lenders’. 98  He argued repeatedly that poor 
borrowers ‘do not get anywhere near the courts’.99 In 1926, Walter Wormersley 
MP (Conservative) had made the same argument: ‘Ninety-eight per cent of 
them [borrowers] never dream of going to a court of law.’100 As before, the legal 
process was seen to be expensive, complicated and risky.101 Maria Miller MP 
(Conservative), while preferring ‘opportunity and freedom’, believed that this 
was an area where it was ‘required to protect consumers in the unequal battle 
with lenders’.102 Concerns over bargaining inequity echo those of revisionist 
judges in 1897 and, as in 1927, there was a willingness to regulate because 
existing legislation had failed. However, although Battle recognised that earlier 
failures were for the most part a result of misunderstanding how low-income 
borrowers made financial decisions, few policymakers sought a solution built 
on the lived realities of these borrowers. 
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Nonetheless, the government proposed expanding the scope of 
extortionate transactions to include the concept of unfairness and to implement 
an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) system.103 Their intention was to create 
a framework within which borrowers could more readily challenge an unfair 
relationship. The term was vague and deliberately so. While it was expected 
that the OFT would provide guidance, the government wanted to avoid creating 
a list of factors such that lenders could ‘hide’ behind them.104 The government 
sought flexibility for the judiciary to rule in accordance with the unique terms of 
an executed transaction and, departing from the CCA 1974, a court would be 
empowered to consider the lender’s behaviour and financial penalties imposed 
on the borrower following the transaction. Whereas the extortionate credit test 
was seen to be too narrow, the unfairness relationship would take full account 
of the borrower’s circumstances. Cost was to be considered alongside other 
factors that influenced the relationship between a borrower and lender. The DTI 
white paper made clear that transaction costs were not ‘high or low in the 
abstract’, but had to be evaluated in the context in which they were agreed. 
Again, this is almost identical to the intention of over a century of regulation. 
Furthermore, it was assumed that low-income borrowers would utilise the ADR 
mechanism. 
Many within Parliament feared that without detailed guidance the unfair 
transaction test would fail to protect consumers.105 Hendry argued that ‘There 
is no guidance in this whatsoever. It is a bit like a minister coming in and saying 
''We have introduced a new punishment, which is a fine of £3,000'' and when 
we ask, ''What is it for?'' he replies, ''Well, I haven't actually thought of that yet, 
but I am sure it must be for something.''’106 The CBI and Lloyds TSB were 
concerned that neither consumers nor lenders would benefit from such a 
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sweeping test as it would create too much uncertainty.107 Sutcliffe believed that 
‘we risk losing the new test’s effectiveness’ if terms were defined too narrowly 
or employed ‘artificial’ definitions and lists.108 Instead, on a case-by-case basis, 
a court would decide whether a lender had engaged a borrower in an unfair 
relationship.109 Hendry disagreed, pointing out that the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1997 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 
employed the unfair test and provided guidance.110 Adam Price questioned 
whether it was the role of Parliament or the courts to make the law and stated 
that only lawyers gain from vaguely written laws.111 For over a century, and to 
little effect, policymakers had debated the merits of definitions, tests and 
market-wide versus case-by-case regulation to relieve borrowers of 
extortionate bargains. Since 1900, policymakers had sought to protect a certain 
type of borrower - one often considered as vulnerable - from a type of credit 
often defined by its high cost, without distorting the pricing mechanism for 
HCSTC or, worse still, the wider consumer credit market and ‘proper’ banking. 
In its final form, the CCA 2006 did not provide a precise definition of 
unfairness or a guidance rate. After a debtor brought a case to court, the onus 
was on the lender to prove that the transaction was fair. A court could examine 
the terms of agreement, the way in which those terms were enforced and ‘any 
other thing done (or not done) by, or on behalf of, the creditor’.112 In everyday 
language, a court could determine that a credit relationship was unfair based 
on the terms of the contract or business practice. If found to be unfair, a court 
had the power to reopen or set aside a transaction. To address the reality that 
many borrowers avoided the court system, the government sought to expand 
the ADR system under the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), implemented 
by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. CCA 1974-2006 licensed 
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credit providers came within the expanded scheme and were bound by its 
decisions. Because the scheme was free to consumers and required no legal 
representation, it was viewed as an efficient alternative to the courts. The FOS 
was and remains neither a consumer advocacy group nor an industry trade 
body, but is an independent agency. Like visions of the potential effectiveness 
of APR to market pricing, it was hoped that the ADR process would provide 
borrowers with an accessible way to challenge unfair agreements. 
 
Enforcement and licensing 
Anyone offering consumer credit required a licence under the CCA 1974. 
However, Crowther’s ‘powerful tool’ was not functioning as intended, as was 
the case in 1900 and 1927, as only a serious offence called for a licence to be 
suspended or revoked.113 More technically, the OFT ‘lacked flexibility in the 
imposition of intermediate measures to promote compliance’.114 In terms of 
licensing and ongoing regulatory investigation, as in the CCA 1974, would the 
government treat high-cost lenders in the same way as other credit providers? 
For all providers, the government proposed making the fitness test more robust 
and increasing the investigatory powers of the OFT. In addition to past conduct, 
the OFT would determine whether a business was competent to issue credit 
based on its business experience. In a departure from the CCA 1974, the 
revised plan was to implement a risk-based assessment. This method allocated 
resources to the screening and continuing compliance reviews of high-risk 
credit providers. Those deemed to be at low risk would enjoy less scrutiny and 
compliance costs. Through increased powers of investigation, the OFT would 
take a ‘proactive approach to enforcement’. 115  These enhanced measures 
included the power to review accounts and records and make on-site visits. 
Across all risk categories a licence was valid indefinitely, thus removing renewal 
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requirements and rewarding low-risk business practice. As demonstrated by 
this research, since 1900 many lenders had lobbied for enhanced requirements 
such as those implemented by the CCA 2006. Thus, while these measures can 
be considered to be new to policymakers, the trade itself had recognised their 
value for over a century. Individual moneylenders and pawnbrokers, along with 
trade organisations, sought regulation to eliminate what they saw as the 
minority fringe, which was believed to have generated much of the ‘predatory’ 
behaviour and negative publicity. Since 1900, the industry had tried to control 
the fringe and in 2006 this was generally acknowledged by policymakers. 
Another departure from the CCA 1974 was the OFT’s power to grant 
special or intermediate conditions. These conditions would apply to a licence- 
holder who had departed from the spirit or letter of the law. A condition would 
require a lender to address an identified problem. Failure to comply could lead 
to a licence being suspended or revoked. David Sainsbury, Lord Sainsbury of 
Turville (Labour) agreed with these new powers of ‘proportional action’.116 It 
was expected that the system would increase consumer confidence in the 
credit market and thereby increase competition. 117  Again, there is a link 
between new regulations and increased competition. The desired end was to 
lower prices for consumers and to root out irresponsible lenders. However, Nick 
Hawkins MP (Conservative) voiced concern that the OFT was being granted 
‘unfettered powers’.118 From the industry perspective, the Finance and Leasing 
Association expressed similar sentiment.119 Without the consent of a minister, 
the OFT would have wide powers of investigation and the ability to issue fines. 
Hendry feared that the OFT would be both ‘judge and jury’. 120  Sutcliffe 
countered that the Enterprise Act 2002 had set up the OFT as an independent 
regulator, designed to be ‘free of ministerial control’.121 In many respects this 
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debate mirrored that between Crowther and the DTI in the 1970s. Crowther 
lobbied to create an independent regulator, while the civil service argued in 
favour of regulating the credit market from within existing structures. Ultimately, 
the CCA 2006 implemented the white paper’s risk-based approach, granted 
enhanced powers to investigate the fitness of lenders and issue intermediate 
sanctions. To prove their fitness, lenders operating in a high-risk category were 
required to submit a credit competence plan or a credit risk profile. As enacted, 
the OFT would consider whether a lender had a history of irresponsible lending. 
The OFT stated: 
lenders should always take reasonable care in making loans or advancing 
lines of credit and should take full account of the interests of consumers in 
doing so. Lenders should undertake proper and appropriate checks on the 
potential borrower’s creditworthiness and ability to repay the loan and to 
meet the terms of the agreement.122 
 
Once again, moneylenders were understood to be outside mainstream 
banking, but why? This research argues that the CCA 2006 broke from 
Crowther’s approach of equality among lenders, and treated moneylenders 
differently owing to the government’s focus on financial exclusion, poverty 
reduction and responsible lending. These evolving concepts provided a 
different rationale to regulate the credit market. While borrowers were expected 
to act responsibly, proponents claimed that systemic over-indebtedness was 
the result of ‘irresponsible lending’. This belief argued that it should be the 
prerogative of lenders to ensure that borrowers incurred debts appropriate to 
their income. Battle, Ian Wright MP (Labour), Lamb and the DTI white paper 
believed that the concept of ‘responsible lending’ should be incorporated into 
the unfair bargain and licensing fitness test.123 Battle reminded the Commons 
that the concept of responsible lending was incorporated in mortgages and 
believed it should be extended to other credit products.124 Hendry questioned 
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whether such a test would be legally enforceable and cautioned against the 
perils of vague and imprecise legislation.125 Often, irresponsible lending was 
seen as predatory. This harks back to the PBA 1872 and the MLA 1900-1927 
process when certain policymakers held lenders in low esteem, unlike the 
Crowther process which avoided such categories. During the parliamentary 
debate, few mentioned that it was not in the interest of lenders to extend credit 
to applicants who had little chance of repaying the loan. Although not all high-
cost lending was thought to be a problem, politicians once again focused on 
high headline rates of interest. 
Alongside the focus on predatory lending was an expansion in the 
concept of a vulnerable borrower. While traditional factors such as mental state, 
income level, age, business experience and financial pressure applied still, the 
mere state of being in debt and the use of HCSTC indicated that a person was 
vulnerable. Additionally, a borrower could be vulnerable at the time cash was 
needed and owing to long-term circumstances such as illness and/or 
educational background. While this association is not entirely novel, it was 
made more explicit. Put clearly, a low income, financial exclusion and resort to 
moneylenders made people vulnerable.126 This belief was influenced by an 
increase in the debt burden of low-income households. The Bank of England 
indicated that the lowest income group’s average debt as a percentage of 
income had risen from 17 per cent in 1995 to 36 per cent in 2000.127 By 2006, 
vulnerability, high-cost credit, over-indebtedness, financial exclusion and 
poverty were understood to be systemic, which encouraged an economic and 
social policy response that differed from Crowther’s. In 2006, high-risk lenders 
were singled out as different from mainstream banking. However, the entire 
payday loan industry was not considered to be fundamentally flawed. As 
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section C. demonstrates, owing to the Great Recession and growth in payday 
lending the entire market was deemed to be harmful. 
 
Conclusion to Section B. The Consumer Credit Act 2006 
While Crowther put all lenders on an equal footing, by 2006 certain high-risk 
lenders had been singled out. This can be seen in the revamped licensing 
system and fitness test which allocated lenders into risk categories. Higher-risk 
lenders required enhanced fitness and compliance requirements. Small loan 
providers were targeted because their clientele was vulnerable and got by on 
low incomes. Without questioning their morals or intellectual ability, the 
vulnerability of borrowers was of greater concern than in 1974. This can be 
explained, at least in part, as a policy response to over-indebtedness, 
inequality, financial exclusion and poverty. Regulating high-risk lenders was 
one aspect of the government’s poverty reduction and financial inclusion 
strategy. Other areas included financial education, alternative supply channels 
and the Social Fund. This research argues that it was precisely that agenda 
that facilitated a demonstrable shift in how policymakers understood 
moneylending and, in turn, how far they were willing to intervene. However, the 
goal of poverty reduction and the financial inclusion agenda were to be 
achieved at least in part through market-enhancing regulation that improved 
competition and lowered prices. Far from restricting access to credit, the goal 
was to increase the availability of ‘proper’ and ‘responsible’ credit. Regulation 
was intended to form the ‘right’ kind of market. 
When compared to the 1970s, the structure of the market had changed 
considerably and now included international companies backed by capital 
market and bank finance. While it was understood that many lenders acted 
responsibly, policymakers used negative terms, such as ‘predatory’, ‘loan 
sharks’ and ‘rogue’ to define the fringe. Similarly, certain MPs advocated 
market intervention based on moral and ethical reasons, which was not as 
prevalent during Crowther. Financial exclusion, inequality and poverty shifted 
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the policy response towards a social justice mandate not witnessed in the 
1970s. Putting lenders in risk categories, intermediate sanctions and the ADR 
expanded regulation. The price control debate related to these factors. It was 
viewed as a direct response to relieve the pressure on low-income borrowers 
by some. To the majority (i.e., elected officials, academics and charities) it was 
a blunt instrument that would fail to solve the high cost of short-term credit. 
Either lenders would allocate costs to fees not captured in the cap, or worse, a 
cap would segment the market and leave scope for illegal lenders to meet the 
demand for small sums. Although there was a growing sense that the issue was 
being addressed under the guise of social justice, interest rate capping was not 
seen as an effective way to reduce the cost of small loans and was not 
implemented. At this point the entire industry was viewed as ‘predatory’. 
Owing to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, which encouraged a 
substantial increase in loan volumes, regulators would again focus on 
moneylending. Did this growth encourage a response similar to that seen in 
1900 and 1927 when regulators sought to restrict the market? Were the goals 
of the financial inclusion agenda, including access to affordable credit, 
reconsidered during the Great Recession and its aftermath? Which factors 
concerning the effect of price controls on the payday loan market were 
analysed? Was there evidence of lenders earning unusually high returns from 
vulnerable borrowers during the financial crisis? Did policymakers engage 
borrowers differently from in the past? Section C. analyses the development of 
regulation and the moneylending market during the crisis, with a focus on price 
controls and the APR debate. 
 
C. The Great Recession and market expansion 
By 2013, an estimated 1,800 retail outlets were offering payday loans, more 
than the approximate 1,200 McDonalds and 764 Starbucks outlets operating in 
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the UK.128 The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) estimated that from 
2008 to 2014, at least 2-5 new payday lenders entered quarterly.129 In 2010, 
the University of Bristol estimated that 1,300 pawnshops were lending £192 
million annually, as compared to 800 in 2003.130 From 2007 to 2010, NPA 
membership rose from 530 to 1,080 outlets, and by 2015 pawnbrokers were 
lending £930 million annually.131 One independent pawnbroker with four shops 
competed with 13 others in his vicinity. Another claimed that 10-12 pawnshops 
operated in his local area. 132  A main shopping street in the Borough of 
Rochdale was reported to have at least ten payday lenders.133 Although a far 
cry from the late 1920s, in Manchester, where 47 pawnbrokers competed within 
six miles of each other, pawnbrokers and payday lenders expanded rapidly 
between 2006 and 2013.134 Table 21 demonstrates the growth of payday loans 
from 2008 to 2013. In 2013-2015, pawn and payday lenders issued 
approximately £3.5 billion annually, an approximate threefold increase over 
2008. Table 22 supports the expansion narrative, demonstrating that from 2006 
market entry and acquisition activity had increased. 
  
                                            
128 ‘Payday lending: Fixing a broken market’, Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
(May 2014), 10; Company websites and statistica.com. 
129 ‘Payday lending market investigation: Final report’, Competition and Markets Authority 
(February 2015), 16 (hereafter CMA (2015)). 
130 ‘Pawnbroking customers in 2010’, 7-9. 
131 Ibid.; ‘Key facts’, The National Pawnbrokers Association (8 October 2015), thenpa.com. 
132 ‘The impact on business and customers of a cap on the total cost of credit’, A report for the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills prepared by The Personal Finance Research 
Centre, University of Bristol (2013), 10 (hereafter Bristol Report (2013)). 
133 HC deb. 20 January 2014, vol. 574. 
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Leicester University Press, 1983), 142. 
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Table 21 Payday loan market growth 
 
 2008 2011 2012 2013 
Estimated     
Value of loans £700 - £800 m £1.9 bn £2.8 bn £2.5 bn 
Number of loans 2.3-3.0 m 7.4 m 10.2 m 10.0 m 
 
Sources: CMA (2015); NPA (2015); and the Bristol Report (2013).  
 
Table 22 M&A and market expansion 
 
 Market Acquired 
Lender (owned by) Entry  
Cheque Centres (CNG Financial) 1996 2006 
The Money Shop (DFC) 1998 1999 
Payday Express (DFC) 1999 2009 
H&T 2003 - 
PaydayUK (DFC) 2006 2011 
WageDayAdvance (Speedy Group) 2007 2013 
Wonga 2007 - 
CashEuroNet (Cash America) 2008 - 
CFO Lending 2008 - 
Global Analytics 2009 - 
MYJAR 2009 - 
Ariste (EZCORP) 2009 2012 
The Cash Store 2010 - 
Speedy Cash (Speedy Group) 2010 - 
 
Source: CMA (2015), table 7.1. 
 
There was widespread consensus among politicians, think-tanks and 
academics that the growth in payday lending was due to financial exclusion, 
economic inequality, stagnant wages and the rising cost of living, all of which 
were exacerbated by the Great Recession. This is similar to 1872-1927, when 
loan volume was increasing, yet distinct in that inclusion in the mainstream 
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banking system was seen as a solution to the excessive costs of financial 
exclusion. In 2011, the Institute for Fiscal Studies expected that household 
disposable income would experience its largest fall since 1981.135 StepChange, 
Consumer Focus and the Money Advice Trust saw increased arrears across 
priority debt categories, including telephone, energy, water, rent and council 
tax.136 It was argued that up to 6.2 million low-income people could not meet 
modest expenditure without borrowing.137 The CMA found that over 70 per cent 
of payday loans were taken out to cover living, household and vehicle 
expenses.138 Recall that in the 1970s Crowther found that 43 per cent of loans 
were used for immediately due bills.139 Clive Hollick, Lord Hollick of Notting Hill 
(Labour), argued that,  
The demand for short-term payday loans and longer-term high-interest 
loans is being driven by the crushing impact that the very tough economic 
climate is having on personal and family budgets. The fall in real incomes 
and the above-inflation increases in the price of essentials such as utilities 
and food are leaving many people short of the money they need to make 
ends meet, so they turn to the payday lenders.140 
 
Without financial reserves, the working poor used payday loans to avoid 
having to choose between ‘putting the heating on and putting food on the 
table’.141 This is similar to Mabel Robinson’s findings in 1888 when the use of 
small loans was driven by insufficient wages that were ‘barely enough to keep 
body and soul together’.142 Yvonne Fovargue MP (Labour) sought to regulate 
the ‘proliferation’ of payday lenders and ease ‘the pressure on their [borrowers’] 
squeezed living standards and … ever-rising bills’.143 Many believed lenders 
                                            
135 HC deb. 4 July 2011, vol. 530; HC deb. 10 December 2012, vol. 555. 
136 HC deb. 2 July 2013, vol. 565; ‘Consultation response: FCA proposals for a price cap on 
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were targeting and preying on vulnerable borrowers. While the CCA 1974 
sought to treat moneylenders and pawnbrokers equally and the CCA 2006 
reversed that process somewhat, by 2010 the industry was again understood 
to be largely predatory. The Great Recession had amplified concerns over the 
industry and the goals of the financial inclusion agenda.  
Moneylenders had been removed from the mainstream and had rejoined 
the legal ‘loan sharks’.144 Unlike in 2006, much of the HCSTC sector was 
considered to be problematic. Similarly, Tom Blenkinsop MP (Labour) argued 
that pawnbrokers facilitated ‘criminal activities’, including ‘hiding fenced goods, 
drugs and weapons’. 145  His comments echoed those of a Victorian-era 
speaker, who, at the Annual Congress for the Promotion of Social Sciences, 
claimed that pawnbrokers ‘willingly received stolen goods’.146 Accompanying 
the more general use of the term ‘shark’ and associating the legal industry with 
criminal activity, some policymakers felt obliged to reform the market on moral 
grounds. Owing to the vulnerability of borrowers, Susan Jones MP (Labour), 
Duncan Hames MP (Liberal Democrat), Neil Parish MP (Conservative) and 
Andrew Percy MP (Conservative) sought to reform, or even close down, the 
immoral and ‘evil’ industry.147 Such moralising had not systematically been 
heard since the nineteenth century. 
Payday lending was of interest to policymakers because, as James 
Younger, Lord Younger of Leckie (Conservative) stated, it affected ‘the most 
vulnerable’.148 Younger believed it was in line with coalition values to foster free 
choice among consumers, regulate irresponsible lending and protect 
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vulnerable borrowers.149 MPs and peers, among them Stella Creasy, Rachel 
Reeves (Labour), Justin Tomlison (Conservative), Yvonne Fovargue, Sheila 
Gilmore (Labour), Rebecca Harris (Conservative), Lorely Burt (Liberal 
Democrat), Parry Mitchell, Lord Mitchell of Hampstead (Labour) and Maurice 
Glasman, Lord Glasman of Stoke Newington and Stamford Hill (Labour) had 
directly encountered many of the issues involved in their surgeries, academic 
research and by consulting charities and lenders.150 For the first time, in any 
meaningful way, politicians had sought and heard borrowers’ experiences. 
However, like the bias in nineteenth-century courts, constituents willing to 
engage their local MPs were unlikely to have a positive experience of payday 
loans. Also unique to the period, the government had conducted or sponsored 
several research projects, including the OFT’s Review of High Cost Credit 
(2010) and Payday Lending Compliance Review (2013), the Bristol Report 
(2013), the FCA’s Consultation Paper Proposals For a Price on High-Cost 
Short-Term Credit (2014) and the CMA’s Payday Lending Market Investigation 
(2015). Consistent with earlier generations, the media paid considerable 
attention to payday loans and focused on their high cost. 151  By 2010, 
policymakers felt the need to intervene as a result of personal experience, 
morality and having widely reviewed market research. 
The next subsection demonstrates that as economic conditions 
worsened and the payday loan market grew in response, the relationship 
between financial exclusion and borrower vulnerability were driving features in 
the price control and APR debate. It seeks to understand why, after refusing to 
do so for over a century, policymakers imposed price controls on 
moneylenders. What had changed and what evidence was presented to 
support the measure? How did policymakers understand the business of 
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moneylending, bargaining inequity and credit rationing, leading up to the 
implementation of price controls in 2015?  
Price controls 
From 2010 to 2015 several initiatives sought to impose a limit on the total cost 
of HCSTC.152 This is not surprising as Edward Glaeser and Jose Scheinkman 
argued that price control measures gain support during periods of economic 
recession and increasing inequality.153 Glaeser and Scheinkman’s model of 
usury laws: 
explain these regulations as a primitive means of social insurance. In the 
model, agents are faced with temporary, idiosyncratic income shocks. 
These agents are assumed to be unable to insure themselves through 
credit markets (or through sufficient savings) against these negative 
income shocks. Agents can only respond to bad shocks by borrowing.154 
 
Relating high-cost credit and usury as a form of social insurance is not 
entirely different from the way Paul Johnson analysed the working poor’s burial 
insurance. While the upper classes rightly thought of this insurance as inferior, 
the product was designed to meet the needs of those who bought it. This 
research supports Glaeser and Scheinkman’s findings, as parliamentary 
interest in the industry grew as the economic conditions of the working poor 
deteriorated. However, the implementation of price controls was not immediate 
or uncontroversial. From 2010 to 2013 the government rejected price controls. 
It was not until 2014 that a cap on the total cost of credit was approved. What 
follows analyses key areas of the debate and compares the progression from 
2010 to 2015 with periods examined previously. 
Arguably, one reason why the process took several years was because 
‘the problem’, and by extension a definitive solution, was disputed. Whether or 
not payday loans helped or harmed consumers, the effectiveness of price 
                                            
152 Unlike an interest rate cap, a total cost credit limits the total amount of paid over the life of a 
loan. 
153 Edward Glaeser and Jose Scheinkman, ‘Neither a borrower nor a lender be: An economic 
analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws’, NBER Working Paper No. 4954 (1994), 4-5. 
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controls was and remains contested.155 Michael Stegman and Robert Faris 
argued that payday loans harm consumers as they create debt-traps, and 
Paige Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman suggested that turning to payday loans 
increased the risk of bankruptcy.156 In separate studies, John Caskey and 
Younghee Lim et al. could not decide whether payday loans helped or harmed 
consumers.157 Conversely, Petru Stoianovici and Michael Maloney found no 
evidence that payday loans encouraged a cycle of debt and Donald Morgan 
and Michael Strain found that access to payday loans helped consumers and 
led to fewer dishonoured cheques and bankruptcy filings.158 Whereas Milton 
Friedman suggested that he ‘knows of no economist of any standing … who 
has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest,’ Kenneth Avio found that price 
controls could help those at the lowest end of the market, but then Jonathan 
Zinman studied the effects of an interest rate cap in Oregon and he found 
restrictions on credit had harmed consumers.159 Michael Staten and Robert 
Johnson believed that competition was the best form of price control and 
questioned how any government could legally define an ‘excessive rate’ or 
‘unconscionable transaction’.160 Finally, the often cited work of David Cayne 
                                            
155 The research cited in this paragraph analysed the US market. During 2010-2015, owing to 
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and Michael Trebilcock determined that without independent conditions such 
as high entry barriers or a monopolistic market structure, price control ‘is not 
only naive, it clouds the relevant issues by framing an economic problem in 
moralistic terms’.161 
As late as 2014, the FCA had claimed that ‘there is no clear conclusion 
as to whether HCSTC is good or bad for consumers’ or on ‘the impact of 
HCSTC bans, price caps or lending restrictions’.162 Without conclusive data, on 
what grounds were regulators basing intervention? If, as John Campbell 
argued, borrowers do not always maximise their own welfare, are limited 
cognitively or exhibit a present-biased preference, then, as Ian Ramsey 
suggested, regulators could appeal to interest rate ceilings as a corrective.163 
However, in another paper Campbell found that the payday loan market did not 
exhibit traditional market failures such as abnormal profits, high barriers to entry 
or market power and displayed no appearance of asymmetric information or 
high search costs.164 During the regulatory process many of these arguments 
and market conditions were debated.  
That many payday loans were used for basic expenses was not 
disputed. The Bristol Report distinguished between pawnbroker and payday 
loans on the one hand, and home credit products on the other, because pawn 
and payday loans were used for ‘bills and everyday spending’, whereas home 
credit was issued for larger amounts and for different purposes.165 Without an 
adequate income or savings the need for loans was urgent and desperate. The 
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Bristol Report found that without payday loans and pawnbroking borrowers 
were likely to default on other household bills.166 The two main advantages 
cited were convenience and speed. It was recognised that there were few if any 
alternatives. 167  Borrowers also expressed high levels of satisfaction. The 
University of Bristol found satisfaction levels exceeding 95 per cent among 
pawnbroker customers. 168  In comparison, only 38 per cent of surveyed 
customers ranked Natwest Bank’s service as ‘good’.169 In fact, so valued were 
small loan products that many consumers indicated that they would choose to 
borrow at higher prices.170 As before, borrowers were more concerned with 
non-price features than APRs and the total cost of credit. Few borrowers 
shopped around. Approximately 80 per cent of retail payday borrowers lived 
within 3.2 miles of the outlet they used.171 The highest level of price comparison 
- 46 per cent - was conducted by online borrowers.172 On average, this group 
had slightly higher incomes and were younger than retail borrowers. 
That borrowers needed cash quickly to pay for unavoidable expenses 
and were price-insensitive is consistent across time. What differed was the 
political response. In this period policymakers were increasingly convinced that 
more information disclosure would fail to encourage price competition. Creasy, 
the most active and vocal MP seeking to reform the industry, argued that the 
debt cycle and high costs were grounds for market intervention. 173  The 
proposed solution was to control the total cost of credit. The adoption of this 
measure took time and required a major policy reversal. In 2010, the OFT found 
that the HCSTC ‘markets work reasonably well’, but less than three years later 
it was arguing that ‘the payday loans market is not working well for many 
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consumers’.174 In 2010, consumer groups had not yet reversed their protest 
against price caps. These included Citizens Advice, the Association of British 
Credit Unions, the Institute of Public Policy Research, Which? and Advice 
UK.175 As before, policymakers were concerned that capping the cost of credit 
would result in rationing and potentially drive borrowers to illegal providers.176 
There was not yet enough support to enact legislation or empower a regulator 
to control the price of credit. 
By 2011, the ease of access, financial exclusion, economic inequality, 
lack of price competition, the debt-trap, high levels of lender concentration, 
perceived levels of ‘excessive’ profit and the overall growth of the market were 
cited as justifications for the government to intervene in the payday loan 
market.177 It was believed that the market was impaired owing to limited price 
competition and the OFT’s inability to regulate the industry. Creasy argued that 
without renewed regulation ‘family debt, poverty and financial difficulties’ could 
only get worse.178 As a precedent, the government had intervened in the water 
and energy industries. Creasy claimed that such efforts were ‘best practice 
market intervention’.179 In 2011, Ian Lavery MP (Labour) argued that owing to 
insufficient competition the price of loans was ‘artificially high, with the most 
vulnerable having to pay the price’.180 Nick Boles MP (Conservative), although 
an ‘economic liberal’, agreed that there was substantial market failure and 
sought new regulations.181 Jenny Chapman MP (Labour) suggested that the 
only way to solve the problem of high prices was to implement price controls.182 
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This met resistance from Richard Bacon MP (Conservative), who argued 
that an ‘all-powerful regulator’ was in no position to implement such ‘draconian’ 
price control measures.183 Damian Hinds MP (Conservative) believed that the 
use of payday loans could be rational and that regulating such a free and 
diverse market would lead to adverse consequences and growth in alternative 
products.184 Hinds did however suggest that, regardless of one’s ‘spectrum of 
belief in the free market,’ the industry excess should be curbed and the 
vulnerable protected. John Woodcock MP (Labour) agreed with the importance 
of consumer freedom, but overriding that choice was the government’s 
responsibility to prevent exploitation of the vulnerable who were at risk of 
‘making the wrong short-term choices when in a desperate situation’.185 Hersh 
Shefrin and Meir Statman, economists, classify this type of regulation as 
paternalistic - that is, an act to benefit persons who might make mistakes if left 
to their own devices.186 This framework is the opposite of many frameworks 
found in the past, when in Lord Elcho words it was impossible to save ‘a fool 
from his folly’. At this point, however, few disagreed that vulnerable members 
of society required some protection. 
Reformers drew on evidence from abroad. Jonathan Edwards MP (Plaid 
Cymru) cited the ‘backlash’ against lenders in the US, where in 35 states price 
controls were operating, and that 14 countries in Europe had restrictions of 
some sort.187 James Sassoon, Lord Sassoon of Ashley Park (Conservative) 
nuanced the argument saying that while successful implementation of price 
caps and rollover limits in Japan had brought ‘huge benefits’ to the poorest 
consumers, similar regulation in France and Germany had resulted in negative 
consequences such as reduced access to credit and a rise in illegal lending.188 
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With respect to the Japanese market, Hiroshi Domoto, an economist, would 
probably disagree with Sassoon. Domoto argued that, as a direct result of 
regulation, loan volumes fell from 8.5 trillion yen to 2.5 trillion yen and that this 
decrease had a harmful impact on the working poor.189 Domoto found that ‘with 
the cap interest rate being lowered … workers whose creditworthiness is 
relatively weak have run into difficulties borrowing, public officers and 
employees of big companies have become able to borrow at lower interest rates 
than in the past, and thus the disparity in standards of living between the two 
groups has widened.’190 If poverty and inequality were driving demand, and if 
the British market responded as the Japanese market did, inequality would 
worsen.  
Many policymakers suggested that the payday lending model relied on 
repeat borrowing. This claim was supported by the data. In 2012, the CMA 
found that among the eleven major lenders, 80 per cent of loans (ex-rollovers) 
were issued to repeat borrowers.191 However, Table 23, using data from the 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), which was no friend of 
the industry, demonstrates that, to remain profitable lenders needed to extend 
multiple loans. Furthermore, first-time borrowers are more likely than repeat 
customers to default. In 2011 and 2012, lenders incurred doubtful expense 
rates equal to 45 per cent of total costs.192 This rate is higher than the estimated 
33 per cent rate documented during the MLSC 1897 and MLSC 1925. 
As a comparison, in 1973 the National Association of Moneylenders 
estimated that the average cost of administering a loan was £9 which, adjusted 
for inflation, was £84.89 in 2010.193 In 2005, Collard and Kempson found that it 
cost commercial and non-profit lenders £30-£75 in set-up costs for a new 
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customer.194 The higher expenses shown below were probably a result of 
increased client acquisition costs. From 2008 to 2013, the CMA noted ‘fierce 
competition’ to acquire new clients.195  
 
Table 23 Cash America estimated UK loan p/l 
 
2010-2011 
Revenue per first loan (after discounts) £35.26  
Cost per first loan 104.66  
Average loss per first loan (£69.40) 
  
Revenue per repeat loan £78.35 
Total cost per repeat loan 22.01 
 £56.34 
  
Revenue total per three loans £191.96 
Cost total per three loans 148.68 
 £43.28 
 
Source: ‘Payday lending: Fixing a broken market’, 18. 
 
The ACCA and CMA estimated that, on average, customers took out 3-
4 loans a year.196 Though distinct from repeat borrowing, Wonga, the largest 
UK lender, advocated that its clients limited rollovers to three.197 Table 24 
shows that of all loans issued in 2012, the majority were paid early or on time 
(64 per cent) and that 84 per cent were eventually paid in full.198 
Under normal circumstances, delayed payment resulted in additional 
fees and charges. In 2012, approximately 36 per cent of borrowers incurred 
penalty charges, the cost of which, as Table 25 demonstrates, varied. Like 
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credit card companies, payday lenders earn more from clients who incurred 
interest and penalty fees but eventually paid off the principal in full.  
 
Table 24 2012 payday loan repayment 
 
Repaid All Online 
High 
street 
Early 14% 16% 7% 
On Time 50% 51% 48% 
Late 22% 20% 29% 
Never 14% 13% 16% 
 
Source: CMA (2015), figure 2.5. 
 
Whether payday lenders entrapped borrowers was debated. However, 
the data supported the assertion that repeat borrowing was necessary for a 
lender to remain profitable and that 86 per cent of loans were repaid, with 22 
per cent having incurred penalty fees. Debates on the debt cycle also led to 
questions concerning the high cost of payday loans, with headline rates of more 
than 5,800 APR.199 The average amount borrowed was £260 and 50 per cent 
of loans were for less than £200.200 The average duration was 22 days and the 
most frequent amount borrowed was £100.  
Table 25 demonstrates that while headline prices tended to cluster 
around £30 for a £100 month-long loan, there was a great variation in fees.201 
As a point of comparison, under most scenarios these charges were 
considerably less than unauthorised bank overdraft fees.202 As of 9 July 2016, 
for an unarranged overdraft of £100 outstanding for 28 days, Lloyds TSB 
charged £80 and The Royal Bank of Scotland charged £90. 
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Table 25 Total cost of credit for the largest high street lenders 
 
 Borrow for: 
   28 days 28 days 
Lender (product) 
28 
days 
14 
days 
11 days 
late 
28 days 
rollover 
     
Cheque Centres (payday) £29.99 £29.99 £59.99 £59.98 
The Money Shop (cheque) 29.85 29.85 58.85 59.70 
The Money Shop (other) 29.99 29.99 58.99 59.98 
H&T (cheque) 17.64 17.64 48.80 35.28 
H&T (debit) 20.00 20.00 52.37 40.00 
Speedy Cash (payday) 25.00 25.00 37.50 50.00 
Speedy Cash (flex) 23.01 11.51 32.05 46.03 
Speedy Cash (flex) 23.01 11.51 32.05 45.92 
The Cash Store (payday) 38.24 34.06 66.74 76.48 
Maximum £38.24 £34.06 £66.74 £76.48 
Minimum 17.64 11.51 32.05 35.28 
Difference £20.60 £22.55 £34.69 £41.20 
 
Source: CMA (2015), table 4.1 and 5.6. 
 
Like the PBA 1872 and MLA 1900-1927, it was assumed that the high 
cost of borrowing resulted in abnormal returns.203 Major expenses for lenders 
included bad debts, client acquisition, advertising, retail operations and, for 
large lenders, the cost of capital. For online lenders client acquisition, including 
advertising, lead generation and the application process were all expensive. 
The Bristol Report suggested that these lenders, on average, screened 100 
customers for every ten loans, a rejection rate of 90 per cent.204 Dollar Financial 
estimated a conversion rate of 3.75 per cent. A statistical outsider was industry 
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leader Wonga, which rejected an estimated 60 per cent of applicants, far fewer 
than the 90 per cent online industry average.205 
Critics in Parliament questioned the tactics of the ‘very profitable’ 
industry; often these critiques coincided with the industry’s peak ROCE in 
2011.206 From 2009 to 2013, the ROCE of the eleven major lenders ranged 
from 17 to 44 per cent.207 At the firm level there was variation between lenders, 
with larger lenders varying less than smaller providers, and their returns ranged 
from -175 to 170 per cent. ROCE peaked in 2011 and decreased thereafter. 
From 2009 to 2013, the CMA believed that the three largest lenders had returns 
‘indicative of shortcomings in the competitive process’.208 However, by 2013 
the industry had begun to experience a downturn, and now three of the nine 
large lenders were no longer profitable. In 2013, ROCE averaged 17 per cent 
compared to 33 per cent in 2012. This decrease was primarily a result of 
shrinking loan volumes. Although there is no study of the British market, Aaron 
Huckstep, and Skiba and Tobacman found no evidence of abnormal returns in 
the US industry.209 At the very least the CMA study demonstrated that the 
industry is cyclical and that returns vary by provider, with some having positive 
returns in the same period that others lost money. As demonstrated in Table 
13 and Table 25, this is consistent across time, as the operations of any one 
business were influenced by market factors and company-specific operations. 
Although not a universally held view, the assumption that high prices resulted 
in excessive profits is found in each episode examined by this research. 
Fovargue summarised many of the issues of concern: consumers 
borrow to pay for everyday necessities; demand features are driven by 
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inequality and rising prices; and lenders exploit borrowers and so unfairly profit 
and trap borrowers in a debt cycle: 
According to a recent report, 48 per cent of people who go to payday 
lenders are female, and the majority of females have borrowed for 
everyday necessities. They have borrowed to buy food for the family, or to 
pay the heating bills. Capping the cost of credit constitutes a welcome 
recognition that these companies are making profit from despair, but there 
is much more to be done. The root cause of rising prices and low incomes 
needs to be addressed if people are to be saved from being dragged into 
a spiral of debt…The people I represent are hard-working people who 
want the best for their families and who are doing the right thing.210 
 
Categorising female borrowers as ‘hard-working people … who do the 
right thing’ is a far cry from the Chief Magistrate of the Metropolitan Police 
Courts, Thomas Henry’s claim made in 1870: ‘There is no doubt that a great 
number of the women in this town go into a pawnbroker’s shop and pledge a 
shawl to get 4d to enable them to go into the public-house.’211 However, while 
Martin Lewis, a financial commentator, did not blame borrowers for their 
behaviour, a remnant of the Victorian-era ethic can be discerned in his 
suggestion that, instead of taking out a payday loan, borrowers should place a 
credit card in a tub of water and keep it frozen for emergencies. Lewis and Jo 
Swinson MP (Liberal Democrat) suggested this technique ‘might instil in them 
the discipline of not being tempted to use it for everyday spending’.212 Lewis 
and Swinson failed to appreciate that for the working poor, emergency and 
everyday spending were often one and the same.  
Despite widespread support, price controls were again rejected by the 
government in 2013.213 On behalf of the government, the University of Bristol 
Personal Finance Research Centre studied the impact of capping the total cost 
of credit on HCSTC lenders and borrowers. It advised against capping the cost 
of credit. As before, it suggested that controls would lead to price clustering, 
credit rationing and less competition as lenders would quit the market. The 
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Centre found that there was no clear evidence that controls reduce the actual 
cost of credit to the consumer.214 Still, it was concerned about repeat borrowing, 
the high cost of credit and that lenders were not performing adequate 
affordability checks. 
In that same month, the OFT published its findings concerning the 
compliance of payday lenders.215 The OFT concluded that the market was not 
functioning to the benefit of ‘many consumers’ and found ‘widespread non-
compliance’ with the CCA 1974.216 In response, they required that 50 lenders, 
who made up approximately 90 per cent of the market, prove compliance within 
twelve weeks or their licences could be revoked.217 They were particularly 
concerned with the systematic failure to perform affordability tests and 
excessive loan pricing.218 As in previous episodes, they argued that owing to a 
weak competitive structure, firms competed on non-price features with very little 
pressure on pricing. This is not surprising given that 74 per cent of borrowers 
identified speed as an extremely or very important feature of payday loans.219 
To address the issues of concern the government planned to overhaul 
the market through the ‘tough, flexible and dynamic’ powers of the then newly 
created FCA.220 Oversight of payday lenders was being transferred from the 
OFT to the FCA.221 Using similar terminology to that found in the CCA 1974 
and CCA 2006, the government believed that ‘more effective regulation of the 
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credit industry is vital to securing better outcomes for consumers. The 
Government wants to see a regulatory regime which can keep pace with the 
innovative and fast-moving consumer credit market.’ 222  Unlike before, 
protecting the consumer was cited as more important than market efficiency 
and the well-being of lenders. Sarah Brown, a legal scholar, identified this 
hierarchy as a ‘protective ethic’.223 
It was believed that regulation had failed to supervise the payday lending 
market. Even recent innovations such as the CCA 2006 ADR mechanism had 
failed because it ‘resembled a middle-class service for middle class people’.224 
In 2012, Sassoon suggested that ‘compared to the current regulatory regime 
under the OFT, the FCA will have a broader and more effective toolkit to monitor 
and tackle developments in the market and supervise practice among firms.’225 
As seen in 1974 and 2006, successive governments had critiqued existing 
regulation and sought improvements to encourage competition while providing 
ample consumer protection. 
As politicians debated the merits of price controls and with the OFT 
having placed 50 lenders on notice, the business response was decisive. By 
July 2013, eleven of the 50 firms had ceased issuing payday loans and three 
more had their licences revoked.226 Just as Isaac Gordon had feared in 1900, 
regulation had made it difficult to issue loans profitably. Comparing Q3 2014 to 
Q3 2013, for seven major lenders revenue and new lending decreased by 40 
per cent and profits by 30 per cent.227 Wonga attributed these declines to the 
changing regulatory environment and higher costs. CMA research agreed, 
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stating that ‘the contraction is likely to have been driven by a combination of 
lenders tightening their credit policies and the exit of some suppliers from the 
market as they adjust to and anticipate tighter regulatory conditions.’228 Major 
lenders modified their participation in the market: Cheque Centres ceased 
offering single-instalment payday loans, CFO Lending stopped offering payday 
loans, EZCorp, a subsidiary of Ariste, ceased UK operations and Cash Store 
went into bankruptcy. By November 2014, an estimated 50 lenders had left the 
market. 229  The Consumer Finance Association, an industry trade group, 
referred to 2013, a year during which members experienced a 68 per cent 
decrease in loan volumes, as the ‘perfect political, media and regulatory 
storm’.230 
Three charges commonly held against the industry were that the market 
lacked price competition, granted credit too easily and exploited vulnerable 
people.231 From 2013 to 2015 the OFT, University of Bristol, FCA and CMA 
released detailed reports on the payday lending market. Comparatively, more 
data became available in 24 months than in the previous 144 years. In 2014, 
using its statutory powers, the FCA gathered information from eight leading 
lenders and was able to amass data on 16 million loans. Using qualitative and 
quantitative techniques, the FCA analysed how a price cap would affect lending 
decisions and the financial position of borrowers. 232  They found that the 
industry’s pricing was excessive, harmful to ‘significant numbers’ of borrowers 
and that these high-priced loans were of limited benefit.233  
Although not unanimous, opinion supported price controls. Damian 
Hinds, previously a vociferous opponent of price capping, had changed his 
mind: 
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I was reluctant because, in this country, [apart from] natural monopolies … 
we do not price control. It goes against the philosophy of our economy and 
our politics … I believe in the efficacy of markets, in consumer 
sovereignty… I was trying to reconcile all those beliefs about what markets 
do … and in many ways the normal laws of economics do not seem to 
apply [to payday loans].234 
 
Hinds cited over-optimistic consumers concerning their ability to pay 
back, and the ineffectiveness of disclosure terms which had become ‘blah … 
blah … blah …’. Concerns over the limitations of information disclosure find 
support in economic, legal and behavioural research.235  Hinds and others 
considered it a positive outcome that certain firms would leave the market and 
overall loan volumes would decrease.236 For the FCA and its supporters the 
verdict was clear: payday loans were a peculiar kind of credit and the market 
was fundamentally different from mainstream banking. However, while the 
CMA agreed that price competition was an issue, it was less confident that price 
controls could overcome the urgency of borrower demand. 237  The CMA 
believed that price controls would harm competition owing to price clustering 
around the ceiling and decreased profitability, which would act as a deterrent 
to market entry. As in previous disclosure arguments, the CMA suggested that 
lenders be required to provide total cost information in a clear way so that 
borrowers would search for lower-priced alternatives.238 Seemingly, like the 
economics literature, the government had failed to reach a consensus in 
support of price controls. However, price control advocates had won enough 
support and the FCA’s cap on the total cost of credit came into effect on 2 
January 2015. Table 26 illustrates the FCA’s three-part mechanism, including 
an initial cap, default fee maximum and limits on the total cost of credit. The cap 
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ensured that customers would not pay more than £24 per £100 borrowed.239 
Officially recognising that APR calculations were ill suited to short-term credit, 
the cap was not stated in APR form. However, an official government 
publication revealed that under the FCA price cap a 14-day loan APR worked 
out at 1,492 per cent, and for loans of more than 30 days the APR was 1,270 
per cent.240 While repeat borrowing was permitted, borrowers were limited to 
two rollovers and lenders could not access a borrower’s bank account under 
the continuous payment authority after two unsuccessful attempts. 241  As 
opposed to Crowther, which sought a unified calculation for disclosure 
purposes, the FCA provided product-specific formulas for price calculations.242  
 
Table 26 Three-part price control 
 
Source: ‘FCA confirms price cap rules for payday lenders’, FCA press release (11 November 
2014). 
 
Philip Davies MP (Conservative), Jacob Rees-Mogg MP (Conservative), 
Nadhim Zahawi MP (Conservative), Graham Stuart MP (Conservative) and 
                                            
239 ‘Detail rules for the price cap on high-cost short-term credit, including feedback on CP 14/10 
and final rules’, Financial Conduct Authority PS 14/16 (November 2014), 7-8. 
240 Edmonds, ‘High cost consumer credit’, 44. 
241 ‘Tougher rules for payday lenders take effect’, Financial Conduct Authority press release (1 
July 2014). See also the FCA’s Consumer Credit Sourcebook 6.7 Rules on refinancing. 
242 ‘Detail rules for the price cap on high-cost short-term credit’, 48. 
0.8% 
daily 
When loans are taken out or 
rolled over, the interest and 
fees charged must not 
exceed 0.8% per day or the 
amount borrowed 
£15 
Default 
fee 
If borrowers default, fees 
must not exceed £15. Firms 
can continue to charge 
interest after default but not 
above the initial rate 
Of amount borrowed, 
applying to all 
interest, fees and 
charges. Borrowers 
must never have to 
pay more in fees and 
interest than 100% of 
what they borrowed. 
Total cost cap 
100% 
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Judith Wilcox, Baroness Wilcox (Conservative), among others, dissented.243 
For the most part the arguments against capping, like the arguments in favour, 
were not new. It was feared that caps would result in credit rationing, fewer 
lenders and an increase in illegal lending. In fact, the FCA agreed that price 
controls would lead to market segmentation, an increase in loan duration and 
fewer firms in the market.  
Unlike before, regulators believed that the lowest segment of the market 
was better off without access to payday loans and that any decrease in the 
profitability of firms was required to ‘secure protection for borrowers’.244 For 
those at the margin, it was expected that these changes would lead to an 
improved financial position, better mental health outcomes and less stress.245 
Like the expanded definition of vulnerability, these expected improvements 
demonstrate a broad understanding of the effects of poverty. Moreover, Robert 
Mayer, a political scientist, argued that borrowers at the highest risk of default 
were subsidised by the more deserving struggling borrowers.246 Credit rationing 
would eliminate the penalty placed on the majority by segmenting marginal 
borrowers out of the market. Mayer was responding to Alyssa Labat and Walter 
Block’s article published one year earlier and in the same journal, where they 
argued that ‘setting an arbitrary interest rate and claiming that rate is the just 
price does not allow consumers and producers to communicate. Therefore, the 
just price must be, and can only be, the mutually agreed upon price.’ 247 
Although the FCA admitted that the literature was inconclusive, it had 
implemented price controls based on its belief that the lowest segment of 
borrowers were better off without loans. The goal was to restrict access to the 
wrong kind of credit. The FCA also determined, without conclusive evidence, 
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that an increase in illegal money lending was unlikely to occur. It was argued 
that the three-part cap structure allowed companies to respond and adapt, 
which would encourage viable market competition. 
The industry’s argument that the caps were too low and that affordability 
checks would protect borrowers and foster price competition received little 
support. Until 2013, few charities sought price controls. By 2014, and in 
response to the FCA’s policy statement, dozens of organisations were in 
support. Though many organisations argued for a lower cap and/or further 
restrictions, groups such as Transact, StepChange, Association of British 
Credit Unions, Citizens Advice, Community Investment Coalition, Christians 
Against Poverty, Which?, Money Advice Trust, the Money Charity and the 
Trading Standards Institute supported capping the total cost of credit.248 These 
organisations agreed with the FCA’s conclusion that payday loans did not 
benefit consumers, failed to conform with regulatory standards and that pre-
cap pricing was excessive. Edward Carson’s position in 1927, that 
moneylender loans provided little to no benefit, had found support in the twenty-
first century. While the BCCA, an alternative finance trade group, agreed that 
‘given past behaviour, our sector does not get a lot of sympathy’, it cautioned 
that the industry was now dramatically reshaped, with 700 fewer retail outlets 
and dozens of online providers having exited the market.249 As many cautioned 
would be the case, major lenders such as Wonga priced their loans at the cap, 
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indicating that few lenders would undercut the regulatory pricing structure.250 
As predicted in both 2014 and 1900, price controls had forced lenders into 
higher-value loans with longer durations and instalment payments. 
 
Disclosure terms 
As before, there were calls to ban payday loan advertising. It was argued that 
advertising had grown considerably between 2008 and 2012, targeted young 
people, seemed to ‘normalise’ the product, failed to offer clear and pertinent 
information and too easily permeated daily life in public transport, on websites 
and on the high street. Data indicated that advertising’s impact had grown from 
12 million in 2008 to 7.6 billion in 2012 or 152 loan advertisements per viewer 
annually.251 Martin Wheatley, CEO of the FCA, did not rule out the ‘extreme 
option’ of banning advertisements.252 It was believed that limiting advertising 
would influence consumer behaviour and result in fewer loans. Wheatley’s 
opinion mirrored George Lewis’s and Archie Lloyd’s, who in 1898 had argued 
that if advertisements were ‘attacked’, then ‘fewer people would come in 
contact’ with moneylenders.253 Crowther, however, took little issue with the 
normalisation of advertising all consumer credit products. It was taken for 
granted that advertising was a part of daily life and went mostly unchallenged. 
The post-2006 period broke from the past in that there was growing 
agreement among politicians, industry, charities and borrowers that APR was 
not suited to short-term credit. It was argued that for loans of less than twelve 
months, APR was too sensitive to loan duration. The CMA concluded that ‘that 
the regulatory obligations on lenders to disclose APRs were unlikely to be of 
much, if any, assistance to customers’.254 Again, a simple example was used 
to demonstrate why the use of APR was deceptive. According to Martin Lewis 
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if someone were to lend £20 and asked the borrower to repay with a pint of 
beer next week, ‘most people would see it as reasonable deal’; at £3 the APR 
is 141,000 per cent. 255  Government-led research found that borrowers 
considered the APR irrelevant. Instead, 89 per cent of borrowers took into 
consideration the total cost of credit in cash terms and were well aware of the 
amount owed.256 These findings - that APR was irrelevant and that customers 
were aware of the high costs - were further supported by academics and 
government research. These included John Caskey, the Bristol Report, Tim 
Edmonds of the House of Commons Library, the FCA and the CMA.257 As 
moneylenders and pawnbrokers had argued over a century earlier, the amount 
owed in pounds and pence was of greater concern than percentage disclosure. 
There was widespread support for providing costs in cash terms. Tellingly, 
when in 2015 the FCA implemented price controls, they did not specify an APR, 
but quoted a daily rate. 
A major component of the PBA 1872, MLA 1900-1927, CCA 1974 and 
CCA 2006 were debates and plans to overhaul the regulations pertaining to 
disclosure. In terms of consumer protection, theory indicates that disclosure 
requirements are considered market-friendly, inexpensive and protective of 
‘personal autonomy’. 258  As this research has demonstrated, in the 
moneylending and pawnbroking markets there has long been a difference in 
focus between borrowers, who have ignored mandatory disclosure terms, 
lenders, who have claimed the terms do little to help consumers, and regulators, 
who relied on this mechanism even before the PBA 1872 came into effect. The 
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legal scholars Omir Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider argued that mandated 
disclosure, or what they call the regulatory ‘Disclosure Empire’, has been a 
‘spectacular failure’.259 They believed that, while mandated disclosure focuses 
on a real problem and rests on a credible assumption that the more information 
the better, it fails to appreciate how people actually make decisions and there 
is no evidence that disclosure improves the terms of borrowing.260 As seen in 
1900 and 1927, regulators were concerned about the influence of advertising 
on vulnerable borrowers and attention was directed to the industry during 
periods of perceived or actual growth in loan volume. In each period regulators 
sought to reduce the number of advertisements and require clear and 
consistent disclosure terms. 
 
Conclusion to section C. The Great Recession and market expansion 
The regulatory process from 2010 to 2015 built on concerns raised during the 
2006 debate, among them financial exclusion, poverty, economic inequality and 
borrower vulnerability. As the payday lending market expanded and with 
economic conditions deteriorating policymakers focused on the industry. The 
narrative had shifted from targeting the ‘abusive fringe minority’ to considering 
much of the industry as predatory. Unlike in earlier periods politicians 
communicated directly with borrowers. For them, payday loans were a ‘real’ 
problem as opposed to a theoretical debate. Also unique to the period, price 
controls were supported by charities and think-tanks. In 2012, Citizens Advice 
began an aggressive campaign after experiencing a twelve-fold increase in 
consumer complaints.261 It is not that the warnings about price caps, such as 
the consequences of credit rationing and fewer competitors, went unheeded, 
but that these market conditions were considered beneficial. In 2014, Simon 
Danczuk MP (Labour) said, ‘There are far too many of them [payday lenders], 
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and better regulation will be critical in that regard.’262 The FCA estimated that 
price controls would cause profits before overheads to fall by 43 per cent.263 
With the support of Parliament, HM Treasury and leading charities the FCA 
believed that the most effective way to protect borrowers and reduce poverty 
was to restrict access to credit by controlling its price. As seen in 1900 and 
1927, restriction in the supply of credit were viewed favourably. While in 2006 
regulation was expected to create the ‘right’ market, by 2015 the market and its 
pricing mechanism were the problem. 
Despite admitting that the evidence concerning the efficacy of payday 
loans and the effect of price controls were inconclusive, the FCA determined 
that ‘excessive’ charges ‘contribute to borrowers’ worsening financial situation’ 
and reinstated usury.264 If, as in 1900 and 1927, moneylenders were seen as 
evil, the product harmful and borrowers vulnerable, what contributed to the 
implementation of price controls? Since 2004, political interest in payday 
lending had coincided with New Labour’s financial inclusion agenda, which 
included banking facilities, affordable credit and financial education.265 The 
Great Recession added to these concerns. While regulation was considered a 
corrective to the lack of price competition, that market structure had existed for 
over a century. Advocates of financial inclusion argued that while ‘proper’ 
finance alleviates poverty, payday loans were harmful. This position embraced 
an expansive definition of poverty, vulnerability and harm, including financial, 
mental health and general welfare. 266  Accordingly, price controls were 
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implemented to mitigate the working poor’s ‘failure’ to mitigate financial risk and 
encourage ‘responsible’ behaviour in the ‘proper’ markets.267 The links between 
financial exclusion, poverty and payday loans were different from previous 
frameworks and facilitated the implementation of price controls. The issue was 
not solely a government response to a market failure but an intervention on 
social grounds.  
In 2014-2016 policymakers believed that price controls would reduce 
prices for qualified borrowers and that those denied loans would be better off. 
While there was concern that illegal lenders might fill the void, the FCA found 
little evidence to support that.268 There were suggestions that, instead of turning 
to illegal lenders, the working poor would once again borrow from friends and 
family.269 In addition to being historically inaccurate, it is unlikely that friends 
and family would have sufficient capital to supply the multi-billion pound market. 
Before price controls came in many lenders were charging above the 0.8 
per cent daily maximum. Once the market became aware of the cap, as 
predicted and sought, firms began adjusting their pricing or withdrawing from 
the market. These results indicate that capping the total cost of credit had 
influenced the supply side. On the demand side it is unclear where customers 
such as Edward, who took out a £100 to pay his final notice electricity bill, would 
turn without access to payday lending.270 Karen Rowlingson, an expert on 
HCSTC social policy, suggested that borrowers would turn to other forms of 
credit (pawn, doorstep, overdrafts, etc.) that were not subject to price 
controls.271 Rowlingson advocated a wider reform of the social system that 
would mitigate the need for HCSTC in the first instance. The CMA recognised 
this too, asserting that the price cap would do little to alleviate the ‘perceived 
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urgency’ of the payday loan decision.272 Moreover, it argued that, with fewer 
firms in the market, the cap would reduce competition and fewer incentives 
would deter new entrants. However, the FCA was aware of the risks; in fact, 
smaller loan volumes and a less attractive market were stated intentions of the 
reform. 
 
D. Conclusion 
In the decades following CCA 1974, consumer credit use increased 
dramatically. As early as 2003, policymakers were concerned about the high 
level of credit card debt and the ‘extortionate bargains’ contracted by HCSTC 
lenders. By then, pawnbroking and moneylending businesses were owned by 
corporations backed by funding from public and private equity. Many 
policymakers believed that credit was too easily obtained and that the cycle of 
debt was conditioned by unavoidable economic circumstances and predatory 
lenders who too readily took advantage of the working poor. The OFT sought 
to distinguish between ‘irresponsible’ and ‘responsible’ lending. This type of 
thinking resembled the Victorian debate over what constituted helpful and 
harmful credit. Owing to financial exclusion, over-indebtedness, economic 
inequality and poverty, policymakers became concerned with the vulnerability 
of HCSTC borrowers. Their concern encouraged expansion of the boundaries 
of what constituted vulnerability and an appreciation of how debt burdens 
influenced the financial, social and health outcomes of low-income families. 
Accordingly, consumer protection began to outweigh concerns about interfering 
too much in the market. What was seen to benefit consumers in the 1970s (i.e., 
accessibility) was challenged during this period. Even so, in 2006 credit access 
outweighed any serious debate concerning price controls. Instead, lenders 
were placed in risk categories, with high-risk providers having to meet stringent 
business and filing requirements. By segmenting the HCSTC sector, this 
research argues that the CCA 2006 reflected the priorities of the financial 
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inclusion agenda which linked poverty and access to ‘proper’ finance. However, 
the response also indicated that the market allocated credit efficiently so that 
government interference in the pricing mechanism was unwarranted. As seen 
in the 1970s, it was expected that targeted regulation would encourage price 
competition. The market and not government was best positioned to achieve 
the goals of financial inclusion and consumer protection.  
To place some of these targeted measures in context, the CCA 2006 
expanded or widened the legal test to determine whether a transaction was 
extortionate or unfair. The CCA 1974 test was considered imprecise and too 
narrow. Since 1900, in almost identical manner, each successive regulatory 
episode considered prior regulatory efforts to have failed and yet replaced each 
one with a largely similar measure. In 1974, the government provided an 
exhaustive list of test factors. Against Crowther’s recommendation, the CCA 
1974 rejected the 48 pcpa guidance rate in order to widen the test. Again in 
2006, Parliament sought to provide the courts with wide powers of review. 
However wide and with similar consistency low-income borrowers have shown 
little interest in seeking redress through the courts. Although strengthened by 
the ADR system, the long-standing and failed policy of a case-by-case 
approach, which was seen as harsh and unconscionable, grossly exorbitant, 
unfair, and the like, was again relied on. However, a definitive break from the 
CCA 1974 was enacted with licensing and monitoring segmented lenders into 
a risk category. HCSTC lenders were once again regulated differently and no 
longer considered part of mainstream finance.  
As the payday loan market expanded and the Great Recession ground 
on, support for price controls gained momentum. While most policymakers 
appreciated that the industry served a purpose, they believed that lower loan 
volumes and fewer market participants would benefit society. Regulating the 
industry was a response to a perceived structural failure (lack of price 
competition), but was also influenced by financial inclusion and poverty 
reduction. Given that a lack of price competition was identified in the 1970s, 
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and arguably before then, this research argues that the financial exclusion and 
poverty link facilitated market intervention. Adding to this argument, the CMA 
believed that price controls were not likely to correct the lack of price 
competition, thus it would be difficult to argue that price controls were 
implemented to improve the efficiency of the market. In many respects, when 
considering market efficiency and innovation, the HCSTC sector responded to 
borrower demand when other institutions failed to. While Crowther relied on 
consumer protection through market competition and a unified regulatory 
framework in which easily accessible credit was viewed positively, by 2014 
policymakers were seeking to limit the market with price controls.  
In 2006, the industry was singled out as different and fringe lenders were 
targeted as abusive. With the onset of the Great Recession, the entire industry 
was deemed predatory. The FCA was convinced that price controls would 
usher in lower costs for those borrowers considered viable credit risks and 
those segmented out of the market would be better off without a loan. This 
position is far different from Thomas Chambers MP’s (Liberal), who in 1870 
argued that freedom of contract provided far better borrower protection than 
regulation.273 In 2015, price controls were implemented to protect marginal 
borrowers and reduce loan volumes and profitability. Even before then the 
creation of the FCA, with an explicit brief to protect consumers, caused the 
market to contract.274 While there was evidence that earnings had increased in 
the aftermath of the Great Recession, the financial gains varied by provider and 
were not long lived. The CMA evidence demonstrated the cyclical nature of the 
business.275 During the MLSC 1925, a London moneylender testified to the 
same. Since 1900, many policymakers have equated high interest rates with 
high profit rates, a view moneylenders have found difficult to overturn. From the 
industry’s perspective, a small victory is that, after over a century of debate, 
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there was agreement that APR was an inappropriate, if not ineffective, measure 
of short-term credit. 
Since the cap, early data suggest that higher-income borrowers are 
paying less for payday loans and that credit availability for marginal borrowers 
has decreased.276 Whether marginal borrowers are better off remains unclear. 
The demand for emergency credit has not fallen and 40 per cent of the British 
population have less than one week’s income in savings.277 While advocates of 
price controls argue that payday loan users are vulnerable, trade associations 
suggest that payday loan borrowers are sophisticated and proactive managers 
of their financial resources.278 What is clear is that price controls have had a 
dramatic impact on the market. This research argues that the financial inclusion 
agenda, when combined with the growth of the market as a result of the Great 
Recession, facilitated the implementation of price controls. 
The motivation for and impact of the financial inclusion agenda is a 
developing field of research. Rowlingson has argued that regulation has 
normalised payday lending and failed to address the causes of demand: labour 
market insecurity, withdrawal of some state welfare and increasing 
financialisation.279 This is distinct from when, in 1900, policymakers refused to 
implement a moneylending licensing system as they were concerned it would 
normalise and legitimise the industry. Scholars have suggested that the 
financial inclusion programme and payday loan regulation demonstrated a 
substitution of the role of the state as ‘provider/redistributor’ for 
‘regulator/enabler’. 280  Donncha Marron, Craig Berry and Rajiv Prabhakar 
argued separately that it is assumed that financial markets are natural and the 
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inclusion agenda focuses on how to dismantle barriers to increase 
participation.281 From this perspective, the financialisation of daily life shapes 
social participation and ‘responsible’ citizenship. Increased participation in the 
‘proper’ markets rewards consumers with lower pricing. Moreover, a greater 
ability to manage financial risk and uncertainty was expected to improve health 
outcomes and family life. Further historical research is needed to understand 
the relationship between normative, ‘proper citizenship’, poverty and financial 
market participation. 
As in the nineteenth-century poverty debate, it was believed that 
government intervention was necessary to overcome a social problem that 
limited productive self-sufficiency.282  Under financial inclusion, the goal for 
vulnerable borrowers was greater access and improved financial skills to 
enhance self-support, which would offer economic and life security.283 One of 
the assumptions of its agenda is that with better financial management and 
skills, borrowers could avoid HCSTC. An alternative view is that the working 
poor manage rationally and extraordinary well on limited budgets. In 1900, 
Maud Pember Reeves, a feminist, author and member of the Fabian Society, 
argued along the same lines. From 1900 to 1904, she studied the weekly 
budget of 30 working-class families in Lambeth, and found that ‘there seems to 
be little choice in the manner of keeping a family on 20s a week’.284  
This research’s historical perspective has demonstrated that the price 
control debate is more complex than viewing the issue through the single lens 
of traditional market failure-oriented economic theory. This research argues 
that the financial inclusion agenda influenced the regulation and development 
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of the payday loan market, first through the CCA 2006 and its segmentation of 
high-risk lenders and then through price controls. While related to the historical 
poverty debate, by the twenty-first century the link between finance, poverty 
and vulnerability had expanded to include ‘unemployment, poor skills, low 
income, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family 
breakdown’.285 However, whereas targeted measures enacted in the CCA 2006 
were expected to encourage price competition and protect vulnerable 
borrowers, by 2015 the FCA was intervening in the market’s pricing 
mechanism. The FCA’s position directly conflicted with Crowther’s belief that 
regulation could not protect those ‘who through no fault of their own’ experience 
insufficient incomes.286 Justifying the implementation of price controls based 
solely on market failure itself fails to appreciate the influence of social justice 
concerns, especially those related to inequality and economic ‘fairness’, 
concepts previously unseen.287 Whereas it was suggested that ‘proper’ finance 
would reduce poverty, payday loans were considered to have contributed to it. 
The issue was not solely a government response to market failure, but a social 
justice intervention driven by concerns about economic fairness and the 
government’s role in constructing the ‘right’ kind of market participation. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has analysed the regulation and development of the British 
moneylending and pawnbroking markets since the 1870s. The six regulatory 
episodes examined demonstrate that the role of state intervention in these 
markets has long been debated. It has identified five areas of regulatory 
concern and three main policy responses. The areas of regulatory concern are: 
the high cost of loans, advertising, the use of the annual percentage rate and 
the legitimacy of moneylenders and pawnbrokers in the financial system and 
regulatory enforcement. The three main policy responses are: price controls, 
information disclosure and licensing. This research has examined how freedom 
of contract, borrower rationality, bargaining inequity, market segmentation and 
credit rationing were understood by politicians, lenders, trade groups, the 
judiciary, charities and other interested parties. It has shown how majority and 
minority viewpoints informed regulation and has documented the often 
conflicting expectations of how regulation was meant to influence lending 
decisions, borrower outcomes and poverty. By identifying the primary 
motivating factors to regulate, the study answers why and how some 
policymakers sought to restrict low-income borrowers from gaining access to 
credit. This topic is not solely an exercise in historical analysis; answers to such 
questions influence policy seen in Britain, the United States and Japan.1 This 
conclusion examines the implications, limitations and future work pertinent to 
the research. Finally, it offers an answer to why moneylending and pawnbroking 
have generated such passionate debate, even being described as the devil 
incarnate. 
In 1900, 1927, 2006 and after the Great Recession there were calls to 
limit an ‘evil’ industry whose loan product had harmed vulnerable borrowers. In 
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response, price controls were believed to encourage market contraction by 
credit rationing. However, at the end of the nineteenth century price controls 
and ‘price control light’ by means of a guidance rate in the courts were 
considered controversial and were rejected in 1900 as they conflicted with 
belief in freedom of contract and an ideology that held that state intervention 
undermined the market. In 1927, a guidance rate was adopted because the 
MLA 1900 had failed to limit the ‘evil’ and protect borrowers. In 1974, price 
controls and the guidance rate were deemed unnecessary because the CCA 
1974 was expected to improve competition and reduce prices. In 2015, the FCA 
cited a lack of price competition as a reason for implementing its three-part 
payday loan price control. 
Since 1870, many policymakers have believed that moneylender and 
pawnbroker rates and profits are excessive. Price controls were advocated to 
mitigate this. However, the pre-2013 profit data compiled by this research show 
that moneylenders did not consistently or comparatively earn excessive profits. 
In 1925, the evidence indicated that returns varied widely by firm and over time. 
Additionally, based on licensing data and qualitative evidence from official 
publications and journalism, the pawnbroking and moneylending markets had 
new entrants during periods of growth and declined during periods of falling 
demand. These results indicate low barriers to market entry. Researchers have 
found no evidence of traditional market failures in the US market. Post-2013 
data reveal that the majority of borrowers repay their loans and, on average, it 
took British lenders three payday loans per customer before they reached 
profitability. However, it is true that a minority of lenders issued loans to 
borrowers who had limited means to honour them. 
Despite conflicting evidence, price controls were imposed in 2015. Since 
the Great Recession, the historical record has received little attention. Few 
price control advocates appreciated that under the capped rates of the PBA 
1800, pawnbrokers were struggling in a competitive environment characterised 
by high loan advanced rates. In the 1870s, it was acknowledged that price 
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controls were an incentive to credit rationing and illegal lending and incurred an 
expensive administrative burden. Pawnbroking price controls had created the 
market conditions predicted by its opponents both then and now. 
With the implementation of price controls in 2015, this research suggests 
that the regulatory environment has gone full circle. Once again, a dominant 
HCSTC product, payday loans, is restricted by price controls, just like the 
dominant Victorian-Edwardian product: pawnbroking. A perceived lack of price 
competition was central to the price control debate. The FCA determined that 
the pricing structure warranted control over the market’s pricing mechanism. 
Whether a lack of price competitiveness was a failure justifying price controls 
has been debated for decades. While this research cannot solve the debate, it 
has shown that non-price competition has been present since the 1870s. It has 
documented that lenders have responded to borrower demand for convenience 
and speed. The evidence shows high levels of customer satisfaction and 
indicates that borrowers were and are willing to pay more for payday loans if 
they deliver convenience and speed. While the FCA and CMA have found that 
the market is fiercely competitive with regard to speed, product innovation, 
payment flexibility, market entry and customer satisfaction, like previous 
policymakers they have struggled to understand why borrowers have failed to 
drive price competition. This leads to a question for economists to explore: Do 
these features indicate market failure or borrower preferences that regulators 
disapprove of?  
Whether borrowing decisions are considered informed or uniformed, 
rational or irrational, has motivated policymakers to regulate. Related to this is 
the effect moneylending and pawnbroking had on poverty. While Gareth 
Stedman Jones and Gertrude Himmelfarb have helped to frame the poverty 
debate, and Melanie Tebbutt has applied that debate to pawnbroking, this 
research analyses how perceptions of poverty influenced the drafting of new 
regulation. It also analyses conflicting opinions within the industry. This 
approach is unique in that it links the poverty debate to a financial product and 
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provides the industry’s perspective. Also new to the literature, this research 
compares the results to the twenty-first-century financial inclusion agenda. 
Although some Victorian politicians, charity workers and pawnbrokers 
supported transacting free of regulation, those same advocates believed 
Parliament was unlikely to remove price controls. Despite a strong belief in 
freedom of contract, a compromise was reached and a two-tiered fixed pricing 
regime was agreed. Moreover, much of the PBA 1800 remained in force. There 
are limits, then, to how far narrative labels such as ‘Victorian free trade’ can be 
applied. This research argues that the PBA 1872 was favourable to industry 
because pawnbrokers presented a coherent narrative and supported their 
position with financial evidence. That pawnbrokers did not gain public sympathy 
further endorses the pivotal role of the pawn trade association in advancing 
regulation. 
To use the full circle analogy again, successful price control regulation 
that sought to restrict credit access arose when the cause and effect of poverty 
were debated intensely. In Victorian Britain, Archibald Orr-Ewing argued that 
pawn loans contributed to immoral and irrational behaviour which excluded 
borrowers from economic self-sufficiency and social freedom. This line of 
thought equated poverty with a lack of effort. Both indiscriminate charity and 
pawn loans were thought to encourage, if not accelerate, an individual’s journey 
into pauperism. In this context, while the conditions of poverty were the result 
of individual choice, the effects and costs of poverty were borne by society as 
a whole. 
The implications of the Victorian poverty debate as applied to 
pawnbroking and the financial inclusion agenda as applied to payday lending 
are many. In both episodes there is a connection between a specific financial 
product and poverty. Pawn and payday loans were accused of exacerbating 
the conditions of poverty. In essence, the wrong kind of finance contributed to 
poverty. Opponents of pawn believed that by making ‘rational’ decisions and 
with ‘prudent’ budgeting the working poor would no longer need small cash 
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loans. It was believed that friendly society borrowers had improved their life 
outcomes through hard work and moral propriety. By participating in a friendly 
society borrowers exhibited self-sufficiency, the opposite of dependence-driven 
charity and pawn loans. Notwithstanding that the right kind of finance was 
unavailable to a typical pawn borrower, the right kind of market opportunity 
existed and access was a matter of working harder.  
In the twenty-first century, payday lending was argued to be the wrong 
kind of finance. Payday loans were thought to have a deleterious impact on 
finances, health outcomes and well-being of individual borrowers’ families. The 
Victorian and contemporary episode were framed by the belief that, by making 
the right decisions, an individual could improve his life, social and financial 
outcomes. The modern goal of financial literacy lacks Victorian moral language. 
It suggests that ‘responsible’ financial management needs to be taught and 
implies that the working poor manage risk and their budget poorly. This 
research has documented that borrowers used loans for priority debts and that 
not having access to such loans would lead to questionable and more 
expensive outcomes, such as service disruptions, insufficient food and higher 
finance charges. Since the PBSC 1870, the evidence indicates that low-income 
borrowers have developed a complex hierarchy of bill payments on limited 
budgets and resort to pawn and moneylending to fulfil immediate cash needs. 
While not a critique of the financial inclusion agenda, this research nonetheless 
recognises that the ability of poor borrowers to manage has been 
underappreciated by most policymakers. 
In Victorian and contemporary Britain, in some sense, an appropriate 
financial market existed, one that was considered normative. An individual’s 
participation in that market benefited both the individual and society. Despite 
the ramifications of credit rationing and illegal lending, price controls were used 
to restrict credit access to the wrong kind of market. From 1927 to 1974, 
advertising restrictions were in place to accomplish that end. Further research 
is needed to understand the historical development of the ‘right’ market 
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participation, financial citizenship and its relationship to poverty. 2  Recent 
comments made by Ben Carson, head of the US Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, claiming a relationship between poverty and ‘mind-set’, 
and Gordon Brown’s (Labour, former Chancellor of the Exchequer and Prime 
Minister) observation that two-thirds of British children living in poverty are in 
families where someone is working, should prioritise such research.3 
The expectation that the working poor participate in mainstream banking 
in part indicates an acceptance of the pervasive role of finance in modern 
society. However, while affordable credit is a pillar of the financial inclusion 
agenda, mainstream banks do not offer short-term cash loans to the working 
poor. In addition to concerns about reputational damage, banks have noted the 
high expense and credit risk associated with payday loans. This scenario is 
similar to that in the Victorian era when the working poor had no access to basic 
banking facilities. Common to all periods examined by this research, few 
policymakers have supported viable alternatives to HCSTC. While Nadhim 
Zahawi MP (Conservative) suggested that providing income support to the poor 
would reduce the demand for high-cost loans, such proposals have failed to 
gain political or electorate support.4 Although state-sponsored pawnbrokers 
were discussed in the 1870s and at various times credit unions were proposed, 
neither were entertained seriously. 
As Sean O’Connell, Richard Berthoud and Teresa Hinton have argued, 
credit unions link debt capacity to savings and are therefore ill suited to the 
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credit needs of low-income borrowers.5 Crowther noted the inherent tension in 
pricing risk and expense for a market segment that experienced financial 
difficulties before seeking credit. This dynamic is one of the peculiar features of 
the market. Moreover, to the extent that payday loans are taken to meet priority 
debts owed by the working poor, the industry is at the crossroads of private 
markets and public welfare. As Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate, payday loan 
and pawnbroking volume is believed to be inversely related to support provided 
by the welfare state. While the limitations of the Social Fund have been 
discussed, further research that compares the development of welfare policy in 
terms of poverty reduction, economic self-sufficiency, risk mitigation and private 
market solutions such as payday loans is needed. 6  As this research has 
demonstrated, economic and social policy approaches can lead to different 
regulatory outcomes. 
Government control of the cost of credit is a major intervention in the 
marketplace. Nevertheless, Patrick Collinson, a journalist, criticised the FCA for 
allowing the ‘crack addicts of the debt world’ to continue borrowing.7 Collinson 
argued that retail payday outlets would not survive the rate cap and ‘probably 
revert back to what they were before: pawnshops’. As this research has shown, 
although the CCA 1974 facilitated a single licence, pawn and moneylending 
have a long history of providing credit and operated independently for centuries. 
It is historically mistaken to claim that payday lending evolved out of pawn. 
Irrespective, Collinson’s comment reflected the longstanding belief that 
borrowers are better off without HCSTC. Recall that in 1897 William Owen 
supported price controls and credit rationing because small loans only delayed 
the evil day of reckoning.8 In many respects, it was assumed that high prices 
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yielded high profits. Many considered the HCSTC pricing and profit structure to 
be excessive and that the product unfairly gained from the already limited 
resources of the working poor. However, whether it was Orr-Ewing in the 
nineteenth century or Collinson today, those seeking to abolish pawn and 
moneylending have not presented viable alternatives.  
To a lesser degree, moneylenders and pawnbrokers have demonstrated 
frustration with their industry. They have sought legitimisation and want to curb 
abuse through regulation. Moneylenders believed enhanced regulation such as 
capital requirements and posted bonds would legitimise their role in the 
financial system. In the 1900s, Parliament was unwilling to provide such 
legitimacy. Despite their best efforts, moneylenders and pawnbrokers have 
struggled to overcome the shock value of high interest rates and fees. In the 
1900s, the burdensome cost of loans and the typical borrower profile gave rise 
to resistance from those who considered licensing to indicate government 
approval. More dramatically, regulation categorised transactions as legal or 
illegal without necessarily influencing the demand curve. This dynamic is no 
different from contemporary debates concerning British drug policy and the 
legalisation of cannabis.9 Similarly, since 1870 pawnbrokers and moneylenders 
have believed regulation should be applied consistently. In 2017, this position 
was shared by Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase.10 Like their Wall Street 
contemporaries, lenders of small sums have sought stable markets and in part 
saw regulation as contributing to that goal. From an historical perspective, 
examining how government has legitimised HCSTC, acted as an incentive to 
illegal markets and contributed to market stability are topics in need of further 
research. 
The response to high interest rates has focused on many of the issues 
examined by this research, including price controls, benchmarks to measure 
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harsh transactions, APR, advertising and multiple loans for each borrower. In 
fact, there is very little evidence that moneylenders and pawnbrokers disputed 
the high cost of their credit. However, while the cost of credit was considered 
shocking, the expenses incurred received little sympathy. From a business 
history standpoint and of value to providers today, this research suggests that 
lenders have benefited from providing policymakers with expense and profit 
data. In 1870-1872, such data persuaded Parliament to raise the price ceiling 
on pawn, and, in 1900-1927, comparing their margin to banks’ and retailers’ 
influenced the price control debate. As a related point, this research suggests 
that while Victorian pawnbrokers informed Parliament on the effects of 
seasonal cyclicality and forfeiture resale, later providers failed to analyse how 
economic and business cycles influenced the pawn and moneylending 
markets. Regulators and lenders may benefit from analysing the market over 
longer periods than did the CMA and FCA. As before, data could be compiled 
by trade associations. 
This research has found that increased loan volumes and blanket 
advertising have led to calls for regulation to restrict the market. In 2016, and 
like Edward Carson in 1925, Google considered payday lenders predatory and 
banned them from advertising with it. 11  Since 1900, tension has existed 
between lenders who relied on advertising to generate business and 
policymakers who believed lenders were withholding information from 
uninformed borrowers. This research has shown that the motivation for 
advertising and information disclosure regulation varied. In 1900-1927, 
disclosure terms were intended to restrict market access, while in the 1970s, 
they were amended to increase competition and lower pricing. Given these 
variations, it is important to clarify the purpose of advertising restrictions and 
information disclosure so that they align with desired outcomes. 
                                            
11 ‘An update to our AdWords policy on lending products’, Google press release, 11 May 2016. 
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Along with the price control and advertising debates, attention centred 
on how the cost of a loan should be stated. Repeatedly, the response was 
through the APR. It was believed, perhaps even hoped, that borrowers would 
utilise APR information to drive price competition. Technology has mitigated the 
calculation burden and the CMA and FCA have recognised the limitations of 
APR when applied to short-term loans, but its use as a benchmark remains. As 
late as 2014, Wonga was censured by the Advertising Standards Authority for 
a television commercial that highlighted the cost of a loan in monetary form 
while claiming the APR was irrelevant.12 This research has documented that for 
over 100 years, those outside looking in - parties other than lenders and 
borrowers - have sought more disclosure in percentage form. Beyond 
consumer credit, and as John Kay, an economist, argued, the interaction of 
information disclosure, market efficiency and consumer protection has serious 
implications when considering the increased presence of financialisation.13 
Accordingly, the historical study of HCSTC information disclosure and its 
influence on the borrowing decision add to an important field of research. 
This research has shown how the high cost of loans, advertising, the use 
of APR, the legitimacy of moneylenders and pawnbrokers within the financial 
system and regulatory enforcement have interacted with debates concerning 
poverty and the role of financial regulation in the British economy. Since the 
turn of the twentieth century, the high cost of loans and prolific advertising have 
been matters of concern and have generated intense scrutiny by Parliament. 
Along with period-specific motivation, this scrutiny has led to six major 
regulatory episodes. While the regulatory debate once focused on freedom of 
contract and consumer choice, it has since shifted to financial exclusion and 
poverty. However, during each episode, economic and social concerns were 
debated and no period slots into a simple category. While opinions mirroring 
                                            
12 ‘Wonga banned from using ad that didn’t mention 5,853% interest rate’, Guardian, 8 October 
2014. 
13 John Kay, Other People’s Money (London: Profile Books, 2015), 260. 
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that of the Lord Salisbury who, in 1872, argued that free trade between lender 
and borrower offered the best form of protection, are found throughout, even 
Crowther, with its focus on regulatory unification and market competition, 
suggested that the moneylending and pawn markets were unique. 
Generations of policymakers have struggled to comprehend borrowers’ 
preference for non-price features. While in the 1900s many believed regulation 
would impede market operations, Crowther argued that targeted regulation 
would enhance the market’s efficiency. At times theories attributed to Jeremy 
Bentham and Adam Smith were used to counter the advance of price controls. 
Others sought regulation to limit, even eliminate, what was seen as the moral 
and financial harm inflicted on poor borrowers by unscrupulous lenders. While 
the industry’s high pricing and use of advertising have attracted much attention, 
these factors alone do not warrant the amount of time and effort that 
government and others have devoted to regulating the industry. 
It is only by coupling high interest rates with the typical end-user (most 
often the working poor) that such efforts can be understood. This is supported 
by the fact that, despite moneylenders and pawnbrokers contributing little to 
overall consumer credit volume, they have for decades generated newspaper 
headlines and debate. Few save the owner are outraged when an entrepreneur 
in need of capital transacts with a venture fund on unfavourable terms. The 
formation of moneylending and pawnbroking regulation incorporated economic 
concern and social policy aimed at protecting the vulnerable. If not, it is unlikely 
that the price control debate would have been revisited so often. However, this 
research argues that high interest rates and the conditions of the working poor 
are insufficient to explain such persistence. 
A final consideration and complication is the product itself: money. Who 
decides monetary value and determines the fairness of its cost and 
distribution?14 For now, concerning payday loans, the answer is the FCA under 
                                            
14  In Money: The Unauthorized Biography - From Coinage to Cryptocurrencies (London: 
Vintage Books, 2015), Felix Martin examines these and related themes. 
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the authority of the government. The FCA believed that above 0.8 per cent a 
day, the cost of credit was excessive and harmful to the borrower. Still, the 
question remains, does freedom to participate in the financial markets offer 
protection to the poor or should they be precluded, protected and limited from 
accessing HCSTC? This research suggests that the peculiarity of the subject 
is driven by its high cost, the working poor’s borrower profile and, however small 
the amount, the role of money and its regulation is complicated. This reality 
helps to explain why, whether framed in economic terms or social policy, 
motivations to limit the supply of funds and restrict the working poor’s access 
to high-cost credit have varied so dramatically. 
 
  
297 
Sources 
 
Archive Material 
 
 
The British Library, London 
 
M78445-55  Pawnbrokers Gazette and Trade Circular, 1867-1894 
PP2501   The Moneylenders’ Federation Manual and Directory, 1913 
GC948028 Woodhead's Directory of the Credit Drapers of Great Britain, 
1909 
 
The Guildhall & City Business Library, City of London 
 
MSS295 Pawnbrokers Gazette and trade circular, 1895-1941 
MSS295 National Pawnbrokers’ Association Journal, 1959-1986, 1988-
1992 
S1752 National Pawnbrokers’ reports and accounts, 1975-1979, 
1998-2001, 2006-2007, 2011-2012 
S1752 Times: The House Magazine of the National Pawnbrokers’ 
Association, 1993-2004 
332.34 The Pawnbroker, 2005-present 
A 42 DIR 57 London Yellow Pages 
 
The London Metropolitan Archives 
 
CLC/034 The Bouverie Society 
 
MS22321 Rules of the society 1885, 1889 and 1934 
MS22322 Minutes 1801-11, 1841-1948 
MS22323 Visitors book 
MS22324 Society papers and invoices 
MS22325 List of sons of members on active duty in the First World War  
MS22326 Photographs 
 
CLC/063 The Eastern Society of Master Pawnbrokers 
 
MS22327 Society minutes, 1813-1821, 1824-1831 
MS22328 Society papers, 1821-1830 
 
CLC/093 Metropolitan Pawnbrokers’ Protection Society 
 
MS22329 Society minutes, 1863-1913 
MS22330 Society papers and correspondence 
  
298 
 
CLC/097 Parliamentary Pawnbrokers’ Reform Association 
 
MS22331 Minutes and executive reports, 1868-1871 
MS22332 Telegraphs, Alfred Hardaker 
MS22333 Photographs 
 
The National Archives, London 
 
AJ 10 Consumer Council 
 
AJ10/60 Submissions to public inquiries 
 
BT 103 Board of Trade Solicitor’s Department 
 
BT103/28 Correspondence and papers, MLA 1900-1911 
 
BT 250 Board of Trade Committee on Consumer Credit 
 
BT250/2 Consumer credit: Summary of conclusions 
BT250/4 Official bodies 
BT250/5 BT evidence submitted 
BT250/14 HM Treasury 
BT250/16 Association of County Court Registrars 
BT250/27 Lancashire and Cheshire Moneylenders Association 
BT250/23 Hire Purchase Trade Association 
BT250/24 HP Information Ltd 
BT250/25 Institute of Credit Management 
BT250/28 Law Society 
BT250/34 National Association of Moneylenders 
BT250/38 National Pawnbrokers’ Association 
BT250/46 Association of Family Case Workers 
BT250/47 Consumer Council 
BT250/48 Consumers’ Association 
BT250/49 National Citizens Advice Bureaux Council 
BT250/50 National Federation of Consumer Groups 
BT250/52 Beneficial Finance Company 
BT250/61 Midland Bank 
BT250/66 Provident Clothing and Supply Company 
BT250/75 County of West Sussex 
BT250/93 Councils on moneylending and pawnbroking 
BT250/100-01 Newspaper Advice Bureaux 
BT250/112 Summary of existing legislation on consumer (credit) 
protection 
  
  
299 
CUST 49 Custom & Excise 
 
CUST49/2069 Linnell moneylending case 
CUST49/2942 Moneylender case 
 
FV 62 Department of Trade and Industry: Industrial and Commercial Policy 
D2 
 
FV62/10 Inter-departmental consideration 
FV62/25 Consideration by administration group 
FV62/27 Consideration by lending and security group 
FV62/29 Consumer sale and loan group 
FV62/34 National Association of Moneylenders, Cheque Traders 
Federation and National Pawnbrokers Association 
FV62/35 Inter-departmental consideration and submission to ministers 
FV62/41 Consumer credit: Report of the Committee; submission to 
ministers 
FV62/52 Consideration of pawnbrokers: Recommendation 197 
FV62/60 Regulation of the cost of credit: Recommendations 237-241, 
244 
FV62/102-06 Major policy papers on the whole of proposed legislation 
FV62/115 General legislative issues: Consultations with general bodies 
FV62/157 Crowther Committee Report on Consumer Credit: Letter from 
Prime Minister’s Secretary suggesting early action 
 
IR40 Board of Inland Revenue: Stamps and Taxes Division 
 
IR40/2736  Registrations under the MLA 1900 
IR40/3555  Registrations of moneylenders and evasion of tax 
 
MEPO2 Records of the Metropolitan Police Office 
 
MEPO2/814  Special report no. 282 ref 459818 ‘MLA 1900’ 
 
T326 Treasury: Finance, Home and General Division 
 
T326/805 Setting up of Crowther Committee on consumer credit: 
Composition and terms of reference 
 
Interview 
 
Sir Royston Goode, CBE, QC, DCL, FBA, 20 November 2015. 
Member of the Crowther Committee 
 
  
  
300 
Public Records Office of Northern Ireland 
 
D1507 Edward Carson Non-Irish papers 
 
D1507/B/43/1-28 Letters, 1925-1926 
 
 
Official Publications 
 
The Pawnbrokers Select Committee 1870 (377). 
The Pawnbrokers Select Committee 1872 (288). 
The Pawnbrokers Act 1872: 35 & 36 Vic. c. 93. 
Report from the Select Committee on Moneylending 1897 (364). 
Report from the Select Committee on Moneylenders 1898 (260). 
The Moneylenders Act 1900: 63 & 64 Vic. c. 51. 
The Moneylenders Act 1911: 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 51. 
Report from the Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords and the House 
of Commons on the Moneylenders Bill 1925 (153). 
The Moneylenders Act 1927: 17 & 18 Geo. 5 c. 21. 
The Pawnbrokers Act 1960: 8 & 9 Eliz. 2 c. 25. 
Consumer Credit, Report of the Committee 1971 (4596). 
The Consumer Credit Act 1974, c. 39. 
The Consumer Credit Act 2006, c. 14. 
* 
‘Access to financial service’, HM Treasury (1999). 
Consumer credit (Advertisements) Regulations 1989. 
‘The Consumer Credit Bill’, House of Commons Library Research paper 05/03 
(11 January 2005). 
‘Consumer credit regulation’, Office of Fair Trading (1994). 
‘Consumer credit regulation: Guidance on the regulations implementing the 
consumer credit directive’, Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (August 2010). 
Consumer credit sourcebook (CONC) release 8, Financial Conduct Authority 
(2016). 
Consumer credit sourcebook (CONC), release 1, Financial Conduct Authority 
(2013). 
‘The consumer credit (total charge for credit) regulations 1980’, The 
Department of Trade (28 April 1980). 
‘Credit union expansion project’, Department for Welfare and Pensions 
(May 2012). 
Davies, Richard and Peter Richardson, ‘Evolution of the UK banking system’, 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Q4 (2010). 
‘Detail rules for the price cap on high-cost short-term credit, including 
feedback on CP 14/10 and final rules’, Financial Conduct Authority 
PS14/16 (November 2014). 
  
301 
Edmiston, Kelly, ‘Could restrictions on payday lending hurt consumers?’, The 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review Q1 (2011). 
Edmonds, Timothy, ‘High cost consumer credit’, House of Commons Library 
briefing paper 05849 (15 July 2014). 
Edmonds, Timothy, ‘Consumer credit regulation’, House of Commons 
Treasury Committee briefing paper 06842 (7 March 2014). 
‘Extortionate credit’, Office of Fair Trading (1998). 
 ‘Fair, clear, and competitive: The consumer credit market in the 21st century’, 
Department of Trade and Industry (December 2003). 
‘FCA confirms price cap rules for payday lenders’, Financial Conduct Authority 
press release (11 November 2014). 
Flannery, Mark and Katherine Samolyk, ‘Payday lending: Do the costs justify 
the price?’, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Center for Financial 
Research working paper 9 (2005). 
‘Financial inclusion: An action plan for 2008-11’, HM Treasury (December 
2007). 
‘Financial inclusion: Credit, savings, advice and insurance’, House of 
Commons Treasury Committee Twelfth Report of Session 2005-06 vol. I 
(November 2006). 
‘Government response to The Bristol University report on high cost credit’, 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (March 2013). 
‘Guide for consumer credit firms’, Financial Conduct Authority (February 
2016). 
House of Lords Select Committee on Financial Inclusion, evidence session 
11, 25 October 2016. 
House of Lords Select Committee on European Union 36th annual report 
2007, Chapter 4: UK Consumer credit legislation. 
‘Home credit market investigation’, Competition and Markets Authority (30 
November 2006). 
‘Illegal lending in the UK’, A report for the Department for Trade and Industry 
by Policis Ltd and the Personal Finance Research Centre, University of 
Bristol University (November 2006). 
‘The impact on business and customers of a cap on the total cost of credit’, A 
report for the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills by The 
Personal Finance Research Centre, University of Bristol (2013). 
‘Irresponsible lending - OFT guidance for creditors’, Office of Fair Trading 
(February 2011). 
Kempson, Elaine, ‘Over-indebtedness in Britain’, A report to the Department 
of Trade and Industry by The Personal Finance Research Centre, 
University of Bristol (September 2002). 
Kempson, Elaine and Claire Whyley, ‘Extortionate credit in the UK’, A report 
for the Department for Trade and Industry by the Personal Finance 
Research Centre, University of Bristol (June 1999). 
Kempson, Elaine et al., ‘In or out? Financial exclusion: A literature and 
research review’, Financial Services Authority (July 2000). 
  
302 
Nickell, Stephen, ‘Two current monetary policy issues’, Bank of England 
Monetary Policy Committee (16 September 2003). 
Morgan, Donald and Michael Strain, ‘Payday holiday: How households fare 
after payday credit bans’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff 
Reports 309 (2007). 
‘OFT launches review into payday lending’, Office of Fair Trading (24 
February 2012). 
‘Pawnbrokers and moneylenders’, a report for the Department of Trade and 
Industry on behalf of the Crowther Committee by NOP Market Research 
(1971). 
‘Payday lending compliance review final report’, Office of Fair Trading 1481 
(2013). 
 ‘Payday lending market investigation: Final report’, Competition and Markets 
Authority (24 February 2015). 
‘Payday lending: Pieces of the picture’, Financial Ombudsman Service Insight 
Report (2014). 
‘Promoting financial inclusion’, HM Treasury (2004). 
‘Proposals for a price cap on high-cost short-term credit: Consultative paper’, 
Financial Conduct Authority CP 14/10 (July 2014). 
Report of the Commissioners of HM Inland Revenue, 1870-1909. 
Report of the Commissioners of HM Customs & Excise, 1910-1949.  
‘Review of high cost credit’, Office of Fair Trading 1232 (2010). 
Rowe, Becky et al., ‘Consumer Credit Research: Payday loans, logbook loans 
and debt management services’, A report for the Financial Conduct 
Authority written by ESRO Research (24 April 2014). 
Rowlingson, Karen et al., ‘Capping the cost of payday lending in the UK: What 
will the impact be?’, A paper for the Financial Conduct Authority (July 
2014). 
Study on interest rate restrictions in the EU, Final Report for the EU 
Commission DG Internal Market and Services, Project 
ETD/2009/IM/H3/87, Brussels/Hamburg/Mannheim. 
‘Technical annexes: Supplement to CP 14/10’, Financial Conduct Authority 
(July 2014). 
‘Three centuries of data’, available for download from the Bank of England 
website. 
‘Tougher rules for payday lenders take effect’, Financial Conduct Authority 
press release (1 July 2014). 
‘Transparency of credit charges’, House of Commons Treasury Committee 
First Report of Session 2003-04 vol. 1. 
‘The true cost of credit’, Office of Fair Trading (1990). 
‘Unjust credit transactions’, Office of Fair Trading (1991).  
  
303 
Primary Sources 
 
Books 
 
Bellot, H. L. and R. J. Willis, The Law Relating to Unconscionable Bargains 
with Moneylenders, London: Stevens, 1897. 
Collard, Charles, The Money-Lenders Acts, 1900-1911, London: Butterworth, 
1912. 
Farrow, Thomas, In the Money Lender’s Clutches, London: Yeoman 
Company, 1896. 
Farrow, Thomas, The Moneylender Unmasked, London: Roxburghe Press, 
1895. 
Goode, Royston, The Consumer Credit Act: A Student’s Guide, London: 
Butterworth: 1979. 
Hardaker, Alfred, A Brief History of Pawnbroking, London: Jackson, Ruston & 
Keeson, 1892. 
Matthews, Joseph, The Law of Money-Lending, Past and Present, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1906. 
Rowlingson, Karen, Moneylenders and Their Customers, London: Policy 
Studies Institute, 1994. 
Weir, William, The First Hundred Years, 1851-1951: A Sketch of the History of 
the Glasgow Pawnbrokers Association, Glasgow: Glasgow Pawnbrokers 
Association, 1952. 
 
Miscellaneous 
 
‘A guide to the Consumer Credit Act 2006’, Glovers Solictors (October 2006). 
‘A modern credit revolution: An analysis of the short-term credit market’, 
Independently produced by the Social Market Foundation on behalf of 
the Consumer Finance Association (2016). 
‘Annual report’, Albemarle & Bond Holdings plc (1989 and 2006). 
‘Annual report 2014’, The Consumer Finance Association. 
Berry, Craig and Valentia Serra, ‘Financial citizenship: Rethinking the state’s 
role in enabling individuals to save’, The International Longevity Centre 
(April 2012). 
‘Changing household budgets’, Money Advice Trust (June 2014). 
Collard, Sharon and Elaine Kempson, ‘Affordable credit: The way forward’, 
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2005). 
Collard, Sharon, Elaine Kempson et al., ‘Tackling financial exclusion: An area-
based approach’, The Policy Press (2001). 
‘Consultation response: FCA proposals for a price cap on high-cost short-term 
credit’, Money Advice Trust (August 2014). 
‘Consumer Credit Act’, Slaughter & May (October 2008). 
‘Credit 2.0: Commentary on borrowing and spending in the 21st Century’, 
Consumer Finance Association (July 2015). 
  
304 
‘Credit crunched: Commentary on the UK’s changing attitude towards 
borrowing and spending’, Consumer Finance Association (May 2013). 
Cribb, Jonathan, ‘Income inequality in the UK’, Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(2013). 
Davis, Philip, ‘Economic theories of poverty’, Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
(June 2015). 
‘Farrow’s Bank’, British Banking History Society (undated).  
‘FCA’s proposals for a price cap on high-cost short term credit’, Citizens 
Advice Bureau (August 2014). 
‘Financial inclusion commission call for evidence response from the 
Consumer Finance Association’, Consumer Finance Association 
(December 2014). 
Gibbons, Damon and Nehra Malhotra, ‘Payday lending in the UK: A review of 
the debate and policy options’, Centre for Responsible Credit (2010). 
‘Hope for millions of borrowers stuck in a cycle of debt, Which? response to 
the FCA announcement on a price cap for payday lenders’, Which? (11 
November 2014). 
‘How the casual labourer lives’, Liverpool Joint Research Committee (1909). 
‘Information package’, The National Pawnbrokers Association (March 2017). 
Institute of Fiscal Studies, Gini coefficient data set accessed 28 August 2016. 
‘It’s absolutely right that payday loan customers are compensated for such 
poor practices’, Which? (27 July 2015). 
Journal of the Statistical Society 35:4 (1872): 541-545. 
‘Key Facts’, National Pawnbroker Association (2 October 2015). 
Lane, Pippa and Laura Rodrigues, ‘Filling the gap: Can banks step into the 
gap left by payday loans - and if so, how?’, Citizens Advice Bureau (21 
July 2015). 
‘Memorandum of association’, H&T Group plc (1 May 2006). 
Mitton, Lavinia, ‘Financial inclusion in the UK: Review of policy and practices’, 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2008). 
‘OFT launches compliance review into payday lending’, BCCA Quarterly 
Newsletter 61 (2002). 
‘Our quarterly magazine’, BCCA 73 (July 2016). 
‘Overdraft charges more expensive than payday loans’, Which? (9 July 2016). 
Palmer, Guy et al., ‘Monitoring poverty and social exclusion 2006’, the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation and the New Policy Institute (2006). 
‘Payday lending: Fixing a broken market’, The Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (May 2014). 
‘Payday lending: Its role and purpose in credit granting’, Consumer Finance 
Association (March 2013). 
‘Payday loans’, Citizens Advice Bureau (Campaign 2014). 
‘Payday loans: An improved market?’, Citizens Advice Bureau (March 2016). 
‘Pawnbroking customers in 2010’, A report for the National Pawnbrokers 
Association prepared by the Personal Finance Research Centre, 
University of Bristol (2010). 
  
305 
‘Proposals for a price cap on high-cost credit’, Association of British Credit 
Unions (2014). 
‘Proposals for a price cap on high-cost short-term credit’, Financial Services 
Consumer Panel (2 August 2014). 
‘Proposals for a price cap on high-cost short-term credit’, Toynbee Hall 
(August 2014). 
‘Proposals for a price cap on high-cost short-term credit’, Trading Standards 
Institute (August 2014). 
‘Proposals for a price cap on high-cost short-term credit CP10/14’, 
StepChange (September 2014). 
‘Proposals in response to the CMA’s recommendations on high cost short 
term credit’, Christians Against Poverty (October 2015). 
‘Response to the FCA consultation CP 14/10: Proposals for a price cap on 
high-cost short-term credit’, Community Investment Coalition (undated). 
‘Response to the FCA’s proposals for a price cap on high-cost short-term 
credit’, The Money Charity (August 2014). 
Ridsdale, Richard, Shillings per Pound: The Moneylenders’ Interest Table, 
London: Gledhill’s Printing Words (1928). 
Rossiter, Jenny and Niall Cooper, ‘Scaling up for financial inclusion’, Debt on 
our Doorstop campaign (2005). 
‘Scaling up for financial inclusion: A national strategy for expanding access to 
affordable credit and financial services’, Debt on our Doorstep campaign 
(2005). 
‘StepChange debt charity response to FCA’, StepChange (September 2014). 
‘The pawnbrokers guide’, The National Pawnbrokers’ Association (1999). 
‘Transact response to FCA price cap’, Transact (August 2014). 
 
Journalism and Periodicals 
 
 
‘All for Crowther’, Observer, 28 March 1971. 
‘Alleged legal abuse’, Liverpool Mercury, 3 January 1895. 
Badger, Emily, ‘Does “wrong mind-set” cause poverty or vice versa?’, New 
York Times, 30 May 2017. 
Boggan, Steve, ‘Pawn again’, Guardian, 20 October 2007. 
Brown, Gordon, ‘Theresa May is creating an epidemic of poverty. Don’t give 
her a free hand’, Guardian, 12 May 2017. 
Christie, Sophie, ‘Rated: The best and worst banks this year for customer 
service’, Telegraph, 28 August 2014. 
‘Civil servant affair’, Gloucester Journal, 14 March 1925. 
Collinson Patrick, ‘Payday lending will shrink but only a complete ban will do’, 
Guardian, 24 February 2015. 
Creasy, Stella, ‘Legal loan sharks are circling the poor’, Guardian, 3 February 
2011. 
‘Credit to Crowther’, The Times, 30 March 1971. 
  
306 
Dakers, Marion, ‘Payday loans past their peak as price cap comes into force’, 
Telegraph, 3 January 2015. 
Dickens, Charles, ‘Sketches of London No. 35’, Evening Standard, June 
1835. 
Dunkley, Emma, ’Wonga caps fees on payday loans’, Financial Times, 16 
December 2014. 
Elliot, Larry, ‘Margaret Thatcher's deregulation of the City a myth, says 
thinktank’, Guardian, 25 May 2015. 
‘The evils of the usury system: The prospect of legislation’, St James’s 
Gazette, 12 October 1898. 
Friedman, Milton, ‘Defense of Usury’, Newsweek, 6 April 1970. 
Goff, Sharlene, ‘Tougher UK rules drive payday lenders away’, Financial 
Times, 20 May 2014. 
‘High cost of credit to be reviewed’, Guardian, 3 July 1968. 
Hollingshead, John, ‘The poor man's banker’, Good Words 5 (1864): 179-182. 
‘Interest at 400 per cent’, Lloyd’s Weekly, 1 July 1900. 
Jones, Rupert, ‘Crackdown on payday loans advertising’, Guardian, 1 July 
2013. 
‘Legalisation of cannabis “only solution to crime and addiction problems”’, 
Guardian, 20 November 2016. 
Lewis, Martin, ‘Don’t tell MPs I’m against payday loan regulation!’, 
moneysavingexpert.com, 28 January 2011. 
‘Literary notes review’, Birmingham Daily Post, 15 February 1895. 
Melville, Joy, ‘Moneylenders are tough if you want £300’, Guardian, 17 June 
1967. 
Merrill, Jamie, ‘Church of England to open credit union in its “war” on Wonga’, 
Independent, 20 June 2014. 
‘Moneylenders’, Cheshire Observer, 15 May 1897. 
‘Moneylenders’, Marlborough Express, vol. XLI:213, 1907. 
‘Money-lenders’, Western Mail, 2 April 1895. 
‘Moneylenders’ methods’, Lancashire Evening Post, 13 December 1924. 
‘Moneylending evils’, The Times, 18 March 1925. 
‘The moneylending business’, Pall Mall Gazette, 9 January 1895. 
‘The money-lending business preliminary fees’, Pall Mall Gazette, 9 January 
1895. 
‘Money-lending revelations, 350 per cent interest’, Sheffield Evening 
Telegraph, 27 February 1896. 
‘MPs told of credit curbs’, Guardian, 2 November 1968. 
‘Mr Plimsoll’s pawnbroking bill’, The Spectator, 2 May 1870. 
Mullaney, Tim, ‘Lessons from the CEO Warren Buffet turns to for guidance’, 
CNBC.com, 4 April 2017. 
O’Connell, Sean, ‘Alternatives to money lenders?’, History and Policy, 3 May 
2005. 
Osborne, Hillary, ‘Payday lenders may vanish within year as result of price 
cap, says economist’, Guardian, 10 November 2014. 
  
307 
‘Pawnbrokers’, Chamber’s Journal 19 (1882): 158-161. 
‘Pawnbrokers’, Daily Telegraph, 21 August 1871. 
‘Pawnbrokers’, The Latest News, 25 April 1870. 
‘Pawnbrokers’, The Sheffield and Rotherham Independent, 28 August 1871. 
‘Pawns, pawners and pawnbrokers’, Once a Week 10:247 (1864): 340-345. 
‘Plague of moneylenders; MPs swamped with circulars’, Western Daily Press, 
3 July 1924. 
Rigby, Elizabeth, ‘Miliband attacks Britain’s “Wonga economy”’, Financial 
Times, 5 November 2013. 
Robinson, Mabel, ‘Pawnbroking in England and abroad’, Fortnightly Review 
44:259 (1888): 69-88. 
Rowlingson, Karen, ‘Short of cash, rent and food - Britons in dire financial 
straits’, The Conversation, 2013. 
‘Ruined by exorbitant interest’, Leicester Chronicle and Mercury, 20 February 
1895. 
‘Shylock’s methods’, Yorkshire Evening Post, 20 May 1897. 
‘The shark’s prey’, Edinburgh Evening News, 26 September 1924. 
‘Tighter law on loan advertising’, Guardian, 12 September 1968. 
The usury laws, Northern Echo, 18 June 1895. 
‘Uncle’s bill’, Daily Telegraph, 9 April 1870. 
Warren, Rachel, ‘Uncle breaks loose; pawnbrokers; family money’, The 
Times, 24 September 1988. 
Watt, Nicholas and Patrick Wintour, ‘Payday loan firms face cap after 
government U-turn’, Guardian, 28 October 2012. 
‘Wonga banned from using ad that didn’t mention 5,853% interest rate’, 
Guardian, 8 October 2014. 
‘What is the cost of credit?’, Guardian, 5 October 1968. 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
 
Books 
 
Abel-Smith, Brian and Peter Townsend, The Poor and the Poorest: A New 
Analysis of the Ministry of Labour’s Family Expenditure Surveys for 
1953-54 and 1960, London: G. Bell & Sons, 1965. 
Atiyah, Patrick, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979. 
Ball, Stuart, Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain 1918-1945, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Banting, Keith, Poverty, Politics and Policy: Britain in the 1960s, London: 
Macmillan, 1979. 
Berthoud, Richard and Elaine Kempson, Credit and Debt, London: Policy 
Studies Institute, 1992. 
  
308 
Bigelow, Gordon, Fiction, Famine, and the Rise of Economics in Victorian 
Britain and Ireland, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Burton, Dawn, Credit and Consumer Society, Oxford: Routledge, 2008. 
Calder, Lendol, Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of 
Consumer Credit, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
Caskey, John, Fringe Banking: Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and the 
Poor, New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1994. 
Chinn, Carl, Poverty amidst Prosperity: The Urban Poor in England, 1834-
1914, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995. 
Coopey, Richard, Mail Order Retailing in Britain: A Business and Social 
History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Daunton, Martin, Progress and Poverty: An Economic and Social History of 
Britain, 1700-1850, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Daunton, Martin, Wealth and Welfare: An Economic and Social History of 
Britain, 1851-1951, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Daunton, Martin, State and Market in Victorian Britain: War, Welfare and 
Capitalism, Woodbridge: Boydell, 2008.  
Daunton, Martin and Matthew Hilton, The Politics of Consumption: Material 
Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America, Oxford: Berg 2001. 
Dicey, Albert, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in 
England during the Nineteenth Century, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 
2008. 
Dorey, Peter, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality, 
London: IB Tauris, 2011. 
Elliehausen, Gregory, ‘An analysis of consumers’ use of payday loans’, 
Financial Services Research Program Monograph 41, George 
Washington University School of Business, Washington, DC, 2009. 
Elliehausen, Gregory and Edward Lawrence, ‘Payday advance credit in 
America: An analysis of consumer demand’, Credit Research Center 
Monograph 35, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, 
Washington, DC, 2001. 
Englander, David, Poverty and Poor Law Reform In 19th-Century Britain, 
1834-1914: From Chadwick to Booth, London: Routledge, 2013. 
Finlay, Steven, Consumer Credit Fundamentals, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009. 
Finn, Margot, The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 
1740-1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Fraser, Derek, The Evolution of the British Welfare State: A History of Social 
Policy since the Industrial Revolution, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009. 
Geisst, Charles, Beggar Thy Neighbour: A History of Usury and Debt, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 
Geisst, Charles, Loan Sharks: The Birth of Predatory Lending, Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2017. 
  
309 
Goode, Royston, ‘The Consumer Credit Act 1974’, The Cambridge Law 
Journal 34:1 (1975): 79-130. 
Grover, Chris, The Social Fund 20 Years On: Historical and Policy Aspects of 
Loaning Social Security, Farnham: Ashgate, 2011. 
Hatton, Thomas, The New Comparative Economic History: Essays In Honor 
of Jeffrey G. Williamson, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. 
Hilton, Matthew, Consumerism in Twentieth-Century Britain: The Search for a 
Historical Movement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Himmelfarb, Gertrude, The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial 
Age, London: Faber, 1984. 
Hoppen, Theodore, The Mid-Victorian Generation, Oxford: Clarendon, 1998. 
Horne, Oliver, A History of Savings Banks, London: Oxford University Press, 
1947. 
Hudson, Kenneth, Pawnbroking: An Aspect of British Social History, London: 
Bodley Head, 1982. 
Hyman, Luis, Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
Johnson, Paul, Saving and Spending: The Working-Class Economy in Britain 
1870-1939, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. 
Jones, Gareth Stedman, An End to Poverty: A Historical Debate, London: 
Profile Books, 2004. 
Jones, Gareth Stedman, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship 
Between Classes in Victorian Society, London: Verso, 2013. 
Karger, Howard, Shortchanged: Life and Debt in the Fringe Economy, San 
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2005. 
Kay, John, Other People’s Money, London: Profile Books, 2015. 
Kempson, Elaine and Claire Whyley, Kept In or Opted Out? Understanding 
and Combating Financial Exclusion, Bristol: Bristol University Press, 
1999. 
Lastra, Rosa Maria, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Lee, Stephen, Aspects of British Political History, 1815-1914, London: 
Routledge, 2004. 
Martin, Felix, Money: The Unauthorized Biography - From Coinage to 
Cryptocurrencies, London: Vintage Books, 2015. 
Mayer, Robert, QuickCash: The Story of the Loan Shark, DeKalb, IL: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 2010. 
McBriar, Alan, An Edwardian Mixed Doubles, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987. 
Mulvey, Paul, The Political Life of Josiah C. Wedgwood: Land, Liberty and 
Empire, 1872-1943, Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2010. 
O'Connell, Sean, Credit and Community: Working-Class Debt in the UK since 
1880, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Offer, Avner, The Challenge of Affluence, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007. 
  
310 
Orchard, Dorothy and Geoffrey May, Moneylending in Great Britain, New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1933. 
Rock, Paul, Making People Pay, London: Routeldge, 1973. 
Rose, Nikolas, Power of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Routh, Guy, Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906-1979, London: 
Macmillan, 1980. 
Searle, Geoffrey. Morality and the Market in Victorian Britain. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998. 
Schwed, Peter, God Bless Pawnbrokers, New York: Dodd Mead, 1975. 
Taylor, Avram, Working-Class Credit and Community since 1918, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 
Tebbutt, Melanie, Making Ends Meet: Pawnbroking and Working-Class Credit, 
Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983. 
Trumbull, Gunnar, Consumer Lending in France and America: Credit and 
Welfare, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Vincent, David, Poor Citizens: The State and the Poor in Twentieth-Century 
Britain. London: Longman, 1991. 
Walsh, Michael, Sacred Economics: Buddhist Monasticism and Territoriality in 
Medieval China, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 
Winstanley, Michael, Gladstone and the Liberal Party, London: Routledge, 
1992. 
Woloson, Wendy, In Hock: Pawning in America from Independence through 
the Great Depression, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
 
Edited Volumes 
 
Baldwin, Robert, ‘Introduction’ in Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy 
and Practice, 1-11, eds. Robert Baldwin et al., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011. 
Balleisen, Edward and David Moss, ‘Introduction’, in Government and 
Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation, 1-10, eds. Edward 
Balleisen and David Moss, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010. 
Caskey, John, ‘Payday lending: New research and the big question’, in The 
Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Poverty, 681-708, ed. Philip 
Jefferson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Hall, Peter and David Soskice, ‘Introduction’, in Varieties of Capitalism: The 
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, 1-68, eds. Peter 
Hall and David Soskice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Johnson, Paul, ‘Credit and thrift and the British working class, 1870-1939’, in 
The Working Class in Modern British History, 147-170, ed. Jay Winter, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
  
311 
Lanzalaco, Luca, ‘Business interest associations’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Business History, 293-318, eds. Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Logemann, Jan, ‘Introduction’, in The Development of Consumer Credit in 
Global Perspective, 1-20, ed. Jan Logemann, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012. 
Moloney, Niamh et al., ‘Introduction’ in The Handbook of Financial Regulation, 
1-12, ed. Niamh Moloney et al., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
Seldon, Anthony, ‘The Heath government in history’, in The Heath 
Government 1970-74: A reprisal, 1-20, eds. Stuart Ball and Anthony 
Seldon, London: Routledge, 2013. 
Tomlinson, Jim, ‘Managing the economy, managing the people’, in 20th-
century Britain, Economic, Cultural and Social Change, 234-246, eds. 
Francesca Carnevali and Julie-Marie Strange. London: Pearson 
Longman, 2007. 
 
Articles 
 
Aldohni, Abdul Karim, ‘Loan sharks v. short-term lenders: How do the law and 
regulators draw the line?’, Journal of Law and Society 40:3 (2013): 420-
429.  
Ali, Paul et al., ‘Payday lending regulation and borrower vulnerability in the UK 
and Australia’, Journal of Business Law 3 (2015): 223-225. 
Anderson, Elisabeth, ‘Experts, ideas and policy change: The Russell Sage 
Foundation and small loan reform, 1909-1941’, Theory and Society 37:3 
(2008): 271-310. 
Avio, Kenneth, ‘An economic rationale for statutory interest rate ceilings’, 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 13 (1973): 61-72. 
Baker, David and Mackenzie Breitenstein, ‘Is history repeating itself? Why 
interest rate caps pave the way for the return of the loan shark’, Banking 
and Law Journal 579 (2010): 581-603. 
Ben-Shahar, Omir and Carl Schneider, ‘The failure of mandated disclosure’, 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 159:647 (2011): 647-749. 
Berthoud, Richard and Teresa Hinton, ‘Credit unions in the United Kingdom’, 
London Policy Institute, 1989. 
Bertrand, Marianne and Adair Morse, ‘Information disclosure, cognitive 
biases, and payday borrowing’, The Journal of Finance LXVI:6 (2011): 
1865-1893. 
Berry, Craig, ‘Citizenship in a financialised society: Financial inclusion and the 
state before and after the Crash’, Policy & Politics, 43:4 (2015): 509-525. 
Bristow, Edward, ‘The Liberty and Property Defence League and 
Individualism’, The Historical Journal 18:4 (1975): 761-789. 
 
 
  
312 
Brown, Sarah, ‘Consumer credit relationships - protection, self-
interest/reliance and dilemmas in the fight against unfairness: The unfair 
credit relationship test and the underlying rationale of consumer credit 
law’, Legal Studies 36:2 (2016): 230-257. 
Burkey, Mark and Scott Simkins, ‘Factors affecting the location of payday 
lending and traditional banking services in North Carolina’, The Review 
of Regional Studies 34:2 (2004): 191-205. 
Campbell, John et al., ‘Consumer financial protection’, The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 25:1 (2011): 91-113. 
Campbell, John et al., ‘The regulation of consumer financial products: An 
introductory essay with four case studies’, Harvard University Faculty 
Research Working Paper Series 10:40 (2010): 1-48. 
Cartwright, Peter, ‘The vulnerable consumer of financial services: Law, policy 
and regulation’, Centre for Risk, Banking and Financial Services, 
University of Nottingham, February 2011.  
Cartwright, Peter, ‘Understanding and protecting vulnerable financial 
consumers’, Journal of Consumer Policy 38 (2015): 119-138. 
Cayne, David and Michael Trebilcock, ‘Market considerations in the 
formulation of consumer protection policy’, University of Toronto Law 
Journal 23 (1973): 396-430. 
Collins, Daniel, ‘Misleading APRs in consumer credit agreements: A new 
influence?’, The Journal of Business Law 7 (2012): 629-639. 
Domoto, Hiroshi, ‘The risk of Yamikin market, which is spreading quietly in 
Japan’, Institute for Research on Credit Business 12:003 (2012): 1-18. 
Domoto, Hiroshi, ‘Adverse effects caused by the revised money lending 
business law’, Institute for Research on Credit Business 13:001 (2013): 
1-10. 
Fearon, Peter, ‘A “social evil”: Liverpool moneylenders 1920s-1940s’, Urban 
History 42:3 (2015): 440-462. 
Finn, Margot, ‘Working-class women and the contest for consumer control in 
Victorian county courts’, Past & Present 161 (1998): 116-154. 
Fleming, Anne, ‘City of debtors: Law, loan sharks, and the shadow economy 
of urban poverty, 1900-1970’, Enterprise & Society 17:4 (2016): 734-740. 
Gazeley, Ian, ‘The poor and the poorest, 50 years on: Evidence from British 
household expenditure surveys of the 1950s and 1960s’, Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society A:180 (2017): 455-475. 
Glaeser, Edward and Jose Scheinkman, ‘Neither a borrower nor a lender be: 
An economic analysis of interest restrictions and usury laws’, National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 4954 (1994): 1-45. 
Granovetter, Mark, ‘The impact of social structure on economic outcomes’, 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19:1 (2005): 33-50. 
Greenwald, Bruce and Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Externalities in economies with 
imperfect information and incomplete markets’, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economies 101:2 (1986): 229-264. 
  
313 
Hayek, Friedrich, ‘The use of knowledge in society’, The American Economic 
Review XXXV:4 (1945): 519-530. 
Howells, Geraint, ‘The potential and limits of consumer empowerment by 
information’, Journal of Law and Society 32:3 (2005): 349-370. 
Howells, Geraint, ‘The consumer credit litigation explosion’, The Law 
Quarterly Review 126 (2010): 617-644. 
Huckstep, Aron, ‘Payday lending: Do outrageous prices necessarily mean 
outrageous profits?’, Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 12:1 
(2007) 203-231. 
Jenkins, Jamie, ‘The labour market in the 1980s, 1990s and 2008/09 
recessions’, Economic & Labour Market Review 4:8 (2010): 29-36. 
Johnson, Paul, ‘Small debts and economic distress in England and Wales, 
1857-1913’, The Economic History Review 46:1 (1993): 65-87. 
Johnson, Paul, ‘Market discipline in Victorian Britain’, London School of 
Economics working paper 06/05 (2005): 1-32. 
Labat, Alyssa and Walter Brock, ‘Money does not grow on trees: An argument 
for usury’, Journal of Business Ethics 106:3 (2012): 383-387. 
Laybourn, Keith, Book review ‘Working class credit and community since 
1918 by Avram Taylor’, The American Historical Review 108:5 (2003): 
1527-1528. 
Lee, Jinkook and Jeanne Hogarth, ‘The price of money: Consumers’ 
understanding of APRs and contract interest rates’, Journal of Public 
Policy & Marketing 18:1 (1999): 66-76. 
Leyshon, Andrew and Nigel Thrift, ‘The restructuring of the UK financial 
services industry in the 1990s: A reversal of fortune?’, Journal of Rural 
Studies 9:3 (1993): 223-241. 
Leyshon, Andrew and Nigel Thrift, ‘Geographies of financial exclusion: 
Financial abandonment in Britain and the United States’, Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers 20 (2005): 312-341. 
Lim, Ghee-Soon, ‘Pawnbroking in Singapore’, Asian Case Research Journal 
5:2 (2001): 251-270. 
Lim, Youngee et al., ‘Payday loan use and consumer well-being: What 
consumers and social workers need to know about payday loans’, 
Journal of Poverty 18:4 (2014), 379-398. 
Lindgren, Kevin, ‘The Consumer Credit Act 1974: Its scope’, The Modern Law 
Review 40 (1977): 159-173. 
Lomincka, Eva, ‘The future of consumer credit regulation’, Contemporary 
Issues in Law 7:2 (2005): 184-210. 
Marron, Donncha, ‘Governing poverty in a neoliberal age: New Labour and 
the case of financial exclusion’, New Political Economy 18:6 (2013): 785-
810. 
Martin, Nathalie, ‘1,000% interest-good while supplies last: A study of payday 
loan practices and solutions’, Arizona Law Review 52:3 (2010): 563-622. 
Mayer, Robert, ‘Loan sharks, interest-rap caps, and deregulation’, 
Washington and Lee Law Review 69:2 (2012): 807-848. 
  
314 
McKibbin, Ross, ‘Working-class gambling in Britain 1880-1939’, Past and 
Present 82:1 (1979): 147-178. 
Minkes, Aron, ‘The decline of pawnbroking’, Economica 20 (1953): 10-23. 
Oeltjen, Jarret, ‘Pawnbroking on parade’, Buffalo Law Review 37:751 (1989): 
751-788. 
Oeltjen, Jarret, ‘Pawnbroking: An historical, comparative perspective’, Arizona 
Journal of International and Comparative Review 8:1 (1991): 53-74. 
Peterson, Christopher, ‘Truth, understanding, and high-cost consumer credit: 
The historical context of Truth in Lending Act’, Florida Law Review 55 
(2003): 807-903. 
Pinker, Robert, ‘Social policy and social justice’, Journal of Social Policy 3:1 
(1974): 1-19. 
Prabhakar, Rajiv, ‘Asset-based welfare: Financialisation or financial 
inclusion?’, Critical Social Policy, 33:4 (2013): 658–678. 
Ramsey, Ian, ‘To heap distress upon distress? Comparative reflections on 
interest-rate ceilings’, The University of Toronto Law Journal 60:2 (2010): 
707-730. 
Rubin, Gerry. ‘From packman, tallymen, and “perambulating Scotchmen” to 
Credit Drapers’ Association, 1840-1914’, Business History Review 28:9 
(1986): 206-233.  
Scott, Peter, ‘The twilight world of interwar British hire purchase,’ Economic 
History Review 56:2 (2003): 195-225. 
Serpell, Andrew, ‘Protecting the desperate: The regulation of payday lending’, 
The Federal Law Review 43 (2015): 147-176. 
Sheen, Na, ‘Consumer rationality/irrationality and financial literacy in the credit 
card market: Implications from an integrative review’, Journal of Financial 
Services Marketing 19:1 (2014): 29-42. 
Shefrin, Hersh and Meir Statman, ‘Ethics, fairness and efficiency in financial 
markets’, Financial Analysts Journal November-December (1993): 21-
29. 
Skiba, Paige and Jeremy Tobacman, ‘Do payday loans cause bankruptcy?’, 
Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper 11-13 (2011): 1-32. 
Skiba, Paige and Jeremy Tobacman, ‘The profitability of payday loans’, Yale 
Law School working paper (2007): 1-14. 
Sloman, Peter, ‘The pragmatist’s solution to poverty: The Heath government 
tax’s credit scheme and the politics of social policy in the 1970s’, 
Twentieth Century British History 27:2 (2016): 220-241. 
Smith, Harold, Book review ‘Making ends meet: Pawnbroking and working-
class credit by Melanie Tebbutt’, Journal of Economic History 44:3 
(1983): 856-857. 
Staten, Michael and Robert Johnson, ‘Case for deregulating interest rates on 
consumer credit’, Credit Research Center, Purdue University, Indiana 
(1995): 1-60. 
  
315 
Stegman, Michael and Robert Faris, ‘Payday lending: A business model that 
encourages chronic borrowing’, Economic Development Quarterly 17:1 
(2008): 8-32. 
Stoianovici, Petru and Michael Maloney, ‘Restrictions on credit: A public policy 
analysis of payday lending’, Clemson University, South Carolina (2008). 
Taylor, Andrew, ‘Stanley Baldwin, heresthetics and the realignment of British 
politics’, British Journal of Political Sciences 35/3 (2005): 429-463. 
Thompson, Paul, Book review ‘Making ends meet: Pawnbroking and working-
class credit’, The American Historical Review 89:2 (1984): 433-434. 
Vesselitsky, V. and M. Bulkley, ‘Money-lending among the London poor’, 
Sociological Review 9 (1917): 129-138. 
Wilson, Bart et al., ‘An experimental analysis of the demand for payday loans’, 
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 10:1 (2010): 1-27. 
Zinman, Jonathan, ‘Restricting consumer credit access: Household survey 
evidence on effects around the Oregon rate cap’, Journal of Banking & 
Finance 34:3 (2010): 546-556. 
 
 
Theses 
 
Brown, Sarah, ‘Consumer credit and over-indebtedness: The Parliament 
response: Past, present and future’, Unpublished PhD thesis, University 
of Leeds School of Law (2006). 
Egginton, Heidi, ‘Popular antique collecting and the second-hand trade in 
Britain’, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge (2016). 
Fleming, Anne, ‘City of debtors: Law, loan sharks, and the shadow economy 
of urban poverty, 1900-1970’, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Pennsylvania (2014). Abstract: ProQuest AAI3670898. 
 
 
